To honor Fechner and obey Stevens: relationships between psychophysical and neural nonlinearities

G. T. Fechner (1860/1966) famously described two kinds of psychophysics: Outer psychophysics captures the black box relationship between sensory inputs and perceptual magnitudes, whereas inner psychophysics contains the neural transformations that Fechner's outer psychophysics elided. The relationship between the two has never been clear. Moreover, psychophysical power laws are found in almost every sensory system, yet the vast majority of neurons show sigmoid nonlinearities. Here, we selectively review the literatures on psychophysical and physiological nonlinearities and show how they can be placed within a framework for understanding the relationship between inner and outer psychophysics: a neural organization with a logical structure commensurate to outer psychophysical theory. In theoretical treatments of Stevens's law, the power law is a consequence of combining a Weber's law scaling of inputs with a Weber's law-like scaling of sensation magnitudes, yielding an exponent that is the ratio of the Weber constants. A neural derivation using physiological sigmoid nonlinearities should be commensurate to this internal logic. There is a class of models in which two nonlinear neural mechanisms (e.g., a sensory channel and the cortical numerosity mechanism tapped by magnitude estimation) are coupled through feedback, yielding power law behavior as an emergent property of the system, with an exponent that is a ratio of neural coupling strengths. Rather than a discrepancy between psychophysics and physiology, these models suggest complementarity between inner and outer psychophysics, because the Weber constants required for outer psychophysics modeling can be derived from the sigmoid nonlinearities of inner psychophysics.     

A plea for pragmatics

Let intentionalism be the view that what proposition is expressed in context by a sentence containing indexicals depends on the speaker’s intentions. It has recently been argued that intentionalism makes communicative success mysterious and that there are counterexamples to the intentionalist view in the form of cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct interpretation. In this paper, I argue that these objections can be met, once we acknowledge that we may distinguish what determines the correct interpretation from the evidence that is available to the audience, as well as from the standards by which we judge whether or not a given interpretation is reasonable. With these distinctions in place, we see that intentionalism does not render communicative success mysterious, and that cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct one can easily be accommodated. The distinction is also useful in treating the Humpty Dumpty problem for intentionalism, since it turns out that this can be treated as an extreme special case of mismatch.     

Variations of the Fechner wheel

The Fechner wheel is a disk that is printed in black and white. When the Fechner wheel spins at an appropriate speed, semicircles on the wheel appear to be in color. Modern computer technology makes it possible to rapidly and repeatedly present a series of images on a monitor screen. A series of still images of a Fechner wheel can be substituted for a Fechner wheel on a motor shaft. Straight lines and lines of text can be substituted for semicircles to obtain a color effect. A color effect can be obtained in small areas of black-and-white pictures.     

A plea for more intervision

The author presents an argument for tolerance, mutual understanding and reconciliation in psychotherapy, instead of a continued emphasis of schools. Psychotherapists' work with clients is proposed as a likely area for mutual understanding, rather than continued emphasis on their particular theories and academic matters. Psychotherapeutic intervision groups in which a small number of therapists voluntarily discuss their cases with peers from various backgrounds have become increasingly common again in recent years.Slightly revised version of a presentation made at the Georgetown Family Center Symposium in November 1995.     

A plea for logical objects

An account of validity that makes what is invalid conditional on how many individuals there are is what I call a conditional account of validity. Here I defend conditional accounts against a criticism derived from Etchemendy’s well-known criticism of the model-theoretic analysis of validity. The criticism is essentially that knowledge of the size of the universe is non-logical and so by making knowledge of the extension of validity depend on knowledge of how many individuals there are, conditional accounts fail to reflect that the former knowledge is basic, i.e., independent of knowledge derived from other sciences. Appealing to Russell’s pre-Principia logic, I defend conditional accounts against this criticism by sketching a rationale for thinking that there are infinitely many logical objects.     

A plea for virtue in ethics

Comments on the original article, "Nonrational processes in ethical decision making" by M. D. Rogerson et al (see record 2011-19198-001). The current authors suggest that Rogerson, Gottlieb, Handelsman, Knapp, and Younggren (October 2011) presumed that the only ethical theories available for grounding decision-making models are of the rational, neoliberal variety. Rogerson et al stated, "Contextual, interpersonal, and intuitive factors are inextricably linked and inexorably influential in the process of ethical decision making. Ethical theory would benefit from encompassing these subtle yet powerful forces" (Rogerson et al., 2011, p. 616). They sought to augment these models with a cluster of contextual considerations, appending to them accounts of emotion, context, and intuition. First, notwithstanding the theories attributed to (the caricature of) Kant and his ilk, there are several ethical theories that include an account of what Rogerson et al. (2011) consider to be "nonrational" processes. From feminist theories to narrative ethics, sophisticated contextual theories have been developed and are readily available. Second, we question whether thick contextual considerations can simply be tacked on to extant models of decision making originally built upon a philosophical foundation that assumes a rational, autonomous agent who deliberates independently and logically.     

A plea for minimally biased naturalistic philosophy

Synthese - Naturalistic philosophers rely on literature search and review in a number of ways and for different purposes. Yet this article shows how processes of literature search and review are...     

Interpretation without hermeneutics: A plea against ecumenism

I have been much helped by Axel Bühler writings on hermeneutics (in particular by his unpublished Conference sull'ermeneutica) and would like to thank him and Donald Davidson for comments.     

