People think about what is true for conditionals,not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of “if”

We report the results of two priming experiments that examine the comprehension of conditionals—for example, “if there are apples then there are oranges”—and biconditionals—for example, “if and only if there are apples then there are oranges”. The first experiment showed that participants read a biconditional faster when it was primed by a true possibility, “there were apples and there were oranges” than when it was primed by a false possibility, “there were no apples and there were oranges”; a conditional was primed equally by both possibilities. The second experiment showed that participants read the negated-antecedent conjunction faster when it was primed by a conditional than when it was primed by a biconditional; the affirmative conjunction was primed equally by both connectives. The experiments show that (a) when people understand “if A then B”, they access the true possibilities, “A and B”, and “not-A and B”, and (b) when they understand “if and only if A then B” they access “A and B”, but they do not access “not-A and B”. We discuss their implications for current theories of reasoning.     

On the inferential epistemics of trait centrality in impression formation

We provide a novel, inferential, account of the trait centrality phenomenon. We suggest that a trait possesses the property of “centrality” to the extent that it is subjectively deemed to imply other traits. Five studies explore four central elements of this view. First, trait relations can be stored as unidirectional rules (“if X then Y” but not necessarily “if Y then X”). Second, the strength of individuals' lay inference rules determines the effect of traits on impressions. Third, situationally manipulating the strength of lay inference rules influences the impact of traits on impressions. Fourth, the impact of an inference rule is reduced when it is difficult to discern the inference rule and when processing resources are limited. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cue-type manipulation dissociates two types of task set inhibition: backward inhibition and competitor rule suppression

Backward inhibition (BI) reflects the suppression of a recently abandoned task set to allow for smooth transition to a new task even when the rules do not generate a response conflict. Competitor rule suppression (CRS) reflects the inhibition/suppression of irrelevant task rules when these rules generate a response conflict even if they have not recently been abandoned. We assessed whether BI and CRS are differentially affected by the difficulty in retrieving category-response mappings from memory. Retrieval demands were manipulated via the information provided by the task cues, which either indicated the relevant dimension (dimension cues; “color”) or the relevant dimension with its category-to-key mapping (mapping cues; “red green”, indicating that “red” and “green” go with the left/right responses, respectively). CRS was larger with dimension compared to mapping cues when cue-type varied between groups and was larger after trials involving dimension cues when cue-type varied on a trial-by-trial basis. In contrast, BI was not influenced by cue-type. These results suggest that task switching involve at least two distinct inhibitory processes, with CRS being related to the ease of retrieval of category-response mappings from memory.     

Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning.     

When will is not the same as should: The role of modals in reasoning with legal conditionals

Naïve reasoners reject logically valid conclusions from conditional rules if they can think of exceptions in which the antecedent is true, but the consequent is not. However, when reasoning with legal conditionals (e.g., “If a person kills another human, then this person should be punished for manslaughter”) people hardly consider exceptions but evaluate conclusions depending on their own sense of justice. We show that participants’ reluctance to consider exceptions in legal reasoning depends on the modal auxiliary used. In two experiments we phrased legal conditionals either with the modal “should” (i.e., “ . . . then this person should be punished”), or with “will” (i.e., “ . . . then this person will be punished”) and presented them as modus ponens or modus tollens inferences. Participants had to decide whether the offender should or will be punished (modus ponens) or whether the offender indeed committed the offence (modus tollens). For modus ponens inferences phrased with “should” we replicate previous findings showing that participants select conclusions on the basis of their own sense of justice (Experiments 1 and 2). Yet, when the legal conditional is phrased with the modal “will” this effect is attenuated (Experiments 1 and 2), and exceptions are considered (Experiment 1). The modal auxiliary did not affect modus tollens inferences.     

