Metacognition in Humans and Animals

ABSTRACT— It has long been assumed that metacognition—thinking about one's own thoughts—is a uniquely human ability. Yet a decade of research suggests that, like humans, other animals can differentiate between what they know and what they do not know. They opt out of difficult trials; they avoid tests they are unlikely to answer correctly; and they make riskier "bets" when their memories are accurate than they do when their memories are inaccurate. These feats are simultaneously impressive and, by human standards, somewhat limited; new evidence suggests, however, that animals can generalize metacognitive judgments to new contexts and seek more information when they are unsure. Metacognition is intriguing, in part, because of parallels with self-reflection and conscious awareness. Consciousness appears to be consistent with, but not required by, the abilities animals have demonstrated thus far.     

Responsible Relationship: Imago Dei and the Moral Distinction between Humans and Other Animals

In light of modern evolutionary science, some theologians have criticized using the image of God to distinguish humans from other animals. This concept, however, still offers rich theological insight into the natures of both humans and other animals. Following the relational interpretations of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, this article explores how the imago Dei may be used to distinguish human creatures without necessarily implying a division in kind between humans and other animal creatures. Humans are distinguished not by any superior abilities they might possess, but by the character of their relationship to God and other creatures.     

Scalar Timing in Animals and Humans

John Gibbon's lifetime work provided a deep understanding of the mechanisms whereby the time sense indexes the passage of time (its accumulation) and records, that is, stores, relevant time intervals in memory, enabling behavior to occur at the right time. The Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET; Gibbon, 1977) remains the most prominent of the theoretical accounts of animal and human timing. SET deals with the three principle psychophysical properties of timing data: flexible accuracy, multiplicative variance, and ratio comparisons. It differs from many other timing theories in its emphasis on scalar variability, a term that refers to the linear increase in the standard deviation of timing errors as a task's criterion time increases. Recently, research based on the conceptual framework and analytic tools of SET in John Gibbon's lab was expanded from a decades-long focus on nonhuman species to an assessment of timing performance in “normal” and brain-diseased human subjects, aimed at understanding the functional and neural mechanisms underlying interval timing in humans. This review is aimed at showing that animal and human data obtained with a variety of timing paradigms are both amenable to analyses of accuracy and scalar variability under the SET framework. In the second part of this report we discuss advances made in our understanding of neurobiological mechanisms underlying interval timing by taking advantage of the SET framework. Issues awaiting new theoretical developments in modeling time production and perception, as revealed by psychophysical findings of recent clinical research that are still not well understood (i.e., sources of nonscalar variability), are raised at the end.     

Killing Humans and killing Animals

It is one thing to say that the suffering of non‐human animals ought to be considered equally with the like suffering of humans; quite another to decide how the wrongness of killing non‐human animals compares with the wrongness of killing human beings. It is argued that while species makes no difference to the wrongness of killing, the possession of certain capacities, in particular the capacity to see oneself as a distinct entity with a future, does. It is claimed, however, that this is not the only factor to be taken into account: pleasant or happy life is in itself good. The application of these conclusions to killing animals for food is then considered, with some passing reflections on infanticide.     

Moral Agency in Other Animals

Some philosophers have argued that moral agency is characteristic of humans alone and that its absence from other animals justifies granting higher moral status to humans. However, human beings do not have a monopoly on moral agency, which admits of varying degrees and does not require mastery of moral principles. The view that all and only humans possess moral agency indicates our underestimation of the mental lives of other animals. Since many other animals are moral agents (to varying degrees), they are also subject to (limited) moral obligations, examples of which are provided in this paper. But, while moral agency is sufficient for significant moral status, it is by no means necessary.     

Comparing Lives: Rush Rhees on Humans and Animals

In several posthumously published writings about the differences between humans and animals, Rush Rhees criticises the view that human lives are more important than (or superior to) animal lives. Rhees' views may seem to be in sympathy with more recent critiques of “speciesism.” However, the most commonly discussed anti‐speciesist moral frameworks – which take the capacity of sentience as the criterion of moral considerability – are inadequate. Rhees' remark that both humans and animals can be loved points towards a different way of accounting for the moral considerability of humans and animals that avoid the problems of the capacity‐based approaches.     

Levinas and Our Moral Responsibility Toward Other Animals

In this essay I show that while Levinas himself was clearly reluctant to extend to nonhuman animals the same kind of moral consideration he gave to humans, his ethics of alterity is one of the best equipped to mount a strong challenge to the traditional view of animals as beings of limited, if any, moral status. I argue that the logic of Levinas's own arguments concerning the otherness of the Other militates against interpreting ethics exclusively in terms of human interests and values, and, furthermore, that Levinas's phenomenology of the face applies to all beings that can suffer and are capable of expressing that suffering to me. Insofar as an animal has a face in Levinas's sense through which it is able to express its suffering to me, then there is no moral justification for refusing to extend to it moral consideration. ¹ 1. I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.      

Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals

It is commonly thought that neo-Hobbesian contractarianism cannot yield direct moral standing for marginal humans and animals. However, it has been argued that marginal humans and animals can have a form of direct moral standing under neo-Hobbesian contractarianism: secondary moral standing. I will argue that, even if such standing is direct, this account is unsatisfactory because it is counterintuitive and fragile.     

Health Is Associated With Antiparasite Behavior and Fear of Disease-Relevant Animals in Humans

Evolutionary arms races between humans and parasites resulted in a set of behavioral adaptations that serve as parasite-avoidance mechanisms. We investigated associations among reported health of the respondent, antiparasite behavior, and sensitivity to disgust and fear of disease-relevant and irrelevant animals. Ninety-seven participants (15–19 years old) rated their fear and disgust at 25 colorful pictures of disease-relevant and disease-irrelevant invertebrates. Consistent with previous work, we found that participants reported greater fear and disgust of disease-relevant invertebrates relative to disease-irrelevant invertebrates. Better perceived health correlated with lower fear of disease-relevant invertebrates. Sensitivity to disgust correlated with reported antiparasite behaviors. Contrary to expectations, we found a positive correlation between antiparasite behavior and reported health, which suggests that antiparasite behavior influences perceived health (but not vice versa), and we found that males perform more antiparasite behaviors than females. These results support the idea that disgust and fear of disease-relevant objects are adaptive emotions that prevent contact with contagious objects, especially in individuals with low perceived health.     

Adapting to Climate Change: What We Owe to Other Animals

In this article, I expand the existing discourse on climate justice by drawing out the implications of taking animal rights seriously in the context of human‐induced climate change. More specifically, I argue that nonhuman animals are owed adaptive assistance to help them cope with the ill‐effects of climate change, and I advance and defend four principles of climate justice that derive from a general duty of adaptation. Lastly, I suggest that even if one can successfully argue that the protection of human interests in adaptation ought to be prioritised, nonhuman animal rights will continue to place significant constraints on climate change action.     

The Epistemological Problem of Other Minds and the Knowledge Asymmetry

The traditional epistemological problem of other minds seeks to answer the following question: how can we know someone else's mental states? The problem is often taken to be generated by a fundamental asymmetry in the means of knowledge. In my own case, I can know directly what I think and feel. This sort of self‐knowledge is epistemically direct in the sense of being non‐inferential and non‐observational. My knowledge of other minds, however, is thought to lack these epistemic features. So what is the basic source of my knowledge of other minds if I know my mind in such a way that I cannot know the minds of others? The aim of this paper is to clarify and assess the pivotal role that the asymmetry in respect of knowledge plays within a broadly inferentialist approach to the epistemological problem of other minds. The received dogma has always been to endorse the asymmetry for conceptual reasons and to insist that the idea of knowing someone else's mental life in the same way as one knows one's own mind is a complete non‐starter. Against this, I aim to show that it is at best a contingent matter that creatures such as us cannot know other minds just as we know a good deal of our own minds and also that the idea of having someone else's mind in one's own introspective reach is not obviously self‐contradictory. So the dogma needs to be revisited. As a result, the dialectical position of those inferentialists who believe that we know about someone else's mentality in virtue of an analogical inference will be reinforced.     

Animated Bodies in Immunological Practices: Craftsmanship,Embodied Knowledge,Emotions and Attitudes Toward Animals

Taking up the body turn in sociology, this paper discusses scientific practices as embodied action from the perspective of Husserl’s phenomenological theory of the “Body”. Based on ethnographic data on a biology laboratory it will discuss the importance of the scientist’s Body for the performance of scientific activities. Successful researchers have to be skilled workers using their embodied knowledge for the process of tinkering towards the material transformation of their objects for data production. The researcher’s body then is an instrument of measuring as well as a kind of archive of knowing. Their body becomes a disciplined instrument which has its own place and function inside the laboratory. Furthermore, the appresentational apperception of Bodies (Husserl) is being discussed as a basis for the emotional and ethical concerns towards laboratory-animals. Attitudes towards animals in the laboratory setting (as well as elsewhere) are highly emotional. Nevertheless, following the literature of the sociology of the body, those emotional reactions still follow certain cultural patterns which themselves can be understood as embodied ways of knowing “right” or “wrong”. Besides as an instrument, the scientist’s body can also be understood as a resource of emotional attachment towards animals. It is an instrument for performing transformation as well as one for caring.