The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium

The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use of the method of reflective equilibrium and for the best interpretation of the method.     

Knowledge, Equilibrium and Convention

There are two general classes of social conventions: conventions of coordination, and conventions of partial conflict. In coordination problems, the interests of the agents coincide, while in partial conflict problems, some agents stand to gain only if other agents unilaterally make certain sacrifices. Lewis' (1969) pathbreaking analysis of convention in terms of game theory focuses on coordination problems, and cannot accommodate partial conflict problems. In this paper, I propose a new game-theoretic definition of convention which generalizes previous game-theoretic definitions (Lewis 1969, Vanderschraaf 1995), and which can be used to characterize norms of justice in partial conflict situations. I argue that the key structural property necessary for a social arrangement to be a convention is that it be conditionally self-enforcing, in the sense that: (i) each agent has a decisive reason to follow her end of the arrangement given that she expects all to do likewise, (ii) given a different set of expectations, some agents would have had a decisive reason to deviate, and (iii) these facts are common knowledge. This leads to a definition of convention as a strict correlated equilibrium (Aumann 1974) together with appropriate common knowledge conditions. Examples are given in which it is shown how this more general account of convention can be used to analyze norms of justice as well as coordination problems. It is only a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by certain rules. I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express'd, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly be call'd a convention or agreement betwixt us,... David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature And so it goes — we're here because we're here because we're here because we're here. Once the process gets started, we have a metastable self-perpetuating system of preferences, expectations, and actions capable of persisting indefinitely. As long as uniform conformity is a coordination equilibrium, so that each wants to conform conditionally upon coordination by the others, conforming action produces expectation of conforming action and expectation of conforming action produces conforming action. This is the phenomenon I call convention. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Intrinsic Quantum Nature of Nash Equilibrium Mixtures

In classical game theory the idea that players randomize between their actions according to a particular optimal probability distribution has always been viewed as puzzling. In this paper, we establish a fundamental connection between n-person normal form games and quantum mechanics (QM), which eliminates the conceptual problems of these random strategies. While the two theories have been regarded as distinct, our main theorem proves that if we do not give any other piece of information to a player in a game, than the payoff matrix—the axiom of “no-supplementary data” holds—then the state of mind of a rational player is algebraically isomorphic to a pure quantum state. The “no supplementary data” axiom is captured in a Lukasiewicz’s three-valued Kripke semantics wherein statements about whether a strategy or a belief of a player is rational are initially indeterminate i.e. neither true, nor false. As a corollary, we show that in a mixed Nash equilibrium, the knowledge structure of a player implies that probabilities must verify the standard “Born rule” postulate of QM. The puzzling “indifference condition” wherein each player must be rationally indifferent between all the pure actions of the support of his equilibrium strategy is resolved by his state of mind being described by a “quantum superposition” prior a player is asked to make a definite choice in a “measurement”. Finally, these results demonstrate that there is an intrinsic limitation to the predictions of game theory, on a par with the “irreducible randomness” of quantum physics.     

论语言与思想的反思平衡

弗雷格和达米特从说者视角出发,认为语言是思想的容器和交流的工具,因而思想是静态的。戴维森则从听者视角主张:思想作为一种倾向性的语言,乃是解释者赋予说者的命题态度内容,因而思想是动态的。据此我们进一步论证:思想是解释者在交流过程中与说者所共同建构的东西,而不是说者在说话之前的现成之物;思想不是解释者的意见,也不单是说者的意图,而是话语自身的意义;思想是说者与解释者在话语交流的互动过程中一个逐步完成的过程。说者的话语与解释者赋予说者的思想之间是一种相互依赖、相互调整、相互促进的反思平衡关系。     

An Agent-Based Account of the Normativity of Reflective Equilibrium

Philosophia - According to an influential characterisation of reflective equilibrium, it is a kind of algorithm for licensing explicitly normative claims in philosophical inquiries. Call this the...     

