Unravelling the relationship between populism and belief in conspiracy theories: The role of cynicism,powerlessness and zero-sum thinking

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.     

Right- and left-wing prejudice toward dissimilar groups in cultural and economic domains

According to recent studies, people on both the political right and left show prejudice toward groups whose beliefs are in conflict with their own. This prediction applies to both cultural and economic dimensions of political beliefs. In three studies (N = 499) we demonstrate that people on both the cultural and economic right and left show negative attitudes toward groups on the other side of the given spectrum and that underlying this effect is the perception of value violation. In two out of three studies, we manipulated the extremity of target worldviews to further explore the causal chain between political beliefs, the perception of value violation, and prejudice. Our results showed a high degree of symmetry between the political left and right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs. However, although people on both sides of the political spectrum show prejudice toward each other, people on the cultural and economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left.     

Stability of National-Identity Content: Level,Predictors, and Implications

A neglected topic in empirical research on national identity is its stability at the individual level, and this is especially true for its content, that is, the meaning elements that people associate with the concept of nation. In this article, we study the stability of key dimensions of national-identity content. We ask three simple questions: How stable is national-identity content—as captured in the ethnic/civic framework—at the level of individual citizens? Are there clear differences in stability across subgroups? What are the implications of interindividual differences in stability? Analyzing data from four waves of a large-scale panel survey of German citizens (N = 4,654) collected over a five-year period (2016–21), we show that there is high but not perfect stability of the degree to which individuals subscribe to ethnic and civic criteria of nationhood. Second, we find little difference in stability as a function of several theoretically selected characteristics. Third, we show that the association between national-identity content and relevant political attitudes (immigration attitudes and far-right party support) increases with intraindividual stability. These findings have important implications for our understanding of how national-identity content is shaped and mobilized and how it can influence political attitudes and behaviors.     

The unique effects of blatant dehumanization on attitudes and behavior towards Muslim refugees during the European ‘refugee crisis’ across four countries

Blatant dehumanization has recently been demonstrated to predict negative outgroup attitudes and behaviors. Here, we examined blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees during the ‘Refugee Crisis’ among large samples in four European countries: the Czech Republic (N = 1307), Hungary (N = 502), Spain (N = 1049), and Greece (N = 934). Our results suggest that blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees is (a) prevalent among Europeans, and (b) uniquely associated with anti‐refugee attitudes and behavior, beyond political ideology, prejudice, and—of particular relevance to the refugee crisis—empathy. We also find that blatant dehumanization of Muslim refugees is significantly higher and more strongly associated with intergroup behavior in the Eastern European countries (especially the Czech Republic) than in Spain and Greece. Examining a range of outgroup targets beyond refugees, our results further illustrate that blatant dehumanization is not purely an ethnocentric bias: while individuals across contexts feel warmer towards their group than all others, they rate several high‐status outgroups as equally or more fully ‘evolved and civilized’ than the ingroup. Our research extends theoretical understanding of blatant dehumanization, and suggests that blatant dehumanization plays an important and independent role in the rejection of Muslim refugees throughout Europe.     

On Self‐Love and Outgroup Hate: Opposite Effects of Narcissism on Prejudice via Social Dominance Orientation and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism

Previous research has obtained mixed findings as to whether feelings of self‐worth are positively or negatively related to right‐wing ideological beliefs and prejudice. We propose to clarify the link between self‐worth and ideology by distinguishing between narcissistic and non‐narcissistic self‐evaluations as well as between different dimensions of ideological attitudes. Four studies, conducted in three different socio‐political contexts: the UK (Study 1, N = 422), the US (Studies 2 and 3, Ns = 471 and 289, respectively), and Poland (Study 4, N = 775), investigated the associations between narcissistic and non‐narcissistic self‐evaluations, social dominance orientation (SDO), right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA), and ethnic prejudice. Confirming our hypotheses, the results consistently showed that after controlling for self‐esteem, narcissistic self‐evaluation was positively associated with SDO (accounting for RWA), yet negatively associated with RWA (accounting for SDO). These associations were similar after controlling for psychopathy and Machiavellianism (Study 3) as well as collective narcissism and Big Five personality characteristics (Study 4). Studies 2–4 additionally demonstrated that narcissistic self‐evaluation was indirectly positively associated with prejudice through higher SDO (free of RWA) but indirectly negatively associated with prejudice through lower RWA (free of SDO). Implications for understanding the role of self‐evaluation in right‐wing ideological attitudes and prejudice are discussed. Copyright © 2017 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology     

