Belief in Supernatural Evil and Mental Health: Do Secure Attachment to God and Gender Matter?

This study examines whether belief in supernatural evil is associated with mental health. In addition, it assesses how secure attachment to God moderates this association and how gender conditions the moderating effect of secure attachment to God. Among a variety of mental health outcomes, this study focuses on general mental health problems as well as anxiety-related disorders (e.g., general anxiety, social anxiety, and paranoia). Using data from the 2010 Baylor Religion Survey (N = 1,627), the analyses reveal that belief in supernatural evil is positively associated with general anxiety and paranoia. In addition, secure attachment to God buffers the positive associations between belief in supernatural evil and social anxiety and paranoia. Yet, when general mental health problems and general anxiety serve as the outcome measures, secure attachment to God attenuates the positive associations of belief in supernatural evil with mental health only for women, but not men. These results underscore the ways that religious beliefs have both positive and negative implications for mental health. Furthermore, they highlight the importance of gender in the complex relationships between religious beliefs and mental health.     

Postpartum Depression in Mothers and Fathers: The Role of Parenting Efficacy Expectations During the Transition to Parenthood

Research demonstrates that belief in one’s effectiveness as a parent (parenting efficacy) is linked to numerous positive outcomes for new parents. Conversely, the perceived inability to meet expectations is associated with negative mental health consequences for mothers and fathers. In the present paper we examine the impact of parenting efficacy expectations on the mental health statuses of new parents. Using three waves of data spanning from the prenatal period to the 4-months postpartum period from a sample of 150 first-time mothers and fathers in the Midwestern United States, we find that parenting efficacy is negatively associated with postpartum depression (PPD) for both mothers and fathers throughout the transition period. We also find that mothers and fathers whose parenting efficacy experiences were more negative than expected reported higher levels of PPD at 1-month postpartum. This effect dissipates for mothers, but not fathers, by 4-months postpartum, suggesting differences in the experiences of mothers and fathers during this transition. We conclude that research on the transition to parenthood should continue to include fathers in an effort to better understand the mental health consequences of becoming a parent for the first time, as well as enhance interventions designed to assist couples experiencing this important transition.     

Insight into the Parenthood Paradox: Mental Health Outcomes of Intensive Mothering

Though people often report wanting to have children because they think it will make them happier, much research suggests that parenting is associated with decreased well-being. Other studies have found that parenting is related to increased life satisfaction. The goal of this study was to provide insight into this paradox by investigating the relationship between a specific way of parenting, intensive parenting, and maternal mental health. An online survey was completed by 181 mothers with children ages 5 and under. Intensive mothering beliefs correlated with several negative mental health outcomes. Controlling for perceived family social support, the belief that women are the essential parent was related to lower life satisfaction and believing that parenting is challenging was related to greater depression and stress. The results of this study suggest that aspects of intensive mothering beliefs are detrimental to women’s mental health. It may not be parenting per se, but specific and particularly intensive ways of parenting, that relate to negative mental health outcomes.     

Aligning Spinoza with Descartes: An informed Cartesian account of the truth bias

There is a bias towards believing information is true rather than false. The Spinozan account claims there is an early, automatic bias towards believing. Only afterwards can people engage in an effortful re‐evaluation and disbelieve the information. Supporting this account, there is a greater bias towards believing information is true when under cognitive load. However, developing on the Adaptive Lie Detector (ALIED) theory, the informed Cartesian can equally explain this data. The account claims the bias under load is not evidence of automatic belief; rather, people are undecided, but if forced to guess they can rely on context information to make an informed judgement. The account predicts, and we found, that if people can explicitly indicate their uncertainty, there should be no bias towards believing because they are no longer required to guess. Thus, we conclude that belief formation can be better explained by an informed Cartesian account – an attempt to make an informed judgment under uncertainty.     

