共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Nikk Effingham 《Erkenntnis》2011,74(2):225-240
This paper argues that, in light of certain scenarios involving time travel, Sider’s definition of ‘instantaneous temporal
part’ cannot be accepted in conjunction with a semantic thesis that perdurantists often assume. I examine a rejoinder from
Sider, as well as Thomson’s alternative definition of ‘instantaneous temporal part’, and show how neither helps. Given this,
we should give up on the perdurantist semantic thesis. I end by recommending that, once we no longer accept such semantics,
we should accept a new set of definitions, which are superior in certain respects to Sider’s original set. 相似文献
2.
Arnold Chien 《Synthese》2008,161(1):47-66
I argue for a subsumption of any version of Grice’s first quantity maxim posited to underlie scalar implicature, by developing
the idea of implicature recovery as a kind of explanatory inference, as e.g. in science. I take the applicable model to be
contrastive explanation, while following van Fraassen’s analysis of explanation as an answer to a why-question. A scalar implicature
is embedded in such an answer, one that meets two probabilistic constraints: the probability of the answer, and ‘favoring’.
I argue that besides having application at large, outside of linguistic interpretation, these constraints largely account
not only for implicatures based on strength order, logical and otherwise, but also for unordered cases. I thus suggest that
Grice’s maxim and its descendants are expressions of general explanatory constraints, as they happen to be manifested in this
particular explanatory task. I conclude by briefly discussing how I accordingly view Grice’s system outside of scalar implicature. 相似文献
3.
E.J. Lowe 《Erkenntnis》1998,48(2-3):191-208
I propose a fourfold categorisation of entities according to whether or not they possess determinate identity-conditions and
whether or not they are determinately countable. Some entities – which I call ‘individual objects’ – have both determinate
identity and determinate countability: for example, persons and animals. In the case of entities of a kind K belonging to
this category, we are in principle always entitled to expect there to be determinate answers to such questions as ‘Is x the
same K as y?’ and ’How many Ks are there satisfying condition C?’, even if we may sometimes be unable in practice to discover
what these answers are. But other entities apparently lack either determinate identity, or determinate countability, or both.
In these terms I try to explain certain important ontological differences between familiar macroscopic objects and various
rather more esoteric entities, such as the ‘particles’ of quantum physics, quantities of material stuff, and tropes or property
instances.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
4.
Tamar Schapiro 《The Journal of Ethics》2011,15(3):147-167
In this paper I defend Kant’s Incorporation Thesis, which holds that we must “incorporate” our incentives into our maxims
if we are to act on them. I see this as a thesis about what is necessary for a human being to make the transition from ‘having
a desire’ to ‘acting on it’. As such, I consider the widely held view that ‘having a desire’ involves being focused on the
world, and not on ourselves or on the desire. I try to show how this view is connected with a denial of any deep distinction
between reason and inclination. I then argue for an alternative view of what ‘having a desire’ involves, one according to
which it involves being focused both on the world and on ourselves. I show how this view fits naturally with the Kantian distinction
between reason and inclination, accounts for independent intuitions about ‘having a desire’, and supports the Incorporation
Thesis. I then make some further suggestions about how we might conceive of the object of incorporation. 相似文献
5.
N. Ángel Pinillos 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):301-324
Sometimes two expressions in a discourse can be about the same thing in a way that makes that very fact evident to the participants.
Consider, for example, ‘he’ and ‘John’ in ‘John went to the store and he bought some milk’. Let us call this ‘de jure’ coreference.
Other times, coreference is ‘de facto’ as with ‘Mark Twain’ and ‘Samuel Clemens’ in a sincere use of ‘Mark Twain is not Samuel
Clemens’. Here, agents can understand the speech without knowing that the names refer to the same person. After surveying
many available linguistic and pragmatic tools (intentions to corefer, presuppositions, meanings, indexing, discourse referents,
binding etc.) I conclude that we must posit a new semantic primitive to account for de jure coreference. 相似文献
6.
Darrell P. Rowbottom 《Erkenntnis》2008,69(3):335-349
In his Bayesian Nets and Causality, Jon Williamson presents an ‘Objective Bayesian’ interpretation of probability, which he endeavours to distance from the
logical interpretation yet associate with the subjective interpretation. In doing so, he suggests that the logical interpretation
suffers from severe epistemological problems that do not affect his alternative. In this paper, I present a challenge to his
analysis. First, I closely examine the relationship between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views, and show how, and
why, they are highly similar. Second, I argue that the logical interpretation is not manifestly inferior, at least for the
reasons that Williamson offers. I suggest that the key difference between the logical and ‘Objective Bayesian’ views is in
the domain of the philosophy of logic; and that the genuine disagreement appears to be over Platonism versus nominalism (within
weak psychologism).
相似文献
Darrell P. RowbottomEmail: |
7.
The Universal Right to Education: Freedom,Equality and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Fraternity</Emphasis>
Ylva Bergström 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2010,29(2):167-182
The overall aim of the article is to analyse how the universal right to education have been built, legitimized and used. And
more specifically ask who is addressed by the universal right to education, and who is given access to rights and to education.
The first part of the article focus on the history of declarations, the notion of the universal right to education, emphasizing
differences in matters of detail—for example, the meaning of ‘compulsory’, ‘children’s rights’ or ‘parents’ rights’—and critically
examining the right of the child and the right of the parent in terms of tensions between ‘social rights’ and ‘private autonomy
rights’. Despite differences in detail, the iterations of the universal right to education do share to the full in the idea
of education as such. In the second part the attempt to scrutinize the underlying assumptions legitimizing the consensus on
education, focusing again on the notion of the child. In conclusion I argue that a certain notion of what it is to be a human
being is inscribed within the circle of access to rights and education. These notions of what it means to be a child, a parent,
a citizen or a member of the ‘human family’ are notions of enlightenment and humanity and, to my understanding, aspects of
how democracy is configured around freedom, equality and fraternity. 相似文献
8.
