The emotional self: Embodiment,reflexivity, and emotion regulation

Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition, and consciousness in realising emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article, I suggest an alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances, the self gets overwhelmed by emotion and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one's feelings and being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.     

Collective emotions

Research on collective emotions has been limited until recently to theories of irrational crowds, scepticism about genuinely group‐level psychological phenomena and analyses of the unconscious or ritual sources of mass affective experience. However, collective emotion is now a thriving research area that combines studies from philosophy, anthropology, sociology, social psychology and neuroscience. This article examines neo‐Durkheimian theories of collective emotions and relevant contributions of discursive psychologists and other social scientists influenced by the “turn to affect.” I argue that future theoretical and empirical investigations should do the following: (1) critically examine theories focusing on diffuse emotional energy and discrete collective emotions by also exploring the generation and production of genuinely collective mixed emotions; (2) clarify problems with “bottom‐up” models of causal mechanisms through exploration of “affective practices”; and (3) explore the implications of Tuomela's ( 2013 ) “top‐down” social ontology of “group agents” as a framework for theories and studies of collective emotion.     

Nietzsche on the sociality of emotional experience

In this paper, I explore the sociality of emotional experience in the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Specifically, I describe four key mechanisms through which an individual's sociocultural context shapes her emotional experience on Nietzsche's view—emotional contagion as habitual affective mimicry, the production of emotions' felt character through the assimilation of dominant social beliefs and norms, affective interpretation à la Christopher Fowles, and the imposition of dominant notions of emotional appropriateness—fleshing out a dimension of Nietzsche's thought which is largely taken for granted but remains undertreated. After detailing these mechanisms, I argue that attending to the sociality of emotional experience in Nietzsche's thought is crucial not only for understanding key elements of his moral psychology (including certain of his reflections on freedom and self-transformation), but also for understanding his interpretation of nihilism as a psychological-affective phenomenon produced by the society to which one belongs. On Nietzsche's view, attending to the sociality of emotion helps individuals recognize the way in which the sociocultural contexts they inhabit might undermine their flourishing—and also helps them envision the conditions (especially sociocultural conditions) requisite for healthier, more empowering emotional lives.     

Emotional Intelligence,Social Problem‐Solving Skills,and Psychological Distress: A Study of Chinese Undergraduate Students1

This study examines how emotional intelligence (EI), personality, and social problem‐solving skills were linked to depression and life dissatisfaction in 144 Chinese undergraduate students in Hong Kong. Factor analyses of questionnaire responses yielded 3 separate dimensions of depression (affective, somative, and cognitive). Structural equation modeling showed that EI (self‐emotions appraisal and use of emotion) was linked to somatic and cognitive symptoms of depression, after controlling for personality. Also, social problem solving was linked to psychological distress, and moderated its links with personality and EI. These results underscore the differences among the links between the components of EI and of psychological health, and support the possibility of promoting people's psychological health through EI and social problem‐solving interventions.     

The Face of the Chameleon: The Experience of Facial Mimicry for the Mimicker and the Mimickee

This research addressed three questions concerning facial mimicry: (a) Does the relationship between mimicry and liking characterize all facial expressions, or is it limited to specific expressions? (b) Is the relationship between facial mimicry and liking symmetrical for the mimicker and the mimickee? (c) Does conscious mimicry have consequences for emotion recognition? A paradigm is introduced in which participants interact over a computer setup with a confederate whose prerecorded facial displays of emotion are synchronized with participants’ behavior to create the illusion of social interaction. In Experiment 1, the confederate did or did not mimic participants’ facial displays of various subsets of basic emotions. Mimicry promoted greater liking for the confederate regardless of which emotions were mimicked. Experiment 2 reversed these roles: participants were instructed to mimic or not to mimic the confederate’s facial displays. Mimicry did not affect liking for the confederate but it did impair emotion recognition.     

Exploring how people respond to conflicts between self‐interest and fairness: Influence of threats to the self on affective reactions to advantageous inequity

Two studies examined how people deal with conflicts between their self‐interest concerns and their striving for fairness. Specifically, the affective reactions to outcome arrangements in which people receive better outcomes than comparable other persons, were studied. These arrangements of advantageous inequity constitute situations in which fairness and self‐interest concerns are in conflict. Building on the social psychology of the self, it was predicted, and found, in both field and lab experiments that when people experience a self‐threat, they react more positively to arrangements of advantageous inequity than when not experiencing this threat. This supports the view that people's need for positive information about their selves is an important factor in the underlying psychological processes of the way that people deal with conflicts between their fairness and self‐interest concerns.     

The Feminist Pacifism of William James and Mary Whiton Calkins

In this paper, I accompany William James (1842–1910) and Mary Whiton Calkins (1863–1930) in the steps each takes toward his or her respective proposal of a moral equivalent of war. I demonstrate the influence of James upon Calkins, suggesting that the two share overlapping formulations of the problem and offer closely related—but significantly different—solutions. I suggest that Calkins's pacifistic proposal is an extension of that of her teacher—a feminist interpretation of his psychological and moral thought as brought to bear on the problem of war. Calkins's brand of pacifism widens the scope of James's “moral equivalent of war” in a way that is consonant with feminist ideals of inclusiveness and social justice. I conclude by commenting on how James's and Calkins's pacifism can continue to be extended fruitfully in contemporary feminist pacifist theory and practice.     