Demons are everywhere: The effects of belief in pure evil,demonization, and retribution on punishing criminal perpetrators

Do preconceived beliefs about evil influence perceptions and punishments of those who harm others? We examined the effects of belief in pure evil (BPE), demonization, and belief in retribution on punishment of a stereotypically (vs. non-stereotypically) evil criminal. Participants punished the stereotypically evil perpetrator more (i.e., greater recommended jail time, opposition to parole, and support for his execution) because of increases in demonization (i.e., greater perceptions of the criminal as wicked, evil, and threatening), but not increases in retributive feelings. However, regardless of the criminal’s exhibited stereotypically evil traits, greater BPE predicted harsher punishment of the perpetrator; both greater demonization and stronger retributive feelings mediated the relationship between BPE and severe punishments. Further, effect sizes indicated BPE (vs. the evilness manipulation) more strongly predicted demonization and punishment. Thus, some individuals naturally see perpetrators as demons, and retributively punish them, whether or not there is more explicit stereotypic evidence of their evil dispositions.     

Self‐supporting Arguments*

Deductive and inductive logic confront this skeptical challenge: we can justify any logical principle only by means of an argument but we can acquire justification by means of an argument only if we are already justified in believing some logical principle. We could solve this problem if probative arguments do not require justified belief in their corresponding conditionals. For if not, then inferential justification would not require justified belief in any logical principle. So even arguments whose corresponding conditionals are epistemically dependent upon their conclusions—epistemically self‐supporting arguments—need not be viciously circular. R.B. Braithwaite and James Van Cleve use internalist and externalist versions of this strategy in their proposed solutions to the problem of induction. Unfortunately, their arguments for self‐support are unsound and any theory of inferential justification that does not require justified belief in the corresponding conditionals of justification‐affording arguments is unacceptably arbitrary. So self‐supporting arguments cannot be justification‐creating.     

Meeting the Evil God Challenge

The evil God challenge is an argumentative strategy that has been pursued by a number of philosophers in recent years. It is apt to be understood as a parody argument: a wholly evil, omnipotent and omniscient God is absurd, as both theists and atheists will agree. But according to the challenge, belief in evil God is about as reasonable as belief in a wholly good, omnipotent and omniscient God; the two hypotheses are roughly epistemically symmetrical. Given this symmetry, thesis belief in an evil God and belief in a good God are taken to be similarly preposterous. In this paper, we argue that the challenge can be met, suggesting why the three symmetries that need to hold between evil God and good God – intrinsic, natural theology and theodicy symmetries – can all be broken. As such, we take it that the evil God challenge can be met.     

On the alleged normative significance of a platitude

It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p.     

Inference and the taking condition

It has recently been argued that inference essentially involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and drawing his conclusion because of this fact. However, this Taking Condition has also been criticized: If taking is interpreted as believing, it seems to lead to a vicious regress and to overintellectualize the act of inferring. In this paper, I examine and reject various attempts to salvage the Taking Condition, either by interpreting inferring as a kind of rule‐following, or by finding an innocuous role for the taking‐belief. Finally, I propose an alternative account of taking, according to which it is not a separate belief, but rather an aspect of the attitude of believing: Believing that p implies not only taking p to be true and taking oneself to believe that p, but also taking one's reasons q to support p, when the belief in question is held on account of an inference.     

Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief

G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It's raining, but I don't believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe, and has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic's Paradox, analogous to Moore's paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it's raining, but I shouldn't believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy, arguing both that akratic belief does not require belief‐akratic‐paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.     

Believing in Miracles

Classical Christian definitions of miracle speak of events transcending the natural powers of objects. A personal creator, I argue, might well cause such events in order to achieve a supernatural purpose—bringing creatures to eternal life. Miracles—events transcending natural powers, disclosing and realizing the divine purpose—would then be integral to the rational order of nature. David Hume' arguments against believing reports of miracles are shown to be very weak. Laws of nature, I suggest, are best seen not as exceptionless rules but as context–dependent realizations of natural powers. In that context miracles transcend the natural order not as "violations" but as intelligible realizations of a divine supernatural purpose. Miracles are not parts of scientific theory but can be parts of a web of rational belief fully consistent with science.     

