Beyond intuition and instinct blindness: toward an evolutionarily rigorous cognitive science

Cognitive psychology has an opportunity to turn itself into a theoretically rigorous discipline in which a powerful set of theories organize observations and suggest focused new hypotheses. This cannot happen, however, as long as intuition and folk psychology continue to set our research agenda. This is because intuition systematically blinds us to the full universe of problems our minds spontaneously solve, restricting our attention instead to a minute class of unrepresentative “high-level” problems. In contrast, evolutionarily rigorous theories of adaptive function are the logical foundation on which to build cognitive theories, because the architecture of the human mind acquired its functional organization through the evolutionary process. Theories of adaptive function specify what problems our cognitive mechanisms were designed by evolution to solve, thereby supplying critical information about what their design features are likely to be. This information can free cognitive scientists from the blinders of intuition and folk psychology, allowing them to construct experiments capable of detecting complex mechanisms they otherwise would not have thought to test for. The choice is not between no-nonsense empiricism and evolutionary theory; it is between folk theory and evolutionary theory.     

Memory on the beach: an Australian memory (and hypnosis) laboratory

The memory (and hypnosis) lab at the University of New South Wales investigates a broad range of memory topics. We try to find innovative methods from cognitive and clinical psychology to address theoretical and empirical questions about memory. We aso use hypnosis as one major methodological tool in our investigations of memory (as well as other cognitive processes). In this paper, we review the projects currently underway in our memory (and hypnosis) lab.     

Reflections on intersections between cognitive and social psychology: A personal exploration

I appreciate the opportunity offered by the editor to reflect on the relationship between cognitive and social psychology. This topic has interested me my entire professional life, because I was admitted to graduate school to study social psychology and then eventually migrated to cognitive psychology. The organization of this paper is as follows: I first relate my (somewhat puzzling) personal experiences that led me to wonder about relations between cognitive and social psychology. I suggest that, for many topics, the placement of a topic of study in one field or the other is arbitrary. Next I selectively review some common historical influences on the development of both fields, ones that have made them similar. Both grew from common seeds, which include Gestalt psychology as it became applied to a wider array of topics, experimental psychologists becoming interested in attitude change during and after World War II, and Bartlett's famous book on Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Next I review some research from my lab that picked up themes from Bartlett's work and that, in some aspects, combines cognitive and social approaches. I also discuss the issue of memory conformity or the social contagion of memory, and conclude with thoughts about how social and cognitive psychologists might collaborate on an exciting new arena, creating empirical studies of collective memory. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive niches: an ecological model of strategy selection

How do people select among different strategies to accomplish a given task? Across disciplines, the strategy selection problem represents a major challenge. We propose a quantitative model that predicts how selection emerges through the interplay among strategies, cognitive capacities, and the environment. This interplay carves out for each strategy a cognitive niche, that is, a limited number of situations in which the strategy can be applied, simplifying strategy selection. To illustrate our proposal, we consider selection in the context of 2 theories: the simple heuristics framework and the ACT-R (adaptive control of thought-rational) architecture of cognition. From the heuristics framework, we adopt the thesis that people make decisions by selecting from a repertoire of simple decision strategies that exploit regularities in the environment and draw on cognitive capacities, such as memory and time perception. ACT-R provides a quantitative theory of how these capacities adapt to the environment. In 14 simulations and 10 experiments, we consider the choice between strategies that operate on the accessibility of memories and those that depend on elaborate knowledge about the world. Based on Internet statistics, our model quantitatively predicts people's familiarity with and knowledge of real-world objects, the distributional characteristics of the associated speed of memory retrieval, and the cognitive niches of classic decision strategies, including those of the fluency, recognition, integration, lexicographic, and sequential-sampling heuristics. In doing so, the model specifies when people will be able to apply different strategies and how accurate, fast, and effortless people's decisions will be.     

False memories and fantastic beliefs: 15 years of the DRM illusion

This article reviews research using the Deese/Roediger—McDermott (DRM) associative memory illusion, whereby people falsely remember words that were not presented. This illusion has broadly influenced basic theories of memory in cognitive psychology and neuroscience and naturally raises the question as to how these theories apply to more complex autobiographical memories. Some applicability is evident from research linking individual differences in the DRM illusion to false autobiographical memories (e.g., misremembering public events) and fantastic autobiographical beliefs (e.g., memories from past lives). But which aspects generalize? Here it is argued that a process—oriented approach is needed in order to answer this question. Many productive years of DRM research indicate that multiple and often opposing psychological processes cause even the most basic false memories. In light of these discoveries, more researchers need to use methods that isolate these component processes if the goal is to understand false memories both in the lab and in life.     

