共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Jeff McMahan 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):23-41
This paper argues that certain central tenets of the traditional theory of the just war cannot be correct. It then advances an alternative account grounded in the same considerations of justice that govern self-defense at the individual level. The implications of this account are unorthodox. It implies that, with few exceptions, combatants who fight for an unjust cause act impermissibly when they attack enemy combatants, and that combatants who fight in a just war may, in certain circumstances, legitimately target noncombatants who bear a significant degree of moral responsibility for a wrong, when the prevention or rectification of that wrong constitutes a just cause for war.
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Jeff McMahanEmail: |
2.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
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John Martin FischerEmail: |
3.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
4.
Varelius J 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):39-50
It has been suggested that, in addition to individual level decision-making, informed consent procedures could be used in
collective decision-making too. One of the main criticisms directed at this suggestion concerns decision-making power. It
is maintained that consent is a veto power concept and that, as such, it is not appropriate for collective decision-making.
This paper examines this objection to collective informed consent. It argues that veto power informed consent can have some
uses in the collective level and that when it is not appropriate the decision power a concerned party ought to have in connection
with an arrangement should be made relative to the interest she has at stake in it. It concludes that the objection examined
does not undermine collective informed consent.
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Jukka VareliusEmail: |
5.
Joke Bruinsma-de Beer 《Pastoral Psychology》2006,55(2):167-174
In this article the author discusses the differences between pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. She clarifies the specific identity of pastoral care on the basis of Henning Luther’s theology. He distinguishes different anthropological presuppositions in pastoral care and psycho-social therapy. Consequently, she demonstrates the relevancy of Luther’s theology for today’s Practical Theology.
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Joke Bruinsma-de BeerEmail: |
6.
Waelbers K 《Science and engineering ethics》2009,15(1):51-68
This article defends three interconnected premises that together demand for a new way of dealing with moral responsibility
in developing and using technological artifacts. The first premise is that humans increasingly make use of dissociated technological
delegation. Second, because technologies do not simply fulfill our actions, but rather mediate them, the initial aims alter
and outcomes are often different from those intended. Third, since the outcomes are often unforeseen and unintended, we can
no longer simply apply the traditional (modernist) models for discussing moral responsibility. We need to reinterpret moral
responsibility. A schematic layout of a model on Social Role-Responsibility that incorporates these three premises is presented
to allow discussion of a new way of interpreting moral responsibility.
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Katinka WaelbersEmail: |
7.
A Critique of Frankfurt-Libertarianism 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Kevin Timpe 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):189-202
Most libertarians think that some version of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is true. A number of libertarians, which I call ‘Frankfurt-libertarians,’ think that they need not embrace any version of PAP. In this paper, I examine the writings of one such Frankfurt-libertarian, Eleonore Stump, for her evaluation of the impact of Frankfurt-style counterexamples (FSCs) to PAP. I show how, contrary to her own claims, Stump does need a PAP-like principle for her account of free action. I briefly argue that this discussion also goes some distance to showing that any Frankfurt-libertarian is in a similar position regarding the need for some PAP-like principle. If I am correct, then Frankfurt-libertarians must either renounce their incompatibilism or concede that FSCs fail to show all PAP-like principles to be false.
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Kevin TimpeEmail: |
8.
Mark Siderits 《Sophia》2008,47(1):29-42
Paleo-compatibilism is the view that the freedom required for moral responsibility is not incompatible with determinism about
the factors relevant to moral assessment, since the claim that we are free and the claim that the psychophysical elements
are causally determined are true in distinct and incommensurable ways. This is to be accounted for by appealing to the distinction
between conventional truth and ultimate truth developed by Buddhist Reductionists. Paleo-compatibilists hold that the illusion
of incompatibilism only arises when we illegitimately mix two distinct vocabularies, one concerned with persons, the other
concerned with the parts to which persons are reducible. I explore the view, its roots in Buddhist Reductionism, and its prospects.
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Mark SideritsEmail: |
9.
Chris Cuomo 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):75-85
Richard Mohr emphasizes the importance of dispelling false beliefs about lesbians and gay men, and establishing legislation
that protects the rights of sexual minorities. He argues that homophobic policies originate in the belief that gay men and
lesbians are categorically less morally valuable than others, rather than deserving of unequal treatment because of their
behaviors or actions. In response, I show that homophobic panic over lesbian or gay sex acts is actually quite influential,
and argue that Mohr fails to take account of the political and philosophical significance of sexual freedom, and the inextricability
of sexual being and sexual doing.
相似文献
Chris CuomoEmail: |
10.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
11.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(1):127-136
Ernest Sosa draws a distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge, and this distinction forms the centerpiece
of his new book, A Virtue Epistemology. This paper argues that the distinction cannot do the work which Sosa assigns to it.