Bible Beliefs,Conservative Religious Identity,and Same‐Sex Marriage Support: Examining Main and Moderating Effects

Research finds that Americans who espouse theologically conservative beliefs about the Bible generally oppose same‐sex marriage. Studies exploring this link, however, have been limited in that their operationalization of fundamentalist belief has been problematically conceptualized and they have potentially confounded the effect of conservative religious identity. The current study asks: (1) How do distinct beliefs about the nature and authority of the Bible influence same‐sex marriage support? (2) Do these beliefs influence same‐sex marriage support independently of conservative religious identity? (3) To what extent do Bible beliefs and conservative religious identity moderate one another's effects? And (4) to what extent are these factors moderated by religious tradition and frequency of Bible reading? Analyses of 2006 Portraits of American Life Study data reveal that while identifying as religiously conservative is the strongest predictor of opposition to same‐sex marriage, believing in inerrancy and creationism remain strong predictors in full models. I also find moderating effects between belief in creationism, inerrancy, inspiration; religious‐conservative identity; and religious tradition. Findings clarify how theological beliefs and religious identity shape support for same‐sex marriage across religious traditions.     

Believing at Will is Possible

There are convincing counter-examples to the widely accepted thesis that we cannot believe at will. For it seems possible that the truth of a proposition depend on whether or not one believes it. I call such scenarios cases of Truth Depends on Belief (TDB) and I argue that they meet the main criteria for believing at will that we find in the literature. I reply to five objections that one might level against the thesis that TDB cases show that believing at will is possible, namely that (1) mind-reading is impossible, (2) in TDB cases, one's belief is caused by one's desire, (3) in TDB scenarios, one chooses not a belief but something else, (4) TDB cases are reducible to Feldman cases, and that (5) if truth depends on belief, we are on the road to a regress. Of course, TDB scenarios hardly, if ever, occur in real life. For three reasons, they are nonetheless important. First, they show that the thesis that it is conceptually impossible to believe at will is simply false. Second, they provide us with an important constraint on any version of the thesis that it is psychologically impossible to believe at will. Third, they show us that, contrary to what several philosophers claim or imply, believing at will should not be identified with believing irrespective of—what one considers to be—the truth, nor should believing irrespective of the truth be considered a necessary condition for believing at will.     

Patient attributions for cardiac events: predictors of physical and psychological recovery

This study examined cardiac rehabilitation (CR) patients' causal attributions for their cardiac events, and used those attributions as predictors of cross‐sectional and prospective health status. Data were collected from 163 participants at the beginning and end of their CR programs. Results showed that patients' attributions can be categorized into controllable ones that are behavioral in nature, uncontrollable ones that are biological in nature, and a separate category for stress‐related causes. Findings showed that stress attributions at the beginning of CR were associated with engaging in healthy behaviors in the last month of CR, which, in turn, were positively associated with metabolic equivalence levels at the end of CR. Results imply a motivational component to believing that cardiac events are caused by stress.     

Deliverance,demonic possession,and mental illness: some considerations for mental health professionals

This paper outlines an unconventional treatment for mental illness, the exorcism or deliverance ritual used by Pentecostals and some other charismatic Christians. Deliverance beliefs and practices are based on the assumption that both mental and physical ills result from possession of the sufferer by demons, and are to be treated by the expulsion of those demons. Deliverance practitioners claim to treat schizophrenia, ADHD, and Reactive Attachment Disorder, and believe that these problems are related to sins either of the person in treatment or of an ancestor. Clinicians and counsellors dealing with clients who partially or completely espouse deliverance beliefs may need to understand their worldviews and to discuss their belief system before managing to engage them in conventional mental health treatments. Unusual ethical problems may also be met in the course of such work.     

