Conditional reflexes as related to hypnosis and hypnotic techniques

Hypnosis has never been adequately explained in terms of conceptual framework of most schools of psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic concept that it consists of submission and surrender of important ego functions to the therapist does not explain all observed facts. During my wartime studies and since, I have been impressed by the observation that the patient’s ego is by no means powerless and defenseless, even during a deep state of trance, i.e., in states of trance sufficiently deep to eliminate awareness of painful body injuries (1965). Erickson (1954) has shown on many occasions that in resistant subjects one of the best ways to induce trance is to encourage the patient to resist as much as he can. Haley (1963) has pointed out in detail that at the beginning of any hypnotic relationship there evolves a subtle battle for“one-upman-ship. ” These observations certainly show that surrender in the psychological sense is by no means an aspect of even the most successfully induced trance states. By contrast to these excessively simple psychotherapeutic models, Pavlovian physiology (Pavlov, 1941) explains most of the variegated phenomena of the trance and of the particular psychological set which hypnotic psychotherapy provides. Pavlov (1941) concluded from his studies in the dog that“hypnosis can be produced by the continuation of one and the same stimulus, finally resulting in an inhibitory state” (p. 75) irrespective of the nature of this stimulus. In man it is quite obvious that it is the monotony and repetitiveness of the hypnotist’s discourse and the unchanging sameness of the setting and of the position of the patient which is the most convenient way to induce trance. Also Helge Lundholm’s method (1942) of deepening hypnosis by counting is explainable by this important and simple finding of Pavlov.     

Schilder and Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity

In the late 1920s, the Viennese psychoanalyst Paul Schilder, after performing a conditioning experiment with human subjects, criticized I. P. Pavlov’s concept of “experimental neurosis.” Schilder maintained that subjective reports by conditioned human subjects were more informative than the objectively observed behavior of conditioned dogs. In 1932, Pavlov published a rejoinder to Schilder’s critique in theJournal of the American Medical Association. Pavlov maintained that Schilder misunderstood the value and implications of the scientific, objective method in the study of experimental neurosis. In 1934, Schilder subjected Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity to an incisive critique in a 1935 article inImago. Schilder objected to Pavlov’s narrow, reductionist conceptualization of the conditional reflex. Schilder reiterated his view that the psychological, subjective explanation of the conditional reflex is preferable to the physiological, objective explanation, and that the inference of cortical phenomena from experimental findings might be improper. Neither Pavlov nor any of his disciples replied to Schilder. The author provides an apology for the Pavlovian position, suggesting that Schilder was unfamiliar with early and late writings of Pavlov.     

Pavlovvs. Köhler

During the 1920s, I. P. Pavlov’s scholarly interests broadened to consider problem-solving. Distrusting Wolfgang Köhler’s Gestalt explanation of the problemsolving process and its interspecies aspects, Pavlov performed, from 1933 to 1936, a number of experiments, including a replication of Köhler’s building experiment, using chimpanzees as subjects. Confirming Köhler’s findings, Pavlov explained the problemsolving process in terms of unconditional reflexes and the establishment, by Pavlovian conditioning and the Thorndikian method of trial and error, of temporary neural connections identical, on the psychological level, to associations. In contrast to Köhler’s “structural” explanation, Pavlov emphasized the processes of analysis and synthesis. According to Pavlov insight is achieved progressively—as the result of the organism’s problem-solving behavior—contradicting Köhler’s thesis of a sudden subjective reorganization of the environmental situation. Pavlov explained interspecies differences among higher organisms in terms of the range of a species behavior, with the second signal system as the main distinguishing characteristic between human and nonhuman species.     

The second signal system as conceived by Pavlov and his disciples

Pavlov clearly formulated his ideas on thesecond signal system (specifically, language) in the 1930s. This occurred in conjunction with his interest in interspecies differences and in the study of human neuroses. Pavlov proposed that conditional reflexes signal concrete reality while symbolic-language provides abstractions of reality. Phylogenetically, language emerged in the humans because this form of communication had survival value to the species. Pavlov’s disciples L. A. Orbeli and N. I. Krasnogorskii had considered the ontogenetic development of language. The experimental investigation of A. G. Ivanov-Smolenskii extended Pavlov’s empirical study of the function of language in psychopathology. Notwithstanding a sustained interest in language, Pavlov did not develop a theory of language acquisition based upon the conditioning principle. Pavlov’s conceptualization of language may not have been original, nor did it contribute significantly to modern linguistics. It is now mainly of historical interest. It was, nevertheless, important to the conceptualization of neuroses within the context of the theory of higher nervous activity and it had far-reaching political implications for Soviet psychology in the immediate post-World War II period.     

