Negative cognitive errors and positive illusions for negative divorce events: Predictors of children's psychological adjustment

This study examined the relations among negative cognitive errors regarding hypothetical negative divorce events, positive illusions about those same events, actual divorce events, and psychological adjustment in 38 8- to 12-year-old children whose parents had divorced within the previous 2 years. Children's scores on a scale of negative cognitive errors (catastmphizing, overgeneralizing, and personalizing) correlated significantly with self-reported symptoms of anxiety and self-esteem, and with maternal reports of behavior problems. Children's scores on a scale measuring positive illusions (high self-regard, illusion of personal control, and optimism for the future) correlated significantly with less self-reported aggression. Both appraisal types accounted for variance in some measures of symptomatology beyond that explained by actual events. There was no significant association between children's negative cognitive errors and positive illusions. The implications of these results for theories of negative cognitive errors and of positive illusions, as well as for future research, are discussed.     

Tricks of Memory

Remembering an episode from even the recent past may involve a blend of fiction and fact. We discuss a straight-forward laboratory paradigm that is proving useful in the study of false memories of simple episodes. In this paradigm, subjects study lists of 15 related words ( bed, rest, awake ...) that are all related to a critical word that is not presented ( sleep ). Later, subjects recall and recognize the critical missing word with about the same probability that they remember words from the list. This memory illusion is resistant to people's attempts to avoid it. We argue that similar memory errors are commonplace and are a natural outcome of an intelligent cognitive system, which makes inferences about incoming information. Therefore, memory illusions, like perceptual illusions, are a consequence of normal human information processing and offer a window for examining basic cognitive processes.     

Creating memory illusions: expectancy-based processing and the generation of false memories.

The present research investigated the generation of memory illusions. In particular, it attempted to delineate the conditions under which category-based thinking prompts the elicitation of false memories. Noting fundamental differences in the manner in which expected and unexpected person-related information is processed and represented in the mind, it was anticipated that, via gist-based recognition, participants would display a pronounced propensity to generate expectancy-consistent false memories. The results of three experiments supported this prediction. In addition, the research revealed that participants' false memories were accompanied by the subjective experience of knowing (Expt. 2) and that false recognition was exacerbated under conditions of executive dysfunction (Expt. 3). We consider the theoretical implications of these findings for recent treatments of memory illusions and social cognition.     

Efferent factors in natural event perception can be rationalized and verified: a reply to Turvey and Solomon

Contrary to the view that ambient light information unequivocally specifies phenomenal events, recent research suggests that natural event perception is determined by processes that pick up and combine visual and motor information. This thesis is challenged by Turvey and Solomon (1984). The present article responds to their misgivings by elaborating empirical methods and theoretical arguments of past work. A control experiment is also presented on pointing measurements of distance illusions related to esophoric shifts of eye convergence that are induced by near work. The soundness of both the empirical methodology and the theoretical arguments in support of the original thesis is upheld.     

Slowing presentation speed increases illusions of knowledge

Prior research on false memories has shown that suggestibility is often reduced when the presentation rate is slowed enough to allow monitoring. We examined whether slowing presentation speed would reduce factual errors learned from fictional stories. Would subjects use the extra time to detect the errors in the stories, reducing reproduction of these errors on a later test? Surprisingly, slowing presentation speed increased the production of story errors on a later general knowledge test. Instructing the reader to mark whether each sentence contained an error, however, did decrease suggestibility. Readers appear to passively accept information presented in stories and need a constant reminder to monitor for errors. These results highlight differences between typical episodic false memories and illusions of knowledge (such as learning from fiction). Manipulations that reduce suggestibility for episodic false memories do not always reduce suggestibility for illusions of knowledge.     

