The origins of the phenomenology of pain: Brentano,Stumpf and Husserl

The following investigation aims to determine the historical origins of the phenomenology of pain. According to my central thesis, these origins can be traced back to an enthralling discussion between Husserl and two of his most important teachers, Brentano and Stumpf. According to my reconstruction of this discussion, while Brentano defended the view that all feelings, including pain, are intentional experiences, and while Stumpf argued that pain is a non-intentional feeling-sensation, Husserl of the Logical Investigations provides compelling resources to resolve the polemic between his teachers by showing how pain can be conceived as a pre-intentional experience. According to my argument, this largely forgotten discussion is of significance not only because it enriches our understanding of pain, but also because it modifies the phenomenological conception of consciousness. Thus in the concluding section, I show why the Husserlian resolution of the controversy between Brentano and Stumpf is of importance for our understanding of the central phenomenological theme—intentionality.     

Philosophy of Science: Interfaces between Logic and Knowledge Representation

Abstract

In this inaugural lecture I offer, against the background of a discussion of knowledge representation and its tools, an overview of my research in the philosophy of science. I defend a relational model-theoretic realism as being the appropriate meta-stance most congruent with the model-theoretic view of science as a form of human engagement with the world. Making use of logics with preferential semantics within a model-theoretic paradigm, I give an account of science as process and product. I demonstrate the power of the full-blown employment of this paradigm in the philosophy of science by discussing the main applications of model-theoretic realism to traditional problems in the philosophy of science.

I discuss my views of the nature of logic and of its role in the philosophy of science today. I also specifically offer a brief discussion on the future of cognitive philosophy in South Africa. My conclusion is a general look at the nature of philosophical inquiry and its significance for philosophers today.     

A unifying model for the structure of intellectual abilities

Models of the structure of cognitive abilities suggested by Spearman, Thurstone, Guilford, Vernon and Cattell-Horn are reviewed. It is noted that some of the models include a general intellectual factor (g) while others do not. It is also noted that some models are nonhierarchical, while in others more narrow abilities are subsumed under broader abilities in a hierarchical pattern. An empirical study in which a test battery of 16 tests was administered to some 1000 subjects in the 6th grade is reported. Using the LISREL technique to test different models, good support is obtained for oblique primary factors in the Thurstone tradition as well as for the second-order factors fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and general visualization hypothesized by Cattell and Horn. It is also found, however, that the second-order factor of fluid intelligence i is identical with a third-order g-factor. On the basis of these results a three-level model (the HILI-model) is suggested, with the g-factor at the top, two broad factors reflecting the ability to deal with verbal and figural information, respectively, at the second-order level, and the primary factors in the Thurstone and Guilford tradition at the lowest level. It is argued that most previously suggested models are special cases of the HILI-model.     

The use-conditional indexical conception of proper names

In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. Secondly, two general motivations for an indexical view on names will be introduced and defended. Thirdly, I will criticize the two most popular versions of the indexical view on names: formal variable accounts and salience-based formal constant accounts. In the fourth and final section, I will develop my own use-conditional indexical view on names in three different steps by confronting an initial version of this view with three different challenges.     

Perceived impact of online written feedback on students’ writing and learning: a reflection

In this reflective study, I perceive the impact of my own written feedback on students’ academic writing skills in particular and on learning in general. Anchored on Schon’s reflection-on-action (ROA) framework, my reflection arose from a content analysis of my written feedback on 80 student drafts and 44 feedback responses. I found that my written feedback is of two types: focus on form and focus on meaning. Coding the feedback led to an identification of six feedback functions: instructive/using imperatives (18.36%); suggestive (15.31%); asking questions/probing (23.98%); stating a personal opinion (6.12%); corrective (29.59%); and affirming/negating (6.63%). The categorisation of feedback according to these functions was influenced by Wolsey’s feedback functions (2008) which was adapted by Alvarez, Espasa and Guasch. Results revealed that I employ corrective feedback, probing questions and instructive feedback more frequently than suggestive feedback, personal statement or affirmation/negation. I also found that my feedback on form (59%) is higher than my feedback on meaning (41%). I explain the relationship of these findings by identifying some confounding factors that enabled me to interrogate my assumptions, along with a discussion of their implications.     

Testing the hypothesized effect of dysgenic fertility on intelligence with existing reaction time data: A comment on Woodley,te Nijenhuis,and Murphy (2013)

Dysgenic fertility has supposedly resulted in a decline in general intelligence (g) over time. In light of evidence that simple visual reaction time (RT) is inversely related to IQ, Woodley et al. (2013) tested the hypothesized dysgenic effect by subjecting to a meta-regression simple visual RT data collected over 100 years in 15 studies. This analysis found that RT had significantly increased according to a linear function over this time period. Woodley et al. then used this result to estimate the rate at which g had declined over the same period. The present comment points out that there are large gaps in the distribution of RTs analyzed by Woodley et al. with respect to year tested, and that RT in males did not vary as a function of year in the 13 studies published from 1941 on. It is concluded that although existing data are consistent with the idea that g has been adversely affected by dysgenic fertility, it cannot be determined at what rate g has fallen over time.     

