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Jacques Bouveresse 《Ratio》2007,20(4):357-376
This paper provides a systematic exposition of what Wittgenstein took to be the fundamental error committed by James George Frazer, author of the classic anthropological work The Golden Bough, in his account of ritual practices. By construing those rituals in scientific or rationalistic terms, as aimed at the production of certain effects, Frazer ignores, according to Wittgenstein, their expressive and symbolic dimension. It is, moreover, an error to try to explain the powerful emotions evoked even today by traditions such as fire festivals (which may once have involved human sacrifice) by searching for their causal origins in history or prehistory; the disquieting nature of such practices needs to be understood by attending to the inner meaning they already have in our human lives. Certain important general lessons are drawn about the necessarily limited power of scientific and causal explanations when it comes to alleviating many of our fundamental perplexities not just in the area of anthropology but in philosophy as well. 1 1 Originally published in French as ‘Wittgenstein, Critique de Frazer’, Agone 23 (2000), pp. 33–54. Translated into English (with minor editorial corrections and additional bibliographical references and abstract) specially for the present issue of Ratio by John Cottingham, by kind permission of Jacques Bouveresse and Editions Agone, Marseilles. English version © John Cottingham. The translator is grateful to Severin Schroeder and Christopher Wingfield for helpful corrections to an earlier draft.
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MIKEL BURLEY 《Heythrop Journal》2010,51(6):1000-1010
This paper responds to Severin Schroeder's recent charge that Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion contains an ‘unresolved tension’ between three propositions, namely: (1) ‘As a hypothesis, God's existence (&c) is extremely implausible’; (2) ‘Christian faith is not unreasonable’; and (3) ‘Christian faith does involve belief in God's existence (&c)’. I argue as follows: that the first of these propositions has no place in Wittgenstein's thinking on religion; that the second is ill‐phrased and should be re‐worded as the proposition that ‘Christian faith is neither unreasonable nor reasonable’; and that the third proposition (contrary to what Schroeder seems to assume) tells us nothing about the nature of the objects of religious belief. It follows from my argument that Schroeder has not exposed a tension in Wittgenstein's thoughts on religion. I end with some positive remarks about Wittgenstein's method. 相似文献
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三维物体图形的大小和颜色影响内隐和外显记忆的实验研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本研究探索非言语信息的内隐记忆。用新异的不熟悉的三维物体图形作为实验材料,物体决定测验评价内隐记忆,是/否再认测验评价外显记忆,操纵学习(?)测验间物体图形的颜色(实验一)和大小(实验二),80名被试参加实验一,另80名参加实验二。结果发现:(1)存在着非言语信息的内隐记忆,且与外显记忆相分离;(2)新异的不熟悉三维物体的颜色和大小由外显记忆的情节系统所表征,而非属于结构表征系统,从而支持多重记忆系统假说。 相似文献
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JUDITH GENOVA 《Philosophical Investigations》1979,2(1):9-23
Recently, commentators such as Kenny and Hacker have disagreed about whether Wittgenstein's early picture theory of meaning is at all compatible with his later theory of "meaning-as-use". Arguing in favor of their compatibility, Kenny finds that meaning-as-use supplements, rather than rivals the earlier conception of meaning: 相似文献
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