“I Am Moral,But You Are Deterred”: Differential Attributions About Why People Obey the Law1

This research examined the different attributions that individuals make for law‐abiding behavior by different people. Experiment 1 reveals that individuals believe that they and other highly moral people are motivated to obey laws because of internal reasons (e.g., laws reflect valued rules and moral behavior), whereas they believe that criminals are motivated by external reasons (e.g., fear of punishment). However, Experiment 2 shows that even some criminals are seen as motivated to obey laws regarding particular types of crimes because of internal factors. Experiment 3 replicates these general findings using a between‐subjects design. Finally, Experiment 4 shows that individuals believe that they are motivated to obey laws regarding minor transgressions (e.g., speed limits) for both internal and external reasons. Discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for both psychological theory and social policy.     

Children's Assignment of Gender to Animal Characters in Pictures

Tests showed that 4- to 6-year-old children believe that people can be influenced or “controlled” both by thinking (e.g., both wishful thinking and magical behavior) and by realistic means (e.g., positive reinforcement, example, and group pressure). Belief in control by thinking did not vary by the subjects' sex or age, influence type (wishing or magical behavior), or target response (behavior, emotion, or thought). Quantitative measures, however, suggested that magical behavior was seen by subjects as being more efficient than wishing, and that emotion was considered easier to influence than thinking. Beliefs in control by thinking were not related to a measure of fantasy—reality differentiation (realism).     

The Formal Structure of Kind Representations

Kind representations, concepts like table, triangle, dog, and planet, underlie generic language. Here, we investigate the formal structure of kind representations—the structure that distinguishes kind representations from other types of representations. The present studies confirm that participants distinguish generic-supporting properties of individuals (e.g., this watch is made of steel) and accidental properties (e.g., this watch is on the nightstand). Furthermore, work dating back to Aristotle establishes that only some generic-supporting properties bear a principled connection to the kind, that is, are true of an individual by virtue of its being a member of a specific kind (e.g., telling time for a watch). The present studies tested the hypothesis that principled connections are part of the formal structure of kind representations. Specifically, they tested whether they structure a newly learned kind representation. Experiment 1 found that introducing a property of a newly encountered novel kind in any one of four linguistic frames that provide evidence that a property has a principled connection to a kind (e.g., “It has fur because it is a blick”) led participants to infer a different conceptual consequence of principled connections (i.e., “There is something wrong with this blick, which does not have fur”) for which they had no direct evidence. Two introduction frames that provided no evidence for principled connections (e.g., “Almost all blicks have fur”) did not generate the same consequence. Experiment 2 found that all of the targeted properties were generic licensing, irrespective of the introduction frame. That the distinction between properties that bear principled connections to their kinds, and merely generic-supporting properties structures novel kind representations, provides strong evidence that this distinction is part of the formal structure of kind representations.     

Thinking About One’s Subjective Well-Being: Average Trends and Individual Differences

In two studies, participants reported what they had been thinking about while completing measures of subjective well-being (SWB). These thought reports were analyzed with respect to life domain, valence, and how strongly they were related to actual levels of SWB. Most people focused on their life circumstances (e.g., career) rather than on dispositional predictors (e.g., personality) of SWB. The domains mentioned most frequently (career, family, romantic life) were also the ones that were most strongly related to actual SWB, indicating that most of people think about things that actually contribute to their SWB. Some domains are predominantly mentioned in positive contexts (e.g., family) whereas others are predominantly mentioned in negative contexts (e.g., money). On average, people thought more about positive than about negative things, a result that is magnified for respondents high in extraversion or emotional stability. In sum, these findings provide insight into what people think contributes to their SWB; beliefs that may guide them as they make important decisions.     

Resisting persuasion by the skin of one's teeth: the hidden success of resisted persuasive messages

Recent research has suggested that when people resist persuasion they can perceive this resistance and, under specifiable conditions, become more certain of their initial attitudes (e.g., Z. L. Tormala & R. E. Petty, 2002). Within the same metacognitive framework, the present research provides evidence for the opposite phenomenon--that is, when people resist persuasion, they sometimes become less certain of their initial attitudes. Four experiments demonstrate that when people perceive that they have done a poor job resisting persuasion (e.g., they believe they generated weak arguments against a persuasive message), they lose attitude certainty, show reduced attitude-behavioral intention correspondence, and become more vulnerable to subsequent persuasive attacks. These findings suggest that resisted persuasive attacks can sometimes have a hidden yet important success by reducing the strength of the target attitude.     

Can the Mind Command the Body?

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.     

