From Patterns To Prosperity: A Review Of Rachlin’s The Science Of Self-control.

The Science of Self‐Control (Rachlin, 2000) presents a clear overview of research and theory on self‐control, emphasizing important recent research by Rachlin and his students on temporally extended behavioral patterning as an aid to curbing impulsive decisions. We found the book well suited as a textbook in a graduate seminar on self‐control, particularly because it lucidly presents several provocative ideas about self‐control, decision making, addiction, and general theories of behavior. Of particular interest are his discussion of the “primrose path” to addiction and his behavioral research on the “prisoner's dilemma” as it relates to self‐control. Although we take some issue with teleological behaviorism, the theory of behavior advocated by Rachlin, we recommend this book to anyone interested in self‐control.     

Rational Thought And Rational Behavior: A Review Of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.

Standard economic theory says that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions and then to select the one with the highest weight. Such a procedure would maximize subjective expected utility. But, because of constraints on time and available information, people and other animals often bypass this process by using “fast and frugal” heuristics to make decisions. Rationality is thus said to be “bounded” by time and information constraints. The articles in this book describe and organize common heuristics. They show that use of such heuristics is generally the best approach to many real world problems and therefore not irrational. Heuristics evolved, they say, not as deviations from rationality but as aids to rationality in cases where the standard model would have proved to be too slow or inefficient. Although the approach of almost all of the authors of these papers is that of cognitive psychology—a focus on internal cognitive mechanisms—their findings and even their theories may be interpreted in terms of reinforcement and punishment acting on behavioral patterns.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

如何用行为经济学应对不确定性：拓展有效助推的范围

本文提出了决策中不确定性的五种类型及其行为学和心理学的应对机制：用简捷启发式替代加权求和应对信息不确定性, 用直觉应对认知不确定性, 用价值观预测选择偏好应对行为不确定性, 用决策参照点的权重替代概率应对结果不确定性, 用时间换时间以降低延迟折扣应对未来不确定性。新行为经济学应当通过“为什么”的功能性分析, 找到行为助推的心理杠杆。化解不确定性本身就是一种有效的行为助推; 化繁为简是行为助推的关键所在。     

Thinking Morality Interpersonally: A Reply to Burgess-Jackson

In a comment on my paper “Feminism, Ethics, and the Question of Theory” ( Walker 1992 ), Keith Burgess-Jackson argues that I have misdiagnosed the problem with modem moral theory. Burgess-Jackson misunderstands both the illustrative—“theoretical-juridical”—model I constructed there and how my critique and alternative model answer to specifically feminist concerns. Ironically, his own view seems to reproduce the very conception of morality as an individually internalized action-guiding code of principles that my earlier essay argued is the conception central to modern moral theories.     

Contexts,Polarities, and Pluralism. Discussion of Slochower’s “Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess”

In her searching paper “Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess,” (this issue) Slochower finds the potential for excess as inherent in any psychoanalytic theory. I argue that context is key in understanding this phenomenon within relational psychoanalysis; what she describes may not be the case for other theories. The beginnings of relational theory as a movement, generational and radical, could lead to therapeutic overconfidence or certainty around countertransference insights and disclosures. Slochower sees an abundance of certainty in this stance, as well as pressure for premature mutuality. As a complement or balance to this intense mode of interpersonal engagement, Slochower elaborates her own work on holding, wherein the analyst “brackets” her experience and respects the patient’s need for privacy and nonimpingement. Uncertainty is an affirmative stance in letting the patient’s inner life come into being. There are a number of polarities in Slochower’s paper—between mutuality and privacy, certainty and uncertainty, and in the origin story of relational psychoanalysis between relational and classical theories. I argue that pluralism offers a path forward from polarities to a rich complex world of multiple possibilities and recognition of different minds and theories.     

Tropes or Universals: How (Not) to Make One's Choice

This article discusses a familiar version of trope theory as opposed to a familiar version of the theory of universals, examining how these two rivals address the problem of “attribute agreement”—a problem that has been at the root of the very reason for developing these theories in the first place. The article shows that there is not much of a difference between the ways these two theories handle the problem, and in a more general way it argues that there is little reason for preferring one theory over the other. It is not interested in this claim only for the sake of the debate between trope theory and the theory of universals. Indeed, the reasons why it claims that it is so difficult to choose one theory over the other can be applied to other cases as well (where they might lead to claims of metaphysical equivalence).     

