Are color experiences representational?

The dominant view among philosophers of perception is that color experiences, like color judgments, are essentially representational: as part of their very nature color experiences possess representational contents which are either accurate or inaccurate. My starting point in assessing this view is Sydney Shoemaker’s familiar account of color perception. After providing a sympathetic reconstruction of his account, I show how plausible assumptions at the heart of Shoemaker’s theory make trouble for his claim that color experiences represent the colors of things. I consider various ways of trying to avoid the objection, and find all of the responses wanting. My conclusion is that we have reason to be skeptical of the orthodox view that color experiences are constitutively representational.     

Salience drives non-spatial feature repetition effects in cueing tasks

In an exogenous cueing task repeating a non-spatial feature can benefit performance if the feature is task-relevant to a discrimination response. Previous studies reporting this effect have used complex displays. In the current study, we look at the generalizability of this effect, by extending it to a simple exogenous cueing paradigm in which the cue and target displays each consist of single-object onsets. We also investigate the influence of task-relevant and irrelevant features independently within the same experiment. Consistent with previous studies, we find non-spatial feature repetition benefits in all three experiments. Importantly, and unlike previous studies, we find that the most salient, rather than the task-relevant, feature drives the non-spatial feature repetition benefit. Furthermore, in addition to the previously observed non-spatial feature repetition benefits, we also found a spatially specific feature repetition benefit. We argue that these new findings are consistent with habituation accounts of attentional cueing effects.     

Memory cueing and instructional effects on Wason’s selection task

The present study examined the hypothesis that violation and role-playing instructions are necessary conditions for facilitation on Wason’s selection task and that facilitation due to memory cueing via thematic content is secondary. The results of a factorial experiment employing these factors did not support the hypothesis. Memory cueing was indicated as the primary factor, but violation instructions did increase the amount of facilitation observed. This interactive effect and the nature of facilitation by memory cueing are briefly discussed.     

Edge-induced illusory contours and visual detection: Subthreshold summation or spatial cueing?

Findings that illusory contours can facilitate visual detection of a subthreshold real line (Dresp & Bonnet, 1995) were not replicated, when line-induced instead of edge-induced illusory contour stimuli were used (Salvano-Pardieu et al., 2006). Rather, the results of the latter study supported the importance of spatial cues. The present study was designed to investigate whether spatial cueing might also facilitate detection of targets superimposed on edge-induced illusory contours. In Experiment 1, a target line was superimposed on the illusory contour of a Kanizsa square, presented between dots with a precise or distant location to the target, or on a homogeneous field (control). Detection of the target was poorest for the control, followed by the distant-dots and Kanizsa conditions, whereas it was best for precisely cueing dots. Experiment 2 replicated the conditions in Experiment 1 (Kanizsa, precisely cueing dots, and control) with additional controls for possible luminance effects. The two new conditions matched the Kanizsa condition for overall luminance and preciseness of spatial cueing without generating illusory contours. Performance was best in the dot condition and worst in the control, but the same across the Kanizsa and matched luminance conditions. In Experiments 3 and 4, the stimuli presented were matched more closely to those used by Dresp and Bonnet, but still the results confirmed those obtained in our Experiments 1 and 2. Together, these experiments strongly suggest that detection is also facilitated by spatial cueing rather than subthreshold summation, in the case of edge-induced illusory contours.     

Do isoluminant color changes capture attention?

Four experiments are reported in which the effects of peripheral cues on visual orienting were investigated. In the luminance condition, the cues consisted of a peripheral change in stimulus luminance. In the isoluminance condition, the cues consisted of an isoluminant color change, using the transient tritanopic technique. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was found that peripheral luminance cues captured attention, whereas peripheral isoluminance cues did not. In Experiments 3 and 4, the participants detected a peripheral target that was also isoluminant with the background. Under these conditions, it was found that both luminance and isoluminance cues captured attention. The results are discussed in terms of the roles of the dorsal and ventral streams in visual orienting, and it is concluded that our findings provide partial support for the contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis of C. Folk and colleagues.     

