建设同他者交互关系的未来

本文的核心主题是如何建立同他者的交互关系。作者认为,伦理行为应该从呼吸开始,这是人类最为原初的举动,但在西方文化中一直未得到尊重。忘却呼吸的结果造成了精神和身体的分离,也形成了二元对立的文化传统。要建立二者的伦理关系,首先就要拥有自我爱慕的能力,这是一种栖居在自我状态、能够主宰自己行动和思维的能力,是维持自己家园的前提。在此基础上,作者认为应该开放自我的世界迎接他者的到来,把自己封闭在自我世界的结果将导致对他者异质性的排斥。同时,有必要保持沉默,要耐心倾听,更要换一个方式讲话,充分开发知觉感受,以尊重他者完成自我的超越。二者关系也因此得以建立,这一尊重差异基础之上的二者关系不仅适用于处理性别关系,也可以应用于处理其他文化差异中的二者关系,而无数的二者关系最终组成了多元的世界。     

论生态学的马克思主义的人道主义

生态学的马克思主义基于对人类命运的关照,立足人道主义,反对以单纯保护生态为目的的生态中心主义和企图转嫁生态矛盾的生态帝国主义;认为资本主义的生产、分配和消费方式是引发生态危机的根源;要想摆脱已经上升为人和自然之主要矛盾的生态危机,不仅需要建立“无增长的”经济模式,倡导“劳动闲暇一元论”和日常生活的“简朴主义”,根除虚假需求,克服异化消费,使生产过程分散化、民主化和管理科学化,变控制自然为解放自然,提倡技术为全人类服务,使生态学充满人道主义,而且需要根除资本主义生产的利润动机,杜绝独裁主义的政治和生产逻辑,反对技术法西斯主义,最终废除资本主义制度,建立非极权的、更易于生存的、以实现生态与社会和谐发展为目标的“稳态社会主义”。     

Function of intertrial interval in matching-to-sample

Twelve pigeons were trained on matching-to-sample using either a 0-, 5-, 15-, 25-, or 60-sec intertrial interval. Eight of these 12 pigeons were given one of the following intertrial interval changes: 0 to 60, 0 to 5, 5 to 0, 60 to 0, 15 to 25, 5 to 15, 60 to 5, 5 to 1, 1 to 5, 1 to 25, and 25 to 1 sec. Most intertrial interval changes were repeated at least once. The 0-sec intertrial interval subjects failed to match beyond chance levels, while other intertrial interval values resulted in matching acquisition. Changes from 0 sec to other intertrial interval values increased and changes to 0 sec decreased matching performance. Changes to intertrial interval values other than 0 sec resulted in little change in matching accuracy once stable performance had been attained.     

治疗决策十题

治疗决策是临床决策中的重要组成部分。为了提高治疗决策水平,临床医生可以从以下几个基本环节入手深究决策依据、明确治疗目标、坚持疗效优化、强调安全第一、注意条件约束、注重时效原则、突出救治重点、减损方案危害、分析失悔程度和了解敏感阈值。     

启新、拓新与创新——论生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献

构建和谐社会,必须弘扬生态伦理,繁荣生态伦理学。生态伦理学对伦理学的贡献功不可没,主要体现为：开辟了伦理学研究的新领域,确立了处理人与自然关系的新原则,培育了人对自然的新态度,对传统思想展开了新的系统批判,明确了人类在自然生活中扮演的新角色,对伦理学基本观念进行了新阐释,制定了人类行为新规范。     

Zur Dynamik der Interaktion in der Supervision

The manifold functions of a supervisor in following the course of complex processes together with the trainee, are: ? to keep the goals of the supervision in view, ? to establish a teaching alliance and to support the wish and ambitions of the candidate to learn, ? to build a platform for the complex interactions with the trainee with regard to the dynamics of the training situation and keeping in mind the institutional influences, ? to lay down the setting for the work, ? to explore and to reflect how transference and counter-transference influence the interaction between patient and analyst as well as between trainee and supervisor, ? to examine these interactions together focussing continuously on the interaction between candidate and patient, and to encourage the candidate to do the same on his own, ? to continuously formulate hypotheses about the core conflict, the transference phenomena and resistance of the patient, ? to explore and reflect on the cooperative work.     

Psychological and behavioral implications of connectedness to communities with opposing values and beliefs

Without a doubt, people can feel simultaneously connected to multiple communities (e.g., Deaux, 1993; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). But, to what degree can people feel simultaneously connected to communities with opposing beliefs and values? And, more importantly, what are the psychological implications of being dually connected to these communities? Capitalizing on a sample of individuals positioned to potentially feel connected to two very distinct communities, we examined jail inmates' (N = 256) sense of connectedness to the criminal community and to the community at large. Results indicated that (a) connectedness to the community at large is orthogonal to connectedness to the criminal community, supporting the supposition that it is possible to be dually connected to opposing communities; and (b) connectedness to the community at large moderated the relationship between criminal connectedness and indicators of psychological distress, suggesting that connectedness to the criminal community is especially problematic when it occurs in tandem with connectedness to the community at large. These findings are consistent with predictions from the self-expansion model.     