老年人的消极交往与心理健康

积极交往和消极交往分别会对老年人的心理健康产生有利和不利影响, 然而, 探讨消极交往的负面作用及其机制的研究相对较少。目前研究主要涉及消极交往的类型(社会隔离、丧偶或离婚)、来源(配偶、子女或朋友)及强度, 并探讨感知评估、自尊的中介作用及性别、婚姻、受教育水平等变量的调节作用。社会情感选择理论、优劣势整合理论、社会交换理论及镜中我理论在一定范围内对消极交往的负面作用做出了合理解释。采取“原谅”或“认知疏远”的应对策略能有效缓解消极交往的负面影响。未来研究应进一步考察不同文化背景及社会网络背景下消极交往对老年人心理健康的影响, 同时加强对消极交往的理论研究和线上研究, 并关注相关的干预研究。     

Self‐criticism and self‐reassurance as mediators between mental health attitudes and symptoms: Attitudes toward mental health problems in Japanese workers

Japanese workers suffer high rates of mental health symptoms, recognised recently by the Japanese government, which has enacted workplace well‐being initiatives. One reason for poor mental health concerns negative attitudes about mental health problems such as shame, which may be mediated by self‐reassurance and self‐criticism. This study aimed to evaluate shame‐based attitudes toward mental health problems and explore the relationship between mental health attitudes, self‐criticism, self‐reassurance, and mental health symptoms. Japanese workers (n = 131) completed three measures: attitudes toward mental health problems, mental health symptoms, and self‐criticism/reassurance. A high proportion of workers reported negative attitudes about mental health problems. There were strong relationships between mental health attitudes, mental health symptoms, self‐criticism, and self‐reassurance. Path analyses revealed that the total and indirect effects (through self‐criticism and self‐reassurance) of mental health attitudes on mental health were larger than the direct effect alone. Hated‐self and family reflected shame were identified as predictors for mental health symptoms. The findings suggest the importance of self‐criticism and self‐reassurance in mental health and mental health attitudes. Implications for help‐seeking behaviours also are discussed. Interventions aimed at reducing self‐criticism and enhancing self‐reassurance are recommended to improve mental health attitudes and increase help‐seeking in Japanese workers.     

Mental health among people with psoriasis undergoing patient education in climate therapy

This study investigated the mental health of people with psoriasis undergoing patient education in climate therapy. A prospective design included a baseline assessment and two follow‐ups after a 3‐week patient education program. Participants were 254 adults. Positive mental health was measured by the mental health continuum short form (0–70), and negative mental health by the emotional distress subscale (1–4) of the health education impact questionnaire. Paired‐samples t‐tests were used to evaluate changes in mental health from baseline to follow‐up. Multiple linear regression was used to analyse the ability of socio‐demographic and clinical variables and emotional distress to predict changes in positive mental health. To predict change in negative mental health we repeated the same analysis but with a change in negative mental health as a dependent variable and positive mental health as an independent variable. The results show that positive mental health and health‐related emotional distress improved significantly from before to after the intervention by 7.1 points, p < 0.001 and 0.21 points, p < 0.001) respectively. At the second follow‐up, health‐related emotional distress remained significantly improved compared with baseline levels by 0.11 points, p = 0.004. The longer participants had lived with psoriasis ( β = 146, p = 0.027), and the presence of co‐morbid health problems (β  =  111, p = 0.051) the greater the improvement in the positive mental health immediately after the intervention. No predictors were identified for negative mental health. This study indicates that the promotion of positive mental health needs to be integrated into the climate therapy program, and sustained in their home context.     

EVIL, ORIGINAL SIN, AND EVOLUTION

This article has three sections. The first discusses the problem of evil; the second, the sins of both angels and men that originally introduced evil into the world; the third, a teleological theory of evolution that clarifies the relationship between the first two sections. At present there is a great deal of discussion about the nature of the evolutionary process. Some argue that ultimately it is a strictly random one. But it is quite impossible to prove scientifically that evolution is strictly random. From a Christian point of view the best way to view it is to see it not only as the result of divine intelligence, but also as due to a ferocious conflict between superhuman powers – the biblical angels and demons to whom God in the beginning gave the power to guide and develop his creation.