Knowing minds: Linking early perspective taking and later metacognitive insight

Recent metacognitive research using a partial knowledge task indicates that a firm understanding of ‘knowing about knowing’ develops surprisingly late, at around 6 years of age. To reveal the mechanisms subserving this development, the partial knowledge task was used in a longitudinal study with 67 children (33 girls) as an outcome measure at 5;9 (years;months). In addition, first- and second-order false belief was assessed at 4;2, 5;0, and 5;9. At 2;6, perspective taking and executive abilities were evaluated. Metacognition at 5;9 was correlated with earlier theory of mind and perspective taking – even when verbal intelligence and executive abilities were partialled out. This highlights the importance of perspective taking for the development of an understanding of one’s own mind.     

Children with autism can track others' beliefs in a competitive game

Theory of mind (ToM) development, assessed via ‘litmus’ false belief tests, is severely delayed in autism, but the standard testing procedure may underestimate these children's genuine understanding. To explore this, we developed a novel test involving competition to win a reward as the motive for tracking other players' beliefs (the ‘Dot‐Midge task’). Ninety‐six children, including 23 with autism (mean age: 10.36 years), 50 typically developing 4‐year‐olds (mean age: 4.40) and 23 typically developing 3‐year‐olds (mean age: 3.59) took a standard ‘Sally‐Ann’ false belief test, the Dot‐Midge task (which was closely matched to the Sally‐Ann task procedure) and a norm‐referenced verbal ability test. Results revealed that, of the children with autism, 74% passed the Dot‐Midge task, yet only 13% passed the standard Sally‐Ann procedure. A similar pattern of performance was observed in the older, but not the younger, typically developing control groups. This finding demonstrates that many children with autism who fail motivationally barren standard false belief tests can spontaneously use ToM to track their social partners’ beliefs in the context of a competitive game.     

Understanding of others’ knowledge in French and Japanese children: A comparative study with a disambiguation task on 16–38-month-olds

In order to explain the cultural differences reported in the results of false-belief tasks, we attempted to verify the ‘task bias hypothesis’ suggested by certain studies (e.g. Tardif et al. (2004). Journal of Child Language, 31, 779–800; Rubio-Fernandez & Geurts (2013). Psychological Science, 24(1), 27–33. doi 10.1177/0956797612447819). At the same time, we aimed to observe the theory of mind (ToM) ability of infants and young children under the age of three in verbal communication. To this end, we propose a new protocol to test young children's ToM ability, with particular attention paid to the linguistic aspect of the task. This original disambiguation task using proper nouns (first names) was tested on a total of 32 children aged between 16 and 38 months, in France and Japan. The results revealed that after the age of 30 months children begin to correctly interpret nouns while simultaneously taking into account their partner's knowledge (50% of the French and 29% of the Japanese children were successful), whereas this remains difficult for younger children (no child under 30 months was successful). The analysis of error types has shown that ‘memory bias’ was dominant in younger children in particular and ‘association bias’ was rarely observed across all ages. Given that the results of French and Japanese children did not differ significantly, we assume that this new task design could minimise the influence of cultural difference caused by the characteristics of different languages.     

Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks

Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were tested using videos of puppets in various versions of a theory of mind change‐of‐location situation, in order to answer several questions about what children are doing when they pass false belief tests. To investigate whether children were guessing or confidently choosing their answer to the test question, a condition in which children were forced to guess was also included, and measures of uncertainty were compared across conditions. To investigate whether children were using simpler strategies than an understanding of false belief to pass the test, we teased apart the seeing‐knowing confound in the traditional change‐of‐location task. We also investigated relations between children's performance on true and false belief tests. Results indicated that children appeared to be deliberately choosing, not guessing, in the false belief tasks. Children performed just as well whether the protagonist gained information about the object visually or verbally, indicating that children were not using a simple rule based on seeing to predict the protagonist's behaviour. A true belief condition was significantly easier for children than a false belief condition as long as it was of low processing demands. Children's success rate on the different versions of the standard false belief task was influenced by factors such as processing demands of the stories and the child's verbal abilities.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

The role of eye‐gaze in understanding other minds

From an early age, infants are sensitive to eye‐gaze direction. This study examined Baron‐Cohen's (1994, 1995) claim that the ability to use eye‐gaze plays a crucial role in the child's developing understanding of other minds. Children aged 3 and 4 years participated in a face‐reading task, which assessed their capacity to infer mental states from a character's direction of eye‐gaze, and in a false‐belief task. As predicted, no child passed the false‐belief task without prior success on the face‐reading task. However, contrary to a central claim within Baron‐Cohen's model of mind‐reading, presentation of an eye‐gaze cue in the false‐belief task did not enhance children's performance. Furthermore, children did not solely rely on eye‐gaze as a cue, but used another directional cue (an arrow) in inferring a character's desire and intention. These results question the special role of eye‐gaze in the child's developing ability to mind‐read.     

