Are we explaining consciousness yet?

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness.     

Computational exploration of metaphor comprehension processes using a semantic space model

Recent metaphor research has revealed that metaphor comprehension involves both categorization and comparison processes. This finding has triggered the following central question: Which property determines the choice between these two processes for metaphor comprehension? Three competing views have been proposed to answer this question: the conventionality view ( Bowdle & Gentner, 2005 ), aptness view ( Glucksberg & Haught, 2006b ), and interpretive diversity view ( Utsumi, 2007 ); these views, respectively, argue that vehicle conventionality, metaphor aptness, and interpretive diversity determine the choice between the categorization and comparison processes. This article attempts to answer the question regarding which views are plausible by using cognitive modeling and computer simulation based on a semantic space model. In the simulation experiment, categorization and comparison processes are modeled in a semantic space constructed by latent semantic analysis. These two models receive word vectors for the constituent words of a metaphor and compute a vector for the metaphorical meaning. The resulting vectors can be evaluated according to the degree to which they mimic the human interpretation of the same metaphor; the maximum likelihood estimation determines which of the two models better explains the human interpretation. The result of the model selection is then predicted by three metaphor properties (i.e., vehicle conventionality, aptness, and interpretive diversity) to test the three views. The simulation experiment for Japanese metaphors demonstrates that both interpretive diversity and vehicle conventionality affect the choice between the two processes. On the other hand, it is found that metaphor aptness does not affect this choice. This result can be treated as computational evidence supporting the interpretive diversity and conventionality views.     

Modeling adaptive cooperative and competitive metaphors as mental models for joint decision making

In this paper, joint decision making processes are studied and the role of cognitive metaphors as mental models in them. A second-order self-modeling network model is introduced based on mechanisms known from cognitive and social neuroscience and cognitive metaphor and mental model literature. The cognitive metaphors were modeled as specific forms of mental models providing a form of modulation within the joint decision making process. The model addresses not only the use of these mental models in the decision making, but also their hebbian learning and the control over the learning. The obtained self-modeling network model was applied to two types of metaphors that affect joint decision making in different manners: a cooperative metaphor and a competitive metaphor. By a number of scenarios it was shown how the obtained self-modeling network model can be used to simulate and analyze joint decision processes and how they are influenced by such cognitive metaphors.     

Evidence for role-neutral initial processing of metaphors

Two models of metaphor processing are contrasted. The structure-mapping model postulates an initially role-neutral alignment process, followed by directional projection of inferences. The attributive categorization model postulates role-specific processing throughout comprehension. To test between these models, the early stages of metaphor comprehension were probed using a technique based on S. Glucksberg, P. Gildea, and H. Bookin's (1982) finding that metaphorical meaning interferes with literal truthfulness judgments. In Experiment 1, interference effects did not differ between normal metaphors and metaphors with reversed terms, suggesting that initial processing is role-neutral. In Experiment 2, we again found no role dependence in interference effects, even for highly conventional metaphors. In Experiment 3, it was verified that (a) full comprehension is role-sensitive and (b) full comprehension reaction times (RTs) are far longer than interference RTs, buttressing the claim that interference is an early-stage effect. Overall, the results support the structure-mapping model of metaphor processing.     

A relational theory of self-deception

The authors argue that the fragmentary model of consciousness implied in the term ‘self-deception’ has provided the chief metaphor for explaining the apparent discrepancies that can arise between the evaluation of a motivated observer and the evaluation of a less interested external observer. Though self-deception models have explained these discrepancies in terms of both a dualistic opaque consciousness and in terms of cognitive and affective processes, all of these accounts seem to rest on the same essential fragmentation of the psyche. The authors argue that a relational model of consciousness, one that claims the indissolubility of cognition and affect, object and perception, and of past, present, and future can account for the apparent discrepancies involved in the paradigmatic cases of self-deception in a more parsimonious and phenomenologically faithful way than more objectivist and fragmented accounts of self-deception.     

