How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism

Naturalism is often considered to be antithetical to theology and genuine religion. However, in a series of recent books and articles, Willem Drees has proposed a scientifically informed naturalistic account of religion, which, he contends, is not only compatible with supernaturalistic religion and theology but provides a better account of both than either purely naturalistic or purely supernaturalistic accounts. While rejecting both epistemological and methodological naturalism, Drees maintains that ontological naturalism offers the best philosophical account of the natural world and that, in addition, it provides the opening for a supernaturalistic understanding of religion and theology, one that best fits the condition of epistemic and moral distance from the transcendent characteristic of religious wonderers and wanderers. In this paper I examine Drees's claim and argue that it is seriously flawed. I show that Drees's naturalism is, in fact, both methodologically and epistemologically naturalistic. I also show that his attempts to limit naturalism to the sphere of the natural world by means of the phenomena of limit questions and underdetermination fail. Arguing for a more optimistic, but also, I contend, more empirically accurate account of human epistemic and moral capacities, I propose a full-fledged scientifically based naturalistic account of theology.     

Discerning the Limits of Religious Naturalism

In response to my "How to Make Naturalism Safe for Supernaturalism: An Evaluation of Willem Drees's Supernaturalistic Naturalism" (Rottschaefer 2001), Willem Drees maintains that I have misunderstood his purpose and views and have failed to make the case against his view that naturalism is intrinsically limited. In this response, I comment on these concerns.     

Theory structuralism in a rigid framework

This paper develops the first parts of a logical framework for the empirical sciences, by means of a redefinition of theory structuralism as originally developed by Joseph Sneed, Wolfgang Stegmüller, and others, in the context of a ??rigid?? logic as based on a fixed (therefore rigid) ontology. The paper defends a formal conception of the empirical sciences that has an irreducible ontological basis and is unable, in general, to provide purely structural characterizations of the domain of a theory. The extreme rationalist utopia of a characterization of the real world ??up to isomorphism??, therefore, is rejected.     

DOES THE SUPERVENIENCE ARGUMENT GENERALIZE?

We evaluate the scope of Jaegwon Kim's “supervenience argument” for reduction. Does its conclusion apply only to psychology, or does it generalize to all the special sciences? The claim that the supervenience argument generalizes to all the special sciences if it goes through for psychology is often raised as an objection to the supervenience argument. We argue that this objection is ambiguous. We distinguish three readings of it and suggest that some of them make it a plausible claim, whereas other readings make it implausible. We suggest that this ambiguity is the result of picturing the world as being hierarchically organized in levels, with the domain of physics at the bottom and the domains of the social sciences at the top. The plausibility of the objection depends on how we think of this picture. This popular picture, we suggest, involves three different dimensions along which reduction may occur.     

Confusion and dependence in uses of history

Many people argue that history makes a special difference to the subjects of biology and psychology, and that history does not make this special difference to other parts of the world. This paper will show that historical properties make no more or less of a difference to biology or psychology than to chemistry, physics, or other sciences. Although historical properties indeed make a certain kind of difference to biology and psychology, this paper will show that historical properties make the same kind of difference to geology, sociology, astronomy, and other sciences. Similarly, many people argue that nonhistorical properties make a special difference to the nonbiological and the nonpsychological world. This paper will show that nonhistorical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their causal behavior and that historical properties make the same difference to all things in the world when it comes to their distributions. Although history is special, it is special in the same way to all parts of the world.     

JUMPING TOGETHER: A WAY FROM SOCIOBIOLOGY TO BIO‐SOCIO‐HUMANITIES

Sociobiology is a grand narrative of evolutionary biology on which to build unified knowledge. Consilience is a metaphorical representation of that narrative. I take up the same metaphor but apply it differently. I evoke the image of jumping together, not on solid ground but on the strong, flexible canvas sheet of a trampoline, on which natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities jump together. This image overlaps with the traditional East Asian way of understanding—that is, the “Heaven‐Earth‐Person Triad.” Using recent insights from cognitive science—metaphor, embodiment, and conceptual blending—I propose the alternative way of “bio‐socio‐humanities” to understand and experience the world.     

A PERSONAL APPRECIATION

Abstract. My primary relation to Barbour's work is that of indebtedness and appreciation. He has reassured me that despite the vast changes in physics, the Whiteheadian perspective that has been so important to me as a Christian believer provides a valid way of understanding the physical world. If there is a difference between us, it is my greater emphasis on perspective and on the challenge of the Whiteheadian perspective to the ones that now dominate the sciences.     

Indispensability Arguments in Favour of Reductive Explanations

Instances of explanatory reduction are often advocated on metaphysical grounds; given that the only real things in the world are subatomic particles and their interaction, we have to try to explain everything in terms of the laws of physics. In this paper, we show that explanatory reduction cannot be defended on metaphysical grounds. Nevertheless, indispensability arguments for reductive explanations can be developed, taking into account actual scientific practice and the role of epistemic interests. Reductive explanations might be indispensable to address some epistemic interest answering a specific explanation-seeking question in the most accurate, adequate and efficient way. Just like explanatory pluralists often advocate the indispensability of higher levels of explanation pointing at the pragmatic value of the explanatory information obtained on these higher levels, we argue that explanatory reduction—traditionally understood as the contender of pluralism—can be defended in a similar way. The pragmatic value reductionist, lower level explanations might have in the biomedical sciences and the social sciences is illustrated by some case studies.     

