试论中西方未成年人道德养成教育的主要差异

中西方在未成年人道德养成教育方面,既有许多相同或相似之处,也存在着显著的差异。这种差异体现在道德养成教育理念、道德养成内容、道德养成途径、道德养成方法等诸多方面。导致这些差异的原因,既有经济基础、社会结构、政治制度上的根源,又与思想文化背景等密不可分。我们应该根据时代的特点审视这些差异。既要吸收西方未成年人道德养成教育的经验,同时也要注意发扬我国未成年人道德养成教育中的优良传统,使二者优势互补,共同为我国当前的未成年人道德建设服务。     

传统人性论与启蒙德育

人性学说是道德教育的理论基础,启蒙德育学说更是奠基于此。数千年来,中国传统人性论在启蒙德育中发挥着基础性作用。性善论作为传统童蒙教育的理论基础,指向人之为人的应当,体现了理想化的道德诉求。探讨中国传统人性论为我们提供了哪些可利用的道德资源,以及如何吸收传统人性论的精华为当代启蒙德育构建新的人性论基础,对于建立科学的启蒙德育理论和实践模式,对于培养新一代道德公民有着重要的现实意义。     

后现代伦理话语和社会主义荣辱观

现代性道德合法性危机标志着道德形而上学走到了黄昏,后现代主义解构了道德本体论,把个人情感、欲望、意志等合理性感性因素整合进道德人格结构与功能中去,道德回归生活本身,生活世界变得更加丰富多彩;解构了"宏大叙事"总体化道德努力,道德话语权的个体回归使每个人都能在道德的世界自由而充分的生长,过上真正属人的生活;解构了"同一性"普遍化道德,摆脱道德形而上学的纠缠,在一个没有伦理的社会中进行自由的道德选择.在我国满载张力和快速节律的现代化过程中,社会主义荣辱观建构,既要实现传统道德的现代转型.又要汲取西方后现代主义对道德形而上学远见卓识的批评,惟有如此,我们的伦理世界更加丰富,更加成熟,从而超越现代性而后现代化.     

评皮亚杰"约束的道德"与"协作的道德"——兼论代际关系视野中的道德教育

让·皮亚杰在<儿童的道德判断>中提出了"约束的道德"和"协作的道德"两个不曾被人专门讨论的核心概念.它们分别具有以下三大特点:约束的道德是成人权威的体现,协作的道德则是儿童自主制订规则的道德;约束的道德倾向于惩罚性的公正;而协作的道德则追求平等的公正;约束的道德是他律的道德,协作的道德则是自律的道德.深入辨析"约束的道德"和"协作的道德",对于创新建立在成年人与未成年人良性互动基础上的道德教育具有明显的意义和价值.     

以心代理：明代道德权威的缺失

道德权威是维护社会道德秩序的重要力量.在中国传统社会中,道德权威与政治权威是合二而一的,并通过王权合法性问题而展现出来.道德权威的确立需要坚实的理论基础,阳明心学的"以心代理"是导致明代中后期道德生活的混乱与失序的重要原因.     

道德教育之道德的内容结构探讨

道德教育的根本宗旨应是培养既愿做又会做"道德人"的"道德人",这就要求道德教育之道德的内容应是由道德知识、特定社会的道德现实、主体的道德能力构成的有机统一体,不作如是观,道德教育培养的"道德人"便只是"道德书生",在道德实践中可能会因缺乏道德实践能力而时常陷入道德悖论的"困惑"之中,进而可能背离愿意做"道德人"的初衷,转而渐渐不愿做"道德人".构建合理的道德教育之道德的内容结构,需要厘清基本理路,作多方面的认知创新.     

试论社会转型时期法律对伦理的挑战

道德与法律之间存在着相互一致的常态关系和相互矛盾的非常态关系.在常态关系中,道德构成了法律的养料、源泉、基础和底线;而在二者之间的非常态关系中,存在着"向后看"和"向前看"两种形式,其中"向前看"的形式,尤其是社会转型时期"向前看"的形式,具有重要的进步意义.这时,法律向道德提出挑战,而这一挑战成为实现伦理革命,从而推动价值观念变革的有效途径.法律向道德的挑战是道德与法律之间"旧"的常态关系跳跃到"新"的常态关系的"阶梯"或者"节点".     

