Calling the Skeptic’s Bluff: Brains,Vats, and Irrelevance

Dogmatists often exploit the skeptical argument based on the brains-in-a-vat (BIV) scenario as a test case for their epistemological enterprises. I argue that this ‘argument’ does not deserve our attention, so it should not be used as a test case. I first show that the possibilities of empirical knowledge and of skeptical scenarios are inconsistent (the Inconsistency Thesis). If so, the BIV-skeptic must make the case for preferring such scenarios over the possibility of empirical knowledge. The central argument of my paper is that the BIV-skeptic can neither rely on any selection principle (e.g. conceivability) for this purpose, nor can she claim that she needs no such principle. Then I will show that we can even dispense with the Inconsistency Thesis: if the skeptic wishes, she may allow for the possibility of empirical knowledge. The essay concludes with considering the morals of the above argument for the dogmatist (or simply, epistemological) endeavor.

     

Rosenkranz’s Logic of Justification and Unprovability

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Rosenkranz has recently proposed a logic for propositional, non-factive, all-things-considered justification, which is based on a logic for the notion of being in a...     

Experimental Series and the Justification of Temin’s DNA Provirus Hypothesis

A notion of experimental series is developed, in which experiments or experimental sets are connected through experimental suggestions arising from previous experimental outcomes. To that end, the justification of Howard Temin’s DNA provirus hypothesis is examined. The hypothesis originated with evidence from two exploratory experimental sets on an oncogenic virus and was substantiated by including evidence from three additional experimental sets. Collectively these sets comprise an experimental series and the accumulative evidence from the series was adequate to justify the hypothesis by persuading the virology community of its veracity. The notion of crucial experiment is also discussed in terms of experimental series.     

Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.     

The Presentist’s Dilemma

This paper defends three theses: (i) that presentism is either trivial or untenable; (ii) that the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time is not about the status of presentism; and (iii) that there is no temporal analogue of the modal thesis of actualism.     

Mengzi’s Externalist Solution to the Role Dilemma

The role dilemma raises a problem for role ethic interpretations of Confucianism. The dilemma arises from the conflict between the demands and obligations of Humaneness and the demands and obligations of roles one occupies. Favoring the demands of Humaneness (i.e. externalism) undermines a role ethic because roles and role-obligations no longer ground the ethic. However, favoring social role-obligations (i.e. internalism) permits immoral and unjust role-obligations and allows for uncharitable readings of Confucianism.

This paper examines how Mengzi resolves the dilemma. I argue that Mengzi’s account of human nature privileges the demands of Humaneness; social roles are central but defeasible in light of Humaneness. I briefly discuss a prominent articulation of Confucian role ethics as well as the role dilemma. Then, after considering the technical resources within the Mengzi, I argue that Mengzi espouses an externalism about roles. Finally, I explore the relationship between Mengzi’s externalism and role ethics.     

Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist

Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has not been properly motivated and is prima facie implausible. I further argue that, even if the dubious premise is accepted, the resulting proof is intuitionistically invalid. This is problematic, because a proponent of superassertibility as a truth predicate has independent reasons to affect a logical revision in the direction of intuitionism. The resulting dilemma suggests that superassertibility may not be an adequate truth candidate for any significant ranges of discourse. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992     

The Political Egalitarian’s Dilemma

Political egalitarianism is at the core of most normative conceptions of democratic legitimacy. It finds its minimal expression in the “one person one vote” formula. In the literature on deliberative democracy, political equality is typically interpreted in a more demanding sense, but different interpretations of what political equality requires can be identified. In this paper I shall argue that the attempt to specify political equality in deliberative democracy is affected by a dilemma. I shall illustrate the political egalitarian’s dilemma by a hypothetical choice between two informational bases for political equality: Rawlsian primary goods and Amartya Sen’s capability approach. The political egalitarian’s dilemma reveals a clash between the requirement of ensuring equal possibilities to participate in the democratic process and the requirement of subjecting substantive judgments to deliberative evaluation. As such, the dilemma is a variant of the procedure vs. substance dilemma that is well-known in democratic theory. While it has sometimes been argued that deliberative democracy solves the tension between procedure and substance, the political egalitarian’s dilemma shows that this tension continues within deliberative democracy.

Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality1

There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl’s early work the, Logical Investigations, and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned to objects which have an intrinsic property independently of any access or attitude we may have to them. Although not a methodological solipsist, there are nonetheless internalist elements to Husserl’s thought: He believes that we can think of non‐existent objects and his account of indexicals and demonstratives shows that there are two kinds of meaning: one is context independent and internally individuated, the other is partly determined by context and so externally individuated. The paper leaves it open whether this is sufficient to mark Husserl out as an internalist. However, even if he were considered as such, we can be sure of one thing, namely, that his internalism would not be a species of methodological solipsism.     