Expertise effects in memory recall: comment on Vicente and Wang (1998)

K. J. Vicente and J. H. Wang (1998) proposed a "constraint attunement hypothesis" to explain the large effects of domain expertise on memory recall observed in a number of task domains. They claimed to have found serious defects in alternative explanations of these effects, which their theory overcomes. Reexamination of the evidence shows that their theory is not novel but has been anticipated by those they criticized and that other current published theories of the phenomena do not have the defects that Vicente and Wang attributed to them. Vicente and Wang's views reflect underlying differences about (a) emphasis on performance versus process in psychology and (b) how theories and empirical knowledge interact and progress with the development of a science.     

Collaborative recall and collective memory: what happens when we remember together?

Studies of collective memory have traditionally been the domain of philosophers and sociologists, while cognitive psychologists have largely investigated memory at the level of the individual. However, within cognitive psychology there is a variety of psychological theories and experimental paradigms that have been used to study the process and outcomes of remembering in groups. In this paper we review the research on group remembering and draw together findings from different traditions. In doing so, we aim to answer a series of questions about the outcomes and consequences of recalling in groups, and the particular features of groups and of memories that may be conducive to the formation of a collective memory. In clarifying what we know and what is yet to be studied about group memory, we point the way forward for a cognitive psychological study of collective memory.     

Commercial cognitive/memory systems: A case study

Commercial cognitive/memory systems are products that enhance human cognition and memory. Using one of our own product developments as a case study, we describe three phases of commercial systems development and evaluation. We review published examples of Phase One research, report two quasi-experimental investigations that are representative of successful Phase Two research, and provide some measures used to assess the product's success in the early stages of Phase Three. Finally, we discuss the use of theories and findings from basic research in cognitive psychology to develop products of value to individuals and society.     

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Early theories of surprise, including Darwin’s, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of “making sense of surprising events”. The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people’s perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder to explain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process, reducing surprise, and (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find three rather than one explanations). Across the present studies, using different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people’s perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.     

Constructivism, the so-called semantic learning theories, and situated cognition versus the psychological learning theories

In this paper, the perspective of situated cognition, which gave rise both to the pragmatic theories and the so-called semantic theories of learning and has probably become the most representative standpoint of constructivism, is examined. We consider the claim of situated cognition to provide alternative explanations of the learning phenomenon to those of psychology and, especially, to those of the symbolic perspective, currently predominant in cognitive psychology. The level of analysis of situated cognition (i.e., global interactive systems) is considered an inappropriate approach to the problem of learning. From our analysis, it is concluded that the pragmatic theories and the so-called semantic theories of learning which originated in situated cognition can hardly be considered alternatives to the psychological learning theories, and they are unlikely to add anything of interest to the learning theory or to contribute to the improvement of our knowledge about the learning phenomenon.     

Introduction to the special section on integrative approaches to source memory

Source memory involves recognizing or recalling particular features that cause us to think of a mental experience as representing a particular past event. Research directed at understanding source memory comes from many domains, including cognitive-behavioral psychology, neuroscience, lifespan psychology, clinical psychology, and psychiatry. The authors believe that integrating multiple approaches to investigating source memory--most notably here, cognitive-behavioral and cognitive neuroscience--provides productive cross-fertilization of theory, methods, and analyses that in turn will yield unique constraints to our understanding of human memory. The investigations in this special section demonstrate the promise of such an integrative approach for advancing theories of source memory.     

Modeling the conscious correlates of recognition memory: Reflections on the remember-know paradigm

Understanding how memory processes contribute to the conscious experience of memory is central to contemporary cognitive psychology. Recently, many investigators (e.g., Gardiner, 1988) have examined theremember-know paradigm to understand the conscious correlates of recognition memory. A variety of studies have demonstrated that variables have different effects on remember and know responses, and these findings have been interpreted in the context of dual-process models of recognition memory. This paper presents a single-process model of the remember-know paradigm, emphasizing the dependence of remember and know judgments on a set of common underlying processes (e.g., criterion setting). We use this model to demonstrate how a single-process model can give rise to the functional dissociations presented in the remember-know literature. We close by detailing procedures for testing our model and describing how those tests may facilitate the development of dual-process models.     

The influence of mood on perceptions of social interactions

Interpreting our own and others' social behaviors is an important cognitive task in everyday life. Recent work in cognitive psychology suggests that temporary mood states may have a significant effect on the way information about common social events is processed. This study investigated how (a) a person's current mood, (b) the target of the judgments (self vs other), and (c) the characteristics of the social episode (formal-informal; intimate-nonintimate) influenced people's assessment of, and memory for, social behaviors. Subjects were videotaped while engaging in four different kinds of interactions with trained confederates. One day later subjects were hypnotized, and a happy, positive, or depressed, negative mood was induced. They then watched and rated their own and their partner's interactions on the videotape. Results showed strong mood influence on behavior assessments and recall memory, and significant effects due to target (self vs other) and the type of interaction episode. These results are discussed in terms of their implications for contemporary research on social cognition, and their relevance to cognitively based theories of social maladjustment and depression are considered.     