The relationship between color–object associations and color preference: Further investigation of ecological valence theory

Ecological valence theory (EVT; Palmer & Schloss, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107:8877–8882, 2010) proposes that color preferences are due to affective responses to color-associated objects: That is, people generally like colors to the degree that they like the objects associated with those colors. Palmer and Schloss found that the average valence of objects associated with a color, when weighted by how well the objects matched the color (weighted affective valence estimates: WAVE) explained 80% of the variation in preference across colors. Here, we replicated and extended Palmer and Schloss’s investigation to establish whether color–object associations can account for sex differences in color preference and whether the relationship between associated objects and color preference is equally strong for males and females. We found some degree of sex specificity to the WAVEs, but the relationship between WAVE and color preference was significantly stronger for males than for females (74% shared variance for males, 45% for females). Furthermore, analyses identified a significant inverse relationship between the number of objects associated with a color and preference for the color. Participants generally liked colors associated with few objects and disliked colors associated with many objects. For the sample overall and for females alone, this association was not significantly weaker than the association of the WAVE and preference. The success of the WAVE at capturing color preference was partly due to the relationship between the number of associated objects and color preference. The findings identify constraints of EVT in its current form, but they also provide general support for the link between color preference and color–object associations.     

Second-order mappings in grapheme–color synesthesia

Typically, the search for order in grapheme–color synesthesia has been conducted by looking at the frequency of certain letter–color associations. Here, we report stronger associations when second-order similarity mappings are examined—specifically, mappings between the synesthetic colors of letters and letter shape, frequency, and position in the alphabet. The analyses demonstrate that these relations are independent of one other. More strikingly, our analyses show that each of the letter–color mappings is restricted to one dimension of color, with letter shape and ordinality linked to hue, and letter frequency linked to luminance. These results imply that synesthetic associations are acquired as the alphabet is learned, with associations involving letter shape, ordinality, and frequency being made independently and idiosyncratically. Because these mappings of similarity structure between domains (letters and colors) are similar to those found in numerous other cognitive and perceptual domains, they imply that synesthetic associations operate on principles common to many aspects of human cognition.     

Spatial cueing in time–space synesthetes: An event-related brain potential study

Some people report that they consistently and involuntarily associate time events, such as months of the year, with specific spatial locations; a condition referred to as time–space synesthesia. The present study investigated the manner in which such synesthetic time–space associations affect visuo-spatial attention via an endogenous cuing paradigm. Reaction times and ERPs were recorded as 12 time–space synesthetes and 12 control participants did a peripheral target detection task, cued by three different types of centrally presented cues: arrows pointing left or right, direction words “left” or “right”, and month names associated with either the left or the right side of the synesthete’s mental calendar (e.g., “October” or “May”). Cues were followed by probes on the left or right side of the screen, and participants responded to the probes with button presses. Behavioral and ERP data suggested that for synesthetes, month words functioned more effectively as cues to direct attention in space. In synesthetes but not controls, a comparison of ERPs to probes cued by months revealed effects of cue validity on the P3b component peaking 370 ms post-onset and on the subsequent positive slow wave (pSW) observed 600–900 ms post-onset (both larger for invalid probes). No effects of cue validity were observed on early visual potentials (N1) for probes cued by months. The findings suggest that in these time–space synesthetes cue validity influenced post-perceptual processes, such as stimulus evaluation and categorization, with no evidence for enhanced visual processing.     

Is color “categorical perception” really perceptual?

Roberson and Davidoff (2000) found that color categorical perception (CP; better cross-category than within-category discrimination) was eliminated by verbal, but not by visual, interference presented during the interstimulus interval (ISI) of a discrimination task. On the basis of this finding, Roberson and Davidoff concluded that CP was mediated by verbal labels, and not by perceptual mechanisms, as is generally assumed. Experiment 1 replicated their results. However, it was found that if the interference type was uncertain on each trial (Experiment 2), CP then survived verbal interference. Moreover, it was found that the target color name could be retained across the ISI even with verbal interference (Experiment 3). We therefore conclude that color CP may indeed involve verbal labeling but that verbal interference does not necessarily prevent it.     