Accueil des réfugiés en France : le point de vue des Français d’origine maghrébine et des Français « natifs »

Studies on attitudes towards refugees in France have only focused on “native” French people. Extending the study beyond the majority group is important, given the multicultural composition of contemporary Western societies. To this end, 144 “native” French and 109 Maghrebi-French were surveyed. We first tested the model whereby the link between national identification and prosocial intentions towards refugees is mediated by the threat perception, with the group of origin as a moderating variable. This model only applies to “native” French. We then took a closer look at the precursors of prosocial intentions among Maghrebi-French (national identity misrecognition , individualistic/collectivistic orientation). Identity misrecognition correlates positively with prosocial intentions. When controlling for other variables, collectivism is the factor that best predicts the expression of these intentions. Overall, our study showed that depending on the group of origin (“natives” vs. Maghrebi-French), we react differently to refugees. However, even if the feeling of identity misrecognition among Maghrebi-French seems to be associated with the expression of prosocial intentions, the extent of its negative consequences should not be overlooked.     

Motivation to comply with task rules and multitasking performance: The role of need for cognitive closure and goal importance

In three studies, we examined the role task rules play in multitasking performance. We postulated that rules should be especially important for individuals highly motivated to have structure and clear answers, i.e., those high on need for cognitive closure (NFC). High NFC should thus be related to greater compliance with task rules. Specifically, given high goal importance, NFC should be more strongly related to a multitasking strategy when multitasking is imposed by the rules, and to a mono-tasking strategy when monotasking is imposed by the rules. This should translate into better multitasking or mono-tasking performance, depending on condition. Overall, the results were supportive as NFC was related to a more mono-tasking strategy in the mono-tasking condition (Studies 1 and 2 only) and more dual-tasking strategy in the dual-tasking condition (Studies 1–3). This translated into respective differences in performance. The effects were significant only when goal importance was high (Study 1) and held when cognitive ability was controlled for (Study 2).     

重量对元认知监控的无意识影响

采用结构知识归因的方法,以学习判断和项目优先选择作为元认知监测和控制的指标,考察重量对元认知监控的影响是否是无意识的。被试学习粘贴在不同重量纸盒上的词对,进行学习判断(实验1)或项目选择(实验2),并报告其判断或选择的依据。结果:(1)重量影响学习判断和项目优先选择,相对于轻纸盒,被试给予重纸盒上的词对更高的JOL并优先选择重纸盒上的词对进行学习;(2)重量对学习判断的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测的情况下,重量对项目优先选择的影响只发生在判断依据为猜测和直觉的情况下。上述结果支持了元认知的具身性,并提示重量对元认知监控的影响可能是无意识的。     

Four meanings of “categorization”: A conceptual analysis of research on person perception

It is widely assumed that people tend to “categorize” other people. However, the term “categorization” has been used with qualitatively different underlying definitions in the person perception literature. We present a conceptual analysis in which we disentangle four existing definitions: (a) categorization as representing, (b) categorization as dichotomizing, (c) categorization as organizing, and (d) categorization as grouping. Subsequently, we show that seemingly antagonistic viewpoints in the literature may be reconciled by disentangling these definitions. Furthermore, we argue that disentangling these definitions is vital for theoretical interpretations of (past and future) empirical findings. Overall, our work aims to contribute to the clarity of person perception theories, provide novel perspectives on existing debates, and serve as a stepping stone for more differentiated models of person perception.     

Why does gaze enhance mimicry? Placing gaze-mimicry effects in relation to other gaze phenomena

Eye gaze is a powerful signal, which exerts a mixture of arousal, attentional, and social effects on the observer. We recently found a behavioural interaction between eye contact and mimicry where direct gaze rapidly enhanced mimicry of hand movements ). Here, we report two detailed investigations of this effect. In Experiment 1, we compared the effects of “direct gaze”, “averted gaze”, and “gaze to the acting hand” on mimicry and manipulated the sequence of gaze events within a trial. Only direct gaze immediately before the hand action enhanced mimicry. In Experiment 2, we examined the enhancement of mimicry when direct gaze is followed by a “blink” or by “shut eyes”, or by “occluded eyes”. Enhanced mimicry relative to baseline was seen only in the blink condition. Together, these results suggest that ongoing social engagement is necessary for enhanced mimicry. These findings allow us to place the gaze-enhancement effect in the context of other reported gaze phenomena. We suggest that this effect is similar to previously reported audience effects, but is less similar to ostensive cueing effects. This has important implications for our theories of the relationships between social cues and imitation.     

Perception of mind and dehumanization: Human,animal, or machine?

