Dreaming: cognitive processes during cortical activation and high afferent thresholds

The concepts of nonlocal, or distributed, cortical and cognitive activation are examined for their usefulness in describing the relations between sleep and waking neurocognitive processes. Changes in the pattern of distributed activation and inhibition of selected portions of sensory, cognitive, and motor decision modules account for the differences in imagery and thought across sleep and waking states in comparable environments. The massive inhibition of sensory and proprioceptive input to perceptual modules in Stage 1 REM sleep leaves the perceptual and cognitive modules, by default, with their own output as their sole input. Given this constraint, the activation of portions of the cortical structures that execute waking perceptual, cognitive and motor responses is necessary and sufficient to produce the imagery and thought of dreaming sleep. Connectionist models are introduced so that neurophysiological and cognitive concepts of distributed and local activation and inhibition can be translated into a common language, and in so doing, are used to simulate several processes fundamental to the production of imaginal thought and dreaming.     

Computer models of cognitive processes

Conclusion From the small sample of achievements that I have had time to mention, we can only conclude that automation is here to stay. Nor is there any doubt that more powerful automata will be built. A great many of the higher human abilities will be given to machines. The great rush to automation is sure to stimulate psychologists to learn more about the human symbolic processes being mimicked by the machines. And the computers, which are the ultimate cause of the feverish scramble toward automation, are providing both the framework for describing complex models of behavior and also the means for testing these models. With both the means and the motivation at hand, psychologists are sure to make rapid progress in understanding complex human behavior.Operated with support from the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force.     

Eye fixations and cognitive processes

This paper presents a theoretical account of the sequence and duration of eye fixation during a number of simple cognitive tasks, such as mental rotation, sentence verification, and quantitative comparison. In each case, the eye fixation behavior is linked to a processing model for the task by assuming that the eye fixates the referent of the symbol being operated on.     

Postencoding cognitive processes in the cross-race effect: Categorization and individuation during face recognition

The cross-race effect (CRE) describes the finding that same-race faces are recognized more accurately than cross-race faces. According to social–cognitive theories of the CRE, processes of categorization and individuation at encoding account for differential recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Recent face memory research has suggested that similar but distinct categorization and individuation processes also occur postencoding, at recognition. Using a divided-attention paradigm, in Experiments 1A and 1B we tested and confirmed the hypothesis that distinct postencoding categorization and individuation processes occur during the recognition of same- and cross-race faces. Specifically, postencoding configural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for same-race than for cross-race faces; on the other hand, for White (but not Black) participants, postencoding featural divided-attention tasks impaired recognition accuracy more for cross-race than for same-race faces. A social categorization paradigm used in Experiments 2A and 2B tested the hypothesis that the postencoding in-group or out-group social orientation to faces affects categorization and individuation processes during the recognition of same-race and cross-race faces. Postencoding out-group orientation to faces resulted in categorization for White but not for Black participants. This was evidenced by White participants’ impaired recognition accuracy for same-race but not for cross-race out-group faces. Postencoding in-group orientation to faces had no effect on recognition accuracy for either same-race or cross-race faces. The results of Experiments 2A and 2B suggest that this social orientation facilitates White but not Black participants’ individuation and categorization processes at recognition. Models of recognition memory for same-race and cross-race faces need to account for processing differences that occur at both encoding and recognition.     

Ability factors and cognitive processes

Several measures of the speed of information processing were related to ability factors derived from the Cattell-Horn theory of fluid and crystallized intelligence. Ninety-one college students took a battery of paper and pencil tests designed to measure four ability factors: fluid intelligence (Gf), crystallized intelligence (Gc), spatial visualization (Gv), and clerical perceptual speed (CPS). They also performed paper and pencil and computerized versions of three information processing tasks: mental rotations, letter matching, and sentence verification. Correlations among the ability measures, among the information processing measures, and between the two domains were analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis. The four ability factors were found to be largely independent in this college population. Speed of letter-matching and sentence verification were highly correlated, but neither was related to speed of mental rotation. Mental rotation speed was strongly correlated with Gv; letter matching speed was correlated with CPS; and sentence verification speed was correlated with both Gc and CPS.     

Different cognitive processes in two image-scanning paradigms

Mental image scanning is generally assumed to be a single process that allows people to shift attention across visualized objects. However, this implicit assumption is open to question. We report a set of three experiments based on the tasks originally designed by Kosslyn, Ball, and Reiser (1978) and Finke and Pinker (1982). Participants scanned the identical images of an array of dots in the two tasks. Nevertheless, the participants required more time to shift their focus over the imaged stimulus in the Kosslyn et al. (1978) paradigm. Moreover, correlational analyses revealed no consistent relationship between the slopes of the increases in scanning times with increasing distances in the two paradigms. We conclude that in the Kosslyn et al. (1978) paradigm, the participants draw primarily on transformational processes to scan, whereas in the Finke and Pinker (1982) paradigm, they draw primarily on attentional processes. Both processes, transforming the image and shifting an attention window, produce linear increases in time with increases in distance, but for different reasons.     