Pavlov and the concept of association

I. P. Pavlov was profoundly influenced during his youth by the writings of D. I. Pisarev and I. M. Sechenov. Sechenov explained the voluntary act in terms of the formation of associations among sensory impressions and motor responses. Apparently under Pisarev’s influence, Pavlov studied the physiology of the circulatory and digestive systems. In explaining the formation of the conditional reflex (CR), Pavlov rejected the Wundtian, anthropomorphic conceptualization of CR as suggested by A. T. Snarskii. However, using the objective CR method, the Pavlovians experimentally investigated the formation in the cortex of neural connections, which were equated with associations.     

Interaction of dominant focus and conditional reflex as a functional unit of behavior organization

The interaction of two fundamental phenomena—the dominant focus and the conditional reflex—discovered and introduced by A. A. Ukhtomsky and I. P. Pavlov lay at the basis of behavior. According to E. A. Asratyan, the backward conditioned connection is a specialized dominant focus in the functional structure of the consolidated conditional reflex. It makes the behavior goal-directed and active. The dominant focus and conditioned reflex play the same role in the adaptive behavior of the individual as does variability and selection in the process of evolutional adaptation. That is why it is impossible to agree with Popper and Eccles that hypothesis theory has to replace Pavlov’s theory of the conditional reflex. Imprinting and psychonervous activity by images (I. S. Beritashvili) are two special exemplars of conditional reflexes after one coincidence. The so-called “elementary reasoning activity of animals” (according to L. V. Krushinsky) is a kind of the instinctive inherited behavior.     

Pavlov and the mind-body problem

I. P. Pavlov claimed that the mind-body problem would ultimately be resolved by empirical methods, rather than by rational arguments. A committed monist, Pavlov was confronted by dualism in the case of an hysterical person. Under normal conditions, her body's left side was insensitive to pain, but when she was hypnotized, there was a reversal of her sensitivity to pain, with the right side becoming insensitive. Pavlov acknowledged that the divergence between stimulation and response suggested dualism, yet condemned his disciple G.P. Zelenyî as well as Charles S. Sherrington, for their dualistic tendencies. Pavlov's continuous adherence to monism is attributed to the influence of popular scientific books that he read during his adolescence. The books maintained that science was based upon monism. Pavlov proposed that by introducing the concept of emotions, an hysterical person's condition could be explained within the framework of his theory of higher nervous activity, thereby obviating the need to change his paradigm.     

I.P. Pavlov vs. N.I. Bukharin: The critical mind and the arrogance of power

In 1923, Pavlov criticized the Marxist theses and the policy of the Soviet regime. In 1924, N.I. Bukharin, a Marxist theoretician and member of the Soviet government, responded to Pavlov’s passionate speech with a sarcastic diatribe. I suggest that Pavlov’s speech and Bukharin’s article represent a conflict between a scientist critical of the Marxist pseudotheory and a journalist’s abusive response to the realization that his theory was without much merit.     

The role of inhibition in neurotic behavior

Neurotic behavior is explained according to the theory of Pavlov as collision between excitation and inhibition. This internal inhibition imposes a burden on the nervous system. The stress can be relieved by what Pavlov called external inhibition, which is actually excitation of another activity. This principle is applied to the human being in explaining the interaction between nervous centers, the advantage of voluntary self-discipline over imposed discipline. Rioting and social unrest is explained in the terms of conflict between excitation and inhibition.     

Pavlov as a psychologist

American psychologists are informed on Pavlov’s work on conditional reflexes but not on the full development of his theory of higher nervous activity. This article shows that Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity dealt with concepts that concerned contemporary psychologists. Pavlov used the conditioning of the salivary reflex for methodological purposes. Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity encompassed overt behavior, neural processes, and the conscious experience. The strong Darwinian element of Pavlov’s theory, with its stress on the higher organisms’ adaptation, is described. With regard to learning, Pavlov, at the end of his scholarly career, proposed that although all learning involves the formation of associations, the organism’s adaptation to the environment is established through conditioning, but the accumulation of knowledge is established by trial and error.     