Who shows which kind of humor? Exploring sociodemographic differences in eight comic styles in a large Chilean sample

The present study investigates mean-level differences in eight comic styles (fun, benevolent humor, nonsense, wit, irony, satire, sarcasm, and cynicism) depending on the sociodemographic variables gender, age, education, political spectrum, and religious affiliation. A large and varied Chilean adult sample (N = 1,272, 60.1% women; age M = 39.94, SD = 17.33) was recruited in face-to-face interviews and online testing. They completed self-reports of the comic styles (the Comic Style Markers) and sociodemographic variables. Overall, small, but meaningful, differences in comic styles were found for the different sociodemographic groups. Men scored higher than women in all comic styles except for benevolent humor, and six styles decreased with age. Having lower education was associated with more cynicism, while the reverse pattern was found for satire and wit. Religious people showed lower scores in four styles than non-religious people, and cynicism was higher in those identifying with left wing rather than right-wing attitudes. The present study thus provides insights into who is more likely to engage in different kinds of humor in their everyday lives.     

National identification and support for discriminatory policies: The mediating role of beliefs about laïcité in France

In France, laïcité is a legal principle enforcing State secularism. However, research indicates that Modern (vs. traditional) beliefs about laïcité (ML) help legitimate prejudice against minorities. From Social Identity Theory, we hypothesized that ML should be positively linked with national identification, stereotyping, prejudice and support for discrimination. Accordingly, we demonstrate that ML independently predicts support for discriminatory policies (Study 1a, N = 241) and Maghrebi IAT scores (Study 1b, N = 242). ML mediates the link between national identification and Generalized Prejudice (Study 2a, N = 215; Study 2d, N = 114) as well as Support for Discriminatory Policies (Study 2b, N = 250). Experimental corroboration of this mediation was provided (Study 2c, N = 100). An exploratory study showed that priming ML led to more support for discrimination through national identification (Study 3, N = 89). These results reveal the important intergroup regulation feature of ML beliefs in France.     

Right-wing adherence and objective numeracy as predictors of minority group size perceptions and size threat reactions

Racial, ethnic, religious, and sexual minority populations are growing rapidly in the West. We investigate predictors and consequences of threat responses to perceived minority group size, and perceptions of minority group size itself. Study 1 (N = 274) finds that right-wing adherence predicts greater size threat, whereas lower numerical ability predicts larger perceived group size (confirmed in Studies 2–3). Study 2 (Sample 1, N = 124; Sample 2, N = 263) finds that the relation between right-wing adherence and prejudice toward minorities exhibits an indirect effect via group size threat (but not perceived size), explaining 35–66% of this relation. Study 3 (N = 310) finds a comparable indirect effect explaining 27–40% of this relation, even after statistically controlling for indirect effects of realistic, symbolic, and terroristic threat. These findings provide novel insights into psychological processes surrounding perceived minority group size, identifying size threat as especially crucial in understanding intergroup relations.     

