Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up?

The recent, influential Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment (Haidt, Psychological Review 108, 814–834, 2001) proposes a primary role for fast, automatic and affectively charged moral intuitions in the formation of moral judgments. Haidt’s research challenges our normative conception of ourselves as agents capable of grasping and responding to reasons. We argue that there can be no ‘real’ moral judgments in the absence of a capacity for reflective shaping and endorsement of moral judgments. However, we suggest that the empirical literature indicates a complex interplay between automatic and deliberative mental processes in moral judgment formation, with the latter constraining the expression and influence of moral intuitions. We therefore conclude that the psychological literature supports a normative conception of agency.

Informed inferences of unknown feature values in categorization

Many current computational models of object categorization either include no explicit provisions for dealing with incomplete stimulus information (e.g. Kruschke, Psychological Review 99:22–44, 1992) or take approaches that are at odds with evidence from other fields (e.g. Verguts, Ameel, & Storms, Memory & Cognition 32:379–389, 2004). In two experiments centered around the inverse base-rate effect, we demonstrate that people not only make highly informed inferences about the values of unknown features, but also subsequently use the inferred values to come to a categorization decision. The inferences appear to be based on immediately available information about the particular stimulus under consideration, as well as on higher-level inferences about the stimulus class as a whole. Implications for future modeling efforts are discussed.     

Cognitive contours: recent work on cross-cultural psychology and its relevance for education

This paper outlines new work in cross-cultural psychology largely drawn from Nisbett, Choi, and Smith (Cognition, 65, 15–32, 1997); Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, Psychological Review, 108(2), 291–310, 2001; Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently...and Why. New York: Free Press 2003), Ji, Zhang and Nisbett (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(1), 57–65, 2004), Norenzayan (2000) and Peng (Naive Dialecticism and its Effects on Reasoning and Judgement about Contradiction. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 1997) Peng and Nisbett (Cross-Cultural Similarities and Differences in the Understanding of Physical Causality. Paper presented at the Science and Culture: Proceedings of the Seventh Interdisciplinary Conference on Science and Culture, Frankfort, K. Y. 1996), and Peng, Ames, & Knowles (Culture and Human Inference: Perspectives from three traditions. In: D. Matsumoto (Ed.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (pp. 1–2). Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). The paper argues that the findings on cultural influences on inference-making have implications for teaching and education generally, and specifically for the debate on conceptions and misconceptions of Asian students studying in western tertiary institutions around the world. The position defended is that, while there seems to be compelling empirical evidence for intercultural differences in thought patterns, these patterns are, for the most part, insignificant in everyday exchanges, though language and culture might subtlety modulate our inference-making at the margins. Linguistic determinism however is not defended. Nonetheless, the evidence provides food for thought, and it needs to inform the recent debates about international students studying overseas.

Noncategorical approaches to feature prediction with uncertain categories

In four experiments, we investigated how people make feature predictions about objects whose category membership is uncertain. Artificial visual categories were presented and remained in view while a novel instance with a known feature, but uncertain category membership was presented. All four experiments showed that feature predictions about the test instance were most often based on feature correlations (referred to as feature conjunction reasoning). Experiment 1 showed that feature conjunction reasoning was generally preferred to category-based induction in a feature prediction task. Experiment 2 showed that people used all available exemplars to make feature conjunction predictions. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that the preference for predictions based on feature conjunction persisted even when category-level information was made more salient and inferences involving a larger number of categories were required. Little evidence of reasoning based on the consideration of multiple categories (e.g., Anderson, (Psychological Review, 98:409–429, 1991)) or the single, most probable category (e.g., Murphy & Ross, (Cognitive Psychology, 27:148–193, 1994)) was found.     

Speaking of One’s Life: What Can We Learn from Transcultural Studies?