Neural representationalism,the Hard Problem of Content and vitiated verdicts. A reply to Hutto & Myin (2013)

Colombo’s (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) plea for neural representationalism is the focus of a recent contribution to Phenomenology and Cognitive Science by Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin. In that paper, Hutto and Myin have tried to show that my arguments fail badly. Here, I want to respond to their critique clarifying the type of neural representationalism put forward in my (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2013) piece, and to take the opportunity to make a few remarks of general interest concerning what Hutto and Myin have dubbed “the Hard Problem of Content.”     

Being Aggrieved,Faith Crises,and Racism

In this article, I depict the notion of being aggrieved and its relation to crises in or struggles of , faith, using racism to illustrate my claims. I begin the discussion by explaining what I mean by being aggrieved and its relation to faith vis-à-vis racism, relying on theological, philosophical, and psychological frameworks. In the second section of the paper, the faith journey of Malcolm X serves to illustrate this hermeneutical perspective. More specifically, I argue that his faith journey, marred by experiences of racism, led him to a faith wherein his experiences of being aggrieved no longer meant that his being was being aggrieved.     

My So-Called Felicity and the City: Coming of Age with and Through Feminist Media Studies

This essay uses autoethnography to investigate the intersection of the dual identities of feminist scholar and media consumer as one mode of investigating television’s role in women’s identity construction. I draw on my experiences with the popular television programs My So-Called Life, Felicity, and Sex and the City as examples of becoming intertwined with the main characters’ relational and purchasing choices on screen. I examine how women of the third wave, raised on television, have come to define our identities by the presence of a man, due in part to the limited, heteronormative media choices available to young women today. The essay closes with a discussion of how the author’s own coming of age as a feminist media scholar parallels the “coming of age” of the discipline of feminist media studies.     

Hume's atheism and the role of Cleanthes

This is a reply to Willem Lemmens' discussion of my interpretation of the Dialogues on Natural Religion in my 2000 collection Themes from Hume: Self, Will, Religion. I use Lemmens' careful textual analysis to clarify my considered position and to further the reading of Part 12 of the Dialogues.     

Seeing ‘the dark passenger’ – Reflections on the emotional trauma of conducting post-disaster research

This paper acknowledges ‘the [my] dark passenger’ of emotional vicarious trauma associated with conducting post-disaster research. Post-disaster research is tightly bounded by ethics and professional codes of conduct requiring us to be vigilant about the impact of our work on our participants. However, as a disaster researcher, I have been affected by vicarious trauma. ‘Direct personal’ vicarious trauma is where I experienced trauma associated with witnessing devastation making a professional separation from my objective subjects impossible. ‘Indirect professional’ vicarious trauma occurred when PhD students and others under my supervision that I sent to disaster affected places, experienced significant negative emotional responses and trauma as they interviewed their participants. In these situations, I became traumatised by my lack of training and reflected on how the emphasis on the participants came at the expense of the researcher in my care. Limited literature exists that focuses on the vicarious trauma experienced by researchers, and their supervisors working in post-disaster places and this paper is a contribution to that body of scholarship. In acknowledging and exploring the emotions and vicarious trauma of researchers embedded in landscapes of disaster, it becomes possible for future researchers to pre-empt this phenomenon and to consider ways that they might manage this.     

How fragile is our intellect? Estimating losses in general intelligence due to both selection and mutation accumulation

Two dysgenic models of declining general intelligence have been proposed. The first posits that since the Industrial Revolution those with low g have had a reproductive advantage over those with high g. The second posits that relaxed purifying selection against deleterious mutations in modern populations has led to g declining due to mutation accumulation. Here, a meta-analytic estimate of the decline due to selection is computed across nine US and UK studies, revealing a loss of .39 points per decade (combined N = 202,924). By combining findings from a high-precision study of the effects of paternal age on offspring g with a study of paternal age and offspring de novo mutation numbers, it is proposed that, 70 de novo mutations per familial generation should reduce offspring g by 2.94 points, or .84 points per decade. Combining the selection and mutation accumulation losses yields a potential overall dysgenic loss of 1.23 points per decade, with upper and lower bound values ranging from 1.92 to .53 points per decade. This estimate is close to those from studies employing the secular slowing of simple reaction time as a potential indicator of declining g, consistent with predictions that mutation accumulation may play a role in these findings.     

Propositional unity: what’s the problem, who has it and who solves it?