Personality,Ideological Attitudes,and Group Identity as Predictors of Political Behavior in Majority and Minority Ethnic Groups

Prior research on personality and politics has largely investigated relationships using national samples from North America and Europe. In contrast, we used multigroup path analysis to assess how Big Five personality, ideological attitudes (RWA, SDO), and group identities (National and Ethnic Identification) predicted right versus left Political Behavior (party support, past voting, present voting intention) across majority and minority ethnic groups in a New Zealand national sample (N = 6,333). The effects of personality on ideological attitudes and group identities were mostly invariant across ethnic groups and consistent with prior findings. In contrast, the effects of ideological attitudes on Political Behavior varied across ethnic groups being moderately strong for the European majority but nonsignificant for the minorities. Group identities had little effect on Political Behavior. We discuss cultural and contextual factors that might account for this disconnect between ideology and politics among the minority ethnic groups.     

Beyond ‘Liberals’ and ‘Conservatives’: Complexity in Ideology,Moral Intuitions,and Worldview Among Swedish Voters

This research investigated the congruence between the ideologies of political parties and the ideological preferences (N = 1515), moral intuitions (N = 1048), and political values and worldviews (N = 1345) of diverse samples of Swedish adults who voted or intended to vote for the parties. Logistic regression analyses yielded support for a series of hypotheses about variations in ideology beyond the left–right division. With respect to social ideology, resistance to change and binding moral intuitions predicted stronger preference for a social democratic (vs. progressive) party on the left and weaker preference for a social liberal (vs. social conservative or liberal-conservative) party on the right. With respect to political values and broader worldviews, normativism and low acceptance of immigrants predicted the strongest preference for a nationalist party, while environmentalism predicted the strongest preference for a green party. The effects were generally strong and robust when we controlled for left–right self-placements, economic ideology, and demographic characteristics. These results show that personality variation in the ideological domain is not reducible to the simplistic contrast between ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’, which ignores differences between progressive and non-progressive leftists, economic and green progressives, social liberal and conservative rightists, and nationalist and non-nationalist conservatives.     

What is threatening about refugees? Identifying different types of threat and their association with emotional responses and attitudes towards refugee migration

Threat is one of the most important predictors for attitudes towards refugees and migration. The current research addresses the role of different threat types and emotional reactions in the context of refugee migration with a multi-method approach. Using qualitative (Study 1, N = 202) and quantitative (Studies 2–4, N = 873) methods, we identified six types of threat that majority group members in Germany experience in the face of refugee migration: Concerns about cultural differences (symbolic threat), financial strain (realistic threat), criminal acts (safety threat), conflicts within society (cohesion threat), increasing xenophobia (prejudice threat), and refugee care (altruistic threat). All these threat types elicited negative emotions and were associated with negative attitudes towards refugees and support for restrictive migration policies. Paradoxically, concerns about refugee care predicted support for restrictive migration policies particularly well (altruistic threat paradox), which can be explained by a lack of emotional responses to this type of threat. Based on these findings, we propose a bidirectional model of intergroup threat.     

Are the ethnically tolerant free of discrimination,prejudice and political intolerance?

We hypothesized that the ethnically tolerant (i.e., people who are anti‐ethnocentric and score very low on a measure of ethnocentrism) would perceive people with extremely incompatible values and beliefs as out‐groups and would engage in discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Experiments among Australian citizens in Studies 1 (N = 224) and 2 (N = 283) showed that the ethnically tolerant perceived supporters of a message in favour of mandatory detention of asylum seekers as out‐groups and consequently exhibited discrimination, prejudice and political intolerance against them. Study 3 with 265 U.S. citizens showed that, controlling for liberalism, ethnic tolerance led to prejudice against out‐groups. This was replicated with 522 UK citizens in Study 4, which also showed that social identity, and not moral conviction, mediated the link between ethnic tolerance and prejudice. The findings suggest that the ethnically tolerant can be discriminatory, prejudiced and politically intolerant against fellow humans.     