Spirituality,Gendered Subjectivities,and Education in Preadolescents: Canadian preadolescents' reflections on gender-roles and their sense of self

'Adolescents' spirituality' has emerged as a lively focus for discussion and research amongst both academics and practitioners. Yet remarkably little reference has been made to conceptions of the child provided by developmental educational psychology. To gain a holistic perspective of how preadolescents construct their sense of self, cultural meanings of sexuality and spirituality must also be examined. How do adolescents make the connections among a sense of body, self, and soul? What is the role of education? To address these issues, this paper draws on recent research that explored the connections between the self-concepts of Canadian preadolescents (9-12 year-olds) and their perceptions of their gender-role orientation. This paper undertakes an 'excavation' of psychocultural approaches to gender and language, and the mixed messages about early adolescent spirituality and gendered selves implicit in the respective understandings of psychological development. The examination of these theories unearths many points of resonance with contemporary debates about our expectations of the nature of spirituality and sexuality in preadolescence, and our interventions for its nurture. The paper examines gendered perceptions of femininity and masculinity in Canadian preadolescents and how these perceptions influence their self-worth or overall well-being. It focuses on the links between spirituality and gendered perceptions and understandings of emotions and self. The final section discusses the socio-educational implications of the research findings within the context of holistic education. In this way, dialogue with a psychocultural and holistic approach to psychology and education offers valuable additional vocabulary and grammar with which to tackle these challenges.     

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”     

William James and the ‘willfulness’ of belief

This paper explicates and defends some of William James' more controversial claims in ‘The Will to Believe’. After showing some of the weaknesses in standard interpretations of James' position, I turn to James' Principles of Psychology and The Varieties of Religious Experience to spell out in more detail James' account of the nature of the attitudes of belief, doubt, and disbelief and link them to an account of the subject. In so doing, the moral force of the argument comes to the fore by casting the question ‘Can we believe at will?’ in a new light. Through a discussion of the conversion experiences of The Varieties of Religious Experience and the kinds of self‐transformations in which beliefs that once appeared dead become live (or vice versa) that appear throughout James' psychology, the moral urgency of James' position in ‘The Will to Believe’ is clarified.     

Soteriological dimensions in the work of Heinz Kohut

A framework of theological inquiry is utilized to illuminate soteriological dimensions implicit in Heinz Kohut's psychology of the self as expressed in his most recent work,The Restoration of the Self. Kohut's new formulations involve the unfolding of a saving approach that through its broad application seeks to overcome “the psychological danger that puts the psychological survival of modern Western man into the greatest jeopardy.” The theological inquiry employed asks: What is the essential nature of man? How has man fallen away from his essential self? By what means is he to be saved from his broken condition? Kohut's implicit and explicit “answers” are summarized by dealing with four cardinal issues in his book: definitions of the self: the relationship of a psychology of the self to other psychologies; theory concerning the selfs structure, development, and restoration; and the centrality of the empathic response.     

Ekman's basic emotions: Why not love and jealousy?

Paul Ekman's view of the emotions is, we argue, pervasive in psychology and is explicitly shaped to be compatible with evolutionary thinking. Yet, strangely, jealousy and parental love, two emotions that figure prominently in evolutionary psychology, are absent from Ekman's list of the emotions. In this paper we examine why Ekman believes this exclusion is necessary, and what this implies about the limits of his conception of emotion. We propose an alternative way of thinking about emotion that does not exclude jealousy and parental love.     

Emotion recognition and emotional theory of mind in chronic fatigue syndrome

Background: Difficulties with social function have been reported in chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), but underpinning factors are unknown. Emotion recognition, theory of mind (inference of another's mental state) and ‘emotional’ theory of mind (eToM) (inference of another's emotional state) are important social abilities, facilitating understanding of others. This study examined emotion recognition and eToM in CFS patients and their relationship to self-reported social function.

Methods: CFS patients (n?=?45) and healthy controls (HCs; n?=?50) completed tasks assessing emotion recognition, basic or advanced eToM (for self and other) and a self-report measure of social function.

Results: CFS participants were poorer than HCs at recognising emotion states in the faces of others and at inferring their own emotions. Lower scores on these tasks were associated with poorer self-reported daily and social function. CFS patients demonstrated good eToM and performance on these tasks did not relate to the level of social function.

Conclusions: CFS patients do not have poor eToM, nor does eToM appear to be associated with social functioning in CFS. However, this group of patients experience difficulties in emotion recognition and inferring emotions in themselves and this may impact upon social function.     