The Sacredness of Individuality: Introspection for Refuting States of Total Conviction in Boys and Men

This article offers an introspective meditation on what William James described as the “fallible utility” of introspection, promoted here especially for countering experiences of shame, self-loathing, and melancholia—what Adam Phillips calls states of “total conviction”—in boys and men. The article draws on narratives from James’s and the author’s own youthful struggles and from James’s “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,” an essay he believed best captured “the perception on which [his] whole individualistic philosophy is based.” It urges boys and men to attempt, against considerable odds, to practice a more generous self-acceptance, particularly of forbidden homoerotic interests, as their path to greater tolerance of idiosyncratic others.     

Theories of mind in infancy

This paper reviews and evaluates various theories of the origins of theory of mind in infancy. In what a theory of mind consists is first considered. It is argued that any theory of mind has two important features. Firstly, a theory of mind recognizes, at least, the existence of psychological relations between agents and objects, including some relations which involve “action at a distance”. Secondly, in a theory of mind, self and other are equivalent in that both can act equally as agents of psychological relations. Any theory of the development of theory of mind must explicate how it is possible to acquire an understanding of these two features. With this requirement in mind, four main types of recent theories are considered — modularity theories, Piagetian theories, matching theories, and intersubjectivity theories. While no decision is made amongst these theories, suggestions for further improvement in theorizing on this topic are presented.     

Multiple Identities and the Integration of Personality

ABSTRACT Life-history interviews show narrators to shift among multiple, often contradictory self-representations. This article outlines a model that accounts for how a relatively small set of self-symbols and metaphors can form a grammar-like system that simultaneously defines and integrates multiple identities. Drawing on generative theories from linguistics, anthropology, and music, the model proposes that this system provides a unitary deep structure that can be configured in various arrangements to yield multiple surface structures. Each “surface” identity constructs an individual's emotions and social relations–and what he or she accepts as “Me” and rejects as “not-Me”—into a distinct pattern, with identity per se appearing as a dialogic or fugue-like structure of opposed voices. Study-of-lives interviews conducted by the author in urban America and rural Morocco are used to present the model and to demonstrate the pivotal role played by multistable or “structurally ambiguous” symbols in anchoring reversible self-representations which integrate personality as a system of organized contradiction. The musical analogy is emphasized in order to build a bridge toward current research in cognitive science and toward efforts to formulate a “state integration” theory of personality development.     

Building on Wachtel’s Points About Implications of Mitchell’s Ideas: Suggestions Based on the Participatory Philosophical Perspective for Locating the Person in the World of Practical Activities

In his paper “The Relationality of Everyday Life,” Wachtel (this issue) successfully moves us further along the path of the “unfinished journey” (p. 509) of Mitchell’s work. I begin my comments by pointing out how Wachtel identifies the importance for both theory and practice of focusing on everyday life in addition to early parent–child interactions and what transpires in psychoanalytic/psychotherapy sessions. His points about everyday life include rejecting one-person notions of internal processes that are “frozen” in time and offering a way to understand the vicious circles that are a prominent part of most clinical problems. My comments also include suggestions about how we can take another step along the path Wachtel has encouraged us to pursue—which he aptly describes as treating the person as a “self-in-context” (p. 507)—if we approach basic issues about the person’s relationship to others and the world at large along the lines of the participatory philosophical perspective (e.g., Westerman, 2005, 2013, 2014; Westerman & Steen, 2007). That perspective takes as its cornerstone idea the view that from the outset the person is a participant in practical activities. Guided by the participatory perspective, I add to Wachtel’s suggestions about how a focus on everyday life can enter into therapeutic work; present a different view of what are typically called “inner” processes and discuss some of the implications of that view for clinical work; and, most important, put forward an alternative account of vicious circles.     

ALTRUISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

This essay addresses recent claims about the compatibility of the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism with standard Western formulations of the Golden Rule. Derek Parfit claims that the theory of reciprocal altruism teaches us to be “reciprocal altruists,” who benefit only those people from whom we can reasonably expect benefits in the future. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, teaches us to benefit anyone regardless of their intention or ability to return the favor, or as Parfit puts it, the Golden Rule teaches us to be “suckers.” I argue that this distinction is founded on a misconception of the nature of the theory of reciprocal altruism, which is sociobiological as opposed to moral, and that this distinction accordingly confuses is with ought. Sociobiological theories may explain underlying psychological motivations in individuals (and perhaps even in populations), but these theories do not prescribe any sort of moral behavior. Furthermore, the theory of reciprocal altruism does not imply mental states of which agents are aware. The unconscious motivations assumed by this theory are in fact compatible with certain formulations of the Golden Rule; I will accordingly argue for the view that certain words with moral content related to the Golden Rule—such as “altruism” and “selfishness”—exist only insofar as they are social tools, which can further the self‐interests of an individual in any group.     