The Objectivity of Ordinary Life

Metaethics tends to take for granted a bare Democritean world of atoms and the void, and then worry about how the human world that we all know can possibly be related to it or justified in its terms. I draw on Wittgenstein to show how completely upside-down this picture is, and make some moves towards turning it the right way up again. There may be a use for something like the bare-Democritean model in some of the sciences, but the picture has no standing as the basic objective truth about the world; if anything has that standing, it is ordinary life. I conclude with some thoughts about how the notion of bare, “thin” perception of non-evaluative reality feeds a number of philosophical pathologies, such as behaviourism, and show how a “thicker”, more value-laden, understanding of our perceptions of the world can be therapeutic against them.     

Psychology and the fall of Communism: The special case of (East) Germany

The fall of Communism is now universally agreed to be what the philosopher Hegel called a world historical event—one that few predicted but nearly everyone saw as inevitable after it happened. In the aftermath many lives—and worldviews—changed, not only, but also in the human sciences. These remarks attempt to address in a preliminary way both the impact of the fall of Communism on psychology in former East Germany (including changes in personnel and approach) and the ways in which these sciences were employed as resources for reflection on the Communist past as well as the transition to new social and political regimes.     

Genetic testing and human subjectivity

This article offers a brief overview of how methods of DNA testing are reframing what it means to be a living being in a living world. It is no longer the case that genetic technologies objectify life in such a way as to deny something essential to human subjectivity. The style of reasoning of the life sciences today is characterised by complexity, dynamism and emergence. This requires rethinking the relationship between technology, society and subjectivity. Genetic testing is a social and symbolic practice through which notions of identity and relatedness are reconfigured in terms of being genetically at risk. Far from reducing subjectivity to one's biological destiny, genetic technologies have consequences in terms of not only governing others to govern their risk wisely, but also aligning conduct with Western liberal values of autonomy, responsibility and choice. New pastors and gatekeepers of genetic information have assembled around these technologies where psychology plays a key role in facilitating autonomy and instilling a sense of genetic responsibility. Nevertheless, the increasing capitalization of genomics is moving genetic testing beyond these clinical enclosures of control into the domain of consumer choice, creating new forms of subjectification, citizenship and community.     

Fitting Ethics to the Land: H. Richard Niebuhr's Ethic of Responsibility and Ecotheology

Much of ecotheology and environmental philosophy has moved deductively from theological and ethical constructs to questions of how we should relate to the natural world. Such approaches are limited in their ability to guide us toward appropriate environmental action for they do not necessarily fit the way the natural world actually functions. Niebuhr's ethic of response, on the other hand, begins with the concrete situation and is inherently ecological for it focuses on interrelationships in an on-going community. It is inductive in character and open to being informed by new findings in the natural and social sciences; thus it is exceptionally well suited to environmental problems, which involve complex scientific, social, and economic questions.     

Edgar Morin: From Vicious Circles to Virtuous Circles

Morin stresses the danger of the tendency to apply the method of natural sciences to human disciplines, considering the latter a natural object, and seeking one great explicative and definitive mathematical cosmological form by means of the reduction of the anthropological aspect to the biological one, of the biological to the physical–chemical aspect and the physical to the mathematical aspect. Hence the need to find a new way of organizing knowledge based on the concept of “circularity,” which is fundamental both in Morin's thought and in the philosophy of complexity in general. We must therefore establish a circular relation among the various spheres of knowledge: physics–biology–anthropology–sociology. The classical vision of a hierarchized-mechanic world is substituted by the vision of a reticulated world.     

Levels of Reality

Philosophers and non‐philosophers have been attracted to the idea that the world incorporates levels of being: higher‐level items – ordinary objects, artifacts, human beings – depend on, but are not in any sense reducible to, items at lower levels. I argue that the motivation for levels stems from an implicit acceptance of a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from ways we describe the world. Abandonment of the Picture Theory opens the way to a ‘no levels’ conception of reality, a conception that honors anti‐reductionist sentiments and preserves the status of the special sciences without the ontological baggage.     

Trace of pace,place, and space in personal relationships: The chronogeometrics of studying relationships at scale

The study of personal relationships has traditionally relied on self‐reports or observations of face‐to‐face interaction. Digital media increasingly provide the ability to trace communication and relationships at scale. Such methods portend significant theoretical and methodological challenges, as well as potential. As a way of illustrating such potential, big data approaches to the select traditional relational concepts of routine relating, propinquity, homophily, small world, and reciprocity are reviewed. The fields of communication and personal relationships will need to inform such research by developing their own interdisciplinary relationships with geographic information sciences, computational linguistics, and computer sciences or cede a significant frontier of their field to these other disciplines.     

Is symmetry identity?

Wigner found unreasonable the "effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences". But if the mathematics we use to describe nature is simply a carefully coded expression of our experience then its effectiveness is quite reasonable. Its effectiveness is built into its design. We consider group theory, the logic of symmetry. We examine the premise that symmetry is identity; that group theory encodes our experience of identification. To decide whether group theory describes the world in such an elemental way we catalogue the detailed correspondence between elements of the physical world and elements of the formalism. Providing an unequivocal match between concept and mathematical statement completes the case. It makes effectiveness appear reasonable. The case that symmetry is identity is a strong one but it is not complete. The further validation required suggests that unexpected entities might be describable by the irreducible representations of group theory.     

Encounters with the Religious Imagination and the Emergence of Creativity

Ervin Laszlo's notion of the interrelationship between evolution and creativity as being intrinsic to universal life processes has been influential to the biological and social sciences. Central to Laszlo's thinking is the notion of convergence in biological and social systems that are posited on creative complexity. In this article, I employ Laszlo's concept of creativity in relation to the human religious imagination. Cross-cultural studies of the religious imagination examine the architecture of human consciousness and ways of knowing. These two areas are interlinked and generate new kinds of knowledge and understanding of the self and the world. In this way, the religious imagination is a means of generating new possibilities of mind and consciousness.