论伦理关系的特殊本质

首先,伦理关系是一种特殊的社会关系,较之于其他社会关系具有显著的特殊性;其次,从深层的意义上说,伦理关系是一种贯穿道德规定的价值关系;最后,伦理关系的实质和核心内容是主体与主体之间的伦理权利与义务关系。     

对伦理学的对象的再认识——兼与韩东屏教授商榷

伦理学是研究道德和道德现象的科学,也是研究伦理关系及其调整的学问。前者是目前我国学界的主流观点,后者尚未受到足够重视。伦理关系是一种具有普遍性的特殊的社会关系,主要存在于"善"的领域,以伦理权利与义务关系为实质和核心内容,以非强制性的道德调整为主要调整手段。从伦理学的历史和现实看,伦理关系都是伦理学的重要对象,不仅在伦理学理论体系的建构中具有基础性意义,而且在实践上也是完成伦理学使命的关键所在。     

法律正义与道德正义

进入文明时代以来,社会正义一直是人们追求的基本价值目标.社会正义实质上是对人类社会关系(包括个人之间、群体及组织之间、个人与群体及组织之间的相互关系)的公平性、正当性的确认和捍卫,社会正义通常采取法律形式和道德形式来表达.法律正义是以国家意志的形式来表达的社会关系的规定性,它通过制度规范方式来确认和捍卫公民的合法权益和守法义务.道德正义是以德性和良心的形式来表现的社会关系的规定性,它通过伦理规范的方式来确认和维护公民的伦理权利和道德义务.法律正义是道德正义的基础和保障,因而也是社会正义的底线和起点;道德正义是法律正义的前提和灵魂,因而也是社会正义的理想和目标.构建法律正义与道德正义的良性互动关系.是实现社会正义的有效保证.     

论道德权利

在道德生活中,人们之间的关系应当是一种相互的权利与义务关系。道德义务的实质,即是社会和他人对个体的行为要求。但是,由于人们之间的利益关系不可能只是单向的义务关系,因此,有社会和他人对个人的行为要求,也必然有个人对社会和他人的行为要求,这种行为要求,属于道德范围的,便是道德权利。道德权利的客观基础便是社会和他人对个人利益应负的责任。     

公正视角下的权利和义务关系

公正与权利和义务密切相关.公正所涉及的权利和义务,应是严格意义上的相互对应、必然相关的权利和义务,也就是说公正的根本问题是权利与"完全义务"(即狭义的义务)如何分配的问题,即不论是基本权利与基本义务,还是非基本权利与非基本义务,也不论是法定权利与法定义务,还是道德权利与道德义务,一方的权利,必然是他方的义务;反之亦然.     

社会价值与人格价值

人生的价值,就在于对社会的责任和贡献。献体现着外在的社会价值,责任体现着内在的人格价值。所谓社会价值,即个人对社会所作的贡献,或曰个人对社会的“有用性”。所谓人格价值,则是指个人在一定的社会关系中所具有的人格特质。人格就是人的规定性,就是人的政治立场和道德品格。在特定的社会关系中,人格表现为具有一定权利和义务的主体的资格。权利和义务规定着个人的社会责任,同时也使个人成为责任主体。责任意识     

论权利与义务的关系

权利与义务的关系可以归结为两种相关性。一种是一个人的权利与他人的义务的关系:一个人的权利,必然是他人的义务;反之亦然。这是一个人的权利与他人的义务的必然的、客观的、事实如何的关系,亦即所谓“权利与义务的逻辑相关性”。另一种则是基于这种逻辑相关性的“权利义务道德相关性”,亦即一个人的权利应该是对他自己的义务的交换:一个人所享有的权利应该等于他所负有的义务;而他所行使的权利则应该至多等于他所履行的义务。     

人权的儒学进路

麦尔登反对自然权利说,而将权利根植于真实的人际关系和道德社群之中,在其看来,一个人拥有权利就意味着他与他人处于某种道德关系之中,他也有义务履行或是避免某些行为,以支持他人的道德努力。所谓权利,就是从应当履行或避免某些行为的人或人们的角度来看的道德关系。麦尔登不赞成个人主义单子式的独立、自主的自我观,呼吁一种对人的具体实在的观点。麦尔登重视家庭的地位,认为人们从家庭中来学习如何实现对他人的义务以及如何维护自己的应得,并将其扩充至家庭之外更为广泛的社会关系中。麦尔登的思想很多与儒家是相通的,为将权利观念融入儒家思想体系提供了很好的理论借鉴。     

