Being a psychoanalyst: An everyday audacity1

This paper is the work of fi ve psychoanalysts who came together as a group in order to refl ect on their work as analysts. How are we analysts to identify the unconscious resistances that may sometimes hold us back from offering psychoanalysis to some patients? Do these resistances sometimes hamper the inner freedom that we require in order to maintain a psychoanalytic focus once that process is under way? How do we manage from time to time to overcome these resistances or, better, make use of them in order to develop our understanding of the unconscious dynamics that create the link between analyst and patient? The authors discuss these issues with particular reference to clinical situations taken from classic psychoanalytic treatment cases during which the analyst had to fi nd within him‐ or herself the audacity to be a psychoanalyst. Each clinical situation is different: preliminary interviews, in the course of the actual treatment, issues that emerge in the training of candidates. One of the signifi cant features of this group lies in the fact that the participants are at different stages in their development as psychoanalysts (student, associate member, full member, training analyst). This means that their experiences complement one another and encourage a discussion of issues such as how psychoanalysis can be passed on, and the relationship between supervisor and supervisee.     

The Things We Carry: Finding/Creating the Object and the Analyst’s Self-Reflective Participation

I reflect on the interaction between the analyst’s dedicated attention to the patient’s internal object relations and the analyst’s self-reflective participation. Our stops and starts of attention to the patient’s internal objects and our own is in some sense one of the most important elements of our personal participation. I suggest that the patient’s and analyst’s needs for privacy and the illusion of privacy in the presence of the other, undertheorized within relational theory, is not at odds with an emphasis on valuing the patient’s capacity for a “read” on the analyst. Needs for privacy and the illusion of privacy held by patient and analyst need to be integrated into any psychoanalytic theory and form part of the basis of intimate regulatory systems between two people.     

Emotional Communication and the Unconscious in the Analytic Setting

ABSTRACT

One type of unconscious communication is conceptualized as a form of emotional communication, the channel of communication that conveys information about a person’s emotional state through the nonsymbolic expression of feelings and is experienced as feeling in the receiver. Some of the analyst’s feelings are attuned responses to the patient’s unconscious communications; others are disjunctive and related only to the analyst’s unconscious. Attuned feelings can be identified by their congruence—similarities, consistencies, and analogies—with the patient’s verbal material, which reveals the meaning that the analyst’s feeling has within the patient’s subjectivity. Attuned feelings also have a meaning within the analyst’s subjectivity. Two cases are discussed, one in which the analyst experiences the patient’s unconscious communication within the symbolism of one of her own childhood memories. The other illustrates the risk of confusing disjunctive feelings emanating from the analyst’s own unconscious with unconscious communication from the patient.     

On gratitude and gratification

Expressions of gratitude from the patient may be regarded by the analyst as a much-needed validation or affirmation of competence. The analyst's need for gratitude may be a relatively silent presence when things are going smoothly or when the analyst's efforts are openly appreciated by the patient. Ungrateful patients, however, are likely to force the analyst to confront his or her unconscious background wish to enact a longed-for mode of relatedness as part of the daily work of psychoanalysis. The analyst's wish for a specific form of object relationship involving a selfless, devoted helper and an appreciative patient who acknowledges having been helped may be thwarted by certain patients at every turn, knowing they are depriving the analyst of a particular form of gratification in their work. For patients of this type, failure may mean success. The implications of this particular form of clinical stalemate are outlined, and a clinical example illustrates some of the challenges encountered in psychoanalytic work with ungrateful patients.     

Sensory empathy and enactment1

The authors propose the concept of sensory empathy which emerges through contact between analyst and patient as they get in touch with an area concerning the primary bond. This area is not so much based on thoughts and fantasies as it is on physical sensations. Sensory empathy has to do with that instrument described by Freud as pertaining to the unconscious of any human, which enables one person to interpret unconscious communications of another person. The authors link this concept to that of enactment precisely because the latter concerns unconscious, early elements that fi nd in the act a fi rst meaningful expression. It involves both analyst and patient. In other words, the authors wish to emphasize the importance of the analytical process maintaining contact with that immense fi eld of human interaction that can be defi ned as primary sensory area and which becomes intertwined with the evolution of affects. Clinical examples are provided to clarify these hypotheses.     