Questions versus statements: challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Questions versus statements: Challenging an assumption about semantic illusions

In previous semantic-illusion research the tacit assumption has been that questions and statements-to-be-verified of similar semantic content lead to a similar proportion of semantic illusions. This assumption was made despite the fact that questions are thought to have different processing demands from those of statements. This paper presents empirical evidence that questions tend to lead to more semantic illusions than do statements-to-be-verified. Two experiments were carried out to provide a direct comparison between the semantic-illusion rates for statements and for questions. In Experiment 1, open-ended questions led to significantly more semantic illusions than did true/false statements. Experiment 2 replicated this effect using multiple-choice response options in the question condition. It is concluded that the syntactic form of a sentence affects the way in which semantic information is processed, and the implications of the findings are discussed.     

Two spatial maps for perceived visual space: Evidence from relative mislocalizations

When observers are asked to localize the peripheral position of a target with respect to the midposition of a spatially extended comparison stimulus, they tend to mislocalize the target as being more outer than the midposition of the comparison stimulus (cf. Müsseler, Van der Heijden, Mahmud, Deubel, & Ertsey, 1999). For explaining this finding, we examined a model that postulates that in the calculation of perceived positions two sources are involved, a sensory map and a motor map. The sensory map provides vision and the motor map contains information for saccadic eye movements. The model predicts that errors in location judgements will be observed when the motor map has to provide the information for the judgements. In four experiments we examined, and found evidence for, this prediction. Localization errors were found in all conditions in which the motor map had to be used but not in conditions in which the sensory map could be used.     

Combined visual illusion effects on the perceived index of difficulty and movement outcomes in discrete and continuous fitts’ tapping

The speed-accuracy trade-off is a fundamental movement problem that has been extensively investigated. It has been established that the speed at which one can move to tap targets depends on how large the targets are and how far they are apart. These spatial properties of the targets can be quantified by the index of difficulty (ID). Two visual illusions are known to affect the perception of target size and movement amplitude: the Ebbinghaus illusion and Muller-Lyer illusion. We created visual images that combined these two visual illusions to manipulate the perceived ID, and then examined people’s visual perception of the targets in illusory context as well as their performance in tapping those targets in both discrete and continuous manners. The findings revealed that the combined visual illusions affected the perceived ID similarly in both discrete and continuous judgment conditions. However, the movement outcomes were affected by the combined visual illusions according to the tapping mode. In discrete tapping, the combined visual illusions affected both movement accuracy and movement amplitude such that the effective ID resembled the perceived ID. In continuous tapping, none of the movement outcomes were affected by the combined visual illusions. Participants tapped the targets with higher speed and accuracy in all visual conditions. Based on these findings, we concluded that distinct visual-motor control mechanisms were responsible for execution of discrete and continuous Fitts’ tapping. Although discrete tapping relies on allocentric information (object-centered) to plan for action, continuous tapping relies on egocentric information (self-centered) to control for action. The planning-control model for rapid aiming movements is supported.     

Empathy in intimate relationships: The role of positive illusions

Previous studies have shown empathy to be an important aspect of a high quality intimate relationship. Likewise, positive illusions about a partner's characteristics have been shown to contribute to relationship quality. The present study connects these issues by examining the degree to which individuals hold positive illusions about a partner's level of empathy, and the extent to which these positive illusions are related to relationship quality and adjustment in a sample of 55 couples. Results showed that positive illusions concerning a partner's level of empathy were only held by women. In addition, people's evaluation of relationship quality and adjustment was consistently related to both their own and their partner's positive empathy illusions. Finally, an interaction effect was found between participant sex and the partner effect of positive empathy illusions: the illusions held by the partner (only for men) were related to relationship quality. Results and implications for theory and relationship counseling are discussed.     

An experimental and theoretical appraisal of the perspective and size-constancy theories of illusions

The perspective and size-constancy theories of illusions are described. They both imply that illusory distortions arise as a consequence of mistaken perceptual impressions of depth. Predictions from these theories are tested in six experiments and several ancillary studies. They show that although differences in apparent distance may be sufficient for the appearance of illusions their presence is not a necessary condition. Detailed theoretical implications of these results are considered in discussion.     

