时间洞察力对跨期选择偏好的预测

利用津巴多时间洞察力问卷,采用跨期选择经典范式,考察“现在享乐型”和“未来定向型”两类时间洞察力个体在跨期选择上的偏好,从人格特质角度来探究跨期选择的认知机制。结果发现：(1)现在享乐定向组的延迟折扣率显著高于未来定向组;(2)未来定向组在时间洞察力量表“未来维度”得分与延迟折扣率显著负相关。这说明时间洞察力对个体延迟折扣率具有预测作用,支持了跨期选择的时间感知基础模型。     

Examining children's ability to delay reward: Is the delay discounting task a suitable measure?

Discounting the value of delayed rewards has primarily been measured in children with the delay of gratification task and in adolescents and adults with the delay discounting task. In the present study, we assessed the suitability of the delay discounting task as a measure of temporal discounting in children. A sample of 7- to 9-year-olds (N = 98) completed a delay discounting task, a delay of gratification task, a sensation seeking measure, and IQ measures. In addition, teacher-based assessments of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder traits were measured. The results indicated that the majority of children produced meaningful data on the discounting task and discounted rewards hyperbolically. Children with an elevated risk of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder showed a trend towards discounting future rewards on the delay discounting task more steeply than did those at low risk. However, delay discounting was unrelated to either delay of gratification or sensation seeking. We interpret these results as providing some support for the use of delay discounting as a measure of intertemporal choice in children, although the results also suggest that delay discounting and delay of gratification tasks may tap different processes in this population.     

High temporal discounters overvalue immediate rewards rather than undervalue future rewards: An event-related brain potential study

Impulsivity is characterized in part by heightened sensitivity to immediate relative to future rewards. Although previous research has suggested that “high discounters” in intertemporal choice tasks tend to prefer immediate over future rewards because they devalue the latter, it remains possible that they instead overvalue immediate rewards. To investigate this question, we recorded the reward positivity, a component of the event-related brain potential (ERP) associated with reward processing, with participants engaged in a task in which they received both immediate and future rewards and nonrewards. The participants also completed a temporal discounting task without ERP recording. We found that immediate but not future rewards elicited the reward positivity. High discounters also produced larger reward positivities to immediate rewards than did low discounters, indicating that high discounters relatively overvalued immediate rewards. These findings suggest that high discounters may be more motivated than low discounters to work for monetary rewards, irrespective of the time of arrival of the incentives.     

Comparing rapid assessments of delay discounting with real and hypothetical rewards in children

Recent advances in assessment methodology have resulted in a highly efficient procedure for obtaining delay discounting rates for adults: a 5‐trial adjusting delay task (ADT‐5) examining intertemporal choice for hypothetical rewards. The low participant burden of this task makes it potentially useful for children, with whom delay discounting research is relatively limited. However, it is unknown whether results from this task match choice for real rewards. The present study assessed delay discounting for real and hypothetical monetary rewards using a modified ADT‐5 with 9 children admitted to a psychiatric day treatment program. Participants completed up to 3 tasks with each reward type in alternating order. No difference in discounting rate, via log(k), was observed between the first task of each reward type. This finding was replicated across subsequent tasks for the subset of participants (n = 6) who completed all 6 tasks. However, delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards was not found to be statistically equivalent. These results suggest that a modified ADT‐5 using hypothetical rewards may be a viable option for assessing delay discounting in children with psychiatric diagnoses, but additional research is needed to explicitly examine whether hypothetical and real rewards are discounted equivalently in this population.     

跨期选择的认知机制与神经基础

跨期选择是指个体对发生在不同时间的成本与收益进行权衡的决策过程。跨期选择的计算模型从经济学的角度用数学模型来建构时间折扣函数,而认知成分模型则从心理学的角度来研究跨期选择中的心理效应与认知成分。跨期选择的神经基础有三种不同的研究取向：双机制加工取向、单机制加工取向、自我控制取向。未来研究应该在跨期选择的认知机制、神经通路及运行机制、跨期选择的应用,以及从进化的角度对人与动物的跨期选择行为进行更深入的研究。     

Thinking about others and the future: Neural correlates of perspective taking relate to preferences for delayed rewards

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting.     