Control of Equilibrium Position and Stiffness Through Postural Modules

If muscles are viewed as spring-like torque generators, then the integral of torque with respect to joint angle is the potential energy of that muscle. An energy function for the musculoskeletal system can be defined by summing the energy contribution of each muscle and the potential energy stored in the limb. Any local minimum in this energy landscape is a possible equilibrium position for the limb. The gradient of this function with respect to joint angles is a torque field, and the task of postural control is to find a set of muscle activations to produce a desired field. We consider one technique by which this approximation may be achieved: A postural module is defined as a synergy of muscles that produce a class of torque functions that converge at a constant equilibrium position, but whose stiffness at this position varies as a function of activation of the postural module. For a single-joint system, we show that through control of two such modules it is possible to produce any stiffness at any desired equilibrium position. To extend this scheme to a multijoint system, we initially derive the mechanical constraints on the shape of the restoring force field when a multijoint limb is displaced from equilibrium. Next, we consider voluntary control of the force field when the human arm is displaced from equilibrium: Mussa-Ivaldi, Hogan, and Bizzi (1985) have suggested that subjects are unable to voluntarily change the shape and orientation of the field, although they can readily scale it. This suggests existence of a limitation on the independent recruitment of arm muscles. We show, through simulation, that the inability to voluntarily control the shape and orientation of the restoring force field can be attributed to an organization of postural modules that act as local stiffness controllers. We propose that through coactivation, postural modules coarsely encode the work space and serve as an intermediate control system in the motor control hierarchy.     

从"管制"到"平衡"--政府与公众理想关系模式的构建及其制度化

论文从行政民主的角度探讨政府与公众之间的理想关系模式及其制度化构建过程 ,将我国在改革之前的政府与公众模式概括为管制模式。论文指出 ,在制度变迁的过程中 ,这一模式日益受到挑战。而在新的制度环境下 ,我国政府与公众的关系模式应该是平衡模式。这一模式的制度化措施包括培育自主的市民社会 ,赋予公众以独立的活动空间 ;促进行政公开 ,建立一个开放负责的政府 ;推进行政法建设 ,抑制行政恣意     

Intuitions,Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium

It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. This paper develops a methodology for philosophical theorizing that attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, it develops and defends a methodology it calls Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. It argues that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing a mechanism to check the influence of bias on our intuitions. In section 1, it defends the claim that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. In section 2, it outlines recent arguments against the reliability of intuitions. In section 3, it explains and defends its account of Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium.     

均衡的三种向度及其资源观

资源和人类的生存与发展紧密相连。但资源的质和量在一定的时空内不以人的意志为转移。于是,有限资源与无限的人类需求的矛盾推动着人们去认识世界和改造世界,以获得更多的资源。在人类曾经经历的绝大部分时间里,资源问题很容易得到解决。而在人类现代化过程中,尤其在当代,出现     

Reflective Equilibrium as an Ameliorative Framework for Feminist Epistemology

As Helen Longino's overview of Hypatia's engagement with feminist epistemology suggests, the last twenty‐five years’ contributions to this field reveal a strong focus on the topic of knowledge. In her short outline, Longino questions this narrow focus on knowledge in epistemological inquiry. The main purpose of this article is to provide a framework for systematically taking up the questions raised by Longino, one that prevents us from running the risk of becoming unreflectively involved in sexist, racist, or otherwise problematic inquiry. I argue that a specific form of the method of Reflective Equilibrium, as it is widely discussed in moral epistemology, logic, and theories of rationality, enables us to cope with the problems of traditional epistemology, which feminist theorizers such as Sally Haslanger have pointed to. With the account of Reflective Equilibrium I am offering—drawing in many respects on the model provided by Catherine Z. Elgin—we have an ameliorative method that allows us to rethink epistemological values, goals, and standards in a systematic way, and that largely avoids implicit and explicit biases in epistemology.     

Wide Reflective Equilibrium as a Normative Model for Responsible Governance

Soft regulatory measures are often promoted as an alternative for existing regulatory regimes for nanotechnologies. The call for new regulatory approaches stems from several challenges that traditional approaches have difficulties dealing with. These challenges relate to general problems of governability, tensions between public interests, but also (and maybe particularly) to almost complete lack of certainty about the implications of nanotechnologies. At the same time, the field of nanotechnology can be characterized by a high level of diversity. In this paper, we discuss and compare two models for framing public policy in relation to technology regulation: the first is a deliberative model based on foresight knowledge and the second the wide reflective equilibrium model, developed by political philosopher John Rawls. In both models, the aim is to find consensus on (a framework for) policy measures and regulation. On the basis of a critical discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of both models, some tentative conclusions are drawn for effective policy making and implementation based on soft law.