Sean Crawford 《Synthese》2008,160(1):75-96
Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The
distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’
(or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account
of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system
is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails
to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper
is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems.
See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977). 相似文献
9.
K. Romdenh-Romluc 《Philosophical Studies》2006,128(2):257-283
It has traditionally been maintained that every token of ‘I’ refers to its utterer. However, certain uses of indexicals conflict
with this claim, and its counterparts with respect to ‘here’ and ‘now’, suggesting that the traditional account of indexical
reference should be abandoned. In this paper, I examine some proposed alternatives and the difficulties they face, before
offering a new account of indexical reference. I endorse Kaplan’s view that the reference of an indexical is determined on
any occasion it is used by applying its character to a particular context, arguing that the problem cases show that this is not always the context of utterance. The task facing
the semantic theorist is thus to explain what fixes the reference-determining context. I consider and reject both Predelli’s
suggestion that the reference-determining context is the one intended by the utterer, and Corazza et al.’s proposal that the relevant context is fixed by conventions delivered by the utterance setting. The discussion of these
two accounts reveals that an adequate theory of indexical reference should allow the speaker to use indexicals in novel ways,
whilst holding that what a speaker can refer to with an indexical utterance is constrained by what an audience can understand.
I develop an account based around these two requirements. 相似文献
10.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
11.
Stefano Predelli 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2012,41(3):547-562
This essay proposes a novel semantic account of demonstratives, aimed at clarifying the sense in which demonstratives are
semantically dependent on demonstrations. Its first two sections summarize the main views currently on the market. Section 3
argues that they are all vitiated by the same shortcomings, and yield incorrect results of ‘truth in virtue of character’
and entailment. Section 4 proposes a different account of the relationships between demonstratives and demonstrations, grounded
on the idea of truth-conditionally irrelevant aspects of the meaning of certain expressions. The resulting view of demonstratives
is consonant with the so-called ‘bare boned’ account of their truth-conditional role, but is also in the position to recognize
that the dependence of a demonstrative on a demonstration is, in some sense of the term, meaning-governed. The final section
of this essay discusses the distinction between ‘vacuous’ and ‘incomplete’ uses of demonstratives, and cases involving multiple
occurrences of these expressions. 相似文献
12.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
13.
Per Algander 《Res Publica》2012,18(2):145-157
A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition,
often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for
instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition
faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring.
It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be
defended as an instance of a moral option. 相似文献
14.
E. J. Coffman 《Synthese》2006,151(2):257-272
In this paper, I consider some issues involving a certain closure principle for Structural Justification, a relation between
a cognitive subject and a proposition that’s expressed by locutions like ‘S has a source of justification for p’ and ‘p is
justifiable for S’. I begin by summarizing recent work by Peter Klein that advances the thesis that the indicated closure
principle is plausible but lacks Skeptical utility. I then assess objections to Klein’s thesis based on work by Robert Audi
and Anthony Brueckner. One finding is that the typical statement of the relevant closure principle can express a number of
different closure principles, and that recognizing this helps to resolve certain disputes. 相似文献
15.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
16.
17.
E. M. Swiderski 《Studies in East European Thought》2011,63(4):329-343
Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation.
A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski
appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself.
I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this
account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves
and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought
for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that
is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted
human power. 相似文献
18.
Sara Johnsdotter 《Sexuality & culture》2011,15(2):179-194
Recently there has been a semantic shift in the pornographic word ‘cum.’ Traditionally, the word, as a noun, is used to designate
semen. However, ‘cum’ is now used to designate also female fluids during sexual activity. The concept of ‘female cum’ is discussed
in relation to examples from a corpus of two hundred erotic short stories collected from the Internet, and to the physiological
realities of female fluids during sex. In order to show how the innovation of ‘female cum’ is useful in written erotic narrative,
a comparison is made with filmed pornography and drawn erotic comics. Finally, I argue that ‘cum’ in this new context is used
as a device to arouse sexual excitement. 相似文献
19.
Jordi Fernández 《Synthese》2008,160(1):103-121
The purpose of this essay is to determine how we should construe the content of memories. First, I distinguish two features
of memory that a construal of mnemic content should respect. These are the ‘attribution of pastness’ feature (a subject is
inclined to believe of those events that she remembers that they happened in the past) and the ‘attribution of existence’
feature (a subject is inclined to believe that she existed at the time that those events that she remembers took place). Next,
I distinguish two kinds of theories of memory, which I call ‘perceptual’ and ‘self-based’ theories. I argue that those theories
that belong to the first kind but not the second one have trouble accommodating the attribution of existence. And theories
that belong to the second kind but not the first one leave the attribution of pastness unexplained. I then discuss two different
theories that are both perceptual and self-based, which I eventually reject. Finally, I propose a perceptual, self-based theory
that can account for both the attribution of pastness and the attribution of past existence. 相似文献
20.
Matthew Ratcliffe 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2006,5(1):31-52
This paper disputes the claim that our understanding of others is enabled by a commonsense or ‘folk’ psychology, whose ‘core’ involves the attribution of intentional states in order to predict and explain behaviour. I argue that interpersonal understanding is seldom, if ever, a matter of two people assigning intentional states to each other but emerges out of a context of interaction between them. Self and other form a coupled system rather than two wholly separate entities equipped with an internalised capacity to assign mental states to the other. This applies even in those instances where one might seem to adopt a ‘detached’ perspective towards others. Thus ‘folk psychology’, as commonly construed, is not folk psychology. 相似文献