金钱崇拜对个体跨期决策偏好的影响

采用经典跨期选择任务范式,以个体的金钱喜好差异为切入点,通过问卷调查和行为实验考察金钱崇拜对个体跨期决策偏好的影响。结果发现:(1)个体的金钱崇拜水平与其跨期折扣倾向显著负相关;(2)无论跨期决策任务的难易和兑现时间的长短,高金钱崇拜者更倾向于选择较大的延迟奖赏,而低金钱崇拜者更倾向于选择较小的即时奖赏;(3)高、低金钱崇拜者的跨期决策反应时没有明显的差异,但二者的反应时都明显地受到任务难度的影响,即在容易条件下的反应速度显著快些。结果表明,个体的金钱崇拜水平在跨期决策过程中发挥着重要的作用,致使高金钱崇拜者更愿意等待延迟大奖赏的到来。     

Evidence for a magnitude effect in temporal discounting with pigeons

A magnitude effect in human intertemporal choice is well established-larger rewards or outcomes are discounted over time at a lower rate than are smaller rewards. However, many recent studies have failed to find a corresponding effect in nonhuman animals. Here we report a magnitude effect in temporal discounting for pigeons' choices involving a tradeoff between reward delay and amount. Pigeons chose between a small reward (1-s access to food) after a 2-s delay, and a large reward (4.5-s access to food) after a 28-s delay. Across conditions, the delays to the small and large rewards were increased or decreased, respectively. Temporal discounting functions obtained through a value-estimation procedure showed clear evidence of a magnitude effect: The value of the large reward decreased more slowly with increasing delay than the value of the small reward. We linked this result to a nonlinear relationship between choice and the delays associated with the small and large rewards. The nonlinearity was contrary to the generalized matching law but was predicted by the contextual choice model. Our results confirm the existence of a magnitude effect in nonhuman temporal discounting, showing that this adaptation is not unique to humans.     

不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响及其情景依赖性

采用2(不确定性容忍度：高、低)×2(跨期日期：今天/14天、今天/180天)×2(延迟奖赏值：200元、1000元)混合实验设计,探讨不同任务特征下不确定性容忍度对跨期选择的影响。结果表明：跨期日期为180天时,不确定性容忍度主效应边缘显著;不确定性容忍度与延迟奖赏值交互作用显著：在200元时低容忍度个体对延迟奖赏的折扣程度大于高容忍度个体,在1000元时无此效应;跨期日期为14天时,不确定性容忍度的主效应及其与延迟奖赏值交互作用均不显著。这表明,不确定性容忍度对跨期选择存在影响,但这种影响受到跨期日期和延迟奖赏值的调节,具有情景依赖性。     

Heaven can wait. How religion modulates temporal discounting

Evidence suggests that religious systems have specific effects on attentional and action control processes. The present study investigated whether religions also modulate choices that involve higher-order knowledge and the delay of gratification in particular. We tested Dutch Calvinists, Italian Catholics, and Atheists from both countries/cultures using an intertemporal choice task where participants could choose between a small immediate and a larger delayed monetary reward. Based on the Calvinist theory of predestination and the Catholic concept of a cycle of sin–confession–expiation, we predicted a reduced delay tolerance, i.e., higher discount rate, for Italian Catholics than for Dutch Calvinists, and intermediate rates for the two atheist groups. Analyses of discount rates support our hypotheses. We also found a magnitude effect on temporal discounting and faster responses for large than for small rewards across religions and countries/cultures. We conclude that temporal discounting is specifically modulated by religious upbringing rather than by generic cultural differences.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Time discounting and time preference in animals: A critical review