On the common stimulus condition and explanation of the Müller‐Lyer,Poggendorff and Zöllner illusions: The basis for a class of geometrical illusions

Although the Müller‐Lyer, Poggendorff and Zöllner figures and the illusions with which they are associated– those of length, misalignment and non‐parallelism, respectively – are quite different, all three are attributable to the same basic effect, that of the difference in the apparent length of equal lines forming acute and obtuse angles. The role of this basic affect, reported originally by Müller‐Lyer but overlooked by him and others as a possible cause of the three illusions, is identified and discussed. It is suggested that the demonstration of a basic stimulus condition (acute and obtuse angles) and its associated illusion (difference in apparent length) generating a class of “higher order” geometric illusions has implications not only for a closer understanding of the three illusions under consideration but for other classes of illusory phenomena that might also share a common basis.     

Illusions and Knowing What Is Real

Geometrical illusions are displays that give false impressions that observers take to be accurate. They have traditionally been cited as evidence against the naive realist claim that people see the world as it "really" is. Such illusions, however, often depend on their being viewed from a single vantage point (Kennedy & Portal, 1990). In Gibsonian terms, they depend on the availability of impoverished information. In this study, spatial transformations were applied to line-length (Sander parallelogram) and area (Jastrow curves) illusions to provide information to observers about veridical size. In particular, the reversal of certain parts of the displays resulted in informative invariants that specified the veridical nature of the parts. Most observers were able to use the information.     

Positive and negative implications of the causal illusion

The human cognitive system is fine-tuned to detect patterns in the environment with the aim of predicting important outcomes and, eventually, to optimize behavior. Built under the logic of the least-costly mistake, this system has evolved biases to not overlook any meaningful pattern, even if this means that some false alarms will occur, as in the case of when we detect a causal link between two events that are actually unrelated (i.e., a causal illusion). In this review, we examine the positive and negative implications of causal illusions, emphasizing emotional aspects (i.e., causal illusions are negatively associated with negative mood and depression) and practical, health-related issues (i.e., causal illusions might underlie pseudoscientific beliefs, leading to dangerous decisions). Finally, we describe several ways to obtain control over causal illusions, so that we could be able to produce them when they are beneficial and avoid them when they are harmful.     

Why do animals differ in their susceptibility to geometrical illusions?

In humans, geometrical illusions are thought to reflect mechanisms that are usually helpful for seeing the world in a predictable manner. These mechanisms deceive us given the right set of circumstances, correcting visual input where a correction is not necessary. Investigations of non-human animals’ susceptibility to geometrical illusions have yielded contradictory results, suggesting that the underlying mechanisms with which animals see the world may differ across species. In this review, we first collate studies showing that different species are susceptible to specific illusions in the same or reverse direction as humans. Based on a careful assessment of these findings, we then propose several ecological and anatomical factors that may affect how a species perceives illusory stimuli. We also consider the usefulness of this information for determining whether sight in different species might be more similar to human sight, being influenced by contextual information, or to how machines process and transmit information as programmed. Future testing in animals could provide new theoretical insights by focusing on establishing dissociations between stimuli that may or may not alter perception in a particular species. This information could improve our understanding of the mechanisms behind illusions, but also provide insight into how sight is subjectively experienced by different animals, and the degree to which vision is innate versus acquired, which is difficult to examine in humans.     