Effects of preexposure flavor concentration on conditioned aversion and neophobia

In Experiment 1, 128 experimentally naive, water-deprived rats (Rattus norvegicus) received pretraining access to either 0.25 or 1.5% saccharin, distilled water, or 2.0% saline, followed either by a pairing of 0.25 or 1.5% saccharin with an intraperitoneal injection of 0.15 M lithium chloride (LiCl) or by a pairing of distilled water with LiCl. Preexposure to either saccharin concentration reliably reduced conditioned aversion effects to 0.25% saccharin, relative to that for preexposure to distilled water or saline. But only preexposure to 1.5% saccharin reduced aversion effects to that concentration. In Experiment 2, 48 naive, water-deprived rats received preexposure procedures as in Experiment 1. Afterwards, the rats were tested for neophobia to 0.25 or 1.5% saccharin. Neophobia was reliably greater to the 1.5% concentration. However, preexposure to either saccharin concentration obliterated evidence for neophobia to saccharin, relative to that following preexposure to distilled water or saline.     

从认知逻辑视角看西方伦理学的发展

本文希望从认知伦理学的视角出发探讨伦理学的发展,以及人类对道德问题认知的过程与人类一般认知的逻辑之间的一致性。人类认知的逻辑是由概念到判断再到推论的过程,伦理学史由德性伦理学到规范伦理学再到话语伦理学、元伦理学和新德性伦理学的过程,实际上就是人类在道德认知上从概念伦理学到判断伦理学再到推论伦理学最后回归到概念伦理学的过程。     

Reasons and ideals

This paper contributes to the debate on whether we can have reason to do what we are unable to do. I take as my starting point two papers recently published in Philosophical Studies, by Bart Streumer and Ulrike Heuer, which defend the two dominant opposing positions on this issue. Briefly, whereas Streumer argues that we cannot have reason to do what we are unable to do, Heuer argues that we can have reason to do what we are unable to do when we can get closer to success but cannot have reason to try to do what we are unable to do when we cannot get closer to success. In this paper, I reject both positions as they are presented, on the grounds that neither can accommodate an important category of reasons, which are the reasons to realise and to try to realise dimensions of value that lie at the boundary of what is realisable, specifically, genuinely valuable ideals. I defend a third view that we can have reason to do and to try to do what we are unable to do even when we cannot, in Heuer’s sense, get closer to success. Moreover, I argue that we can have reason to realise and to try to realise genuinely valuable ideals for their own sake and not simply for the sake of achieving mundane, realisable ends.     

To warn and to control: two distinct legal obligations or variations of a single duty to protect?

Prior to the Tarasoff decisions, jurisprudence pertaining to the duty to warn, or inform, to prevent violence to third persons, was separate from that pertaining to the duty to control to prevent such violence. The Tarasoff Principle consolidated preventive obligations in the face of foreseeable violence under a single "duty to protect." Even as courts adopted divergent rules for establishing foreseeability, many held to a single duty to protect with warnings as one possibility for fulfilling this option. Particularly over the past decade, courts have again disengaged the duty to warn and the duty to control, each requiring different legal predicates to occur. In recent years, courts have upheld or rejected a duty to warn, upheld or rejected a duty to control; and several courts have, within a single opinion, articulated fundamental distinctions between these two separate protective duties.     

Individualism-Collectivism and Personality

This paper provides a review of the main findings concerning the relationship between the cultural syndromes of individualism and collectivism and personality. People in collectivist cultures, compared to people in individualist cultures, are likely to define themselves as aspects of groups, to give priority to in-group goals, to focus on context more than the content in making attributions and in communicating, to pay less attention to internal than to external processes as determinants of social behavior, to define most relationships with ingroup members as communal, to make more situational attributions, and tend to be self-effacing.     

Behold the lilies: Martin Buber and the contemplation of nature1

Christians attuned to ecological and eco‐justice issues typically welcome the thought that they are called by God to protect and to serve nature, as well as to respond to the needs of the poor and the oppressed. Drawing on Martin Buber's I‐Thou and I‐It conceptuality and highlighting Jesus’ command about the lilies of the field, this article argues that Christians also are called to enter into an I‐Ens relationship with nature, that is, to behold or to contemplate, as well as to protect and to serve nature, as they continue to address ecojustice issues.     

Asymmetrical consequences of behavioral change through reward and punishment

Previous research (Greitemeyer & Weiner, 2003 ) has demonstrated that compliance, because of an anticipated reward is attributed more to the person than compliance because of an anticipated punishment. The present research extended these findings to an educational context. Three studies revealed that parents who ask their children to change inappropriate behaviors are more likely to ascribe their children's improvement to the child, if the child was promised a reward, rather than threatened, to receive a punishment if the child did not improve. Moreover, because a child's improved behavior is more likely to be ascribed to the child given a reward as compared to a punishment, parents expect that rewards (as opposed to punishments) are more likely to sustain improved behavior, when the incentive is no longer offered. Finally, participants report to be more likely to induce behavioral change through reward rather than punishment. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attending to objects: costs or benefits?