Are emotionally intelligent people less prejudiced? The importance of emotion management skills for outgroup attitudes

People vary in their ability to understand, process, and manage information about one's own and others’ emotions, a construct known as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Past research highlighted the importance of EI in interpersonal relations as well as the key role of emotions underlying outgroup prejudice. Remarkably, hardly any research has investigated the associations between EI and outgroup prejudice. In three studies (total N = 922) conducted in Spain and the United Kingdom, we measured emotional intelligence using self-report and performance tests and prejudice toward a variety of outgroups. Results showed that those with stronger performance-based emotion management skills expressed lower generalized ethnic prejudice (Studies 1–3), more positive attitudes toward immigrants (Study 2a) and refugees (Study 2b), and less homophobic attitudes (Study 3). This negative association between emotion management and prejudice was found with different performance-based EI measures and held after controlling for self-perceived EI (Study 1) and self-reported abilities to regulate emotions (Study 3). Study 3 further demonstrated that higher empathy partly accounted for the association between emotion management and prejudice. The findings suggest that emotion management abilities play an important, but so far largely neglected role in generalized prejudice.     

How positive and negative contact relate to attitudes towards Roma: Comparing majority and high‐status minority perspectives

Intergroup contact scholars have recently called for analyzing the effects of negative intergroup contact. In response to this call, we examined the correlates of positive and negative contact with one of the most stigmatized ethnic minorities, that is, Roma. We conducted a study in Bulgaria considering the point of view of the ethnic Bulgarian majority (n = 516) and of Bulgarian Turks (n = 274), an ethnic minority with higher status compared to Roma. Regression analyses showed that positive contact was associated with reduced prejudice and more support for pro‐Roma policies, while negative contact revealed the opposite pattern. These associations did not differ between ethnic Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks. Moreover, positive and negative intergroup emotions mediated the relationships between positive and negative contact on the one hand and prejudice and policy support on the other. Our study highlights the importance of emotional processes involved in positive and negative intergroup contact experiences and encourages future research to analyze how absolute versus relative status differences shape the effects of positive and negative contact in complex hierarchical societies.     

Does System Justification Promote Establishment Voting? Mainstream Politics in France,Germany, and the United Kingdom

Throughout Europe and North America, mainstream political parties have ceded electoral support to antiestablishment parties from the far left and far right. We investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in system justification—the psychological tendency to defend and justify the overarching social system—would be negatively associated with antiestablishment voting, even among citizens who would otherwise be inclined to support radicalism. In three large, nationally representative surveys conducted in France (N = 14,432), Germany (N = 1,168), and the United Kingdom (N = 2,337), we observed that system justification was positively associated with voting for establishment parties and negatively associated with antiestablishment voting. System justification was associated with reduced support for antiestablishment parties on the right and left—even among respondents who were high on ethnic intolerance, opposition to the European Union, economic distress, and support for income redistribution. Thus, all other things being equal, system-justification tendencies reinforce political moderation, establishment voting, and therefore social stability.     

When and how social movements mobilize action within and across nations to promote solidarity with refugees

When and how do social movements form to mobilize action across national boundaries? In the context of the 2015 movement to support Syrian refugees, we develop an integrative model of transnational social movement formation shaped by pre-existing world-views (social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism) and social media exposure to iconic events, resulting in an emergent group consciousness (“we are”, “we believe”, “we feel”). Group consciousness is, in turn, the proximal predictor of solidarity with refugees. Participants were from six countries: Hungary (N = 267), Romania (N = 163), Germany (N = 190), the United Kingdom (N = 159), the United States (N = 244) and Australia (N = 344). Multi-group structural equation models confirmed that group consciousness, shaped by individual differences and exposure to events through social media, was the proximal predictor of solidarity. The subjective meaning of group consciousness varied across samples, reflecting national differences. Results support the importance of considering individual and national differences, and group processes in understanding emergent social movements.     

Friendship and romance across the U.S. political divide: Hindrance or help for outgroup political attitudes?