Silence and table manners: when environments activate norms

Two studies tested the conditions under which an environment (e.g., library, restaurant) raises the relevance of environment-specific social norms (e.g., being quiet, using table manners). As hypothesized, the relevance of such norms is raised when environments are goal relevant ("I am going there later") and when they are humanized with people or the remnants of their presence (e.g., a glass of wine on a table). Two studies show that goal-relevant environments and humanized environments raise the perceived importance of norms (Study 1) and the intention to conform to norms (Study 2). Interestingly, in both studies, these effects reach beyond norms related to the environments used in the studies.     

You can do it if you really try: The effects of motivation on thinking for pleasure

People find it difficult to enjoy their own thoughts when asked to do so, but what happens when they are asked to think about whatever they want? Do they find thinking more or less enjoyable? In the present studies, we show that people are more successful in enjoying their thoughts when instructed to do so. We present evidence in support of four reasons why this is: without instructions people do not realize how enjoyable it will be to think for pleasure, they do not realize how personally meaningful it will be to do so, they believe that thinking for pleasure will be effortful, and they believe it would be more worthwhile to engage in planning than to try to enjoy their thoughts. We discuss the practical implications of thinking for pleasure for promoting alternatives to the use of technology.     

More Rational or More Emotional Than Others? Lay Beliefs About Decision-Making Strategies

Research demonstrates that people utilize both reasoning and feeling in decision making and that both strategies can be advantageous. However, little is known about how people perceive their decision-making relative to others. Despite research findings and popular appeals supporting the use of affective decision processes, across a series of studies, we find that individuals believe they rely more on reasoning, and less on feelings, than others. These effects are driven by the motivation to self-enhance where, in most contexts, individuals believe the use of reasoning is superior, and self-enhancing, compared to the use of feelings. Consistent with this mechanism, beliefs that one’s decisions are more rational than others’ are as follows: (a) stronger for those who exhibit greater beliefs in the superiority of reasoning (vs. feeling), (b) attenuated when the decision context precludes motivational thinking about the self or the self is affirmed, and (c) reversed when the use of feelings is perceived as more self-enhancing. We demonstrate downstream consequences (e.g., decision delegation), rule out alternative explanations, and discuss practical implications of these lay beliefs.     

Preferences as expectation-driven inferences: effects of affective expectations on affective experience

Presents a model arguing that affect and emotion are often formed in an expectation-driven fashion. A pilot study and 2 experiments manipulated undergraduate Ss' affective expectations (e.g., how funny they expected a set of cartoons to be) and whether Ss' expectations were confirmed (e.g., whether the cartoons really were funny). When the value of a stimulus was consistent with an affective expectation, people formed evaluations relatively quickly. Even when the value of a stimulus was discrepant from an affective expectation, people sometimes assimilated the value of the stimulus to their expectations. Other times, such as when making a more fine-grained evaluation of the cartoons, people noticed that they were discrepant from their affective expectations. Under these conditions, people appeared to have more difficulty forming preferences. They took longer to evaluate and spent more time thinking about the cartoons.     

No pain, no gain: Perceptions of calorie expenditures of exercise and daily activities

Reduction in physical activity is considered a major contributor to weight problems. Increasingly, people are expending less energy in household chores but joining fitness clubs. Do people perceive ordinary daily activities to expend less energy than exercise activities using similar amounts of calories? In the present study college students were asked to evaluate the calorie expenditure of 30 physical activities (i.e., exercises and household tasks). The household tasks were matched (in terms of caloric expenditure) to at least one exercise activity. When participants rated both exercise and daily activities, it appears that they focused on rate of caloric expenditure rather than type of activity (i.e., household task or exercise). In Study 2, college students evaluated the energy expenditure of light/leisure, moderate, and intense exercise. This emphasis concerning the benefit of intense physical activity was observed once again. College students appear to have assimilated the belief that intense physical activity expends more energy than longer sessions of lower intensity physical activity using similar amounts of calories. Perhaps one reason why people are not physically active is that they believe physical activities must be intense to be of benefit. At the same time they are automatizing household chores and, thus, become less active overall.     

No pain, no gain: Perceptions of calorie expenditures of exercise and daily activities

Reduction in physical activity is considered a major contributor to weight problems. Increasingly, people are expending less energy in household chores but joining fitness clubs. Do people perceive ordinary daily activities to expend less energy than exercise activities using similar amounts of calories? In the present study college students were asked to evaluate the calorie expenditure of 30 physical activities (i.e., exercises and household tasks). The household tasks were matched (in terms of caloric expenditure) to at least one exercise activity. When participants rated both exercise and daily activities, it appears that they focused on rate of caloric expenditure rather than type of activity (i.e., household task or exercise). In Study 2, college students evaluated the energy expenditure of light/leisure, moderate, and intense exercise. This emphasis concerning the benefit of intense physical activity was observed once again. College students appear to have assimilated the belief that intense physical activity expends more energy than longer sessions of lower intensity physical activity using similar amounts of calories. Perhaps one reason why people are not physically active is that they believe physical activities must be intense to be of benefit. At the same time they are automatizing household chores and, thus, become less active overall.     