Animals are an important model for studies of impulsivity and self-control. Many studies have made use of the intertemporal choice task, which pits small rewards available sooner against larger rewards available later (typically several seconds), repeated over many trials. Preference for the sooner reward is often taken to indicate impulsivity and/or a failure of self-control. This review shows that very little evidence supports this assumption; on the contrary, ostensible discounting behavior may reflect a boundedly rational but not necessarily impulsive reward-maximizing strategy. Specifically, animals may discount weakly, or even adopt a long-term rate-maximizing strategy, but fail to fully incorporate postreward delays into their choices. This failure may reflect learning biases. Consequently, tasks that measure animal discounting may greatly overestimate the true discounting and may be confounded by processes unrelated to time preferences. If so, animals may be much more patient than is widely believed; human and animal intertemporal choices may reflect unrelated mental operations; and the shared hyperbolic shape of the human and animal discount curves, which is used to justify cross-species comparisons, may be coincidental. The discussion concludes with a consideration of alternative ways to measure self-control in animals.     

时间知觉在老年人跨期选择中的作用

随着人口老龄化速度的加快,老年人的跨期选择问题受到越来越多的关注。时间知觉是影响跨期选择的重要因素之一。然而,目前从时间知觉的角度来探讨老年人跨期选择的研究比较有限。本文在总结国内外相关研究的基础之上,试图分析时间知觉的随龄变化如何影响老年人的跨期选择。具体而言,本文从时间长度知觉、时间成本知觉以及时间知觉相关心理动机三个方面进行探讨,并指出了时间知觉视角的局限性及今后的研究方向。     

Modeling the effect of reward amount on probability discounting

The present study with college students examined the effect of amount on the discounting of probabilistic monetary rewards. A hyperboloid function accurately described the discounting of hypothetical rewards ranging in amount from $20 to $10,000,000. The degree of discounting increased continuously with amount of probabilistic reward. This effect of amount was not due to changes in the rate parameter of the discounting function, but rather was due to increases in the exponent. These results stand in contrast to those observed with the discounting of delayed monetary rewards, in which the degree of discounting decreases with reward amount due to amount-dependent decreases in the rate parameter. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that delay and probability discounting reflect different underlying mechanisms. That is, the fact that the exponent in the delay discounting function is independent of amount is consistent with a psychophysical scaling interpretation, whereas the finding that the exponent of the probability-discounting function is amount-dependent is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Instead, the present results are consistent with the idea that the probability-discounting function is itself the product of a value function and a weighting function. This idea was first suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), although their prospect theory does not predict amount effects like those observed. The effect of amount on probability discounting was parsimoniously incorporated into our hyperboloid discounting function by assuming that the exponent was proportional to the amount raised to a power. The amount-dependent exponent of the probability-discounting function may be viewed as reflecting the effect of amount on the weighting of the probability with which the reward will be received.     

跨期决策中的负折扣现象及其机制

主流跨期决策模型认为, 跨期决策存在一个时间折扣过程。时间折扣是指人们会根据将来获益或损失的延迟时间对其效用进行折扣, 折扣后的效用小于原来的效用, 而负折扣现象违背了时间折扣过程。负折扣现象出现在金钱、非金钱的获益与损失领域, 其可能的解释机制为预期情绪。目前关于负折扣现象的研究, 较少验证其影响机制, 未来的研究可以结合眼动追踪和fMRI技术探讨其机制, 并丰富对负折扣现象的影响因素研究。     

