The Dark Side of Morality: Group Polarization and Moral Epistemology

This article argues that philosophers and laypeople commonly conceptualize moral truths or justified moral beliefs as discoverable through intuition, argument, or some other purely cognitive or affective process. It then contends that three empirically well‐supported theories all predict that this “Discovery Model” of morality plays a substantial role in causing social polarization. The same three theories are then used to argue that an alternative “Negotiation Model” of morality—according to which moral truths are not discovered but instead created by actively negotiating compromises—promises to reduce polarization by fostering a progressive willingness to “work across the aisle” to settle moral issues cooperatively. This article then examines potential methods for normatively evaluating polarization, arguing there are prima facie reasons to favor the Negotiation Model over the Discovery Model based on their hypothesized effects on polarization. Finally, I outline avenues for further empirical and philosophical research.     

情境对“热情优先效应”的影响——基于同伴提名法的检验

本研究同时从热情和能力维度独立和互依视角,采用同伴提名法考察社交与工作导向情境对“热情优先效应”的增强与削弱作用。结果发现：（1）社交导向情境下表现出明显的“热情优先效应”;（2）工作导向情境对能力的突显效应与“热情优先效应”的表现相反：在热情与能力独立视角下,情境的削弱效应使得“热情优先效应”无法表现;而在热情与能力互依视角下,“热情优先效应”则强于情境对其的削弱效应。     

HUMAN PHENOTYPIC MORALITY AND THE BIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR KNOWING GOOD

Co‐creating knowledge takes a new approach to human phenotypic morality as a biologically based, human lineage specific (HLS) trait. Authors from very different backgrounds (anthropology and biology, on the one hand, and astronomy, philosophy, and theology, on the other) first review research on the nature and origins of morality using the social brain network, and studies of individuals who cannot “know good” or think morally because of brain dysfunction. They find these models helpful but insufficient, and turn to paleoanthropology, cognitive science, and neuroscience to understand human moral capacity and its origins long ago, in the genus Homo. An unusual narrative capturing “morality in action” takes the reader back 900,000 years, and then the authors analyze the essential features of moral thinking and behavior as expressed by early and later species on our lineage. In what has primarily been the province of philosophers to date, the authors’ morality model is presented for further scientific testing.     

“Ridiculous” dream versus social contract: Dostoevskij, Rousseau, and the problem of ideal society

Drawing on the Second Discourse and the Social Contract and Notes from Underground and “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” this essay examines the striking similarities and fundamental differences between Dostoevskij’s and Rousseau’s treatment of the problem of individual vs. society and their notions of ideal social relations. The essay investigates Rousseau’s attempt to absorb morality into politics and “to concretize” Diderot’s universal moral man into citizen. It also suggests that Dostoevskij takes Rousseau’s attempt at concretization a step further by exposing humanist conceptions of man and society in general as fiction and creating a model of ideal society that absorbs morality, not into politics (as does Rousseau’s model), but into the sanctity of the Word.     

Morality,convention and conventional morality

Among anthropologists and sociologists, it is widely believed that moral rules are best understood as a type of social norm. Moral philosophers, however, have largely been hostile to this suggestion. In recent years, the impulse to distinguish moral rules from others types of social norm has received what many take to be empirical support from the work of Elliot Turiel and his collaborators, who have argued that there are two distinct “domains” of social cognition, the “moral” and the “conventional.” Many philosophers have taken this as proof that moral rules are fundamentally different from “conventional” social norms. I argue that moral philosophers should not be relying upon Turiel’s view to defend the moral/conventional distinction. First, I show that Turiel is claiming much less than many have taken him to be claiming, because he puts a lot of what philosophers have traditionally thought of as “morality” on the side of convention, or else in the broad region between the two that he refers to as “multidimensional contexts.” Second, I argue that his concept of the “conventional” is so narrow that the overwhelming majority of social norms – such as the standard rules of etiquette – wind up falling into the “multidimensional” category. This stems from his failure to distinguish between genuine conventions and what I refer to as “norms with conventional elements.”     

