Mathematics,science and ontology

According to quasi-empiricism, mathematics is very like a branch of natural science. But if mathematics is like a branch of science, and science studies real objects, then mathematics should study real objects. Thus a quasi-empirical account of mathematics must answer the old epistemological question: How is knowledge of abstract objects possible? This paper attempts to show how it is possible. The second section examines the problem as it was posed by Benacerraf in ‘Mathematical Truth’ and the next section presents a way of looking at abstract objects that purports to demythologize them. In particular, it shows how we can have empirical knowledge of various abstract objects and even how we might causally interact with them. Finally, I argue that all objects are abstract objects. Abstract objects should be viewed as the most general class of objects. The arguments derive from Quine. If all objects are abstract, and if we can have knowledge of any objects, then we can have knowledge of abstract objects and the question of mathematical knowledge is solved. A strict adherence to Quine's philosophy leads to a curious combination of the Platonism of Frege with the empiricism of Mill.     

The fantasy of third-person science: Phenomenology, ontology and evidence

Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states. By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.

Prediction of goal-directed behavior: Attitudes,intentions, and perceived behavioral control

A proposed theory of planned behavior, an extension of Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980, Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall) theory of reasoned action, was tested in two experiments. The extended theory incorporates perceived control over behavioral achievement as a determinant of intention (Version 1) as well as behavior (Version 2). In Experiment 1, college students' attendance of class lectures was recorded over a 6-week period; in Experiment 2, the behavioral goal was getting an “A” in a course. Attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and intentions were assessed halfway through the period of observation in the first experiment, and at two points in time in the second experiment. The results were evaluated by means of hierarchical regression analyses. As expected, the theory of planned behavior permitted more accurate prediction of intentions and goal attainment than did the theory of reasoned action. In both experiments, perceived behavioral control added significantly to the prediction of intentions. Its contribution to the prediction of behavior was significant in the second wave of Experiment 2, at which time the students' perceptions of behavioral control had become quite accurate. Contrary to expectations, there was little evidence for interactions between perceived behavioral control and the theory's other independent variables.     

Attitudes and action: The effects of behavioral intent and perceived effectiveness of acts

Based on the assumption that an individual's behavioral intentions mediate the relationship between his attitudes and behaviors, an attempt was made to obtain a direct assessment of (a) subjects' intentions with regard to a series of acts varying in behavioral thresholds and (b) the perceived instrumentality of these acts for achieving one's goals After the reliability of the Intentions Scale was established, it was combined multiplicatively with ratings of perceived effectiveness to form a combined Action Potential Index (AP) The index resulted in significantly greater predictive validity than a conventional attitude assessment instrument. A second study was undertaken to determine the consistency of the AP-index across issues. The high correlations obtained for the AP-index across three issues suggested the operation of an “activism” personality dimension     

The relations between neuroscience and human behavioral science.

Neuroscience seeks to understand how the human brain, perhaps the most complex electrochemical machine in the universe, works, in terms of molecules, membranes, cells and cell assemblies, development, plasticity, learning, memory, cognition, and behavior. The human behavioral sciences, in particular psychiatry and clinical psychology, deal with disorders of human behavior and mentation. The gap between neuroscience and the human behavioral sciences is still large. However, some major advances in neuroscience over the last two decades have diminished the span. This article reviews the major advances of neuroscience in six areas with relevance to the behavioral sciences: (a) evolution of the nervous system; (b) visualizing activity in the human brain; (c) plasticity of the cerebral cortex; (d) receptors, ion channels, and second/third messengers; (e) molecular genetic approaches; and (f) understanding integrative systems with networks and circadian clocks as examples.     

The open future: bivalence,determinism and ontology

In this paper we aim to disentangle the thesis that the future is open from theses that often get associated or even conflated with it. In particular, we argue that the open future thesis is compatible with both the unrestricted principle of bivalence and determinism with respect to the laws of nature. We also argue that whether or not the future (and indeed the past) is open has no consequences as to the existence of (past and) future ontology.     