Causal conditionals and counterfactuals

Causal counterfactuals e.g., 'if the ignition key had been turned then the car would have started' and causal conditionals e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' are understood by thinking about multiple possibilities of different sorts, as shown in six experiments using converging evidence from three different types of measures. Experiments 1a and 1b showed that conditionals that comprise enabling causes, e.g., 'if the ignition key was turned then the car started' primed people to read quickly conjunctions referring to the possibility of the enabler occurring without the outcome, e.g., 'the ignition key was turned and the car did not start'. Experiments 2a and 2b showed that people paraphrased causal conditionals by using causal or temporal connectives (because, when), whereas they paraphrased causal counterfactuals by using subjunctive constructions (had…would have). Experiments 3a and 3b showed that people made different inferences from counterfactuals presented with enabling conditions compared to none. The implications of the results for alternative theories of conditionals are discussed.     

Counterfactual thinking and the first instinct fallacy

Most people believe that they should avoid changing their answer when taking multiple-choice tests. Virtually all research on this topic, however, has suggested that this strategy is ill-founded: Most answer changes are from incorrect to correct, and people who change their answers usually improve their test scores. Why do people believe in this strategy if the data so strongly refute it? The authors argue that the belief is in part a product of counterfactual thinking. Changing an answer when one should have stuck with one's original answer leads to more "if only . . ." self-recriminations than does sticking with one's first instinct when one should have switched. As a consequence, instances of the former are more memorable than instances of the latter. This differential availability provides individuals with compelling (albeit illusory) personal evidence for the wisdom of always following their 1st instinct, with suboptimal test scores the result.     

Emotion words shape emotion percepts

People believe they see emotion written on the faces of other people. In an instant, simple facial actions are transformed into information about another's emotional state. The present research examined whether a perceiver unknowingly contributes to emotion perception with emotion word knowledge. We present 2 studies that together support a role for emotion concepts in the formation of visual percepts of emotion. As predicted, we found that perceptual priming of emotional faces (e.g., a scowling face) was disrupted when the accessibility of a relevant emotion word (e.g., anger) was temporarily reduced, demonstrating that the exact same face was encoded differently when a word was accessible versus when it was not. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed.     

Motivational correlates of need for cognition

Need for cognition is usually characterized as an intrinsic desire to engage in challenging intellectual activity. In achievement situations, however, it could be associated with more extrinsic goals such as success or the avoidance of failure. Three experiments examined this possibility. Participants in all studies were led to believe they would perform either an easy or a difficult intellectual task that they were likely to fail. After inducing this expectation, indices of extrinsic motivation were obtained. Participants with high need for cognition became more motivated to avoid negative consequences of their behavior (e.g., failure) when they expected the task they would perform to be difficult. In contrast, participants with low need for cognition were not appreciably affected by these expectancies. The anticipation of engaging in intellectual activity apparently stimulates different motives in people with high and low need for cognition, and the mindset induced by these motives influences their later behavioral decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MOTIVES FOR PHILOSOPHIZING DEBUNKING AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task.     

Even frequent and expected words are not identified without spatial attention

Previous studies have disagreed about the extent to which people extract meaning from words presented outside the focus of spatial attention. The present study examined a possible explanation for such discrepancies inspired by attenuation theory: Unattended words can be read more automatically when they are expected within a given context (e.g., due to frequent repetition). We presented a brief prime word in lowercase, followed by a target word in uppercase. Participants indicated whether the target word belonged to a particular category (e.g., “sports”). When we used a visual cue to draw attention to the location of the prime word, it produced substantial priming effects on target responses (i.e., especially fast responses when the prime and target words were identical or from the same category). When prime words were not attended, however, they produced no priming effects. This finding replicated even when there were only four words, each repeated 160 times during the experiment. It appears that very little word processing is possible without spatial attention, even for words that are expected and frequently presented.     

Change it Up: Inactivity and Repetitive Activity Reduce Creative Thinking

Across three experiments, we show that a change in the levels of physical activity increases creative thinking, whereas inactivity or repetitive activity lowers it. Participants walking forward were more creative the first few minutes of initiating physical activity than those sitting, or those merely watching changing scenery, and these effects dissipated when they continued the forward movement over time (within 8 minutes). Furthermore, merely anticipating a change in physical activity, for example, when participants were aware a task is coming to its conclusion, also increased creative thinking. We hypothesize that a change in physical activity cues the need to navigate new situations, and thus, can increase mental flexibility and creative thinking to deal with new circumstances. But once people habituate to their physical state, either of being at rest or being in motion, their level of creative thinking also returns to baseline levels. We confirm that mood, feelings of achievement, and energy are not responsible for the observed effects.