Social game theory: Preferences,perceptions, and choices

ABSTRACT

Building on classic game theory, psychologists have explored the effects of social preferences and expectations on strategic behaviour. Ordinary social perceivers are sensitive to additional contextual factors not addressed by game theory and its recent psychological extensions. We review the results of a research programme exploring how observers judge “players” (i.e., individuals making strategic decisions in social dilemmas) on the dimensions of competence and morality. We explore social perception in several well-known dilemmas, including the prisoner’s dilemma, the volunteer’s dilemma, and the trust dilemma. We also introduce a novel self-presentational dilemma. In research conducted over a decade and a half, we have found that judgements of competence are sensitive to both players’ choices and the dilemma’s (expected and actual) outcomes. In contrast, judgements of morality respond strongly to players’ behaviour and little else. We discuss how these social-perceptual patterns might affect expectations, preferences, and strategic choices.     

Pluralism and Ambivalence in the Evolution of Morality

Much good work has been done on the evolution of human morality by focusing on how “selfish genes” can give rise to altruistic human beings. A richer research program is needed, however, to take into account the ambivalence of naturally evolved biopsychological motivators and the historical pluralism of human morality in religious systems. Such a program is described here. A first step is to distinguish the ultimate cause of natural selection from proximate causes that are the results of natural selection. Next, some proximate causes are suggested as possible conditions of biological and emotional valuing as well as of customary social morality and individual rational ethical thought. Finally, different moral perspectives of Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity are briefly presented in order to illustrate how one might inquire about the selection of a variety of biopsychological and cultural proximate causes that enable the evolution of a plurality of religious moral systems.     

MORALITY AND NATURE: EVOLUTIONARY CHALLENGES TO CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Christian ethics accentuates in manifold ways the unique character of human nature. Personalists believe that the mind is never reducible to material and physical substance. The human person is presented as the supreme principle, based on arguments referring to free‐willed actions, the immateriality of both the divine spirit and the reflexive capacity, intersubjectivity and self‐consciousness. But since Darwin, evolutionary biology slowly instructs us that morality roots in dispositions that are programmed by evolution into our nature. Historically, Thomas Huxley, “Darwin's bulldog,” agreed with Darwin on almost everything, except for his gradualist position on moral behavior. Huxley's “saltationism” has recently been characterized by Frans de Waal as “a veneer theory of morality.” Does this mark the end of a period of presenting morality as only the fruit of socialization processes (nurture) and as having nothing in common with nature? Does it necessarily imply a corrosion of personalist views on the human being or do Christian ethics have to become familiar again with their ancient roots?     

Responsibility Ethics,Shared Understandings,and Moral Communities

Margaret Walker's Moral Understandings offers an “expressive‐collaborative,” culturally situated, practice—based picture of morality, critical of a “theoretical‐juridical” picture in most prefeminist moral philosophy since Henry Sidgwick. This essay compares her approach to ethics with that of John Rawls, another exemplar of the “theoretical‐juridical” model, and asks how Walker's approach would apply to several ethical issues, including interaction with (other) animals, social reform and revolution, and basic human rights.     

Right-wing authoritarianism predicts prejudice against “homosexuals” but not “gay men and lesbians”

Can different social category labels for a single group be associated with different levels of prejudice — specifically, sexual prejudice? Some theorizing, and a pilot study in the present research, suggests that the label “homosexuals” carries more deviance-related connotations than does the label “gay men and lesbians.” Given that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) correlates positively with prejudice against groups stereotyped as deviant, it was hypothesized that RWA would predict greater prejudice against “homosexuals” than “gay men and lesbians” among heterosexual participants. Two studies supported this hypothesis and demonstrated that the effect was driven by both perceived threats to heterosexuals' values (i.e., symbolic threat; Study 1) and perceived fundamental differences between “homosexuals” and heterosexuals as social categories (i.e., psychological essentialism; Study 2). Implications for the factors that predict social categorization of and prejudice toward sexual minorities are discussed.     

