Responsibility for Health and Blaming Victims

If we are responsible for taking care of our health, are we blameworthy when we become sick because we failed to meet that responsibility? Or is it immoral to blame the victim of sickness? A moral perspective that is sensitive to therapeutic concerns will downplay blame, but banishing all blame is neither feasible nor desirable. We need to understand the ambiguities surrounding moral responsibility in four contexts: (1) preventing sickness, (2) assigning financial liabilities for health care costs, (3) giving meaning to human suffering, and (4) interacting with health care professionals. We also need to distinguish different kinds of blame, explore the interplay of justice and compassion in avoiding unjustified blaming of victims, and work toward a unified moral-therapeutic perspective that encourages individuals to accept responsibility while avoiding destructive forms of blaming.     

Violate my beliefs? Then you're to blame! Belief content as an explanation for causal attribution biases

We examined the extent to which the content of beliefs about appropriate behavior in social situations influences blame attributions for negative outcomes in relationship situations. Young, middle-aged, and older adults indicated their level of agreement to a set of traditional and nontraditional beliefs. Five months later, we assessed the degree to which these same individuals blamed traditional and nontraditional characters who violated their beliefs in 12 social conflict situations. Older adults held more traditional beliefs regarding appropriate relationship behaviors (e.g., the acceptability of premarital sex). Individual differences in the content of one's beliefs were needed to understand age-related patterns in blame attributions; for example, adherence to traditional beliefs about appropriate relationship behaviors led to higher responsibility and blame attributions toward characters behaving in ways that were inconsistent with these beliefs. Structural regression models showed that beliefs fully mediated the effects of working memory and need for closure on causal attributions and partially mediated the effects of age and religiosity on attributions. Personal identification with the characters had additional, independent effects on attributions. Findings are discussed from the theoretical perspective of a belief-based explanation of social judgment biases.     

Responsibility Without Blame: Empathy and the Effective Treatment of Personality Disorder

Effective treatment of personality disorder (PD) presents a clinical conundrum. Many of the behaviors constitutive of PD cause harm to self and others. Encouraging service users to take responsibility for this behavior is central to treatment. Blame, in contrast, is detrimental. How is it possible to hold service users responsible for harm to self and others without blaming them? A solution to this problem is part conceptual, part practical. I offer a conceptual framework that clearly distinguishes between ideas of responsibility, blameworthiness, and blame. Within this framework, I distinguish two sorts of blame, which I call 'detached' and 'affective.' Affective, not detached, blame is detrimental to effective treatment. I suggest that the practical demand to avoid affective blame is largely achieved through attention to PD service users' past history. Past history does not eliminate responsibility and blameworthiness. Instead, it directly evokes compassion and empathy, which compete with affective blame.     

Snake mother imagery in generalised anxiety disorder

Abstract

Symbols psychoanalysis, depth psychology, mythology and religion from a multiplicity of perspectives – there are many guidelines for their interpretation and integration in clinical practice. The present study, based on a Jungian analytic model, incorporated the snake mother as an imaginary symbol in a patient with generalised anxiety disorder and her treatment within a clinical case study. From an integrative symbolism approach, snakes are considered mysterious, with the ability to express the primary instinctual powers and psychic energy that take root beyond the ego strength and archetypal images. Here, with respect to the patient's main complaint and her underlying core conflict according to Jungian therapy and Persian mythology, it was indicated that the snake mother symbolism, an imagery object from childhood to adolescence, originated from both the personal and the collective unconsciousness. The way in which the symbolism of the snake mother came to work in the therapeutic process was similar to a that of dream and symbolism approach. The snake mother operated as an alternative animus in the shape of a caregiving mother, and supported the patient against her father's misbehavior during her early childhood. It could represent the shadow, the reconsolidation of the anima/animus for patient, and a projection of negative thoughts and actions from animal instincts.     