Cognitive processes in the reflective-impulsive cognitive style

In this study, the authors improved the understanding of the cognitive processes underlying the reflective-impulsive cognitive style (RI), which was initially measured by J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, and W. Phillips (1964) on the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). The authors determined the relationships between the RI style and the cognitive factors, which would be likely to explain different MFFT solving modes-field dependence or independence as a cognitive style, the g factor, the spatial factor, and a metacognitive control index, which the authors developed for this study. The hypotheses were largely based on various studies (J. P. Ancillotti, 1984, 1985; J. Kagan, B. L. Rosman, D. Day, J. Albert, & W. Phillips, 1964; T. Zelniker & W. E. Jeffrey, 1976; T. Zelniker, A. Renan, I. Sorer, & Y. Shavit, 1977). The results are presented separately for each of four groups: (a) reflective individuals, who implement an analytic process and are cognitively mature; (b) impulsive individuals, who use a holistic process and are cognitively immature; (c) fast-accurate individuals, who are capable of implementing both analytic and holistic processes and exhibit cognitive maturity; and (d) slow-inaccurate individuals, who exhibit good metacognitive control but have trouble implementing both types of processing.     

Lateralization of cognitive processes in the brain

The lateralization of cognitive processes in the brain is discussed. The traditional view of a language-visuo/spatial dichotomy of function between the hemispheres has been replaced by more subtle distinctions. The use of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to study brain morphology has resulted in a renewed focus on the relationship between structural and functional asymmetry. Focus has been on the role played by the planum temporale area in the posterior part of the superior temporal gyrus for language asymmetry, and the possible significance of the larger left planum. The dichotic listening technique is used to illustrate the difference between bottom-up, or stimulus-driven laterality versus top-down, or instruction-driven laterality. It is suggested that the hemispheric dominance observed at any time is the sum result of the dynamic interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing tendencies. Stimulus-driven laterality dominance is always monitored and modulated through top-down cognitive processes, like shifting of attention and changes in arousal. A model of top-down modulation of bottom-up laterality is presented with special reference to the understanding of psychiatric disorders.     

Changes in EEG cross-frequency coupling during cognitive behavioral therapy for social anxiety disorder

Coupling between EEG delta and beta oscillations is enhanced among anxious and healthy individuals during anticipatory anxiety. EEG coupling patterns associated with psychotherapy have not yet been quantified in socially anxious individuals. In this study, we used a double baseline, repeated measures design, in which 25 adults with a principal diagnosis of social anxiety disorder completed 12 weekly sessions of standardized group cognitive behavioral therapy and four EEG assessments: two at pretreatment, one at midtreatment, and one at posttreatment. Treatment was associated with reductions in symptom severity across multiple measures and informants, as well as reductions in delta-beta coupling at rest and during speech anticipation. Moreover, the clinical group exhibited greater coupling at pretreatment than did post hoc control participants with low social anxiety. The EEG cross-frequency profiles in the clinical group normalized by the posttreatment assessment. These findings provide evidence of concomitant improvement in neural and behavioral functioning among socially anxious adults undergoing psychotherapy.     

Synchronous neural oscillations and cognitive processes

The central problem for cognitive neuroscience is to describe how cognitive processes arise from brain processes. This review summarizes the recent evidence that synchronous neural oscillations reveal much about the origin and nature of cognitive processes such as memory, attention and consciousness. Memory processes are most closely related to theta and gamma rhythms, whereas attention seems closely associated with alpha and gamma rhythms. Conscious awareness may arise from synchronous neural oscillations occurring globally throughout the brain rather than from the locally synchronous oscillations that occur when a sensory area encodes a stimulus. These associations between the dynamics of the brain and cognitive processes indicate progress towards a unified theory of brain and cognition.     

Executive control of cognitive processes in task switching

In 4 experiments, participants alternated between different tasks or performed the same task repeatedly. The tasks for 2 of the experiments required responding to geometric objects in terms of alternative classification rules, and the tasks for the other 2 experiments required solving arithmetic problems in terms of alternative numerical operations. Performance was measured as a function of whether the tasks were familiar or unfamiliar, the rules were simple or complex, and visual cues were present or absent about which tasks should be performed. Task alternation yielded switching-time costs that increased with rule complexity but decreased with task cuing. These factor effects were additive, supporting a model of executive control that has goal-shifting and rule-activation stages for task switching. It appears that rule activation takes more time for switching from familiar to unfamiliar tasks than for switching in the opposite direction.     