Does simile comprehension differ from metaphor comprehension? A functional MRI study

Since Aristotle, people have believed that metaphors and similes express the same type of figurative meaning, despite the fact that they are expressed with different sentence patterns. In contrast, recent psycholinguistic models have suggested that metaphors and similes may promote different comprehension processes. In this study, we investigated the neural substrates involved in the comprehension of metaphor and simile using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to evaluate whether simile comprehension differs from metaphor comprehension or not. In the metaphor and simile sentence conditions, higher activation was seen in the left inferior frontal gyrus. This result suggests that the activation in both metaphor and simile conditions indicates similar patterns in the left frontal region. The results also suggest that similes elicit higher levels of activation in the medial frontal region which might be related to inference processes, whereas metaphors elicit more right-sided prefrontal activation which might be related to figurative language comprehension.     

Consciousness: mapping the theoretical landscape

What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the theories attempt to explain consciousness. We then situate each of several representative models in this landscape and indicate which aspect of consciousness they try to explain. We conclude that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness should be usefully complemented by a search for the computational correlates of consciousness.     

纳米伦理:规范分析和范式转换

鉴于纳米技术目前显现出的启发式控制活力,可以将其作为伦理学一个重要的潜在探索领域。这就要求把对纳米技术的规范分析从一般技术制品和后果评估扩大到技术隐喻、想象和语言评估,由此认为目前占据主流地位的德莱克斯勒式纳米机器是一种机械隐喻,必然导向决定论式的单向度社会命运,但其论敌斯默莱的生物模拟隐喻实际上意味着一种范式转换,因为它为人在纳米技术发展中提供了表达责任感的道德机会。沿着这一线索,目前倡导伦理导向的纳米技术发展,就是要把它作为一个多学科背景依赖领域,把参与其社会意义塑造的各种主客体要素引导到人道主义立场上来,以使纳米世界建构真正体现人的全面发展。     

A reappraisal of Teresa of Avila's supposed hysteria

This essay offers a reassessment of Teresa's severe seizures which were such a characteristic feature of her mysticism. The diagnosis of hysteria is no longer viable, at the very least given its abandonment by clinicians. An alternative analysis is developed by phenomenologically comparing Teresa's seizures to parallel experiences of subjects in LSD-assisted psychotherapy. Using Stanislav Grof's categories, it is argued that Teresa's seizures are perinatal symptoms. As such, they represent the emergence and reintegration of extremely primitive psychological systems and might be described as the growing pains of transpersonal consciousness. They reflect not degenerative psychopathology but progressive movement toward higher states of consciousness.He has published articles in the fields of metaphor and the psychology of mysticism. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the national meeting of the American Academy of Religion in New York in 1982.     

Memory metaphors in cognitive psychology

In describing memory phenomena in natural language, a spatial metaphor is typically employed. Memories are considered to be objects that are stored in a mind space, and the process of retrieval is conceived as a search for these objects. It is argued that this metaphor has been carried over into many of the popular theories of memory in cognitive psychology and that seemingly diverse theories employ the same underlying set of assumptions. A survey of the analogies that have been used to explain memory is presented and alternatives to the dominant spatial storage and search assumptions are discussed. The spatial metaphor is evaluated, and the role of analogical explanation in psychology is briefly considered. One result of the increasing number of analogical models is the proliferation of hypothetical mental constructs that are only loosely connected to behavioral measures. nt|mis|A number of members of Ebbinghaus Empire at the University of Toronto contributed analogies that are listed in Table 1 and commented on the views expressed here.     