集体与个人间权利与义务的统一——集体主义的本质诉求

集体主义是以集体与个人之间关系的处理为核心的。集体与个人间权利与义务的统一是集体主义的内在属性,是社会的客观要求,更是集体和个人关系存在和发展的必然需求。集体与个人间权利与义务的统一是指个人和集体的权利与义务是双向的、相互的,同时又表现为道德义务相对于道德权利的先在目的性和主体自律性。要实现集体与个人间权利与义务的统一,就要树立正确的集体和个人理念,要有教育、制度等实践措施的保障。     

超越原子主义权利观的“伦理精神”——樊浩教授“伦理精神”系列论著读后

樊浩教授通过对中国传统道德哲学和黑格尔伦理思想的分析,在细致辨析伦理和道德之异同的基础上,建构了内容丰富且具有创新意义的"伦理精神"学术体系。"伦理精神"的本质是"单一物和普遍物的统一","伦理精神"现实地存在于家庭和民族这两个基本的伦理实体以及个人与共同体的普遍伦理关系之中。"伦理精神"是对原子主义权利观的超越,它所内蕴的"从实体性出发"的意涵,可以帮助人们正确处理好复杂的人群共同体伦理关系,培育权利与义务相统一的道德品性,以克服原子主义迷恋个人权利的道德弊端。     

论传统义利观和诚信观的现代转换——从“以诚实守信为荣,以见利忘义为耻”谈起

重义轻利是传统社会的基本价值取向,国人的义利观经历了一个从长期的“羞于言利”到逐渐面对市场逐利,再到一部分人重利轻义、见利忘义的历史转化过程;今天,应改变传统义利观中义与利相互对立的状态,倡导一种义利并重、道义与功利协调发展的新型义利观。诚实信用既是我国传统道德的基本规范,又是市场经济、法制经济的必然要求,从而具有道德建设和法制建设的二重性;法律原则要以其本身所包含的道德合理性为价值基础,而良法的实施又离不开相应的社会道德环境的配合。在市场化和法制化背景下,应该既依托传统,又立足现实,实现传统义利观和诚信观的现代转换。     

论公民的权利与义务

公民的权利与义务既是实体法的意义,同时也具有伦理的意义。法学意义上的权利是以道德权利为基础的。现代法把保障公民的权利看作是法的基本精神,在这个意义上,它就是与现代社会的公民伦理意识相一致的。主张权利和维护权利是公民社会公民的道德义务以及应尽的社会义务,是现代公民社会秩序得以建构的基础条件。社会主义国家承担的义务同时也是公民的权利,所行使的权利也是公民的义务。因此,公民的权利与义务是内在统一的。     

Ross and the particularism/generalism divide

W. D. Ross is commonly considered to be a generalist about prima facie duty but a particularist about absolute duty. That is, many philosophers hold that Ross accepts that there are true moral principles involving prima facie duty but denies that there are any true moral principles involving absolute duty. I agree with the former claim: Ross surely accepts prima facie moral principles. However, in this paper, I challenge the latter claim. Ross, I argue, is no more a particularist about absolute duty than a utilitarian or a Kantian is. While this conclusion is interesting in its own right, it is also important, I argue, because it prevents us from overlooking Ross's criterion of moral obligation and because it may have implications on the broader debate between particularists and generalists.     

Autonomy and moral deference

The idea that a person might have a duty to defer to the moral judgments of others is typically something that arouses our suspicion, in ways that other kinds of deference do not. One explanation for this is the value of autonomy. According to this explanation, people have a duty to be autonomous, and any act of deferring to another person’s moral judgement is not an autonomous action. Call this “the Autonomy Argument” against moral deference. In this article, I criticise the Autonomy Argument. I argue that, even if we accept that an act of moral deference can never be autonomous, those who believe that people have a duty to be autonomous must accept that acts of moral deference are morally necessary. This is because some people are incapable of becoming autonomous by themselves, and deferring to a moral expert is the only way they might ever become autonomous.     