Young Children's Understanding of Intention

Three studies were done to determine when children begin to understand people's intentions as mental-representational states (Searle's prior intentions) and as instantiated in purposive, goal-directed behaviors (Searle's intentions-in-action) that are distinguishable both from the people's desires or preferences and from the outcomes of the actions their intentions engender. Three- and four-year-olds were presented with stories in which the story characters' intentions differed both from their desires or preferences and from the outcomes of their efforts to carry out their intentions. The 3-year-olds, especially the younger ones, showed little ability to distinguish intentions from desires and outcomes. In contrast, most of the 4-year-olds were able to make these distinctions consistently. These and other recent differential studies suggest that children begin to develop a differentiated conception of intention at around 3 1/2 or 4 years of age.     

Event plausibility does not determine children's false memories

In this paper we ask how the plausibility of an event affects the likelihood that children will develop a false memory for it. Over three interviews 6-year-olds and 10-year-olds were shown two true photos and two false photos—a plausible and less plausible event—and reported what they could remember about those events. Children also rated their confidence that the events happened, and how much they could remember about the events. By the final interview, within each age group, there were no differences in children's confidence ratings for the two false events. In addition, within each age group, the rate of false memories was the same for each event; across age groups, younger children developed more false memories than older children.     

Selecting the wrong processor: a critique of Leslie’s theory of mind mechanism–selection processor theory

The fundamental assumption behind Leslie’s theory of mind mechanism theory is that from 18 months onwards a single device, the theory of mind mechanism, allows children to represent both pretend and belief in terms of propositional attitudes. This is compared with Perner’s argument that early pretence is not understood in terms of propositional attitudes. Recent modifications to Leslie’s theory aim to explain why children younger than 4 years fail the false belief test. Leslie argues that the correct proposition is computed, not by the theory of mind mechanism, but by the selection processor, a later-developing executive device. In this paper I examine the coherence of Leslie’s revised theory and conclude that representing beliefs is now entirely the task of the selection processor; the theory of mind mechanism is no longer involved, thus contravening the fundamental assumption of the theory. The conclusion is that the theory and the assumption should be abandoned.     

Perceptual access reasoning: developmental stage or system 1 heuristic?

In contrast with the two dominant views in Theory of Mind development, the Perceptual Access Reasoning hypothesis of Fabricius and colleagues is that children don’t understand the mental state of belief until around 6 years of age. Evidence for this includes data that many children ages 4 and 5, who pass the standard 2-location false belief task, nonetheless fail the true belief task, and often fail a 3-location false belief task by choosing the irrelevant option. These findings can be explained by the PAR hypothesis but pose challenges for the two dominant views. I argue against an alternate hypothesis which is proposed by Anika Fiebich in a recent paper. According to Fiebich, PAR is not a distinct transitional stage in children’s theory of mind development, but is a fast and frugal System 1 heuristic which fades once children become fluent in social reasoning. However, I point out a number of problems with Fiebich’s proposal and argue for the superiority of the PAR hypothesis. I also present five reasons to be skeptical about the findings of Perner and Horn which purportedly show that 4- and 5-year-olds can pass the 3-location false belief task when suitably modified. This is a further difficulty for Fiebich’s proposal, since she relies on these findings in her fluency theory. Finally, I sketch a dual systems theory of mind account based upon the PAR hypothesis which is different from Fiebich’s.     

热执行功能对儿童标准窗口任务测试的影响

主要考察热执行功能对3~4岁儿童标准窗口任务测试的影响。实验采取3×3的被试间设计。设置了3种条件：标准指示、“强化竞争”指示和无对手指示;将随机抽取的270名被试分为3个年龄段,以检测3~4儿童在窗口任务中的认知发展趋势。结果表明：⑴热执行功能也是影响3~4儿童标准窗口任务测试的一个主要因素;⑵3岁后期是3~4岁儿童在标准窗口任务中所体现出来的认知发展差异的分界年龄;⑶3~4岁儿童在窗口任务中还表现出规则推理能力的差异     

Frege on Truth,Assertoric Force and the Essence of Logic

In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative role that the logical laws play vis-à-vis judgement, assertion and inference. My aim in this paper is to develop and defend an alternative reconstruction according to which Frege stresses that logic is not only concerned with ‘how thoughts follow from other thoughts’, but also with the ‘step from thought to truth-value’. Frege considers logic as a branch of the theory of justification. To justify a conclusion by means of a logical inference, the ‘step from thought to truth-value’ must be taken, that is, the premises must be asserted as true. It is for this reason that, in the final analysis, the assertoric force indicates the essence of logic, for Frege.     