Pavlov's view of the inheritance of acquired characteristics as it relates to theses concerning scientific change

Pavlov's position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics was used to test selected theses of Laudan et al. (1986) concerning scientific change. It was determined that, despite negative experimental findings, Pavlov continued to accept the possibility of the inheritance of acquired habits. This confirms the main thesis I that, once accepted, theories persist despite negative experimental evidence. Pavolv's adherence to the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics might possibly be explained by his early experiences. Adolescent readings of a popularized version of Darwin's theory, which included the concept of inheritance of acquired characteristics, profoundly influenced Pavlov's subsequent intellectual life. Overwhelmed by the theory, as originally presented, Pavlov was unable to alter his views in light of contrary findings.     

Pavlov’s position toward konorski and miller’s distinction between pavlovian and motor conditioning paradigms

Two Warsaw medical students, Jerzy Konorski and Stefan Miller, having read I. P. Pavlov’s works on conditional reflexes, informed him in a 1928 letter that they had discovered a new type of conditioning. A previously neutral stimulus preceded the passive lifting of a dog’s paw which then was followed by feeding; this stimulus then evoked the spontaneous raising of that paw. Pavlov responded informing them that their conditioning of motor responses expanded his theory of higher nervous activity, but that their conditioning paradigm—that they named CRII—did not differ fundamentally from the Pavlovian conditioning paradigm. The replication of the Warsaw experiment in Pavlov’s laboratory failed to provide unequivocal results. From 1931 to 1933, Konorski, working in Pavlov’s Leningrad laboratory, further explored the parameters of CRII. Pavlov insisted that the conditioning of motor movements differs from the conditioning of other sensory analyzers only in that, on the neural level, the motor analyzer is both afferent, that is, perceptive, and efferent, that is, responsive. Konorski was not convinced, and he subsequently maintained that the two conditioning paradigms were fundamentally different.     

Pavlov's position toward American behaviorism

Pavlov's development of the conditional reflex theory coincided with the rise of American behaviorism. Substituting an objective physiology for a subjective psychology, Pavlov saw in the rise of American behaviorism a clear confirmation of his method and theory. But in the early 1930s, Lashley attacked Pavlov's theory of specific cerebral localization of function, proposing instead the concept of an internal cerebral organization; Guthrie objected to Pavlov's centralist interpretation of conditioning, proposing instead a peripheralist interpretation; while Hull challenged Pavlov's theory of sleep and hypnosis as the manifestations of inhibition. Pavlov replied with critiques of Lashley's, Guthrie's, and Hull's views, and, convinced that Lashley and Guthrie misunderstood his position, repeated his method's and theory's basic propositions. Yet, Pavlov never gave up the expectation that American behaviorism would accept his conditional reflex theory and saw in Hunter's 1932 statements a support of his assumptions.     

Analysis of thought dissociation in schizophrenia on the basis of Wedensky-Pavlov phasic states

Clinical analysis shows that a fundamental element of though dissociation in schizophrenia is semantic and sound “derailments” of the associative processes. On a pathophysiological level these derailments could be explained through the parabiotic phasic states of Wedensky-Pavlov. In particular these derailments could be explained through the distortion of reciprocal relations between verbal structures by means of Pavlov’s ultraparadoxical phase, wherein the positive stimuli become negative and vice versa. The author assumes that in appropriate (adequate) circumstances one of the mechanisms by which the leading idea directs the associative process is the reciprocal inhibiting-facilitating relations between the verbal (and nonverbal) structures. In schizophrenia (which Pavlov considered as a chronic hypnotic phasic state) these inhibiting-facilitating relations are disorganized and the associative process reveals phasic disintegrative deviations. Therefore thought dissociation in schizophrenia, by the magnifying glass of the pathology, indicates that a reciprocal inhibiting-facilitating relation is a basic principle of functional organization not only on the lower levels of the nervous system, but also on its highest levels.     

Conditional reflexes as related to hypnosis and hypnotic techniques

Hypnosis has never been adequately explained in terms of conceptual framework of most schools of psychotherapy. The psychoanalytic concept that it consists of submission and surrender of important ego functions to the therapist does not explain all observed facts. During my wartime studies and since, I have been impressed by the observation that the patient’s ego is by no means powerless and defenseless, even during a deep state of trance, i.e., in states of trance sufficiently deep to eliminate awareness of painful body injuries (1965). Erickson (1954) has shown on many occasions that in resistant subjects one of the best ways to induce trance is to encourage the patient to resist as much as he can. Haley (1963) has pointed out in detail that at the beginning of any hypnotic relationship there evolves a subtle battle for “one-upmanship.” These observations certainly show that surrender in the psychological sense is by no means an aspect of even the most successfully induced trance states.     

