Horwich, Meaning and Kripke's Wittgenstein

Paul Horwich has argued that Kripke's Wittgenstein's 'sceptical challenge' to the notion of meaning and rule-following only gets going if an 'inflationary' conception of truth is presupposed, and he develops a 'use-theoretic' conception of meaning which he claims is immune to Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical attack. I argue that even if we grant Horwich his 'deflationary' conception of truth, that is not enough to undermine Kripke's Wittgenstein's sceptical argument. Moreover, Horwich's own 'use-theoretic' account of meaning actually falls prey to that sceptical challenge.     

Cognitive meaning and cognitive use

In the first part of this paper the author restates arguments made earlier against well‐known criticisms of a logical nature leveled (by C. Hempel and others) against the so‐called verifiability principle, which purport to show that it is at once both too restrictive and too permissive: including as cognitively meaningful, statements intuitively lacking this property, and excluding others that are generally admitted to possess it. The author claims to show that the charge that the verifiability principle is unduly permissive will not stand, because of certain logico‐semantical blunders made by the critics; and that the charge of being too restrictive can be removed by introducing the notion of guasi‐truth‐conditions. He then moves on to an examination and elaboration of the concept of cognitive use, in terms of which he attempts to turn the flank of the argument purporting to show that the verifiability principle is too restrictive, explaining that even if one does not invoke the concept of quasi‐truth‐conditions, that of cognitive use enables one to save for science and cognition in general sentences that lack truth‐values (cognitive meaning). A version of the verifiability principle that denies cognitive meaning to non‐finitistic, non‐analytic mixed‐quantifications does not therefore do any injury to science, frequent claims to the contrary notwithstanding.     

The use theory of meaning and semantic stipulation

According to Horwich’s use theory of meaning, the meaning of a word W is engendered by the underived acceptance of certain sentences containing W. Horwich applies this theory to provide an account of semantic stipulation: Semantic stipulation proceeds by deciding to accept sentences containing an as yet meaningless word W. Thereby one brings it about that W gets an underived acceptance property. Since a word’s meaning is constituted by its (basic) underived acceptance property, this decision endows the word with a meaning. The use-theoretic account of semantic stipulation contrasts with the standard view that semantic stipulation proceeds by assigning the meaning (reference) to W that makes a certain set of sentences express true propositions. In this paper I will argue that the use-theoretic account does not work. I take Frege to have already made the crucial point: "a definition does not assert anything but lays down something ["etwas festsetzt"]” (Frege 1899, 36). A semantic stipulation for W cannot be the decision to accept a sentence containing W or be explained in terms of such an acceptance. Semantic stipulation constitutes a problem for Horwich's use theory of meaning, especially his basic notion of acceptance.

Frequency of meaning use for ambiguous and unambiguous words

When using verbal stimuli, researchers usually equate words on frequency of use. However, for some ambiguous words (e.g.,ball as a round object or a formal dance), frequency counts fail to distinguish how often a particular meaning is used. This study evaluates the use of ratings to estimate meaning frequency. Analyses show that ratings correlate highly with word frequency counts when orthographic and meaning frequencies should converge, are not unduly influenced by semantic factors, and may provide a better measure of relative meaning dominance than the word association task does. Furthermore, the ratings allow researchers to equate or manipulate frequency of meaning use for ambiguous and unambiguous words. Ratings for 211 words are reported.     

Some reflections on the use and meaning of conflict in contemporary psychoanalysis

The author reflects on the concept of conflict in contemporary psychoanalysis, and especially in European psychoanalysis. In the latter, this concept does not seem to have aroused significant interest. This does not necessarily mean that conflict has been rejected or replaced; rather, there has been a greater focus on preconflictual stages of development. Indeed, conflict is generally implicit in psychoanalytic work, and, like many other concepts, it has very different and at times divergent meanings, both in various psychoanalytic schools of thought and within the same school. The author presents a clinical example to illustrate some of the possible choices of the analyst at work concerning the use of the concept of conflict.     