Eating Disorders: A Bond between Medicine,Culture and Psychoanalysis

Action in connection with the therapeutic process is often equated with acting out. The subtle behaviour that belongs to ?the complicated system of transmitting and receiving unconscious signals? (Sandler), with which the patient attempts to make the analyst behave as the object of transference or to fulfill an unconscious desire, is also described as acting out or micro-acting out (Treurniet). This fine-grained action, however, means nothing; it is not symbolic or communicative action. Its intention is, rather, to trigger effects and induce interactions. It occurs not only on the side of the analysand but also on that of the analyst, and is part of the unconscious communication in the therapeutic process. Presented here are some of the various interactive ways and means with which the analyst is prompted into unconscious action and certain, unnoticed, ways in that he turn ?treats? the patient. The analyst's action responses can bear the character of interpretations with which he may unintentionally reveal how he regards the behaviour of the patient.     

Now Streaming: On Unconscious Communications in the Analytic Process

ABSTRACT

In this article, I illustrate the concept of unconscious communication by means of a clinical example in which a patient was able to recover the memory of a key adolescence experience as the result of the interplay of unconscious messages transmitted between himself and his analyst. When the patient spotted the analyst driving an old, beat-up family car, this triggered an unconscious memory of this painful adolescent episode, one that epitomized and stood for his troubled and disappointing relationship with his father. This memory, which was expressed nonverbally, in turn, evoked a memory in the analyst from his own adolescence that put him in touch with the patient‘s traumatic, adolescent experience, material that had come up previously in the analysis but had not been adequately dealt with or worked through. By grasping the meaning of the interplay of these unconscious messages, the analyst was able to help the patient get in touch with, better understand, and work through, an experience that had an enduring impact on his future life.     

An interruption in unconscious communication in the analytic couple

The authors describe an interruption in communication in the analyses of two patients, which gradually brings the analytic process to a halt/standstill. They propose several hypotheses for understanding this situation. One explanation is mutual identification of primitive superegos in the analytic couple which generates a moralizing effect thereby hindering investigation and discovery. They emphasize the importance of countertransference involvement which partly provokes this particular type of impasse. They also suggest the idea of shared acting out, with complementary participations of analyst and patient. In this way the analytic couple supports a 'bastion' which protects against the risk of breaking the omnipotence of patient and analyst or contributes to this omnipotence. Their shared unconscious phantasy feeds collusion linked to unconscious persecutory guilt. The authors also describe movements to break free from this impasse. The enclave created by the analytic couple is detected and subsequently worked through by way of the patient's contribution of dream material and the analyst's work with her countertransference.     

Exploring a patient's shift from relative silence to verbal expressiveness: Observations on an element of the analyst's participation

By tracing a portion of close process of a patient's shifts from a relatively silent and inhibited stance to one in which he is beginning to verbalize more about his experience and fantasy, I will illustrate some tensions between the analyst's role as facilitating expressiveness and as occupying a place in the patient's internalized world. Since the analyst's functions as facilitator and as internal object (often an obstacle to the patient's expressiveness) are sometimes in conflict with one another, it is important for the analyst to be able to work internally with this conflict as he works with his patient. Splitting processes between these two functions may provide the analyst with cues related to the patient's and the analyst's resistance to understanding the patient's communication of unconscious conflict and the patient's recruitment of the analyst into the patient's internalized world.     

Collusive induction in perverse relating: Perverse enactments and bastions as a camouflage for death anxiety

The author argues that one of the main functions of perverse relatedness is to induce the analyst into becoming the patient's unconscious accomplice in a “perverse pact” against the analytic work aimed at disavowing intolerable aspects of reality. The intense power of collusive induction in perverse relating leads the analyst to participate in transference‐countertransference enactments and to the crystallization of a silent and chronic unconscious collusion between the patient and analyst in the analytic field, stagnating the process (bastion; Baranger and Baranger). The author claims that analysis of perverse pathology should not be limited to interpretation of the patient's intrapsychic functioning but should also focus on the information obtained by the analyst through his participation in collusive enactments; the analyst should also take a “second look” at the analytic “field” to detect underlying bastions. The author reviews the main psychoanalytic contributions that have clarified the phenomenon of collusive induction in perverse relating and as an illustration, describes the analysis of a man with a perverse character; in this patient, one of the main functions of his perverse relatedness was to induce the analyst to become an accomplice in his disavowal of his terror of death. The author highlights the influence of death anxiety in the bastions that develop in the treatment of perverse patients.     