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Hilary KornblithEmail: |
12.
Jessica Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):397-405
In my remarks, I discuss Sosa's attempt to deal with the sceptical threat posed by dreaming. Sosa explores two replies to
the problem of dreaming scepticism. First, he argues that, on the imagination model of dreaming, dreaming does not threaten
the safety of our beliefs. Second, he argues that knowledge does not require safety, but a weaker condition which is not threatened
by dreaming skepticism. I raise questions about both elements of his reply.
相似文献
Jessica BrownEmail: |
13.
F. Allan Hanson 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(3):415-424
Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism’s explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions
of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described
as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for
action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility
to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.
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F. Allan HansonEmail: |
14.
Fariha Thomas 《Res Publica》2008,14(3):169-176
This response discusses Mookherjee’s views on plural autonomy and autonomy-promoting education, and her recognition that different
cultural value systems can lead to varied responses and strategies across cultures. It considers mechanisms to counter forced
marriage and argues from the standpoint of grassroots work within the Muslim community for the importance of the distinction
between traditional culture and religion. It raises the issues of racism, islamophobia, and stereotyping in silencing Muslim
women’s voices and reducing the space for them to argue for change within communities.
相似文献
Fariha ThomasEmail: |
15.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
16.
In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this
special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology,
connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.
相似文献
Bernd BuldtEmail: |
Benedikt L?we (Corresponding author)Email: |
Thomas MüllerEmail: |
17.
Context,content, and relativism 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Michael Glanzberg 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):1-29
This paper argues against relativism, focusing on relativism based on the semantics of predicates of personal taste. It presents
and defends a contextualist semantics for these predicates, derived from current work on gradable adjectives. It then considers
metasemantic questions about the kinds of contextual parameters this semantics requires. It argues they are not metasemantically
different from those in other gradable adjectives, and that contextual parameters of this sort are widespread in natural language.
Furthermore, this paper shows that if such parameters are rejected, it leads to an unacceptably rampant form of relativism,
that relativizes truth to an open-ended list of parameters.
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Michael GlanzbergEmail: |
18.
Sharon Cowan 《Res Publica》2008,14(3):193-201
This paper argues that Article 8 of the ECHR, as applied to the protection of a person’s right to wear a headscarf, is an
inappropriate locus for thrashing out arguments about the right to protection of religious freedom, and that Article 9 allows
for a broader legal and political analysis of the multiple meanings and impacts of religion in our lives. However, the law
should not prohibit women from wearing the headscarf. Legal regulation of the headscarf should be replaced with robust political
debate about the many diverse and intersecting ways in which it is possible to experience womanhood, sexuality, culture, religion,
race, nationality and economic security in the twenty-first century.
相似文献
Sharon CowanEmail: |
19.
Craig Reeves 《Res Publica》2009,15(2):137-164
In Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt struggled to defend the possibility of judgment against the obvious problems encountered in attempts to offer
legally valid and morally meaningful judgments of those who had committed crimes in morally bankrupt communities. Following
Norrie, this article argues that Arendt’s conclusions in Eichmann are equivocal and incoherent. Exploring her perspectival
theory of judgment, the article suggests that Arendt remains trapped within certain Kantian assumptions in her philosophy
of history, and as such sees the question of freedom in a binary way. The article argues that Adorno’s philosophy of freedom
provides the resources to diagnose and overcome Arendt’s shortcomings. Adorno’s position provides a way of embracing the antinomical
character of judgment, by emphasising the need for elements of reason and nature in the phenomenon of freedom. In Adorno’s
lights, judgment becomes an attempt to express a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the tragic status of the potentially free but
actually unfree subject of modernity.
相似文献
Craig ReevesEmail: |
20.
Obstetric Ultrasound and the Technological Mediation of Morality: A Postphenomenological Analysis 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Peter-Paul Verbeek 《Human Studies》2008,31(1):11-26
This article analyzes the moral relevance of technological artifacts and its possible role in ethical theory, by taking the
postphenomenological approach that has developed around the work of Don Ihde into the domain of ethics. By elaborating a postphenomenological
analysis of the mediating role of ultrasound in moral decisions about abortion, the article argues that technologies embody
morality and help to constitute moral subjectivity. This technological mediation of the moral subject is subsequently addressed
in terms of Michel Foucault’s ethical position, in which ethics is about actively co-shaping one’s moral subjectivity. Integrating
Foucauldian ethics and postphenomenology, the article argues that the technological mediation of moral subjectivity should
be at the heart of an ethical approach that takes the moral dimensions of technology seriously.
相似文献
Peter-Paul VerbeekEmail: |