Dehumanization is reached through several approaches, including the attribute‐based model of mind perception and the metaphor‐based model of dehumanization. We performed two studies to find different (de)humanized images for three targets: Professional people, Evil people, and Lowest of the low. In Study 1, we examined dimensions of mind, expecting the last two categories to be dehumanized through denial of agency (Lowest of the low) or experience (Evil people), compared with humanized targets (Professional people). Study 2 aimed to distinguish these targets using metaphors. We predicted that Evil and Lowest of the low targets would suffer mechanistic and animalistic dehumanization, respectively; our predictions were confirmed, but the metaphor‐based model nuanced these results: animalistic and mechanistic dehumanization were shown as overlapping rather than independent. Evil persons were perceived as “killing machines” and “predators.” Finally, Lowest of the low were not animalized but considered human beings. We discuss possible interpretations.     

The relationship between need for closure and compliance to harsh power tactics in high demanding jobs: A study conducted among firefighters and social workers

The present research aimed at expanding Pierro, Kruglanski, and Raven’s work examining the interweaving between the need for closure (NFC; the desire to form quick and unambiguous knowledge) and the Interpersonal Power Interaction model. In particular, this study explored the idea that the greater compliance to harsh power tactics of subordinates’ employees, that are high on NFC, can increase when their desire to achieve cognitive closure is made more salient by a high (compared to low) level of perceived job demands. A sample of 280 subordinates employees belonging to two different organizational contexts filled in a self-report questionnaire. Through a moderation and simple slope analyses, we tested and confirmed our hypothesis. When job demands were high, it potentially impaired the subordinates’ chance to form a quick knowledge. As a result, high NFC subordinates showed a higher compliance with harsh power tactics. Such tactics, limiting the subordinates’ freedom of choice, can be conceived as a means to gain quick knowledge when the organizational context is perceived as particularly demanding. As far as practical implications, these results suggest that for high NFC subordinates the use of more directive and unambiguous guidelines (e.g., harsh power tactics) could minimize the scarcely tolerated cognitive cost associated with high job demands.     

INCREASING OUR COMPASSION FOOTPRINT: THE ANIMALS' MANIFESTO

Our relationships with animals are wide‐ranging. When people tell me that they love animals and then harm or kill them I tell them I'm glad they don't love me. Many individuals, including scientists, ignore their responsibility when they interact with animals and fail to recognize that doing something in the name of science, which usually means in the name of humans, is not an adequate reason for intentionally causing suffering, pain, or death. “Good welfare” usually is not “good enough”. Existing regulations allow animals to be treated in regrettable ways that demean us as a species. Compassion is the key for bettering both animal and human lives. A good way to make the world a more compassionate place for animals is to increase our compassion footprint. We could begin by deciding that we will not intrude on animals' lives unless our actions are in the best interests of the animals irrespective of our desires. It is simple to make more compassionate choices about what we eat and wear and how we educate students, conduct research, and entertain ourselves at the expense of animals. The time to make these changes is long overdue.     

Priming effect in affirmative complex conditional connectives

We report the results of an experiment that examined the mental representations underlying the comprehension of complex conditional connectives (such as “A, on condition that B”) and the conditional if (such as “A, if B”). The mental representations during the comprehension stage were analysed using a “priming methodology”. The experiment showed that participants read the possibility “A and not-B” faster when it was primed by “A, if B” than when it was primed by “A, on condition that B”. The finding suggests that people understand the sentence “A, on condition that B” as biconditional; other possibilities (“A and B”, “not-A and B”, “not-A and not-B”) were primed equally by both connectives. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

Aspects of analytic deduction

Let ? be the ordinary deduction relation of classical first-order logic. We provide an “analytic” subrelation ?³ of ? which for propositional logic is defined by the usual “containment” criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq Atom(\Gamma ),$$ whereas for predicate logic, ?^a is defined by the extended criterion $$\Gamma \vdash ^a \varphi iff \Gamma \vdash \varphi and Atom(\varphi ) \subseteq ' Atom(\Gamma ),$$ where Atom(?) $ \subseteq '$ Atom(Γ) means that every atomic formula occurring in ? “essentially occurs” also in Γ. If Γ, ? are quantifier-free, then the notions “occurs” and “essentially occurs” for atoms between Γ and ? coincide. If ? is formalized by Gentzen's calculus of sequents, then we show that ?^a is axiomatizable by a proper fragment of analytic inference rules. This is mainly due to cut elimination. By “analytic inference rule” we understand here a rule r such that, if the sequent over the line is analytic, then so is the sequent under the line. We also discuss the notion of semantic relevance as contrasted to the previous syntactic one. We show that when introducing semantic sequents as axioms, i.e. when extending the pure logical axioms and rules by mathematical ones, the property of syntactic relevance is lost, since cut elimination no longer holds. We conclude that no purely syntactic notion of analytic deduction can ever replace successfully the complex semantico-syntactic deduction we already possess.     