Pavlov’s conceptualization of unconditional reflexes,or instincts,within the framework of the theory of higher nervous activity

According to I. P. Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity, the establishment and dissolution of conditional reflexes enhances the higher organism’s adaptation to the external environment. Pavlov asserted that, ontogenetically, conditional reflexes are based upon innate, unconditional reflexes (UR) or instincts. Pavlov did not distinguish between URs and instincts, but he preferred the former term. Phylogenetically the URs emerged out of well-established conditional reflexes during the development of higher organisms. An outgrowth of the experimental conditioning procedure, developed during the second decade of this century, was the observation and delineation of new URs. While studying human nervous and psychiatric disorders in the 1930s, Pavlov elucidated other URs. Pavlov identified 13 major URs, but he failed to formulate an exhaustive classification scheme of URs.     

The Pavlovian basis of reciprocal inhibition therapy

While there is a slight disagreement between Wolpe’s views and Pavlov’s statements concerning the application of experimental psychology to the study of psychiatry, Wolpe indicates that he owes much to Pavlov. A Pavlovian analysis of therapy by reciprocal inhibition, which includes the physiological constructs as well as Pavlovian methodology, will increase our understanding of Reciprocal Inhibition therapy. The major techniques of Reciprocal Inhibition therapy are discussed in the terms of Pavlovian method and theory. Desensitization based on systematic relaxation appears to be effective because the excitatory stimulus is presented when the subject’s cortex is predominantly in an inhibitory state while relaxed. Assertive training relies mainly on building up the excitatory process by use of the second signal system. Thought-stopping is analogous to the external inhibition procedure with the use of the second signaling system as the “extra” stimulus. Deductions from Pavlov’s typology predict that an excitable subject will be difficult to desensitize and somewhat easier to train in assertive behavior and thought-stopping. Some implications of relating Pavlovian method and theory to Reciprocal Inhibition therapy are discussed.     

I.P. Pavlov as a youth

Ivan P. Pavlov’s youthful relations with parents and siblings, formal education, and social activities in Riazan’ are described. The Pavlovs, a highly achievement-oriented family descending from a lowly serf, improved their social status by serving the Russian Orthodox Church. Pavlov, the son of a priest, studied in the 1860s at the Riazan’ Ecclesiastic Seminary for priesthood. The turbulent 1860s’ decade was a period of social and political reforms. Western ideas and science were introduced to Russia. The ambitious and idealistic I.P. Pavlov was influenced by popular essays written by the journalist D.I. Pisarev, the works of the German physiologist J. Moleschott, the English writer G.H. Lewes, the German zoologist C. Vogt and the physiologist M.I. Sechenov. Losing his religious faith, Pavlov abandoned the traditional goal of becoming a priest, and, convinced that science was a road to truth and progress, left Riazan’ to study natural science at the University of St. Petersburg.     

The ability to look into the future (Probabilistic Prognosis)

“The Ability to Look into the Future (Probabilistic Prognosis)” is a translation of chapter five of I. M. Feigenberg’sBrain, Mind and Health [Mozg, Psikhika, Zdorov’e], published by Nauka, Moscow, in 1972. The book deals with the psychophysiology of perception, affect, and memory, as well as certain psychopathological phenomena. The main theme of the book and the author’s research is probabilistic prognosis—the prediction of future events on the basis of the probabilistic structure of the past as stored in memory. In the present essay, Feigenberg develops the concept of probabilistic prognosis in an evolutionary context, linking it with the Pavlovian conditional reflex and orienting reactions, and illustrating how the theory can be applied to both animal and human behavior.     

Do We Need Two Notions of Constitution?

Traditionally, constitutionalists have offered just one notion of constitution to analyse the relation that an object, such as a statue or a chain, bears to the object/s from which it is made: let us say, a piece of marble in the first case or a piece of metal in the second. Robert Wilson proposes to differentiate two notions of constitution and, in this way, to offer constitutionalists a more varied range of metaphysical tools. To justify the introduction of the difference, he presents several phenomena and problems, the explanation of which would justify the distinction he makes. In this paper I argue that Wilson’s proposal would not increase the explanatory power of a theory of constitution as it has traditionally been understood, only its complexity. Increasing the complexity without increasing the explanatory power of a theory, I defend, goes against one, at least prima facie, basic theoretical virtue: parsimony. In my argumentation I crucially use, for the case of Wilson’s first three arguments, the existence of principles of existence?persistence, which constitutionalists, Wilson among them, usually accept. In arguing against Wilson’s fourth argument I use a slightly modified version of Lynne Rudder Baker’s theory of constitution.