The single-object advantage is said to occur when performance is faster and/or more accurate when the two targets to be compared appear on one object than when they appear on two different objects. The single-object advantage has been interpreted to suggest that attention can select objects rather than unparsed regions of visual space. In five experiments we explored whether directing attention to one object rather than two objects produces a benefit or a minor cost. Participants were required to compare two target features that belonged to one object, to two objects, or did not belong to any object. In addition, we varied the relevance to the task of object-related global information, such as symmetry of the object and perceptual cluttering of the background. Results showed that attending to one object in comparison to attending to no object produced a benefit only when object-related global information was relevant to the task. In contrast, when object-related global information was irrelevant to the task, attending to one object produced a cost. Thus, it can be concluded that attending to an object does not produce an absolute benefit, but rather produces a smaller cost than attending to two objects.     

The compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge in the analytic situation

In this paper the author shows that human beings have two quasi‐instinctual primitive tendencies – namely, the compulsion to confess and the compulsion to judge (to condemn or to absolve). These compulsions are originally unconscious and become conscious during the course of the analytic process. The compulsion to judge is a natural consequence of the compulsion to confess. These two tendencies are intensified by the analytic situation. The patient has a compulsion to confess to the analyst and to himself, and likewise the analyst has a compulsion to confess to himself and to the patient. The patient therefore has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the analyst as good or bad while, on the other hand, the analyst has a compulsion to judge himself as good or bad and to judge the patient as good or bad. The task of analysis is to make both patient and analyst conscious of their compulsions to confess and to judge (to condemn or to absolve). The compulsion to judge in the analyst, particularly if unconscious, may give rise to mistakes in diagnosis, technique, treatment, and the assessment of analysability. The requirement of analytic neutrality in the analyst constantly conflicts with his compulsion to judge. If we are profoundly involved in our patient's dramatic conflict, we are bound to pass a judgement (condemnation or absolution); however, when we judge, we are not neutral and therefore become incapable of intellectual consciousness of the patient's conflict. Conversely, if we do not judge, we are neutral, but are then relatively uninvolved in the patient's conflict and are hence virtually unable to achieve emotional consciousness. The author attempts to show that neutrality cannot and must not be a preconstituted attitude in the analyst, but can and must be a point of arrival following a profound, intensely felt existential experience based on an attitude of non‐condemnation and non‐absolution.     

文化心理学的元理论突破及其局限性

文化心理学作为一个新兴的心理学取向,在很大程度上突破了主流心理学的元理论局限,提出了新的构建心理学理论体系的指导思想。这些思想为心理学的发展注入了新的血液,在很大的程度上促进了心理学的发展。但是,文化心理学有点矫枉过正,其元理论也存在着一定的不足,对之应有正确的认识。     

What If? The Farther Shores of Neuroethics

Neuroscience is clearly making enormous progress toward understanding how human brains work. The implications of this progress for ethics, law, society, and culture are much less clear. Some have argued that neuroscience will lead to vast changes, superseding much of law and ethics. The likely limits to the explanatory power of neuroscience argue against that position, as do the limits to the social relevance of what neuroscience will be able to explain. At the same time neuroscience is likely to change societies through increasing their abilities to predict future behavior, to infer subjective mental states by observing physical brain states (??read minds??), to provide evidence in some cases relevant to criminal responsibility, to provide new ways to intervene to ??treat antisocial brains,?? and to enhance healthy brains. Neuroscience should make important cultural changes in our special, and specially negative, views of ??mental?? versus ??physical?? illness by showing that mental illness is a dysfunction of a physical organ. It will not likely change our beliefs, implicit or explicit, in free will, or spark a new conflict between science and religion akin to the creationism controversy.     

当代中国的社会转型

本文以我国社会生活发生的广泛而深刻的变化为背景,深入揭示了这种变化深层的社会转型。这种转型就是：由权力社会走向能力社会;由人治社会走向法治社会;由人情社会走向理性社会;由依附社会走向自立社会;由身份社会走向实力社会;由注重先天给定社会走向注重后天努力社会;由一元化社会走向多样化社会;由人的依赖社会走向物的依赖社会;由静态社会走向流动社会;由“国家”社会走向“市民”社会。     

College students' motivations for money and subjective well-being

Previous research indicates that, while making money is important to college students, it is negatively correlated with subjective well-being. This study asked 157 undergraduate business and psychology students about the importance of making money, their motives for doing so, and several dimensions of subjective well-being: satisfaction with life, self-actualization, and mood/affect. Making money remains very important to college students. Being motivated to make money was not globally related to subjective well-being, but wanting to make money to help others, to feel secure, and to feel proud of oneself were predictive of happiness or subjective well-being. Motives such as comparing oneself favorably to others, spending impulsively, and overcoming self-doubt were not correlated with subjective well-being. Business students appeared more motivated to make money than other students and also to have more negative affect.