Hamlet: plea for a measure of normality

The author first considers issues in psychoanalytic interpretations of literary characters, especially the question of treating the character as fiction (the aesthetic illusion) or as a real person. The position he adopts is to interpret Hamlet as a potential person, created by Shakespeare and an expression of Shakespeare’s actual – and intuitive – view of man.

With a synopsis of the tragedy and the context of its creation as background, the author then reflects on questions concerning the play. How does Shakespeare present the characters? Is Hamlet’s madness pretended or real? Which conflicts does he handle in the course of the play? Has Oedipal dynamics a role as motivational factor in his mind?

Hamlet is irrational, impulsive, emotional, inhibited, brooding, suspicious, revengeful, condemning and much more. But, in the view of the author, he is all this in a human, ‘normal’ way. There is nothing convincingly pathological or constricted in his character. ‘Un-normal’ is his intelligence and his wit. Hamlet – an intelligent, reflected, resourceful prince in late Renaissance – who has wrestle with a madhouse of political intrigues, family murders and deceitful friends.

Hamlet in Shakespeare’s text – a fairly normal person in quite a mad world.     

Understanding suicide terrorism: Premature dismissal of the religious-belief hypothesis

We comment on work by Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan (2009), in which they compare two hypotheses for predicting individual support for suicide terrorism: the religious-belief hypothesis and the coalitional-commitment hypothesis. Although we appreciate the evidence provided in support of the coalitional-commitment hypothesis, we argue that their method of testing the religious-belief hypothesis is conceptually flawed, thus calling into question their conclusion that the religious-belief hypothesis has been disconfirmed. In addition to critiquing the methodology implemented by Ginges et al., we provide suggestions on how the religious-belief hypothesis may be properly tested. It is possible that the premature and unwarranted conclusions reached by Ginges et al. may deter researchers from examining the effect of specific religious beliefs on support for terrorism, and we hope that our comments can mitigate this possibility.     

A plea for pragmatism in clinical research ethics

Pragmatism is a distinctive approach to clinical research ethics that can guide bioethicists and members of institutional review boards (IRBs) as they struggle to balance the competing values of promoting medical research and protecting human subjects participating in it. After defining our understanding of pragmatism in the setting of clinical research ethics, we show how a pragmatic approach can provide guidance not only for the day-to-day functioning of the IRB, but also for evaluation of policy standards, such as the one that addresses acceptable risks for healthy children in clinical research trials. We also show how pragmatic considerations might influence the debate about the use of deception in clinical research. Finally, we show how a pragmatic approach, by regarding the promotion of human research and the protection of human subjects as equally important values, helps to break down the false dichotomy between science and ethics in clinical research.     

Lies,lies, and more lies: A plea for propositions

To resolve putative liar paradoxes it is sufficient to attend to the distinction between liar-sentences and the propositions they would express, and to exercise the option of turning would-be deductions of paradox (of contradictions) into reductios of the existence of those propositions. Defending the coherence of particular resolutions along these lines, leads to recognition of the non-extensionality of some liarsentences. In particular, it turns out that exchanges of terms for identicals in the open-sentence — does not expression a true proposition are not invariably truth-preserving because they are not invariably proposition-expression preserving. All of this recommends propositions as fruitful subjects of interesting renewed research.     

Gustav Theodor Fechner: life and work in the mirror of his diary

The diaries of Gustav Fechner reveal much about his motivations to develop the field of psychophysics, as well as some of the steps toward its formulation. Together with his publications on various subjects, the diaries show how psychophysics fits into Fechner's broader scientific program, illuminate his worldview, and reveal his hopes for acceptance of his work by his colleagues.     

Cognition and emotion: a plea for theory

ABSTRACT

Research on cognition and emotion during the past 30 years has made reasonable progress in theory, methods and empirical research. New theories of the cognition–emotion relation have been proposed, emotion research has become more interdisciplinary, and improved methods of emotion measurement have been developed. On the empirical side, the main achievement of the past 30 years is seen to consist in the reduction of the set of serious contenders for a theory of emotions. Still, several important issues are not fully resolved, including the computational implementation of appraisal processes, the nature of emotions, and the link between emotions and actions. Also, quantitative theories of the cognition–emotion relation need to be refined and tested, and improved theories of the link between emotions and bodily and facial expressions need to be developed. To counter the dangers of theoretical fragmentation and knowledge loss, more efforts should be devoted to the analysis, reconstruction, comparison and integration of important theories and hypotheses in the field of emotion, as well as to the systematization of arguments in favor and against these theories and hypotheses.     

A plea for more training opportunities in qualitative methods

This article is a commentary on ‘Assessing ‘good’ qualitative research in the work psychology field: A narrative analysis’ (Cassell & Symon, 2011) and a response to two other commentaries (Hickson, 2011; Locke, 2011).     

Neural model for the Stevens’ power law

A neural model, compatible with known “all or none” neurological principles, duplicates or closely approximates Stevens’ power law with any exponent—greater or less than unity. The model has several electronic analogues, and one is discussed. The model predicts experimental neurological and psychological findings.     

Humanizing education in the Soviet Union: A plea for caution in these postmodern times

In this article, the author problematizes the process of humanizing education in the era of perestroika and glasnost. Identifying herself as a democratic socialist, Kohli invites her Soviet colleagues to acknowledge the criticisms of liberal capitalism before they move headlong in that direction. In deconstructing such taken-for-granted concepts as individualism, democracy, market economy, and community, Kohli suggests that both the West and the East could benefit from re-visiting their respective revolutionary traditions at this crucial historical time.