Temporal dynamics of guilt: changes in the role of interpersonal and intrapsychic factors

Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994) argue that guilt serves primarily interpersonal functions and take issue with more traditional intrapsychic accounts of guilty feelings, in which causality, responsibility, and blame are emphasized. We examined the validity of these claims by asking 198 college students to imagine that they destroyed the valued property of either their best friend or mother, under each of three conditions of causal responsibility (accidental, foreseeable, unjustifiably intended). They then rated the reactions they anticipated from the victim (anger, disappointment; change in impression of the perpetrator), their perceived blameworthiness, aspects of causality, and how guilty they would feel immediately after perpetrating the harm as well as an entire day later. Imagined guilt was curvilinearly related to responsibility at time 1, but linearly at time 2. Results suggest that people only weigh interpersonal concerns more heavily after time has elapsed, but that both factors integrally affect feelings of guilt. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On causality, responsibility, and self-blame: a theoretical note

Examples from the literature on "self-blame" for illness (Tennen, Affleck, & Gershman, 1986) and criminal victimization (Janoff-Bulman, 1979) illustrate insufficient attention to construct validity in the measurement of causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness. Distinctions among these terms have been drawn in detail in a recent theory of the attribution of blame (Shaver, 1985), and these are briefly described. We argue that in future research and theory in the attribution of responsibility and blame, especially self-blame, investigators should attend more carefully to such conceptual distinctions.     

Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.     

Alcohol and Acquaintance Rape in Australia: Testing the Presupposition Model of Attributions About Responsibility and Blame1

According to the presupposition model of attributions about responsibility and blame (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990), an attribution of blame presupposes an attribution of responsibility. Both constructs share the dimensions of choice, intention, and accountability, but an additional dimension of liability relates only to blame. Reactions of 260 university students to acquaintance‐rape scenarios portraying different levels of alcohol intoxication were examined. Results showed that the model's dimensions explained much of the variance in attributions of responsibility and blame, although the hierarchical structure was not supported. Mediational analyses suggest that different attributional principles apply when assigning victim and perpetrator responsibility, which may explain why intoxicated victims are assigned more responsibility than sober victims, but intoxicated perpetrators are assigned less responsibility than sober perpetrators.     

The mother within the mother

This paper describes the subjective experience of internalization, focusing on the daughter's inner world as the encounters becoming and being a mother. Three case vignettes at three phases of a woman's mothering cycle are used to demonstrate modes of registration and expression of her own internalized mother as these in turn involve her offspring. Some issues in analyzing the new mother are raised by the material, as well as implied questions about how "mothering" behaviors emerge at later junctures.     

Working systemically with family violence: risk, responsibility and collaboration

In this article we describe a project which aims to ensure prevention and continued protection from violence for family members. We outline our theoretical approach to assessment and working with violence in family relationships and the associated ethical problems. We identify three recurrent themes: risk, collaboration, and responsibility. We focus on our work with couples, where the man is violent towards the woman. Within this discussion we identify other important clinical issues.     

Dealing with the past: responsibility and personal history

I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.     

The working mother: A critique of the research

This article provides a critique of the research on the working mother. Three major areas of research are reviewed: (1) the effects of maternal employment on preschoolers; (2) the working mother and school age children; and (3) working mothers, identity development, and life satisfaction. It was concluded that the research on maternal employment provided very few definitive answers regarding the effects of a mother's working on her family, children, and herself. Guidelines for conducting future research on maternal employment are presented.     

Two faces of desert

There are two broadly competing pictures of moral responsibility. On the view I favor, to be responsible for some action is to be related to it in such a way that licenses attributing certain properties to the agent, properties like blameworthiness and praiseworthiness. Responsibility is attributability. A different view understands being responsible in terms of our practices of holding each other responsible. Responsibility is accountability, which “involves a social setting in which we demand (require) certain conduct from one another and respond adversely to one another’s failures to comply with these demands” (Watson, Philos Top 24:227–248, 1996). My concern here is the relation between moral responsibility and desert. Plausibly, if someone is morally responsible for something wrong then they deserve blame, and it is on the basis of them being morally responsible and its being wrong that they deserve blame. In this paper, I try to make progress toward understanding why it would follow that being morally responsible for something supports a desert claim. I propose to do this by exploring how the “two faces” of responsibility should proceed. An important upshot is that we gain a new currency by which to evaluate extant theories of responsibility that might favor one or the other conception: do they carry plausible desert commitments? To illustrate this benefit, I argue that accountability theory carries implausible implications for deserved praise.     