The work by Demuth et al. (Integrative Psychological and Bahavioral Science 45:1–20, 2011) is very important in the scenario of transcultural research, as it goes beyond the specific contexts of India and Germany. They successfully explored the dialogic relation between remembered autobiography, the self and the culture from a trans-generational development perspective, managing to identify common and unique processes of each culture. I, however, using a dynamical systems approach, present a supplementary way to the one chosen in the study, with the goal of analyzing how these new perspectives might contribute to the understanding of this phenomenon. The dynamical systems is a perspective sensitive to non-linearity of phenomena and interested in understanding how processes emerge, as it may be useful to analyze the family as a dynamical system under constant interaction with other systems, which makes the emergence of the self, possible. Besides, it would enable the identification of trajectories that individuals build over time, the moments of change and variability, as well as identifying different types of patterns in the process of construction of the self.     

Dissociable perceptual-learning mechanisms revealed by diffusion-model analysis

Performance on perceptual tasks improves with practice. Most theories address only accuracy data and tacitly assume that perceptual learning is a monolithic phenomenon. The present study pioneers the use of response time distributions in perceptual learning research. The 27 observers practiced a visual motion-direction discrimination task with filtered-noise textures for four sessions with feedback. Session 5 tested whether the learning effects transferred to the orthogonal direction. The diffusion model (Ratcliff, Psychological Review, 85, 59–108, 1978) achieved good fits to the individual response time distributions from each session and identified two distinct learning mechanisms with markedly different specificities. A stimulus-specific increase in the drift-rate parameter indicated improved sensory input to the decision process, and a stimulus-general decrease in nondecision time variability suggested improved timing of the decision process onset relative to stimulus onset (which was preceded by a beep). A traditional d’ analysis would miss the latter effect, but the diffusion-model analysis identified it in the response time data.     

Are two heuristics better than one? The fluency and distinctiveness heuristics in recognition memory

Four experiments were conducted to test the impact of having multiple heuristics (distinctiveness and fluency) available during a recognition test. Recent work by Gallo, Perlmutter, Moore, and Schacter (Memory & Cognition 36:461–466, 2008) suggested that fluency effects are reduced when the distinctiveness heuristic can be applied to a recognition decision. In Experiment 1, we used a response reversal paradigm (Van Zandt & Maldonado-Molina Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 30:1147–1166, 2004) to demonstrate that participants transitioned from an early response strategy that was largely reliant on fluency to a later strategy in which the influences of fluency and distinctiveness were both observable. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 showed no evidence for reduction of the fluency heuristic after picture study when the test required a delayed response (Exp. 2a), confidence ratings (Exp. 2b), or the application of conceptual fluency (Exp. 3). The results are consistent with models of memory that assume that familiarity and recollection influence individual memory decisions Wixted (Psychological Review, 114:152–176, 2007).     

Social Cognition and the So-Called Conjunction Fallacy

The so-called ‘conjunction effect’, in which participants incorrectly assert that an instance from the conjunction of two sets is more probable than an instance from one of the two conjoining sets alone, has been a source of debate as to whether it is a genuine fallacy of individual thinking or not. We argue that reasoning about individuals follows a different process than reasoning about sets. 35 participants took part in 3 tasks: a) one involving blocks of different sizes and colours designed to evoke set-based reasoning, b) one where a particular block was ‘individuated’ by stating that it represented a particular person, and c) the original Tversky and Kahneman (Psychological Review 90(4):293–315, 1983) ‘Linda’ problem. As predicted, set-based reasoning was significantly more prevalent for the blocks task than for the other two tasks. Participants’ reasons for their choices suggest that some individuals correctly use set-based logic in one task and a social reasoning process for the other tasks.     

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating

Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.