AFFECT IN PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY: DISCUSSION OF ANDRÉ GREEN'S “ON DISCRIMINATING AND NOT DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN AFFECT AND REPRESENTATION”1

André Green's 1999 programmatic essay on affect and representation, an attempt to extend Freud's model of the neuroses (where affect and representation have different vicissitudes) to non‐neurotic cases is submitted to critical reading. Green wishes to restore the importance of representation; to use the second topographical theory, where id, psychical impulse and object‐cathexis replace the unconscious and the ideational representation in order to conceptualise borderline disturbance, and to show how ultimately the ‘non‐discrimination’ affect‐representation obtains in non‐neurotic cases as well. The author, interested in the question posed in Green's essay as to what we have to sell our borderline patients, addresses the various reasons why this project fails. Among the problematic points are the paradox of Green's model of unconscious affect, that does not allow the analyst to generate meaning with borderline patients, the view of ‘representation’ as replacing presence and perception of the object that does not allow the analyst to be a nonabsent object, and the inabilty to conceptualise affect‐representatives and to work out the definition of affect as ‘the anticipation of a meeting with the other's body’ which does not allow the analyst to function as an ‘anticipatory object’ or ‘an object of affect’.     

From Freud’s dream-work to Bion’s work of dreaming: The changing conception of dreaming in psychoanalytic theory

Bion moved psychoanalytic theory from Freud's theory of dream-work to a concept of dreaming in which dreaming is the central aspect of all emotional functioning. In this paper, I first review historical, theoretical, and clinical aspects of dreaming as seen by Freud and Bion. I then propose two interconnected ideas that I believe reflect Bion’s split from Freud regarding the understanding of dreaming. Bion believed that all dreams are psychological works in progress and at one point suggested that all dreams contain elements that are akin to visual hallucinations. I explore and elaborate Bion’s ideas that all dreams contain aspects of emotional experience that are too disturbing to be dreamt, and that, in analysis, the patient brings a dream with the hope of receiving the analyst’s help in completing the unconscious work that was entirely or partially too disturbing for the patient to dream on his own. Freud views dreams as mental phenomena with which to understand how the mind functions, but believes that dreams are solely the ‘guardians of sleep,’ and not, in themselves, vehicles for unconscious psychological work and growth until they are interpreted by the analyst. Bion extends Freud's ideas, but also departs from Freud and re-conceives of dreaming as synonymous with unconscious emotional thinking – a process that continues both while we are awake and while we are asleep. From another somewhat puzzling perspective, he views dreams solely as manifestations of what the dreamer is unable to think.     

A dark talent: silence in analysis

This paper is presented jointly by two analysts who have worked with patients whose silence stretched over years. They taxed our professional selves and our therapeutic repertoire of responses and techniques to the limit. Partly in response to these experiences, each analyst found herself needing to talk with another who could verify disturbing countertransference reactions from the standpoint of similar experience. The patients' (largely silent) attacks on analysis and their inability to use it conventionally constellated the need in us to talk, in an effort to relieve projected anxiety. Our conversations provided some containment of the destructive fantasies which we found developing in response to lack of verbal interaction with our patients. Unlike patients who project into an analyst in the unconscious hope of finding containment, silent patients project the need for containment, which they then disavow, leaving the analyst carrying the need, and feeling helpless, baffled and undermined in their therapeutic identity (Colman, private communication). In keeping with the theme of this conference, we found that our collaboration about what chronic analytic silence may mean helped to counteract its destructive effect on the analyst-patient relationship     

Enactment as Unconscious Communication

ABSTRACT

I explore the way in which unconscious primitive and nonsymbolic experience is communicated to the analyst’s unconscious through enactment. As the analyst receives the projections unconsciously, she is encouraged to enact aspects of the patient’s internal world. The analytic work then is through the understanding of these subtle and ubiquitous enactments. I value the work of understanding enactments as a rich and subtle pathway into the deepest levels of the patient’s unconscious. I explore the nature of this work and illustrate my point with clinical examples.     

The compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge in the analytic situation

In this paper the author shows that human beings have two quasi‐instinctual primitive tendencies – namely, the compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge (to condemn or to absolve). These compulsions are originally unconscious and become conscious during the course of the analytic process. The compulsion to judge is a natural consequence of the compulsion to confess. These two tendencies are intensified by the analytic situation. The patient has a compulsion to confess to the analyst and to himself, and likewise the analyst has a compulsion to confess to himself and to the patient. The patient therefore has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the analyst as good or bad while, on the other hand, the analyst has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the patient as good or bad. The task of analysis is to make both patient and analyst conscious of their compulsions to confess and to judge (to condemn or to absolve). The compulsion to judge in the analyst, particularly if unconscious, may give rise to mistakes in diagnosis, technique, treatment, and the assessment of analysability. The requirement of analytic neutrality in the analyst constantly conflicts with his compulsion to judge. If we are profoundly involved in our patient's dramatic conflict, we are bound to pass a judgement (condemnation or absolution); however, when we judge, we are not neutral and therefore become incapable of intellectual consciousness of the patient's conflict. Conversely, if we do not judge, we are neutral, but are then relatively uninvolved in the patient's conflict and are hence virtually unable to achieve emotional consciousness. The author attempts to show that neutrality cannot and must not be a preconstituted attitude in the analyst, but can and must be a point of arrival following a profound, intensely felt existential experience based on an attitude of non‐condemnation and non‐absolution.     

TRANSFERENCE BEFORE TRANSFERENCE

This paper is predominantly a clinical presentation that describes the transmigration of one patient's transference to another, with the analyst functioning as a sort of transponder. It involves an apparently accidental episode in which there was an unconscious intersection between two patients. The author's aim is to show how transference from one case may affect transference in another, a phenomenon the author calls transference before transference. The author believes that this idea may serve as a tool for understanding the unconscious work that takes place in the clinical situation. In a clinical example, the analyst finds himself caught up in an enactment involving two patients in which he becomes the medium of what happens in session.     

Countertransference, empathy, and the analytic ideal: the impact of life stresses on analytic capability

Analysts' emotional attitudes toward countertransference issues are influenced by unduly perfectionistic ideals that are partly derived from the early period of psychoanalytic theory. Analysts' unconscious receptivity, whether of the beneficially empathic kind or the disadvantageous countertransference variety, is a reflection of a dynamic internal state. This fundamental relationship between empathy and countertransference is illustrated with examples. Important events that occur in the life of the analyst, by virtue of their impact on his own central compromise formations, cannot but affect his analytic functioning. Minor disturbances in analytic capability are commonplace and do not significantly handicap effective work.     

What's true and whose idea was it?

In this paper, the author explores the idea that psychoanalysis at its core involves an effort on the part of patient and analyst to articulate what is true to an emotional experience in a form that is utilizable by the analytic pair for purposes of psychological change. Building upon the work of Bion, what is true to human emotional experience is seen as independent of the analyst's formulation of it. In this sense, we, as psychoanalysts, are not inventors of emotional truths, but participant observers and scribes. And yet, in the very act of thinking and giving verbally symbolic 'shape' to what we intuit to be true to an emotional experience, we alter that truth. This understanding of what is true underlies the analytic conception of the therapeutic action of interpretation: in interpreting, the analyst verbally symbolizes what he feels is true to the patient's unconscious experience and, in so doing, alters what is true and contributes to the creation of a potentially new experience with which the analytic pair may do psychological work. These ideas are illustrated in a detailed discussion of an analytic session. The analyst makes use of his reverie experience-for which both and neither of the members of the analytic pair may claim authorship-in his effort to arrive at tentative understandings of what is true to the patient's unconscious emotional experience at several junctures in the session.     

Unconscious fantasy in context: The work of Jacob A. Arlow

For Jacob A. Arlow, understanding unconscious fantasies was central to his clinical work. These fantasies are to be found at the core of those eruptions that break without warning into our ordinary lives, whether in the form of hysterical symptoms, daydreams or nightmares. What, however, could an unconscious fantasy be on a theoretical level, beyond a vehicle for discharge? Although partly unconscious, such fantasies are sometimes composed of fixed verbal content with a high degree of internal organisation. Unconscious fantasies therefore pose many challenges to understanding.     

The law and lawyers: Through psychodynamic eyes

Abstract

This article looks at some of the unconscious processes that operate among solicitors in general practice. In particular it considers various defences against the anxiety felt by solicitors partly because of the nature of their work and partly because of what is projected onto them by their clients. It argues that these defences have become embodied in the legal system itself as ‘socially structured defence mechanisms’ (Menzies Lyth 1989).