Sexual Consent and Lying About One’s Self

Despite the acknowledgement of the moral significance of consent there is still much work to be done in determining which specific sexual encounters count as unproblematically consensual. This paper focuses on the impact of deception. It takes up the specific case of deception about one’s self. It may seem obvious that one ought not to lie to a sexual partner about who one is, but determining which features of oneself are most relevant, as well as the lies which it follows would be impermissible to tell, is complicated. It is argued here that deception about one’s morally valenced character traits, those we think of as virtues and vices, are particularly problematic. This is true regardless of whether knowing the truth about those traits would have made a difference to one’s partner’s consent. Attention is then drawn to a range of types of lies that one ought not to tell.     

Unifying ‘the’ Precautionary Principle? Justification and Reflective Equilibrium

Philosophia - The precautionary principle (PP) is an influential principle for making decisions when facing uncertain, but potentially severe, harm. However, there is a persistent disagreement...     

Michael Huemer’s A Priori Defense of Metaethical Internalism

Versions of internalism have played important roles in metaethics, for example, in defending irrealist options such as emotivism. However, internalism is itself as controversial as the views it is used to defend. Standard approaches to testing the view, such as thought experiments about amoralists, have failed to gain consensus. Michael Huemer offers a defense of internalism of a different kind which he calls the “argument from interpretation.” He presents the argument as one Humeans could embrace, but versions could be accepted by others, including Huemer himself. The argument begins from the assumption that a certain principle of charity is true and knowable a priori. But it can only be known a priori if internalism is true. Hence internalism is true. In this paper I argue that this important argument fails. My main objection makes use of recent work in empirical psychology. Huemer needs the principle of charity to be known a priori. I argue that rather than being an a priori issue, it is an empirical one and that the empirical evidence is strong enough to undermine his argument for internalism.     

Insoluble Paradoxes: Thoughts About Michelle Shubin’s and Marc Rehm’s Essays

Michelle Shubin’s and Marc Rehm’s papers (this issue) are linked by their creative use of paradox. Each addresses the dynamics of the clinical moment and invites us to query what we assume—about psychoanalytic goals and about our role in therapeutic process. Shubin revisits the role of analytic honesty, challenging the assumption that we analysts are always honest, and, more importantly, that we always need to be. Rehm asks us to consider the places of forgetting along with remembering in clinical work. He suggests that we may sometimes need not to help our patients remember, but instead to help them forget. I address the clinical and theoretical implications of each paper.     

It’s Not About Technology

It is argued that the question “Can we trust technology?” is unanswerable because it is open-ended. Only questions about specific issues that can have specific answers should be entertained. It is further argued that the reason the question cannot be answered is that there is no such thing as Technology simpliciter. Fundamentally, the question comes down to trusting people and even then, the question has to be specific about trusting a person to do this or that.     

The Role of Religious Values in Decisions About Genetics and the Public’s Health

The latest health care legislation, which promotes prevention and health screening, ultimately depends for its success on recognition of people’s values concerning the technologies being employed, not just the interventions’ technical virtues. Values concerning the deterministic nature of a condition and what groups should be targeted rest on a sense of what is morally, often religiously right in a given health circumstance. This paper looks at a number of leading-edge case examples—breast cancer genetic screening and family decision-making, and newborn screening and biobanks—in examining how the choices made at the individual, family, and societal levels rest on faith in a higher source of efficacy and moral perspectives on the measures that can be taken. Qualitative responses expressing people’s attitudes toward these technologies underscore the importance of considering faith-based values in individual decisions and collective policies on their use. These examples are considered in the context of the historic interplay between science and religion and recent definitions and models of health which incorporate physical, emotional, and social elements, and most importantly, are expanding to incorporate the religious and spiritual values domains.     

Analyzing the Publish-or-Perish Paradigm with Game Theory: The Prisoner’s Dilemma and a Possible Escape

The publish-or-perish paradigm is a prevailing facet of science. We apply game theory to show that, under rather weak assumptions, this publication scenario takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma, which constitutes a substantial obstacle to beneficial delayed publication of more complete results. One way of avoiding this obstacle while allowing researchers to establish priority of discoveries would be an updated “pli cacheté”, a sealed envelope concept from the 1700s. We describe institutional rules that could additionally favour high-quality work and publications and provide examples of such policies that are already in place. Our analysis should be extended to other publication scenarios and the role of other stakeholders such as scientific journals or sponsors.