« Porosité » entre travail et vie privée,conflits et aménagements : une étude comparative de deux populations de femmes

At present, little research has been done regarding the links between work and private life from the standpoint of subjective perceptions. The authors present a qualitative research focused on this issue involving women working in the fields of health and management. The content analysis revealed a double dynamic implying autonomy as well as “permeability” between the two worlds. Three subjective dimensions define this paradoxical movement: “dynamics in social relations”, the “subjective function of the body”, and the “perception of a certain mastery”. Outcomes show how psychological conflict can play an essential role in the personalization process. This was described by participants in terms of satisfaction, yet only under certain conditions.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

Moral Philosophers as Ethical Engineers: Limits of Moral Philosophy and a Pragmatist Alternative

Ever since Kant, moral philosophers have been more or less animated by the mission of discovering inescapable law‐like rules that would provide a binding justification for morality. Recently, however, many have started to question (a) whether this is possible and (b) what, after all, this project could achieve. An alternative vision of the task of moral philosophy starts from the pragmatist idea that philosophizing begins and ends in human experiencing. It leads to a view where morality is seen as a “social technology” that aims to make living together possible, and strengthens people's capability to live a good life within a society. The role of moral philosophy is, accordingly, to develop our moral tools further. Moral philosophers become ethical engineers who use their expertise in ethical topics to criticize existing “moral technology” and construct new concepts, tools, and theories that better answer the current challenges for living a good life.     

Discouraging unethicality versus encouraging ethicality: Unraveling the differential effects of prevention‐ and promotion‐focused ethical leadership

Theory on the impact of ethical leadership has traditionally been based on a deontological approach to morality. Underlying this perspective is the assumption that all leader behaviors that encourage “normatively appropriate conduct” will influence followers in a similar fashion. Put differently, the current consensus seems to suggest that actions that focus on preventing unethical behavior—attending to “the wrong”—will have the same impact as actions that focus on promoting ethical behavior—attending to “the right.” Taking a within‐person approach, we draw upon social exchange theory to challenge this consensus and build theory that suggests a follower's felt trust from their leader will be differentially impacted by prevention‐ versus promotion‐focused ethical leadership. We also explore how these different types of ethical leadership may indirectly, through felt trust, impact citizenship behavior and counterproductive work behavior. Finally, we consider how the role of the “moral manager” may interact with the “moral person” by identifying leader moral hypocrisy as an important between‐person moderator of these effects. Given the importance of ethical decision‐making in organizations and the calls for increased ethical leadership, our findings have important implications for both theory and practice.     

The latent structure of social anxiety disorder and the performance only specifier: a taxometric analysis

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is often treated as a discrete diagnostic entity that represents a naturally occurring class, though empirical evidence largely supports a dimensional conceptualization of social fears. Further, the inclusion of a “performance only” specifier in the DSM-5 implies that individuals who experience intense social anxiety exclusively in performance situations are distinct from those with broader social fears. The purpose of the present research was to examine the latent structure of SAD and the DSM-5 “performance only” specifier in a large nonclinical sample (n = 2019). Three taxometric procedures (MAXCOV, MAMBAC, and L-Mode) were applied to indicators derived from two commonly used measures of social anxiety. Results yielded convergent evidence indicating that social anxiety exhibits a dimensional latent structure. Further, social performance anxiety demonstrates continuous relationships with milder social fears, suggesting that the “performance only” specifier may not represent a discrete entity. The implications of these findings for the assessment, diagnosis, classification, and treatment of social anxiety are discussed.     

Les décisions d’orientation dépendent-elles des stéréotypes sociaux ? Sous quelles conditions ?

IntroductionIn this research we want to show that influence of social stereotypes linked to the social background on the students’ orientation is not a social fate that cannot be ignored but that there really are conditions that allow to reduce or even suppress those effects. The objective is to test the hypothesis according to which the seniority of the teachers, their type of professional commitment and the fact of working or not in an area earmarked for special educational assistance (prioritary education zone) must allow to significantly reduce the stereotypes effects on the academic judgment.MethodWithin the framework of an experimental research lead in school, we have asked high school teachers to express propositions of continuing studies as well as success predictions from ficticious student files reaching the end of high school. The results confirm that the bias generally observed in academic judgments are reduced in professors having a seniority above 5 years compared to the ones having a seniority lower than 5 years, those who have a strong work commitment, like the “self made persons” or “social activists” types, compared to those having a lower type of work commitment like the “self investors” or “careerists” types and those working in an area earmarked for special educational assistance (prioritary education zone) compared to those who work outside these areas.ConclusionThis research shows that factors likely to limit the effects of social background stereotypes on academic judgments do exist.     