The re-emergence of emergence,and the causal role of synergy in emergent evolution

Despite its current popularity, “emergence” is a concept with a venerable history and an elusive, ambiguous standing in contemporary evolutionary theory. This paper briefly recounts the history of the term and details some of its current usages. Not only are there radically varying interpretations about how to define emergence but “reductionist” and “holistic” theorists hold very different views about the issue of causation. However, these two seemingly polar positions are not irreconcilable. Reductionism, or detailed analysis of the parts and their interactions, is essential for answering the “how” question in evolution—how does a complex living system work? But holism is equally necessary for answering the “why” question—why did a particular arrangement of parts evolve? In order to answer the “why” question, a broader, multi-leveled paradigm is required. The reductionist approach to explaining emergent complexity has entailed a search for underlying “laws of emergence.” In contrast, the “Synergism Hypothesis” focuses on the “economics”—the functional effects produced by emergent wholes and their selective consequences in evolutionary change. This paper also argues that emergent phenomena represent, in effect, a subset of a larger universe of cooperative, synergistic effects in the natural world.     

Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study

Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first‐order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to Bernard Williams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. The article uses this case study to highlight the role of methodological conservatism in contemporary metaethics more generally.     

Explanation and Manipulation1

I argue that manipulationist theories of causation fail as accounts of causal structure, and thereby as theories of “actual causation” and causal explanation. I focus on two kinds of problem cases, which I call “Perceived Abnormality Cases” and “Ontological Dependence Cases.” The cases illustrate that basic facts about social systems—that individuals are sensitive to perceived abnormal conditions and that certain actions metaphysically depend on institutional rules—pose a challenge for manipulationist theories and for counterfactual theories more generally. I then show how law‐based accounts of causal structure can answer such challenges. The moral of the story is that the basic manipulationist idea that our interest in causal structure is driven by our interest in manipulating our environment faces decisive problems in a central domain of application, the social sciences.     

Reaction to Mortality: An Interdisciplinary Organizing Principle for the Human Sciences

Ernest Becker's theory about death denial is one example of depth psychological theory. Because very important features of Becker's theory have now successfully and singularly met the rigorous empirical testing of Terror Management Theory (TMT), it must be concluded that the theory of death denial stands apart from and above alternative depth psychological theories in explaining human behavioral and attitudinal motivation. Nevertheless, TMT only touches the surface of Becker's theory in the round. This essay looks at how Becker's wider theories of death denial are applied to (1) personal psychological, (2) social psychological, (3) political, and (4) spiritual aspects of human experience and suggests that what Becker has given us is an organizing principle, a theory of considerable integrative, explanatory, and interpretive power, for a broadly interdisciplinary social science of human behavior.     

The semantics of personality in Russian “subjective sociology”

The article is devoted to the “subjective method” and the role of value preferences, as underscored in Russian proto-sociology, developed by the populists in discussions with the “ethical Marxism,” on the one hand, and with positivists, on the other. The main issue—how was the apologia of individual in these studies connected to the ideals of social development?—leads to the question, whether such ideals could be based on an inborn moral law or “universal good” in the spirit of empirical-positivist theories. Is the use of ethical categories in scientific knowledge admissible in principle, and if so, to what degree? How should the measure of subjectivity in historical or sociological studies be “regulated,” and are there universally binding solutions to these problems?     

Rules as the Impetus of Cultural Evolution

In this paper I put forward a thesis regarding the anatomy of “cultural evolution”, in particular the way the “cultural” transmission of behavioral patterns came to piggyback, through us humans, on the transmission effected by genetic evolution. I claim that what grounds and supports this new kind of transmission is a complex behavioral “meta-pattern” that makes it possible to grasp a pattern as something that “ought to be”, i.e. that transforms the pattern into what we can call a rule. (Here I draw especially on the philosophical insights of Wilfrid Sellars.) In this way I interlink empirical research done in evolution theory with some more speculative philosophical theories, thus shedding new light on the former and adding an empirical footing to the latter.