高低自立水平儿童道德情绪判断及归因特点的实验研究

本研究运用故事情境的临床访谈方法探讨了高、低自立水平儿童的道德情绪判断及归因模式.结果显示,在道德判断任务中,两组儿童在三种侵犯情景(说谎、偷拿、伤害)下均无显著差异;在情绪判断任务中,在偷拿情境和伤害情境下,高自立组对犯过者的情绪判断为高兴/开心者显著少于低自立组,而判断为难过/羞愧者显著多于低自立组;在归因模式上,两组儿童在说谎情境下没有显著差异,而在偷拿情境和伤害情境下,高自立组个人定向显著少于低自立组,而道德定向显著多于低自立组.研究结果提示儿童自立水平越高其道德情绪判断的归因越是"道德定向"的,自立水平越低其道德情绪判断的归因越是"个人定向"的.自立行为发展水平可能是影响儿童道德情绪判断和归因的因素之一.     

程颐"格物致知"思想新探

程颐在表彰<大学>时重点对其中的"格物致知"思想作了诠释发挥.在程颐"格物致知"思想中,所格之"物"主要不是客观世界的"物",而是道德世界的"事",因此所致之"知"并非关于外部客观世界的"知识";程颐所格之"物"虽然主要是道德世界的"事理",但格物的方式--"思"实质上发挥着变化气质而使内在天理呈显的作用,因此所致之"知"也不是关于道德的知识或道德意识,而同样是对内在固有道德本性("天理")的明觉.     

道德市场的合理性及其存在论基础

西方市民社会的经济理论和文化观曾为道德和市场的二元分裂提供理论支持,企业活动的非道德性似乎在经济与市场活动中得到确证.但是,随着现当代经济实践活动中面临的各种伦理问题,道德市场的合理性与建构已成为经济学家和哲学家探讨的重大课题.鲍曼论证了企业作为道德人比作为自利的"经济人"更能理想地实现自己的效用.这一观点得到现代博弈论的进一步论证;而马克思从人的本真性存在为道德市场的合理性提供了存在论基础.     

Dogs and Monsters: Moral Status Claims in the Fiction of Dean Koontz

This article explores conceptions of moral status in the work of American thriller author Dean Koontz. It begins by examining some of the general theories of moral status used by philosophers to determine whether particular entities have moral status. This includes both uni-criterial theories and multi-criterial theories of moral status. After this examination, the article argues for exploring bioethics conceptions in popular fiction. Popular fiction is considered a rich source for analysis because it provides not only a good approximation of the beliefs of ordinary members of the moral community, but also explores important issues in a context where ordinary individuals are likely to encounter them. Following on from this, the article then explores theories of moral status in the context of Koontz’s novels. In particular, the article focuses on the novel Watchers and Koontz’s Frankenstein series. Through these works, Koontz indicates that entities have moral status for a variety of reasons and thus presumably, he is a proponent of multi-criterial theories of moral status. The article concludes with an examination of what this might mean for our understanding of moral status claims generally.     

THE VALIDITY OF MORAL THEORIES

Abstract. We can usefully draw an analogy between ethics and science, despite the significant differences between them. We can then see the ways in which moral theories can indeed be "tested," not by empirical experience but by moral experience. This can be expected to lead to rival moral theories, but in science also we have rival theories. I argue that we should demand more than coherence of our moral theories, as we do of our scientific theories. I try to show how the "testing" of moral theories can be carried out and how this can allow us to accept some moral theories as valid.     