Exploring the impact of dimensional comparisons in health contexts

“Did I exercise enough this week?” “Should I eat that last donut?” “Am I in good shape?” Due to the ambiguity and difficulty of answering such questions, people often use comparison-based information to contextualize their standing, inform self-evaluations, and guide behavior. For example, to ascertain whether they have exercised enough, people can make social comparisons to peers (e.g., “Have I exercised more than my friends?”) or temporal comparisons of the present to the past (e.g., “Have I exercised more this week than last week?”). While ample research has examined the relevance and impact of social and temporal comparisons in a range of health contexts (e.g., health behaviors, risk perceptions), the overarching goal of the present review was to explicate the potential relevance and impact of a third type of comparison standard—dimensional comparisons—in health contexts (with an emphasis on health behaviors like exercise). First, we discuss how social and temporal comparisons shape self-evaluations in both health and non-health contexts. Second, we provide an overview of research conducted on dimensional comparisons in non-health contexts and discuss how comparison sources shape self-evaluations and self-concept formation. Third, we explore the potential impact and relevance of dimensional comparisons on self-evaluations in health behavior contexts. Fourth, and finally, we highlight potential future directions and considerations for advancing our knowledge of the relevance and influence of dimensional comparisons in health contexts.     

Moving Life Science Ethics Debates Beyond National Borders: Some Empirical Observations

The life sciences are increasingly being called on to produce “socially robust” knowledge that honors the social contract between science and society. This has resulted in the emergence of a number of “broad social issues” that reflect the ethical tensions in these social contracts. These issues are framed in a variety of ways around the world, evidenced by differences in regulations addressing them. It is important to question whether these variations are simply regulatory variations or in fact reflect a contextual approach to ethics that brings into question the existence of a system of “global scientific ethics”. Nonetheless, within ethics education for scientists these broad social issues are often presented using this scheme of global ethics due to legacies of science ethics pedagogy. This paper suggests this may present barriers to fostering international discourse between communities of scientists, and may cause difficulties in harmonizing (and transporting) national regulations for the governance of these issues. Reinterpreting these variations according to how the content of ethical principles is attributed by communities is proposed as crucial for developing a robust international discourse. To illustrate this, the paper offers some empirical fieldwork data that considers how the concept of dual-use (as a broad social issue) was discussed within African and UK laboratories. Demonstrating that African scientists reshaped the concept of dual-use according to their own research environmental pressures and ascribed alternative content to the principles that underpin it, suggests that the limitations of a “global scientific ethics” system for these issues cannot be ignored.     

Social identity and cycling among women: The case of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa

Through the lens of the Social Identify Theory (Tajfel, 1974), this research aims to understand how social identity affects the perception of cycling as a mode of transport among women from different socio-income backgrounds. Using the case study of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa (Israel), we found that cycling is associated with distinct social categories rather than seen as a 'socially neutral' practice. In particular, we found cycling to be associated with 'being a Tel-Avivian' and with a healthy and active lifestyle. Such distinct identification of cycling is likely to enhance cycling uptake among more privileged groups, who are often able to identify with these social categories. In contrast, it may create a barrier for underprivileged groups, who do not identify with these social categories. In addition, we show how e-bikes – which are not identified with privileged groups – do not provide an identifiable alternative for women from all groups, as it is identified with “tough” and “violent” men. Furthermore, we show how cycling, in general, is perceived as “tough”, “dangerous” and as requiring a “constant struggle” over space with other road users, and hence fits a typical “masculine” behavior. Finally, we show how currently cycling is perceived by the underprivileged as a threat to their way of life or even as a symbol of them being pushed out of their neighborhood – a perception that limits cycling uptake among these social groups. These findings underscore the importance of accounting for social identity in cycling research and policymaking, especially in low-cycling contexts.