The importance of ‘mass’ in line drawings of faces

Previous research (Davies, Ellis and Shepherd, 1978; Rhodes, Brennan and Carey, 1987) has shown that accurate line drawings of familiar faces are identified rather poorly. However, artists can produce lifelike portraits with pen and ink, and Pearson and Robinson (1985) described an automatic method for producing computer-drawn sketches (‘cartoons’) of faces which appear very similar to those produced by a human artist. In this paper we show that subjects can identify famous faces depicted in such computer-drawn ‘cartoons’ almost as well as full grey-scale images. The cartoon algorithm comprises two components. One component draws lines at the locations of intensity changes corresponding to luminance valleys and edges (the ‘valledge’ detector). The other component applies a ‘threshold’ to the original intensity distribution, and replaces any area darker than threshold with black. Thus the full cartoon contains both ‘line’ and ‘mass’. Neither the valledges nor the threshold components alone were as well identified as full cartoons containing both components. The results suggest that the addition of the threshold component adds significantly to the identifiability of line drawings of faces.     

Neither ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’ nor ‘Better’ in Terms of ‘Good’

In this paper, I argue against defining either of ‘good’ and ‘better’ in terms of the other. According to definitions of ‘good’ in terms of ‘better’, something is good if and only if it is better than some indifference point. Against this approach, I argue that the indifference point cannot be defined in terms of ‘better’ without ruling out some reasonable axiologies. Against defining ‘better’ in terms of ‘good’, I argue that this approach either cannot allow for the incorruptibility of intrinsic goodness or it breaks down in cases where both of the relata of ‘better’ are bad.     

A Lesson in ‘Psycholese,’ or How to ‘Get a Feel For’ Where Your ‘Helper’ Is ‘Coming From’

Oftentimes/frequently the consumers/clients/patients of community/private mental health agencies/facilities experience/encounter difficulty communicating with the mental health professionals/paraprofessionals. Presented is a glossary that should aid novice clients to better communicate with their helpers/therapists/counselors/ caregivers. On the other hand (at the same time), it might just confuse the clients further. This is clearly a risk with counseling.     

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.     

Counseling the ‘disadvantaged’

In this article, Henrietta Tolson looks at the obstacles to a sharing relationship with clients which counselors set up by stereotyping people and seeking to enhance their own status. With the vision of someone who has worked for many years with people in Seattle's central area, she discusses the subtleties of racial and economic prejudice among well meaning, middle class counselors and case workers.     

A characterization of ‘min’ as a procedure for exploiting valued preference relations and related results

This paper is concerned with procedures which transform valued preference relations on a set of alternatives into crisp relations. We present a simple characterization of a procedure that ranks alternatives in decreasing order of their minimal performance. This is done by means of three axioms that are shown to be independent. Among other results, we characterize in a very similar manner a procedure called ‘leximin’ and investigate two families of procedures whose intersection is the ‘min’ procedure.     

Truth and the ‘Politics of Ourselves’

The authors take up Amy Allen's suggestion that while Foucault's work may be able to support a certain type of self‐critique and self‐development, it does not permit the kind of interpersonal relations that are necessary for the development of intersubjective meaning in struggles against imposed identities. The authors contend that for Foucault, relations of ‘truth’ play an important constitutive role in subjectivities, and that understanding the ‘politics of ourselves’ in the context of this truth shows not only an openness to meaningful interpersonal relations, but also that these relations are capable of generating the conceptual and normative resources necessary for resisting socially imposed subjectivities. The authors present such an account of intersubjective relations based on Foucault's discussion of parrhesia, and develop a model of collaborative political action that addresses the criticisms raised.     

‘Fundamentalism’ Christian and Islamic

This article seeks to answer the question whether the term ‘fundamentalism’ is an appropriate label for certain Islamic movements by undertaking a detailed comparison with Protestant Christian fundamentalism, for which the term was originally coined. After an effort to identify and characterize the two phenomena, a number of similarities and differences are discussed. Among the differences is the fact that the most obvious defining characteristics in each case (Biblical inerrancy for Protestants and politicalsocial involvement for Muslims) are of little relevance to the other case. Among the similarities is a common opposition to ‘modernism’ and a tendency to stress what has been distinctive to the Protestant and Islamic traditions, respectively. The conclusion is that, while the two phenomena do have much in common, ‘fundamentalism’ is not an appropriate common label. The author prefers ‘Islamic radicalism’ for the Muslim case and tentatively suggests ‘radical neotraditionalism’ as a common label.