Empathy in adolescence: Relations with emotion awareness and social roles

In this study, we aimed at gaining a better understanding of the individual differences contributing to feelings of empathy in adolescents. Therefore, we examined the extent to which emotion awareness (e.g., recognizing and appreciating one's own and the emotions of others) and a tendency for certain social roles (e.g., helping or teasing peers when being bullied) are related to adolescents’ levels of empathy. The sample was comprised of 182 adolescents aged between 11 and 16. Empathy and emotion awareness were assessed using self‐report measures. Peer reports were used to indicate adolescents’ different social roles: Bullying, defending the victim, and outsider behaviour. Outcomes demonstrated that evaluating one's own and the emotions of others, and more defending nominations were associated with both affective and cognitive empathy, whereas aspects of emotion awareness which are linked with internalizing symptoms were related to empathic distress, suggesting maladaptive emotion appraisal. Furthermore, outsider behaviour was associated with empathic distress, emphasizing a self‐focused orientation. In contrast, more bullying was negatively associated with cognitive empathy. Overall, these outcomes demonstrate that, besides social roles, emotion awareness is an important factor for adaptive empathic reactions, whereas emotion dysregulation might cause distress when witnessing the negative feelings of others.     

Rage Against the Machine: The Case for System‐Level Emotions

Although psychologists have generally conceptualized emotions in light of individual‐ and group‐ level approaches, in the current paper we propose that there are also system‐level emotional events, including both system‐based emotions (experienced as a direct or indirect consequence of system‐level characteristics) and system‐targeted emotions (reflecting evaluations that support or oppose the overarching social system). We begin by discussing how emotions are embedded in the social system and what system‐level functions they serve. We draw on system justification theory to understand the reciprocal relations between emotional life and ideologies that justify or challenge social systems. We then focus on three empirical propositions concerning the dynamics of system‐level emotions: (I) System‐based emotions reflect one’s subjective as well as objective standing in the social order; (II) System‐based emotions reflect one’s subjective appraisal of the social order; and (III) System‐level emotions affect action tendencies and behaviors, including behaviors that promote system stability versus change. The investigation of system‐level emotions promises to deepen our scientific understanding of the motivational dynamics of social stability and social change and to uncover the affective dimension of system justification processes. Extending the social psychological analysis of emotions to include contextual features at the level of social systems builds a much‐needed bridge between emotion research in psychology and sociology.     

Plenary address – A year of living ‘dangerously’: Reflections on risk,trust, trauma and change

This paper examines the role of emotions in the construction and performance of mis/trustful relations; with medical professionals, their technologies, and ultimately, with oneself. Using personal experience of two common conditions as illustrative examples, it questions what it means and feels like to trust, and how, where and by whom such feelings can be enhanced or undermined. It explores some of the ways in which discourses of risk are mobilized and embodied to create a crisis of trust, asking; what kind of selves and emotionalities surface, and what are the health outcomes, when bodies are viewed as ‘at risk’? Visualizing technologies that probe the interior for data play an increasingly prominent role in healthcare, and are typically considered more trustworthy sources of knowledge about the body than anything that might be produced by the tech-free sensing self. However, not all (even ‘physical’) trauma can be seen or quantified, and not all information is equal. The paper reflects on the emotional dissonance that ensues when one's own perceptions and representations are at odds with those of medical experts for whom one is supposed to perform trust. It examines the feeling rules that are broken when we fail to appreciate our treatment at their hands, and asks: What happens when we resist expert author-ity by telling different stories about our embodied selves, ones that make space for emotions in contexts where they are rarely seen to count, and where only what can be measured matters?     

Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections

I develop a multilevel, holistic view of persons, emphasizing embodiment, emotions, consciousness, and the social self. In successive sections I draw from six sources: 1. Theology . The biblical understanding of the unitary, embodied, social self gave way in classical Christianity to a body-soul dualism, but it has been recovered by many recent theologians. 2. Neuroscience . Research has shown the localization of mental functions in regions of the brain, the interaction of cognition and emotion, and the importance of social interaction in evolutionary history and child development. 3. Artificial intelligence . Some forms of robotics use embodied systems that learn by interacting with their environment, but the possibilities for emotion, socialization, and consciousness in robots remain problematic. 4. Relations between levels . Concepts that can help us relate studies of neurons and persons include the hierarchy of levels, the communication of information, thebehavior of dynamic systems, and epistemological and ontological emergence. 5. Philosophy of mind . Two-aspect theories of the mind-brain relation offer an alternative between the extremes of eliminative materialism and the thesis that consciousness is irreducible. 6. Process philosophy . I suggest that process thought provides a coherent philosophical framework in which these themes can be brought together. It combines dipolar monism with organizational pluralism, and it emphasizes embodiment, emotions, a hierarchy oflevels, and the social character of selfhood.     

The self in prejudice

The self as a psychological construct, and the self in relation to the other has been discussed in psychological and sociological literature for decades, but not much attention has been given to the psychological development of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved in the development of self within the social context. Consequently, the aim is to explore the self in the construction and expression of prejudice from both a social and psychological approach, and to explain selfhood influences at the individual, group and community levels. I use the conceptual framework of Kohut's self psychology as a lens to present the development of the self and thus the idea of the development of the self in relation to the other. In such exploration of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas which include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion of “selfgroup’ in terms of overidentification with the in-group. While the social and the psychological in terms of the development of the self cannot be separated, I have therefore attempted to merge at some point the two bodies of thought in relation to the self in prejudice.