负折扣现象:跨期决策中的自我-他人决策差异

负折扣现象作为一种违背时间折扣假定的现象越来越多地引起研究者关注。本文通过两种指标考察了为自己决策和为他人决策在负折扣现象上的差异。实验1运用二择一选择范式考察人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时对于何时发生负性事件的时间偏好。结果发现,相比较于为他人决策,为自己决策时被试更倾向于选择早些发生负性事件,即更容易产生负折扣现象。实验2运用测量时间折扣率的经典范式考察了人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时的时间折扣率。结果发现,为自己决策时比为他人决策时的时间折扣率更小,更容易出现负折扣率。总体结果表明,为自己决策比为他人决策更容易出现负折扣现象。从情绪卷入的角度看,我们推测,为自己决策时由于更多的预期负性情绪卷入,从而导致更容易产生负折扣现象。     

Intertemporal Similarity: Discounting as a Last Resort

Standard models of intertemporal choice assume that individuals discount future payoffs by integrating reward amounts and time delays to generate a discounted value. Alternative models propose that, rather than integrate across them, individuals compare within attributes (amounts and delays) to determine if differences in one attribute outweigh differences in another attribute. For instance, the similarity model 1) compares the two reward amounts to determine whether they are similar, 2) compares the similarity of the two time delays, and then 3) makes a decision based on these similarity judgments. Here, I tested discounting models against attribute‐based models that use similarity judgments to make choices. I collected intertemporal choices and similarity judgments for the reward amounts and time delays from participants in three experiments. All experiments tested the ability of discounting and similarity models to predict intertemporal choices. Model generalization analyses showed that the best predicting models started with similarity judgments and then, if similarity failed to make a prediction, resorted to discounting models. Similarity judgments also matched intertemporal choice data demonstrating both the magnitude and sign effects, thereby accounting for behavioral data that contradict many discounting models. These results highlight the possibility that attribute‐based models such as the similarity models provide alternatives to discounting that may offer insights into the process of making intertemporal choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

时间贴现的分段性

以延迟和相对延迟时间贴现的实验范式, 用选择法、匹配法确定价值主观相等点, 探讨时间贴现的分段性。三个实验和一个问卷调查发现, 时间贴现具有分段性。被试的时间贴现有三次显著变化, 表现为三个时段时间贴现心理状态的不同: 从现在到未来2周内规避损失、偏好风险、愿意短期等待, 从未来2周起直到未来10年采取非补偿性策略、需求与风险并重、愿意长期等待, 和从未来10年起直到未来50年规避风险、聊胜于无、不愿意等待。     

Now or Later? Attentional Processing and Intertemporal Choice

The tendency to discount future prospects in lieu of smaller immediate outcomes is known as temporal discounting. The current work used eye‐tracking methodology to examine attentional processing to different elements of choice during an intertemporal decision task. Our findings reveal that those who tend to prefer the immediate option demonstrate attentional biases that were predictive of choice. When losses were at stake, selective attention biases also predicted unique variance in self‐report measures of risk taking, impulsivity, and self‐control beyond what was accounted for by a discounting parameter (k), a typical method for summarizing intertemporal choice data. Overall, our findings suggest that eye‐tracking measures of selective attention may allow for a better theoretical understanding of the mechanisms and processes involved in intertemporal choice. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention

Rewards that are not immediately available are discounted compared to rewards that are immediately available. The more a person discounts a delayed reward, the more likely that person is to have a range of behavioral problems, including clinical disorders. This latter observation has motivated the search for interventions that reduce discounting. One surprisingly simple method to reduce discounting is an "explicit-zero" reframing that states default or null outcomes. Reframing a classical discounting choice as "something now but nothing later" versus "nothing now but more later" decreases discount rates. However, it is not clear how this "explicit-zero" framing intervention works. The present studies delineate and test two possible mechanisms to explain the phenomenon. One mechanism proposes that the explicit-zero framing creates the impression of an improving sequence, thereby enhancing the present value of the delayed reward. A second possible mechanism posits an increase in attention allocation to temporally distant reward representations. In four experiments, we distinguish between these two hypothesized mechanisms and conclude that the temporal attention hypothesis is superior for explaining our results. We propose a model of temporal attention whereby framing affects intertemporal preferences by modifying present bias.