Relating developments in children's counterfactual thinking and executive functions

The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.     

Perceptual impulsions and unfamiliar solids: Evidence from a drawing task

Previous work (Dziurawiec & Derȩgowski, 1992) has shown that children's distorted drawings of animal models may be explained by the child's tendency to depict typical contours, the outlines of the surfaces which undergo pronounced change. The present paper investigates whether the typical contours notion can be extended to purely geometric solids. Results from a drawing task by children aged nine and eleven years, using unfamiliar models of varying complexity, indicate that the tendency to draw in perspective increases with the increase in figure complexity for both age groups, but younger children show a greater reliance on typical contours than older children. Recasting the data from previous drawing experiments (Bartel, 1928/1958; Cox, 1986) further confirms the utility of the typical contours approach. Finally, the advantages of such an approach over that of canonicity (cf. Palmer, Rosch & Chase, 1981) for the representation of solids are elaborated.     

幼儿看图叙述中心理状态术语的使用与错误信念理解关系的短期跟踪研究

摘 要：为探明汉语儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语的应用及与错误信念理解能力的关系,并追踪二者相互作用的方向,本研究以101名3-5岁儿童为研究对象,纵向探查了前后相隔3个月的儿童看图叙述中心理状态术语使用情况和错误信念能力的发展状况,并从横向和纵向两个时间点分别探讨了心理状态术语的运用与错误信念理解的关系。结果表明：3-5岁儿童错误信念理解能力快速发展;儿童看图叙述中使用较多的愿望术语和情绪术语,信念术语应用相对较少,且认知词汇类型较少。控制了一般语言能力和年龄之后,仅在第一次测验上,情绪术语、信念术语仍然与同期及后期错误信念理解能力存在显著相关。     

Linguistic Acquisitional Style and Mentalising Development: The Role of Maternal Mind-mindedness

We investigated three main questions: (a) Is there consistency over time in mothers' mind-mindedness (the proclivity to treat one's child as an individual with a mind)? (b) Does mind-mindedness relate to children's subsequent mentalising development? and (c) Is mentalising development related to children's linguistic acquisitional style? Two measures of early vocabulary—proportion of common nouns and proportion of frozen phrases—were obtained at 20 months. Three measures of maternal mind-mindedness were taken: (a) mothers' reports of nonstandard words in their children's vocabularies; (b) mothers' meaningful interpretations of their children's early vocalizations; and (c) mothers' propensity to focus on their children's mental attributes at age 3. Children's mentalising abilities were assessed using the “false belief and emotion” task (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989) at age 5. There was clear evidence for consistency in mind-mindedness between 20 months and 3 years. All three measures of mind-mindedness were positively related to children's performance on the false belief and emotion task, but children's linguistic acquisitional style was not related to subsequent mentalising ability. These findings are interpreted as providing support for the view that caregivers' behavior is critical in helping children acquire a “theory of mind.”     

幼儿对基于信念的惊奇情绪的认知发展

采用简化的错误信念任务,考察了90名3~5岁幼儿对自己或他人信念证伪引发的惊奇情绪认知及其错误信念理解。结果显示,3~5岁幼儿对自身或是故事主人公信念证伪之后的惊奇情绪理解表现出显著的发展趋势,其归因均以情境定向为主,只有极少数幼儿提到了相应的信念状态。3、4、5幼儿对他人、以及自身错误信念的认知基本是一致的,通过率分别为一半左右、76.7%、93.3%。幼儿对惊奇情绪产生原因的逆向推理能力在3~5岁之间获得了显著的发展,这一能力显著差于其错误信念认知,且略低于其顺向预测能力。这些结果揭示出幼儿很早就发展的心理理论以及心理表征技能在惊奇情绪理解中的作用     

The effects of single and dual representations on children's gesture production

Investigations that focus on children's hand gestures often conclude that gesture production arises as a result of having multiple representations. To date, the predictive validity of this notion has not been tested. In this study, we compared the gestures of 82 five-year-old children holding either a single or a dual representation. The children retold a story narrated to them, with pictures, by the experimenter. In one condition the children heard a false belief story and hence, when retelling, held two beliefs—or representations—concurrently. In the other conditions, the children retold a version of the story without the false belief component and therefore held single representations. Children were four times more likely to gesture in the false belief condition than in two comparable true belief conditions, supporting the notion that gestures may function to externalise some of the child's cognitive process, particularly when they hold multiple representations.