论常人道德——以还物取酬为个案分析

常人道德是道德生活中一种普遍而经常存在的道德行为类型和道德境界层次。它既不是道德上超凡脱俗的圣贤或先进的“君子”,也不是见利忘义、损人利己的“小人”,而是处于二者之间的“中人”之性和“常人”之德。“常人道德”的特征主要体现为：第一,其行为特征既非应当,也非失当,而表现为正当。第二,其价值观是义利兼顾的;第三,其人己观是人我两利的;第四,其行为动机是追求权利与义务的对等统一。常人道德的存在是一种道德生活的常态真实存在。常人道德的义利统一、人己两利、权利与义务相统一是现代伦理精神的集中体现。常人道德是道德的中间层次与境界。研究常人道德并给予道德上的正面价值评价的意义在于有利于克服我们过去的那种善恶两极的对立道德思维方式,有利于真正实现权利与义务相统一的现代道德精神,有利于当代道德研究面向生活和民众,从而有利于建立与社会主义市场经济相适应的新道德观。     

Journalists: a moral law unto themselves?

ABSTRACT Journalists often take themselves as having a moral duty to protect their sources. If the sources in question leak information from government departments, government ministers will consider themselves as having the moral right to demand that the journalists disclose the identity of those sources. This creates conflicts of value between what journalists and ministers consider to be right. It is argued not only that traditional moral theories cannot resolve such moral conflicts, but that they are in a sense a good thing. A world in which the conflicts occur may be considered to be better than one in which they are prevented from occurring, for one can expect to have both effective journalism and effective government only in the former. The most important consequence of this view is that it makes the professional ethics of journalism (and, by implication, those of other professions) into something more than the mere application of universal moral rules to the various situations in which those who work in the profession are liable to find themselves.     

The Duty to Take Rescue Precautions

There is much philosophical literature on the duty to rescue. Individuals who encounter and could save, at relatively little cost to themselves, a person at risk of losing life or limb are morally obligated to do so. Yet little has been said about the other side of the issue. There are cases in which the need for rescue could have been reasonably avoided by the rescuee. We argue for a duty to take rescue precautions, providing an account of the circumstances in which it arises. This novel duty has important implications for public policy. We apply it to the situation of some of the uninsured in the United States. Given the US clinician's duty to provide emergency care to all people regardless of ability to pay, some of the uninsured have a moral duty to purchase health insurance. We defend the duty against objections, including the possibility that a right to rescue can be waived, thus undermining a duty to take rescue precautions, that the duty of many professionals is voluntarily incurred, and that a distinction between actively assumed and passively assumed risks matters morally.     

Moral Response-dependence, Ideal Observers, and the Motive of Duty: Responding to Zangwill

Moral response-dependent metaethical theories characterize moral properties in terms of the reactions of certain classes of individuals. Nick Zangwill has argued that such theories are flawed: they are unable to accommodate the motive of duty. That is, they are unable to provide a suitable reason for anyone to perform morally right actions simply because they are morally right. I argue that Zangwill ignores significant differences between various approvals, and various individuals, and that moral response-dependent theories can accommodate the motive of duty.     

Moral Ideals and Virtue Ethics

There have traditionally been two schools of thought regarding moral ideals and their relationship with moral duty. First, many have held that moral agents at all times have a duty or obligation to realize or attain moral ideals, or at least they have a duty to strive to realize or attain them. A second school of thought has maintained that attaining or pursuing moral ideals is supererogatory or beyond the call of duty. Recently a third school of thought has been articulated by Robert Audi in his essay “Wrongs Within Rights.” In this paper I express agreement with Audi, and it will be my suggestion that the resources of virtue ethics can profitably be employed to illustrate how his view avoids problems which plague the two traditional schools of thought.     

Moral Luck and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relation between the right to self‐defense against an innocent attacker and the notion of moral luck. It argues that those who accept the existence of such a right rely on the assumption that mere agency makes a significant moral difference – which is precisely the assumption that underlies the view held by believers in moral luck. Those who believe in the right to self‐defense against innocent attackers are thus committed to the idea of moral luck much more than they usually acknowledge. The paper also argues that the arguments offered in support of moral luck, in particular the one based on the relation between agency and self‐identity, might help to shed light on the rather puzzling above right.