Inherent directionality of “even if” counterfactual conditionals

In this research, we investigate whether semifactual conditionals such as “even if there had been an A, there would have been a B” are understood by thinking initially of the antecedent “A”, as was found with factual conditionals. The “inherent directionality” hypothesis assumes that for the comprehension of most relational statements, a presuppositional element (i.e. the “relatum”) is initially established. For “even if”, both terms could work as “relatum”. This is because on the one hand, people tend to infer “B” from “A” and “not-A” and, on the other hand, “B” could work as a pragmatic presupposition. In the present experiment, semifactual and factual conditionals were tested with a sentence-picture verification task. Results were consistent with the “inherent directionality” hypothesis: only “if then” factual conditionals, but not semifactuals, showed a preference for reasoning from the antecedent, with faster verifications.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

Truthiness,the illusory truth effect,and the role of need for cognition

Ease of processing—cognitive fluency—is a central input in assessments of truth, but little is known about individual differences in susceptibility to fluency-based biases in truth assessment. Focusing on two paradigms—truthiness and the illusory truth effect—we consider the role of Need for Cognition (NFC), an individual difference variable capturing one’s preference for elaborative thought. Across five experiments, we replicated basic truthiness and illusory truth effects. We found very little evidence that NFC moderates truthiness. However, we found some evidence that (without an experimental warning), people high on NFC may be more susceptible to the illusory truth effect. This may reflect that elaborative thought increases the fluency with which encoded statements are processed after a delay (thus increasing the illusory truth effect). Future research may fruitfully test whether the influence of NFC and other individual difference measures depends on whether people are making immediate or delayed truth judgments.     

Self-image threat decreases stereotyping: The role of motivation toward closure

Some prior research indicated that self-image threat may lead people to stereotyping and prejudiced evaluations of others. Other studies found that self-image threat may promote less stereotypical thinking and unprejudiced behavior. In a series of three studies, we demonstrate that self-image threat may lead to either more or less stereotypical perception of the outgroup depending on the level of the individuals` motivation toward closure (NFC). The results reveal that when individuals high (vs. low) in NFC perceived a member of an outgroup, they are less likely to use stereotypical traits if their self-image had been threatened by negative feedback (Study 1) or if they had imagined an example of their own immoral activity (Studies 2 and 3). Moreover, our results demonstrate that the fear of invalidity resulting from self-image threat induction is responsible for the foregoing effects (Study 3). These results are discussed in light of theories of motivational readiness and lay epistemics.     

The effects of statistical training on thinking about everyday problems

People possess an abstract inferential rule system that is an intuitive version of the law of large numbers. Because the rule system is not tied to any particular content domain, it is possible to improve it by formal teaching techniques. We present four experiments that support this view. In Experiments 1 and 2, we taught subjects about the formal properties of the law of large numbers in brief training sessions in the laboratory and found that this increased both the frequency and the quality of statistical reasoning for a wide variety of problems of an everyday nature. In addition, we taught subjects about the rule by a “guided induction” technique, showing them how to use the rule to solve problems in particular domains. Learning from the examples was abstracted to such an extent that subjects showed just as much improvement on domains where the rule was not taught as on domains where it was. In Experiment 3, the ability to analyze an everyday problem with reference to the law of large numbers was shown to be much greater for those who had several years of training in statistics than for those who had less. Experiment 4 demonstrated that the beneficial effects of formal training in statistics may hold even when subjects are tested completely outside of the context of training. In general, these four experiments support a rather “formalist” theory of reasoning: people reason using very abstract rules, and their reasoning about a wide variety of content domains can be affected by direct manipulation of these abstract rules.