Preschool children's use of cues to generic meaning

Sentences that refer to categories - generic sentences (e.g., "Dogs are friendly") - are frequent in speech addressed to young children and constitute an important means of knowledge transmission. However, detecting generic meaning may be challenging for young children, since it requires attention to a multitude of morphosyntactic, semantic, and pragmatic cues. The first three experiments tested whether 3- and 4-year-olds use (a) the immediate linguistic context, (b) their previous knowledge, and (c) the social context to determine whether an utterance with ambiguous scope (e.g., "They are afraid of mice", spoken while pointing to 2 birds) is generic. Four-year-olds were able to take advantage of all the cues provided, but 3-year-olds were sensitive only to the first two. In Experiment 4, we tested the relative strength of linguistic-context cues and previous-knowledge cues by putting them in conflict; in this task, 4-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, preferred to base their interpretations on the explicit noun phrase cues from the linguistic context. These studies indicate that, from early on, children can use contextual and semantic information to construe sentences as generic, thus taking advantage of the category knowledge conveyed in these sentences.     

A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know)))

The judgment that a given event is epistemically improbable is necessary but insufficient for us to conclude that the event is surprising. Paul Horwich has argued that surprising events are, in addition, more probable given alternative background assumptions that are not themselves extremely improbable. I argue that Horwich??s definition fails to capture important features of surprises and offer an alternative definition that accords better with intuition. An important application of Horwich??s analysis has arisen in discussions of fine-tuning arguments. In the second part of the paper I consider the implications for this argument of employing my definition of surprise. I argue that advocates of fine-tuning arguments are not justified in attaching significance to the fact that we are surprised by examples of fine-tuning.     

Literal meaning, conventional meaning and first meaning

Literal meaning is often identified with conventional meaning. In A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs Donald Davidson argues (1) that literal meaning is distinct from conventional meaning, and (2) that literal meaning is identical to what he calls first meaning. In this paper it is argued that Davidson has established (1) but not (2), that he has succeeded in showing that there is a distinction between literal meaning and conventional meaning but has failed to see that literal meaning and first meaning are also distinct. This failure is somewhat surprising, since it is through a consideration of Davidson's notion of radical interpretation that the distinction between literal meaning and first meaning becomes apparent.I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support, and to Mark Mercer, Tom Patton and Gary Wedeking for their helpful comments. I would also like to thank David Checkland, who discussed A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs with me at length some years ago.     

Negation: A theory of its meaning,representation, and use

This article presents a model-based theory of what negation means, how it is mentally represented, and how it is understood. The theory postulates that negation takes a single argument that refers to a set of possibilities and returns the complement of that set. Individuals therefore tend to assign a small scope to negation in order to minimize the number of models of possibilities that they have to consider. Individuals untrained in logic do not know the possibilities corresponding to the negation of compound assertions formed with if, or, and and, and have to infer the possibilities one by one. It follows that negations are easier to understand, and to formulate, when individuals already have in mind the possibilities to be negated. The paper shows that the evidence, including the results of recent studies, corroborates the theory.     

Gibbard on meaning and normativity

The paper is a critique of Allan Gibbard’s impressively crafted monograph Meaning and Normativity. The book relies on a subtle form of logical empiricism, developing a normative verificationist semantics within a subjective Bayesian framework. I argue that the resulting account of synonymy is too fine-grained, since it counts clearly synonymous words in different languages as non-synonymous. For similar reasons, Gibbard’s account of analytic implication relies on postulating untenable connections between semantics and epistemology. I conclude that one of the main obstacles to robust realism about normativity and morality, the supposed conceptual connections between normative language and action, is a myth.     

Children use whole-part juxtaposition as a pragmatic cue to word meaning

When parents label novel parts of familiar objects, they typically provide familiar whole-object terms before offering novel part terms (e.g., "See this cup? This is the rim."). Such whole-part juxtaposition might help children to accurately interpret the meaning of novel part terms, but it can do so only if they recognize the conjunction as a potential cue to part meaning. Two studies examined (a) whether 3- to 4-year-olds use whole-part juxtaposition to accurately interpret novel part terms and (b) how they might do so. Study 1 confirmed that children indeed use juxtaposition to guide learning of novel part terms. Furthermore, 2 control conditions clarified that children's use of juxtaposition was not simply due to memory effects, such as the facilitation of lexical access, nor to recognition of the grammatical frame that typically accompanies juxtaposition. Study 2 revealed that children readily use juxtaposition in a novel, gestural format. Such flexibility in recognizing and utilizing novel variants of juxtaposition strongly suggests that pragmatic understanding lies at the heart of children's sensitivity to whole-part juxtaposition.