Arrow-elicited cueing effects at short intervals: Rapid attentional orienting or cue-target stimulus conflict?

The observation of cueing effects (faster responses for cued than uncued targets) rapidly following centrally-presented arrows has led to the suggestion that arrows trigger rapid automatic shifts of spatial attention. However, these effects have primarily been observed during easy target-detection tasks when both cue and target remain on the screen until the behavioral response. We manipulated stimulus duration and task difficulty in an attention-cueing experiment to explore non-attentional explanations for rapid cueing effects. Contrary to attention-based predictions, short-interval cueing effects were observed only for long-duration cue and target stimuli, occurred even when the cue and target were presented simultaneously, and were driven by slowing of the uncued-target responses, rather than any facilitation for cued targets. We propose that, under these long-duration, short-interval conditions, the processing of the cue and target interact more extensively in the brain, and that when the cue and target convey incongruent spatial information (i.e., on invalidly cued trials) it leads to conflict-related slowing of responses.     

Why do non-color words interfere with color naming?

In the non-color-word Stroop task, university students' response latencies were longer for low-frequency than for higher frequency target words. Visual identity primes facilitated color naming in groups reading the prime silently or processing it semantically (Experiment 1) but did not when participants generated a rhyme of the prime (Experiment 3). With auditory identity primes, generating an associate or a rhyme of the prime produced interference (Experiments 2 and 3). Color-naming latencies were longer for nonwords than for words (Experiment 4). There was a small long-term repetition benefit in color naming for low-frequency words that had been presented in the lexical decision task (Experiment 5). Facilitation of word recognition speeds color naming except when phonological activation of the base word increases response competition.     

Can one pay attention to a particular color?

In an array of elements whose colors vary can we selectively choose to process all the items of a particular color preferentially in relation to those of another color? We addressed this question by presenting subjects with arrays containing many elements, and recording reaction times to a luminance change of one of the elements. Half the elements had one color and the other half another color--the spatial distribution being random. In two tasks--a simple detection of this change or a choice reaction time to the polarity of the change--we found that reaction times were independent of the number of items in the array. Cuing the subjects as to the color of the target item had no significant influence on the detection task, but subjects were faster if cued for the discrimination task. A further experiment replicated these findings and examined possible costs and benefits. Our final experiment separated the roles of attentional guidance and postattentional processes by having subjects judge the orientation of the target element and varying the magnitude of the target flash that defined which element was the target. We found that this judgment was also affected by color cuing, and that the size of the effect interacted with the flash strength, suggesting that color cuing has its influence at the stage of attentional guidance. We conclude that subjects can selectively attend to items on the basis of color given the appropriate task and stimulus dynamics.     

Is color an intrinsic property of object representation?

The role of color in object representation was examined by using a variation of the Stroop paradigm in which observers named the displayed colors of objects or words. In experiment 1, colors of color-diagnostic objects were manipulated to be either typical or atypical of the object (eg a yellow banana versus a purple banana). A Stroop-like effect was obtained, with faster color-naming times for the typical as compared to the atypical condition. In experiment 2, naming colors on words specifying these same color-diagnostic objects reversed this pattern, with the typical condition producing longer response times than the atypical condition. In experiment 3, a blocked condition design that used the same words and colors as experiment 2 produced the standard Stroop-like facilitation for the typical condition. These results indicate that color is an intrinsic property of an object's representation at multiple levels. In experiment 4, we examined the specific level(s) at which color-shape associations arise by following the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 with a lexical-decision task in which some items were conceptually related to items shown during color naming (eg banana/monkey). Priming for these associates was observed following color naming of words, but not pictures, providing further evidence that the color-shape associations responsible for the differing effects obtained in experiments 1 and 2 are due to the automatic activation of color-shape associations at different levels of representation.     