Anxiety in the context of cognitive semantic processes

In this experiment anxiety is understood as an indicator for specific structures in the semantic memory. In order to prove this hypothesis a number of positive (12) and negative (11) events were associated. Furthermore the events have been classified the scale "anxious--non anxious". In the experiment 69 subjects took part. Previously the subjects completed the STAI-Trait-part; these data were used to divide the subjects into groups of high (HA) and low (LA) anxious persons (median of the sample). Those associations were analysed in a qualitative and quantitative way. ANOVAS were calculated as well as overlap coefficients and Type-Token-Ratios. HA have more negative associations. LA produce more positive associations. LA show a significantly higher overlap coefficient with positive events, respectively a smaller TTR. The results are discussed in context with psycholinguistic theories.     

Assessor cognitive processes in an operational assessment center

The purpose of this study was (a) to provide additional tests of C. E. Lance, Newbolt, et al.'s (2000) situational specificity (vs. method bias) interpretation of exercise effects on assessment center postexercise dimension ratings and (b) to provide competitive tests of salient dimension versus general impression models of assessor within-exercise evaluations of candidate performance. Results strongly support the situational specificity hypothesis and the general impression model of assessor cognitive processes in which assessors first form overall evaluations of candidate performance that then drive more specific dimensional ratings.     

Cross-cultural differences in processes underlying sequential cognitive activity

Abstract: Similarities and differences in the processes underlying performance on the Stroop Color-Word Test (Card A, 100 color words/black ink; Card B, 100 color patches; Card C, 100 color words/incongruous ink color) were investigated with Japanese ( N = 96) and Americans ( N = 96) with stimulus items read: (a) vertically, top to bottom; and (b) horizontally, left to right. Total time as well as errors, namely, those involved with the underlying processes of identification and sequential organization, were significantly longer or more frequent on Card C than on Cards A and B for both nationalities and spatial arrangements. Further, greater frequency of serial organization errors in females than in males was obtained for the Japanese group, and the opposite for the American group. The implications and directions for future research are discussed.     

Evolution of cognitive processes for solving simple additions during the first three school years

The development of a group of children's cognitive strategies forn solving simple additions was studied by analyzing verbal reports given after each problem (I+J) was solved. The evolution of the cognitive processes involved a gradual shift from more primitive and less demanding strategies (in which, e.g., the child's fingers served as memory aid) to reconstructive memory processes (in which e.g., the answer was derived in a counting process in working memory) to retrieval processes (in which the answer was obtained form long term memory search). During the first semester of the first school year 36 percent of the problems (I⁺J≤13, I≠J, I≠0, I≠1, J≠1,) could not be answered, 40 percent of the solutions were obtained in the most frequent processes utilizing external meory aid and 16 percent in reconstructive memory processes. When in the second semester of the third school year, the same children solved th same problems by utilixing the followitn most frequent strategies; 31 percent long term memory retrieval, 38 percent reconstructive memory processes and 19 percent in processes utilizing external memory aid. If a problem was solved by using a given strategy this strategy was often most likely to have been used bt the child on the occasion before and to be used during the following semester as well. For long-term memory solutions this tendency was strongest and for other strategies it was coupled with a gradual shift towards strategies with increasing sophistication in terms of memory representation.     

Multiple levels of inquiry in cognitive science

Summary Gibsonian ecological psychology, symbolic information processing, and connectionist information processing are frequently construed as three competing paradigms or research traditions, each seeking dominance in experimental psychology and in cognitive science generally. There is an important element of truth in this perspective, and any adequate account of the development of experimental psychology over the past 30 years would have to examine seriously how the various conceptual frameworks, experimental endeavors, and social institutions have figured in this conflict. But the goal of this paper is not to characterize the historical dynamics within experimental psychology and cognitive science; rather, it is to consider what sorts of rapprochement is possible. Rapprochement, however, is not sought simply for its own sake or out of an a priori conviction that scientific enterprises should be unified. Spirited controversy between competing traditions is often an important component of progess (Laudan, 1977). Rapprochement has a purpose when alternative theoretical traditions have reached a point when each confronts serious shortcomings that can best be overcome by incorporating alternative perspectives. In this paper I try to show that this is the situation that exists in experimental psychology and cognitve science generally with respect to the three traditions enumerated above. I first explore how cognitive inquiry directed at internal procedures for processing information could benefit from a detailed study of the context of cognition, including insights provided by the Gibsonian tradition. Second, I examine the current controversy between symbolic and connectionist approaches and address the question of what contributions each offers to the other. Finally, I offer a framework in which multiple levels of inquiry in cognitve science can be related.