Consistent with the intergroup contact literature, cross-political relationships (e.g., friendships or romantic relationships between different partisans) may help reduce inter-political group prejudice. Given that unfavorable attitudes based on the political group membership are particularly heightened at present in the United States, we explored whether having cross-political friendships (Study 1) or romantic relationships (Study 2) predict more positive interpersonal or intergroup attitudes among American Democrats and Republicans. In Study 1, using a social network measure (N = 301), where participants reported on their closest friends, cross-political (versus same-political) friendship was associated with less positive interpersonal attitudes when this relationship was unsatisfying. Having any (versus no) or more (versus less) cross-political group friendships was not associated with holding more positive intergroup attitudes. In Study 2, cross-political romantic relationships were examined (N = 392). Having a cross- (versus same-) political romantic relationship was associated with relatively less positive attitudes toward the political outgroup via lower empathy when relationship satisfaction was low. Study findings highlight the potential limitations of the beneficial effects of intergroup contact.     

Anxious attachment as an antecedent of people's aversion towards pattern deviancy

Research suggests that people's aversion towards pattern deviancy—distortions of repeated forms or models—contributes to social phenomena, such as prejudice. Yet, the factors motivating pattern deviancy aversion remain unclear. Potentially, anxious attachment, as it entails hypervigilant detection of and reactivity to social inconsistency and unreliability, heightens pattern deviancy aversion. In Studies 1 (N = 137) and 2 (N = 102), anxious but not avoidant attachment predicted aversion towards broken patterns of geometric shapes. In Studies 3 (N = 310) and 4 (N = 470), experimentally inducing anxious versus avoidant and secure attachment (Study 3), and versus a neutral prime (Study 4), heightened pattern deviancy aversion. Controlling for participants’ aversion towards unbroken patterns, novel objects, and negative stimuli did not change these results. Our findings demonstrate that anxious attachment is one antecedent of pattern deviancy aversion, and suggest that pattern deviancy aversion may underlie links between anxious attachment and certain social phenomena.     

Improving outgroup attitudes in schools: First steps toward a teacher‐led vicarious contact intervention

Despite the urgent need for promoting positive intergroup relations in schools, research on intergroup relations is not systematically translated into prejudice‐reduction interventions. Although prejudice‐reduction interventions in schools based on indirect contact have been conducted for decades, they have all been carried out by researchers themselves. In a field experiment in Finland in autumn 2015, we tested for the first time a vicarious contact prejudice‐reduction intervention for its effectiveness among adolescents (N = 639) when implemented independently by school teachers instead of researchers. In addition, we tested the extent to which the intervention's effect depends on initial outgroup attitudes, previous direct outgroup contact experiences, and gender, hypothesizing that the intervention improves outgroup attitudes particularly among adolescents with more negative prior attitudes and less positive prior direct contact, and more among girls than among boys. We found an unanticipated overall deterioration in the outgroup attitudes during intervention in both the experimental and control groups. However, attitudes seemed to deteriorate somewhat less in the experimental than in the control group, and the intervention had a significant positive effect on outgroup attitudes in one experimental subgroup that needed it most: girls who had negative rather than positive outgroup attitudes at the outset. We discuss our results in light of previous research and contextual particularities.     

Compliance in crisis: Concern,trust and distrustful complacency in the COVID-19 pandemic

Two studies tested a distrustful complacency hypothesis, according to which either concern or political trust would be enough to sustain law-abiding attitudes and compliance with health-protective policies during the COVID-19 pandemic; but the absence of both concern and trust would result in markedly lower support and compliance. Study 1 supported this hypothesis with NatCen nationally representative sample of Great Britain (N = 2413; weighted regression analyses), focussing on law-abiding attitudes. Study 2 (preregistered) replicated these findings with a representative sample (N = 1523) investigating support for COVID-19 policies and compliant behaviour. Participants who were less concerned about the consequences of the pandemic (for themselves and for others) and simultaneously less trustful of the government expressed weaker law-abiding attitudes and reported less compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. These findings have implications for policy and public health strategies in time of crisis.