The intelligence community and the war on terror: the role of behavioral science

The United States intelligence community has been under intense scrutiny from both inside and outside in the aftermath of September 11. Post mortem assessments of intelligence breakdowns may judge the events as more predictable than was in fact the actual reality. In a troubled world, when threats to national security can materialize very quickly, the intelligence community must be able to effectively and swiftly develop and implement plans to prevent further terrorist attacks on the homeland. Numerous scenarios need to be considered for the management of crisis situations. Intelligence actions must make it more difficult for terrorists to strike at their targets. The war on terror must confront a new generation of enemies who threaten to attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction. This essay will focus on the role of behavioral science and how related reforms within the intelligence community could improve its capability to respond to a huge challenge.     

The convergence of behavioral biology and operant psychology: Toward an interlevel and interfield science

Behavioral biology and operant psychology have developed in parallel but separate paths since their origins in the 1930s. In the first three decades, both fields dealt with microscopic (or molecular) controlling variables and qualitative data. Since about 1960, both have primarily focused on macroscopic (or molar) controlling variables. Their shared interest in foraging in the 1980s suggests a limited convergence beween biologists and psychologists in data, methods, and theories. We draw on accounts of intertheoretic relations from the philosophy of science, including both interlevel theory and interfield theory, to understand this convergence. However, our greater emphasis on methods of data collection and analysis leads us to characterize the convergence as not only one of interfield theory but one of interfield science.     

Rat AA-26: behavioral pharmacology science pioneer.

Rat AA-26, despite 1950s "state of the art," nonetheless generated the first set of behavioral pharmacology cumulative records to appear in the weekly journal Science, the century-old publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The laboratory exploits of this dedicated animal called early attention to the methodological fruits of a marriage between pharmacology and the experimental analysis of behavior.     

Behavioral science integration: A practical framework of multi-level converging evidence for behavioral science theories

Several frameworks exist to help science in organizing known information, connecting previously disparate phenomena, promoting understanding, and identifying gaps in knowledge. This paper integrates previous frameworks that have been used in the behavioral sciences to produce a more comprehensive, specific, and complete framework, consonant with the process of scientific discovery as based on multiple, independent, and converging lines of evidence. This multi-level convergence framework is designed specifically for the analysis and understanding of human cognitive/behavioral traits, in contrast to more general frameworks that are designed to be applied relatively widely (such as across all information processing systems or across all biological organisms). This integrated framework overcomes gaps in prior frameworks, provides a more complete picture of the interrelationships between various aspects of the behavioral sciences, and can aid in evaluating theories, both for comparison and identifying gaps in evidentiary support.     

The ontology of intentionality II: dependence ontology as prolegomenon to noetic modal semantics

This is the second in a sequence of three essays which axiomatize and apply Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology of parts and wholes as a non-Diodorean, non-Kantian temporal semantics for first-order predicate modal languages. The Ontology of Intentionality I introduced enough of Husserl's dependence-ontology of parts and wholes to formulate his account of order as effected by relating moments of unity, and The Ontology of Intentionality II extends that axiomatic dependence-ontology far enough to enable its semantic application. Formalizing the compatibility [Vereinbarkeit] relation implicated in Husserl's notorious doctrine of impossible meanings, the essay introduces a compatibility restriction on relations to formulate Husserl's distinction between singular [einheitliche] and plural [mehrheitliche] objects, using plural relating moments to define first-order versions of Husserl's notions of relation complexes (i.e. Sachverhalte), abstracta of n-ary relation complexes, categorial relations, abstract eide as unifications of categorial relations, semantic domains as completions of abstract eide, and material regions as semantic domains which are compatibility upper bounds of categorial relations. These concepts will enable the formal dependence-ontological noetic semantics for two-valued, first-order modal languages introduced in the sequel Two-Valued Logics of Intentionality, the third essay in the sequence.