EMERGENCE EVERYWHERE?! REFLECTIONS ON PHILIP CLAYTON'S MIND AND EMERGENCE

Abstract. Emergence is a powerful concept marked by great emotional, aesthetic, and intellectual appeal. It makes inroads into the understanding of the most diverse phenomena. Emergence appears to have the potential of explaining anything from the behavior of atoms, ant colonies, and traffic jams to insurance risks, human consciousness, and divine action. Philip Clayton's book Mind and Emergence (2004) offers much‐needed clarification of the philosophical grounding of emergence theory. To a large extent, emergence hinges on the concept of levels and hierarchies in nature. The preferred metaphor is that of a ladder. Given the tendency of concepts like emergence to build ideology, a careful analysis of language and metaphor is called for, however. I argue that the preference for the ladder metaphor does not do justice to the differentiated relationality that is a distinct mark of emergence. This oversight may have detrimental consequences when emergence theory is transferred from natural to social and cultural processes. A hermeneutical analysis suggests that better metaphors and visualizations need to be found. As an invitation to consider alternatives, some examples of complex regular poly topes are offered.     

Topic—vehicle interaction in metaphor comprehension

Property comparison models of metaphor comprehension assume that the topic and vehicle terms in metaphors are both understood to be referring to their conventional literal referents. In contrast, the interactive property attribution model (Glucksberg, McGlone, & Manfredi, 1997) assumes that the vehicle is understood to be referring to a metaphoric category that includes the topic's literal referent as a member. A priming paradigm was used to test the implications of these different models. Prior to interpreting a metaphor, participants read (1) the topic or vehicle concept alone, (2) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-relevant property to one concept, or (3) a sentence ascribing a metaphor-irrelevant property to one concept. All of the prime types facilitated metaphor comprehension with the exception of sentences ascribing metaphor-irrelevant properties to vehicles. The failure of these sentences (but not their topic counterparts) to facilitate metaphor comprehension is attributable to their priming an inappropriate literal interpretation of the vehicle term. These results are consistent with the claim that irrelevant information is suppressed during language comprehension (Gernsbacher, 1990) and support the interactive property attribution model.     

Paradigms,Metaphors, and Narratives

This paper addresses the issue of the status of developmental theories. It discusses the concepts of paradigm, metaphor, and narrative as these apply to developmental theories. The author argues that all developmental theories use metaphors as explanatory models. The type of metaphor a theory uses determines whether or not it has a narrative structure. Developmental theories that use a contextual metaphor as opposed to those that use mechanistic or organismic metaphors do not have narrative structure, although their applications to individual cases create narratives. By examining the type of metaphor developmental theories use it is possible to construct a theory that is both coherent and that corresponds to the events associated with development. This conclusion leads to the rejection of constructivist approaches to viewing development, and suggests that it is possible for a developmental theory to attain the status of a paradigm.     

Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views

Quite a few recent models are rapidly introducing new concepts describing different levels of consciousness. This situation is getting confusing because some theorists formulate their models without making reference to existing views, redundantly adding complexity to an already difficult problem. In this paper, I present and compare nine neurocognitive models to highlight points of convergence and divergence. Two aspects of consciousness seem especially important: perception of self in time and complexity of self-representations. To this I add frequency of self-focus, amount of self-related information, and accuracy of self-knowledge. Overall, I conclude that many novel concepts (e.g., reflective, primary, core, extended, recursive, and minimal consciousness) are useful in helping us distinguish between delicate variations in consciousness and in clarifying theoretical issues that have been intensely debated in the scientific literature--e.g., consciousness in relation to mirror self-recognition and language.     

Metaphor and ‘career’

This article provides a series of readings of a young man’s career—a career that was shared in the context of a research project. Although similar, each reading is qualitatively different in the sense that new material is introduced on each occasion. This, in turn, highlights the limitations of the word as a form of representation. The article argues that in order to encapsulate the irreducible hermeneutic characteristic of a ‘career,’ a non-linear form of representation is required. The article moves on to show how metaphor can be utilized to represent ‘career’ in both words and images. This includes a detailed examination of the notion of metaphorisation—a constructionist term that denotes the relationship between metaphor and consciousness. The article concludes with a discussion of the methodological possibilities offered by metaphor for conducting research.     