At least since Russell’s influential discussion in The Principles of Mathematics, many philosophers have held there is a problem that they call the problem of the unity of the proposition. In a recent paper, I argued that there is no single problem that alone deserves the epithet the problem of the unity of the proposition. I there distinguished three problems or questions, each of which had some right to be called a problem regarding the unity of the proposition; and I showed how the account of propositions formulated in my book The Nature and Structure of Content [2007 Oxford University Press] solves each of these problems. In the present paper, I take up two of these problems/questions yet again. For I want to consider other accounts of propositions and compare their solutions to these problems, or lack thereof, to mine. I argue that my account provides the best solutions to the unity problems.     

Nina Farhi: Leaning on an Annealed Identification: Commentary on Paper by Nina Farhi

In my response to Nina Farhi's paper, I begin my discussion with the concept of a placental space that Farhi develops to represent the psychotic's internal experience of living in a fusion with the Other. Farhi's new concept of an annealed identification provides a useful addition to the psychoanalytic literature to describe the living conditions of a psychotic who is severely entrenched in an unyielding maternal bond. Basing her conceptualizations on Milner's psychotic patient Susan, Farhi also focuses on Milner's discovery that no repressed unconscious existed for her patient Susan. I suggest in my response that Freud's nearly forgotten idea of primal repression and Lacan's idea of maternal jouissance would shed additional light onto the psychotic experience and expand Farhi's notion of an annealed identification with the maternal figure. In addition, I argue for an inclusion of the Third whose presence is so powerfully lacking in the case discussion and in the patient's life.     

How to do things with (recorded) words

The aim of this paper is to evaluate which context determines the illocutionary force of written or recorded utterances—those involved in written texts, films and images, conceived as recordings that can be seen or heard in different occasions. More precisely, my paper deals with the “metaphysical” or constitutive role of context—as opposed to its epistemic or evidential role: my goal is to determine which context is semantically relevant in order to fix the illocutionary force of a speech act, as distinct from the information the addressee uses to ascertain the semantically relevant context. In particular I will try to assess two different perspectives on this problem, a Conventionalist Perspective and an Intentionalist Perspective. Drawing on the literature on indexicals in written texts and recorded messages, I will argue in favor of the Intentionalist Perspective: the relevant context is the one intended by the speaker. Bringing intentions into the picture, however, requires qualification; in particular, I will distinguish my Weak Intentionalist proposal from a Strong Intentionalist one. I will show that the Weak Intentionalist Perspective is flexible enough to deal with cases of delayed communication, but not so unrestricted as to yield counter-intuitive consequences.     

Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism

In this paper, I will give an argument for what I call pannormism, the view according to which if x instantiates a metaphysically basic normative property F, then whatever grounds the being of x also instantiates F. In slogan form: if there is normativity, there is normativity all the way down. Such pannormism is in many ways analogous to panpsychism, and my discussion also contains an important lesson for panpsychism, a way to avoid its so-called combination problem. In Sect. 1, I present the argument; in Sect. 2, I discuss its conclusion.     

How Coincidence Bears on Persistence

The ‘paradoxes of coincidence’ are generally taken as an important factor for deciding between rival views on persistence through time. In particular, the ability to deal with apparent cases of temporary coincidence is usually regarded as a good reason for favouring perdurantism (or ‘four-dimensionalism’) over endurantism (or ‘three-dimensionalism’). However, the recent work of Gilmore (2007) and McGrath (2007) challenges this standard view. For different reasons, both Gilmore and McGrath conclude that perdurantism does not really obtain support from the puzzles of temporary coincidence. In this paper, I will evaluate their arguments and defend the opposite view: that the paradoxes of coincidence do give some support to perdurantism. However, the way in which they do so is rather unexpected. As we will see, there are different ways in which coincidence scenarios may be thought to support perdurantism, some of which have not yet been sufficiently explored. Thus, my immediate goal is to explore one of those directions, bringing into focus a new argument from coincidence to perdurantism. And although I motivate my discussion by examining the arguments in the work of Gilmore and McGrath, the merits of this argument can be independently assessed. More generally, my overall purpose is to contribute to our general understanding of how the topics of coincidence and persistence bear on each other.     

Review of B. F. Skinner's The Behavior of Organisms

As I reread my review nearly 50 years later, I think of the circumstances. I had heard a paper by Fred at the Ithaca meeting of the APA in 1932, and recall the praise by Edna Heidbreder, who was sitting next to me, whose remark was that “He has a clean mind.” The year before his book appeared, I had already cited eight of his published papers in a review of the conditioned response in relation to conventional learning experiments that appeared in the Psychological Bulletin (1937, 34, 61–102). It may be because of that the editor sent me Fred's book to review.

When I received the copy of his new book to review, I read it carefully, and soon reported on it orally before Lewis Terman's weekly seminar to get comments and questions before revising my review. I was pleased by Terman's excitement over the originality of Fred's approach.