Looking compensates for the distance between mother and infant chimpanzee

The development of visual interaction between mother and infant has received much attention in developmental psychology, not only in humans, but also in non-human primates. Recently, comparative developmental approaches have investigated whether the mechanisms that underlie these behaviors are common in primates. In the present study, we focused on the question of whether chimpanzee mother and infant replace physical contact with visual contact. To test this hypothesis, we measured non-synchronous looking ('looking') between mother and infant. A unique setting, in which the mother chimpanzee stayed in one location and the infant chimpanzee moved freely, allowed us to analyze the relation between the visual interaction and the distance of a mother-infant pair during the first year of life. Our results showed that 'looking' increased when body contact decreased or when the distance between mother and infant increased. We also show a behavioral sequence of typical 'secure base' behavior, a behavior characterized by the infant regularly returning to its mother when exploring the environment. These findings imply that attachment between mother and infant chimpanzee appears to develop in a similar fashion as in humans.     

Attributional style of the mother as a predictor of aggressive behavior of the child

The association between the life orientation and attributional styles of a mother and the aggressiveness of her child were studied in 61 mothers and their children, 23 boys and 38 girls, mean age 6.6 years (range 4–13 years). The mother's life orientation and attributional styles were established during interviews using the life-style questionnaire, and a child's aggressiveness was evaluated by the mother using the Health Examination Survey. The factors assessing life orientation were lack of personal control, causal unstability, internal locus of causality, personal responsibility, and democratic educational attitudes. The mother's personal responsibility and internal causal attributions were related to nonaggressiveness in the child, whereas mothers with a lack of personal control were likely to have aggressive children. Educational attitudes were of no importance. The results showed no sex- or age-related variance.     

The empty mother: women's fear of their destructive envy

This paper explains the importance of understanding the little girl's envy of her mother and how the resolution of this envy (and her fear of other women's envy) is crucial to a woman's development. I postulate that envy is a universal part of female development (with more or less destructive effects on a woman's personality, depending on the libidinal/sexual components of her attachment to both parents). I hope to show that by interpreting a woman's fear of her destructive envy, one can free her not only to enjoy her own sexuality and to find appropriate ways to express her aggression, but also to be more creative. I believe that guilt about these envious feelings often leads to profound inhibitions and masochistic behavior. Two clinical examples illustrate how envy manifests itself in treatment with a woman analyst, and how the working through of intense envious feelings leads to a greater ability to enjoy one's own capacities without constant fear of retribution.     

Taking control of violence against doctors

Violence against healthcare professionals is a serious but understudied global problem and one that lacks evidence-based solutions. The current research offers a novel explanation and intervention for addressing this issue: We propose that low feelings of control among patients and their family members play an important role in shaping doctor-patient relationships. To regain a sense of control, we suggest that patients attribute responsibility to doctors for their suffering, which may in turn lead to aggressive behavioural intentions against one's doctors. We conducted three studies to understand whether individuals with low perceived control blame doctors more, and whether threats to their sense of control cause participants to attribute more responsibility to doctors. Study 1 found that feelings of lack of control were an important predictor of attributing responsibility for negative illness-related incidents to doctors in a manner consistent with blame. Study 2 specified that the chaotic and unpredictable nature of illness, and not just its negative valence, is what drives attributions of increased responsibility to doctors. Study 3, which utilized a field setting in hospitals, found that an experimental intervention to increase feelings of control decreased frustration against (Study 3a/3b) and intention to harm doctors (Study 3b). These findings suggest that increasing feelings of control among patients can improve patient-doctor relationships. We also discuss the role of control and scapegoating during the COVID-19 pandemic.     

Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers

For many philosophers, bad‐history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad‐history cases are complicated because blame and sympathy are both fitting. When we are careful to consider the rich natures of those two reactions, we see that they conflict in several important ways. We should see bad‐history cases as cases about whether and how we should blame, rather than as cases giving us ready insight into the nature of moral responsibility.     

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY: A HUMAN DISTINCTIVE?

While agent responsibility appears to be one of the clearest examples of a human distinctive, practices of holding responsible are bound up with social expectations and emotional reactions, many of which are shared with other social animals. This essay attends to the ways in which what Peter Strawson first identified as the reactive emotions, including notably anger, resentment, and indignation, are key to making sense of both the shared and distinctive features of responsible human agency. Like human beings, other social animals express a range of reactive emotions in response to others’ conformity with or violation of implicit social expectations and norms; human beings sometimes reflect on these reactive attitudes and their justifiability, asking whether and when it is appropriate to hold others accountable, blame, and/or punish them. We should recognize that we often praise and blame others for attitudes and desires which they have not chosen and over which they have no direct control, and that this is appropriate.