多元语言文化对个体情境下与社会情境下认知转换功能的差异性影响——来自锡伯族的证据

多民族国家由多个民族和族群组成。个体处于各种民族关系或族群关系中, 需要与其他民族或族群的人协作。“西迁”使我国的锡伯族分居于新疆和东北, 走上了不同的发展道路。新疆锡伯族处于多元语言文化中, 不仅保留了本民族的语言和文字, 也汲取了周边民族的语言文化营养; 而东北锡伯族则与汉族融合, 逐渐失去了本民族的语言和文字, 转用汉语和汉字。采用经典认知转换任务和联合认知转换任务, 对比新疆锡伯族和东北锡伯族在个体情境下和社会情境下的认知转换功能差异, 探讨多元语言文化对个体情境下与社会情境下认知转换功能的影响。结果发现, 在个体情境下, 新疆锡伯族的转换代价更小; 在社会情境下, 新疆锡伯族的联合机制更容易被激活, 他们分配认知资源去表征同伴的任务, 自我-他人的整合程度更高, 转换代价更大。整个研究表明, 多元语言文化对认知转换功能具有不同的影响：促进个体情境下的认知转换功能, 降低社会情境下的认知转换功能。本研究的结果为多民族国家的文化和心理建设提供了重要启示。     

Social cognition: learning about what matters in the social world

Social‐cognitive principles underlie people's learning about what matters in the social world. The benefits of these social‐cognitive principles reveal essential aspects of what it means to be human. But these social‐cognitive principles also have inherent costs , which highlight what it means to be ‘only human’. Social cognition is ‘social’ because what is learned concerns the social world, and where the learning takes place is in the social world. This paper reviews the benefits and costs of both sides of social cognition: (1) the cognition of social psychology principles of organization, explanation, knowledge activation and use; and (2) the social psychology of cognition principles of shared reality role enactment, social positions and identities and internal audiences. The fact that there are inherent costs of the same social‐cognitive principles for which there are essential benefits affords a new perspective on social‐cognitive costs that is different from either the classic ‘conflict’ perspective or the more current ‘limited capacity’ and ‘dual‐process’ perspectives. This ‘trade‐off’ perspective deepens both our understanding of the true nature of these principles and our appreciation of our common humanity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Declarative working memory: A bio-inspired cognitive architecture proposal

Memory is considered one of the most important functions since it allows us to code, store and retrieve knowledge. These qualities make it an indispensable function for a virtual creature. In general, memory can be classified based on the durability of the stored data in working memory and long-term memory. Working memory refers to the capacity to maintain temporarily a limited amount of information in mind, which can then be used to support various abilities, including learning, reasoning, planning and decision-making. Unlike short-term memory, working memory is not only a storage site, but it is also a framework of interacting processes that involve the temporary storage and manipulation of information in the service of performing complex cognitive activities. Declarative memory is a type of long-term memory related with the storage of facts and events. This research focuses on the development of a cognitive architecture for the type of working memory that maintains and manipulates declarative information. The construction of the model was grounded in theoretical evidence taken from cognitive sciences such as neuroscience and psychology, which gave us the components and their processes. The model was evaluated through a case study that covers the encoding, storing, and retrieval stages. Our hypothesis is that a virtual creature endowed with our working memory model will provide faster access to the information needed for the ongoing task. Therefore, it improves the planning and decision-making processes.     

How societal stereotypes might form and evolve via cumulative cultural evolution

The current article examines how societal stereotypes might form and evolve through a process of cumulative cultural evolution as social information is repeatedly passed from person to person. Social psychology research has done much to inform our understanding about the substantial influence stereotypes exert on us as individuals and on our society, yet comparatively little is known about how society's pools of stereotype knowledge form and how they evolve. Here, we review evidence that as social information is repeatedly passed from person to person, there is a continuous cycle of stereotype formation and evolution that is driven by constraints and biases in (a) observations of the social environment, (b) cognitive representations of the social environment, and (c) social transmissions of cognitive representations of the social environment. We suggest the reason stereotypes exist and persist is because they are perfectly adapted for human cognition and the reason they are perfectly adapted for human cognition is because they are the cumulative product of human cognition.     

Cognitive Processing of Traumas: The Role of Intrusive Thoughts and Reappraisals1

Cognitive processing theories of post-traumatic adaptation (Horowitz, 1986a; Janoff-Bulman, 1992) propose that repeated comparisons of trauma content with preexisting cognitive schemas result in trauma reappraisal or schematic revision. Thus, intrusive ruminations should facilitate cognitive integration and resolution of past traumas. However, research has shown that some survivors become stuck in endless, repetitive rumination cycles. This raises the issue of how to differentiate ruminations that promote cognitive integration from those that merely prolong or exacerbate psychological distress. Identifying substantive dimensions for categorizing cognitions about past traumas could enhance prediction of their effects on adjustment and inform clinical treatment interventions. This paper seeks to: (a) Assess the current state of theoretical knowledge concerning cognitive adaptation to trauma, (b) integrate theoretical postulates with empirical research findings, (c) define gaps or inconsistencies in our understanding of the cognitive adaptation process, and (d) identify foci for future theory and research.