Metacontrast masking is processed before grapheme–color synesthesia

We investigated the physiological mechanism of grapheme–color synesthesia using metacontrast masking. A metacontrast target is rendered invisible by a mask that is delayed by about 60 ms; the target and mask do not overlap in space or time. Little masking occurs, however, if the target and mask are simultaneous. This effect must be cortical, because it can be obtained dichoptically. To compare the data for synesthetes and controls, we developed a metacontrast design in which nonsynesthete controls showed weaker dichromatic masking (i.e., the target and mask were in different colors) than monochromatic masking. We accomplished this with an equiluminant target, mask, and background for each observer. If synesthetic color affected metacontrast, synesthetes should show monochromatic masking more similar to the weak dichromatic masking among controls, because synesthetes could add their synesthetic color to the monochromatic condition. The target–mask pairs used for each synesthete were graphemes that elicited strong synesthetic colors. We found stronger monochromatic than dichromatic U-shaped metacontrast for both synesthetes and controls, with optimal masking at an asynchrony of 66 ms. The difference in performance between the monochromatic and dichromatic conditions in the synesthetes indicates that synesthesia occurs at a later processing stage than does metacontrast masking.     

Do we conceptualize every color we consciously discriminate?

Mandik understands color-consciousness conceptualism to be the view that one deploys in a conscious qualitative state concepts for every color consciously discriminated by that state. Some argue that the experimental evidence that we can consciously discriminate barely distinct hues that are presented together but cannot do so when those hues are presented in short succession suggests that we can consciously discriminate colors that we do not conceptualize. Mandik maintains, however, that this evidence is consistent with our deploying a variety of nondemonstrative concepts for those colors and so does not pose a threat to conceptualism. But even if Mandik has shown that we deploy such concepts in these experimental conditions, there are cases of conscious states that discriminate colors but do not involve concepts of those colors. Mandik's arguments sustain only a theory in the vicinity of conceptualism: The view that we possess concepts for every color we can discriminate consciously, but need not deploy those concepts in every conscious act of color discrimination.     

Visuospatial cueing by self-caused features: Orienting of attention and action–outcome associative learning

The effect of a salient visual feature in orienting spatial attention was examined as a function of the learned association between the visual feature and the observer’s action. During an initial acquisition phase, participants learned that two keypress actions consistently produced red and green visual cues. Next, in a test phase, participants’ actions continued to result in singletons, but their color could be either congruent or incongruent with the learned action–color associations. Furthermore, the color singletons now functioned as valid or invalid spatial cues in a visual search, in which participants looked for a tilted line (“/” or “\”) among distractors (“X”s). The results showed that an action-congruent color was more effective as a valid cue in the search task (increased benefit), but less effective as an invalid cue (reduced cost). We discuss our findings in terms of both an inhibition account and a preactivation account of action-driven sensory bias, and argue in favor of the preactivation account.     

Involuntary memory chaining versus event cueing: Which is a better indicator of autobiographical memory organisation?

Involuntary memory chains are spontaneous recollections of the past that occur in a sequence. Much like semantic memory priming, this memory phenomenon has provided some insights into the nature of associations in autobiographical memory. The event-cueing procedure (a laboratory-based memory sequencing task) has also provided some insights into the nature of autobiographical memory organisation. However, while both of these memory-sequencing phenomena have exhibited the same types of memory associations (conceptual associations and general-event or temporal associations), both have also produced discrepant results with respect to the relative proportions of such associations. This study investigated the possibility that the results from event cueing are artefacts of various memory production responses. Using a number of different approaches we demonstrated that these memory production responses cause overestimates of general-event association. We conclude that for this reason, the data from involuntary memory chains provide a better picture of the organisation of autobiographical memory.     

Does contingency awareness mediate the influence of emotional learning on the cueing of visual attention?

Previous research has indicated that conditioning depends on contingency awareness (CA). However, we argue that these studies have examined this issue under methodological conditions that might be insensitive to associative learning without CA. In the present study we examined the effect of an experimental manipulation of CA on attentive processing of classically conditioned stimuli, which is sensitive to associative learning with and without CA. We found that aversive conditioning with additional contingency instructions modulated visual attention, in the sense that the conditioned cues captured and held attention more strongly than the non-conditioned cues. Surprisingly, conditioning under conditions of restricted CA yielded a response pattern that was different from that under full CA. These findings suggest that conditioning with full and restricted CA can lead to qualitatively different effects on attention.