Understanding families as systems

In this article, we discuss recent research that has arisen from theoretical and conceptual models that use a systems metaphor for understanding families. We suggest that research stimulated by such models leads social scientists in new and important directions in understanding the social and emotional development of children in their families. These models view development as resulting from the dynamic transactions across multiple levels of family systems, which regulate a child's behavior. Thus, these models are important in considering multiple influences on development and adaptation.     

Consciousness as a concrete physical phenomenon

The typical empirical approach to studying consciousness holds that we can only observe the neural correlates of experiences, not the experiences themselves. In this paper we argue, in contrast, that experiences are concrete physical phenomena that can causally interact with other phenomena, including observers. Hence, experiences can be observed and scientifically modelled. We propose that the epistemic gap between an experience and a scientific model of its neural mechanisms stems from the fact that the model is merely a theoretical construct based on observations, and distinct from the concrete phenomenon it models, namely the experience itself. In this sense, there is a gap between any natural phenomenon and its scientific model. On this approach, a neuroscientific theory of the constitutive mechanisms of an experience is literally a model of the subjective experience itself. We argue that this metatheoretical framework provides a solid basis for the empirical study of consciousness.     

The career of metaphor

A central question in metaphor research is how metaphors establish mappings between concepts from different domains. The authors propose an evolutionary path based on structure-mapping theory. This hypothesis--the career of metaphor--postulates a shift in mode of mapping from comparison to categorization as metaphors are conventionalized. Moreover, as demonstrated by 3 experiments, this processing shift is reflected in the very language that people use to make figurative assertions. The career of metaphor hypothesis offers a unified theoretical framework that can resolve the debate between comparison and categorization models of metaphor. This account further suggests that whether metaphors are processed directly or indirectly, and whether they operate at the level of individual concepts or entire conceptual domains, will depend both on their degree of conventionality and on their linguistic form.     

Development of metaphor and metonymy comprehension: Receptive vocabulary and conceptual knowledge

Figurative language, such as metaphor and metonymy are common in our daily communication. This is one of the first studies to investigate metaphor and metonymy comprehension using a developmental approach. Forty‐five typically developing individuals participated in a metaphor–metonymy verbal comprehension task incorporating 20 short picture‐stories. Cross‐sectional trajectory analyses linking task performance to either chronological age or receptive vocabulary (mental age, MA) were used to compare the development of metaphor and metonymy. Results showed that development of metaphor and metonymy comprehension is strongly linked with chronological and MA, but metaphor comprehension develops at a slower rate compared to metonymy. It was also found that participants, across all ages, consistently showed around 21% better performance on metonymy. The relationship between metaphor and metonymy comprehension is discussed in terms of linguistic and cognitive models of figurative language comprehension arguing that metonymy is cognitively more basic than metaphor.     

Neuropragmatism, old and new

Recent work in neurophilosophy has either made reference to the work of John Dewey or independently developed positions similar to it. I review these developments in order first to show that Dewey was indeed doing neurophilosophy well before the Churchlands and others, thereby preceding many other mid-twentieth century European philosophers’ views on cognition to whom many present day philosophers refer (e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty). I also show that Dewey’s work provides useful tools for evading or overcoming many issues in contemporary neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind. In this introductory review, I distinguish between three waves among neurophilosophers that revolve around the import of evolution and the degree of brain-centrism. Throughout, I emphasize and elaborate upon Dewey’s dynamic view of mind and consciousness. I conclude by introducing the consciousness-as-cooking metaphor as an alternative to both the consciousness-as-digestion and consciousness-as-dancing metaphors. Neurophilosophical pragmatism—or neuropragmatism—recognizes the import of evolutionary and cognitive neurobiology for developing a science of mind and consciousness. However, as the cooking metaphor illustrates, a science of mind and consciousness cannot rely on the brain alone—just as explaining cooking entails more than understanding the gut—and therefore must establish continuity with cultural activities and their respective fields of inquiry. Neuropragmatism advances a new and promising perspective on how to reconcile the scientific and manifest images of humanity as well as how to reconstruct the relationship between science and the humanities.