Extraretinal and retinal amplitude and phase errors during Filehne illusion and path perception

Pursuit eye movements give rise to retinal motion. To judge stimulus motion relative to the head, the visual system must correct for the eye movement by using an extraretinal, eye-velocity signal. Such correction is important in a variety of motion estimation tasks including judgments of object motion relative to the head and judgments of self-motion direction from optic flow. The Filehne illusion (where a stationary object appears to move opposite to the pursuit) results from a mismatch between retinal and extraretinal speed estimates. A mismatch in timing could also exist. Speed and timing errors were investigated using sinusoidal pursuit eye movements. We describe a new illusion--the slalom illusion--in which the perceived direction of self-motion oscillates left and right when the eyes move sinusoidally. A linear model is presented that determines the gain ratio and phase difference of extraretinal and retinal signals accompanying the Filehne and slalom illusions. The speed mismatch and timing differences were measured in the Filehne and self-motion situations using a motion-nulling procedure. Timing errors were very small for the Filehne and slalom illusions. However, the ratios of extraretinal to retinal gain were consistently less than 1, so both illusions are the consequence of a mismatch between estimates of retinal and extraretinal speed. The relevance of the results for recovering the direction of self-motion during pursuit eye movements is discussed.     

The modulation of haptic line bisection by a visual illusion and optokinetic stimulation

Research has shown that a variety of different sensory manipulations, including visual illusions, transcutaneous nerve stimulation, vestibular caloric stimulation, optokinetic stimulation, and prism adaptation, can all influence people's performance on spatial tasks such as line bisection. It has been suggested that these manipulations may act upon the 'higher-order' levels of representation used to code spatial information. We investigated whether we could influence haptic line bisection in normal participants crossmodally by varying the visual background that participants viewed. In experiment 1, participants haptically bisected wooden rods while looking at a variant of the Oppel - Kundt visual illusion. Haptic-bisection judgments were influenced by the orientation of the visual illusion (in line with previous unimodal visual findings). In experiment 2, haptic-bisection judgments were also influenced by the presence of a leftward or rightward moving visual background. In experiments 3 and 4, the position of the to-be-bisected stimuli was varied with respect to the participant's body midline. The results confirmed an effect of optokinetic stimulation, but not of the Oppel -Kundt illusion, on participants' tactile-bisection errors, suggesting that the two manipulations might differentially affect haptic processing. Taken together, these results suggest that the 'higher-order' levels of spatial representation upon which perceptual judgments and/or motor responses are made may have multisensory or amodal characteristics.     

Illusion reversal rate as a function of subjective depth

Undergraduate students (N = 48) served as subjects in a test of Gregory's theory of illusions. Twenty-four students made judgments about the subjective depth of three reversible illusions--Necker cube, Book, and Pyramid--under the conditions of complete versus incomplete illusions and illusions without depth cues versus with depth cues. An additional 24 subjects recorded the three illusion reversal rates under slightly altered conditions. Differences were found among the various illusions with respect to complete versus incomplete illusions, reversal rate, subjective judgments of depth, and certain correlation values. Support for Gregory's theory of illusion as displaced or misleading depth perception is offered by these results.     

Perceptual influences of error size on voluntary force control during a compound sinusoidal force task

Visual feedback that provides error information is critical to task quality and motor adjustments. This study investigated how the size of perceived errors via visual feedback affected rate control and force gradation strategy of a designate force task. Fourteen young adults coupled force exertions to a compound sinusoidal signal (0.2 Hz and 0.5 Hz) that fluctuated around a mean level of 30% of maximal voluntary contraction, when the size of execution errors were differently scaled with the error amplification factors. In the low (LAF) and high (HAF) amplification factor conditions, the execution errors in the visual display half and double of the real errors, respectively. The visualized error was the real errors in the medium amplification factor (MAF) condition. In addition to a phase-lead of force output, the LAF condition that virtually reduced the size of error feedback associated with a poorer task accuracy than the MAF and HAF conditions. Virtual increase in error size of visual feedback selectively suppressed the fast target force at 0.5 Hz. In addition, complexity and high-frequency components (>0.75 Hz) of force outputs multiplied progressively with increasing error size. Error-enhancing feedback suppressed fast target force, accentuating the use of error information to tune force output, whereas error-reducing feedback enhanced fast target force in favor of predictive force control.