The failure of theories of personhood

The belief persists in philosophy, religion, science, and popular culture that some special cognitive property of persons like self-consciousness confers a unique moral standing. However, no set of cognitive properties confers moral standing, and metaphysical personhood is not sufficient for either moral personhood or moral standing. Cognitive theories all fail to capture the depth of commitments embedded in using the language of "person." It is more assumed than demonstrated in these theories that nonhuman animals lack a relevant form of self-consciousness or its functional equivalent. Although nonhuman animals are not plausible candidates for moral personhood, humans too fail to qualify as moral persons if they lack one or more of the conditions of moral personhood. If moral personhood were the sole basis of moral rights, then these humans would lack rights -- and precisely for the reasons that nonhuman animals would.     

Beyond Altruism: Identity-Construction as Moral Motive in Political Explanation

This article explores conceptual issues pertaining to the role of moral motivation in political explanation. Employing data drawn from long interview with political activists from across the spectrum of American politics, I criticize both rational actor models and so-called "dual" motivational theories, that focus on altruism as the primary moral motive in politics, in contrast to the narrow focus on a certain conception of self-interest. Against both of these approaches, I offer an identity-construction approach to moral motives in politics. This model focuses on the complex interweaving of self and moral motives, and in particular focuses on the concerns political activists have for what kind of person they are and what kind of life they are living. These types of concerns are both moral and self-regarding, and therefore defy the dichotomy between self- and other-regarding at the heart of both rational actor and "dual" motivation accounts of moral motives.     

道德之一元论与多元论：缘起、内涵与论争

一元论与多元论之争是道德心理学领域近些年最为活跃的理论交锋之一。道德一元论认为所有外在的道德现象与内在的道德结构都可以用一种因素来解释。道德多元论则认为道德不能只用单一因素来解释,而是存在多个不同质的道德维度,且具有文化敏感性。对应道德理论和道德基础理论是这场争议的典型代表。双方就伤害的解释力、道德失声现象、模块化道德与洁净维度独立性等方面展开论争。未来研究应从三个具体方面进一步探索道德之一元论与多元论难题,进而保持道德心理学领域的理论活力。     

Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation*

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one's views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non‐deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles.     

"伦理"与"道德"概念的三重比较义

“伦理”与“道德”是伦理学或道德哲学中的两个核心概念,但二者长期处于概念模糊和逻辑混乱状态,导致伦理学和道德教育“名不正而言不顺”。通过对这两个概念进行以词源学为基础的三重比较:汉语言文化中的比较、英语文化中的比较、中西文化中的比较,我们可以得出的结论是:当代“伦理”概念蕴含着西方文化的理性、科学、公共意志等属性,“道德”概念蕴含着更多的东方文化的情性、人文、个人修养等色彩。“西学东渐”以来,中西“伦理”与“道德”概念经过碰撞、竞争和融合的过程,目前二者划界与范畴日益清晰,即“伦理”是伦理学中的一级概念,而“道德”是“伦理”概念下的二级概念。二者不能相互替代,它们有着各自的概念范畴和使用区域。     

传统思想中的“礼”和“礼仪”——兼论“礼”和“礼仪”的道德功能

我国对“礼”和“礼仪”的认识经历了曲折的过程。传统道德中许多关于“礼”和“礼仪”的论述 ,包含着合理的思想内核。我们要很好地利用这笔财富 ,充分发挥它的道德功能 ,广泛地开展礼仪教育 ,加强公民道德建设和社会主义精神文明建设。     

Triune ethics: The neurobiological roots of our multiple moralities

Triune Ethics Theory (TET) is a psychological theory developed to meet three goals. First, it attempts to harvest critical findings from neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive science and to integrate them into moral psychology for the purpose of informing psychological research on the moral life of persons. In contrast to dominant theories that focus on top-down, deliberative reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg), TET is a bottom-up theory that focuses on motivational orientations that are rooted in evolved unconscious emotional systems shaped by experience that predispose one to react to and act on events in particular ways. Second, it seeks to explain differences in moral functioning through a person by context interaction. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence personality formation and behavior in context, while at the same time situations can evoke particular reactions, which vary with personality. Third, it suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development.