Stepping Stones Triple P: An RCT of a Parenting Program with Parents of a Child Diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder

Whilst the Triple P Positive Parenting Program has a large evidence base (Sanders, Clinical Child and Family Psychology Review 2:71–90, 1999; Sanders, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 68:624–640, 2000) and preliminary evidence indicates that Stepping Stones Triple P is also efficacious (Roberts, Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 35(2):180–193, 2006), to date Stepping Stones has not been evaluated with the ASD population. Fifty-nine families with a child with ASD aged between 2 and 9 participated in this randomized controlled trial. The results demonstrate significant improvements in parental reports of child behaviour and parenting styles with the treatment effects for child behaviour, parental over reactivity and parental verbosity being maintained at follow-up 6 months later. Further, the results suggest significant improvements in parental satisfaction and conflict about parenting as well as a sleeper effect for parental efficacy. The results indicate that Stepping Stones Triple P is a promising intervention for parents of children with ASD. Limitations and future research are also addressed.     

Testing the myth of the encoding–retrieval match

The view that successful memory performance depends importantly on the extent to which there is a match between the encoding and retrieval conditions is commonplace in memory research. However, Nairne (Memory, 10, 389–395, 2002) proposed that this idea about trace–cue compatibility being the driving force behind memory retention is a myth, because one cannot make unequivocal predictions about performance by appealing to the encoding–retrieval match. What matters instead is the relative diagnostic value of the match, and not the absolute match. Three experiments were carried out in which participants memorised word pairs and tried to recall target words when given retrieval cues. The diagnostic value of the cue was varied by manipulating the extent to which the cues subsumed other memorised words and the level of the encoding–retrieval match. The results supported Nairne’s (Memory, 10, 389–395, 2002) assertion that the diagnostic value of retrieval cues is a better predictor of memory performance than the absolute encoding–retrieval match.     

The role of familiarity in binary choice inferences

In research on the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, Psychological Review, 109, 75–90, 2002), knowledge of recognized objects has been categorized as “recognized” or “unrecognized” without regard to the degree of familiarity of the recognized object. In the present article, we propose a new inference model—familiarity-based inference. We hypothesize that when subjective knowledge levels (familiarity) of recognized objects differ, the degree of familiarity of recognized objects will influence inferences. Specifically, people are predicted to infer that the more familiar object in a pair of two objects has a higher criterion value on the to-be-judged dimension. In two experiments, using a binary choice task, we examined inferences about populations in a pair of two cities. Results support predictions of familiarity-based inference. Participants inferred that the more familiar city in a pair was more populous. Statistical modeling showed that individual differences in familiarity-based inference lie in the sensitivity to differences in familiarity. In addition, we found that familiarity-based inference can be generally regarded as an ecologically rational inference. Furthermore, when cue knowledge about the inference criterion was available, participants made inferences based on the cue knowledge about population instead of familiarity. Implications of the role of familiarity in psychological processes are discussed.     

Giving Back and Growing in Service: Investigating Spirituality,Religiosity, and Generativity in Young Adults

Generativity investigations have explored the manner by which adults derive meaning and fulfillment from their life activities (e.g., Erikson in Identity, youth, and crisis W.W. Norton & Company Inc.,NY, 1968; McAdams and Logan in American Psychological Association, 15–31, 2004). Faith and religious practice have often been central features of adult meaning making, yet the relationship between one’s spiritual identity and one’s generative concern or activities has received only limited investigation. Lesser still has been investigated examining the degree to which young adults demonstrate generative concern. The current study examined the relationship between aspects of faith (religiosity and spirituality) and generativity (concern and action). A sample of 94 undergraduates from a religiously affiliated college were recruited through door-to-door invitation and were surveyed using a new measure of religiosity (Steger and Frazier in Journal of Counseling Psychology 52(4):574–582, 2005) and two measures of generativity (Loyola Generativity Scale and Generative Behavior Checklist, McAdams et al. 1992). Support was found for a relationship between spirituality and generative concern. These findings are discussed in relation to recent demographic shifts and are compared with earlier work investigating secular spiritual trends on generativity (e.g., Dillon and Wink in The generative society American Psychological Association Press, Washington, DC, 153–174, 2004).     

More than one kind of happiness: Can we recognize vocal expressions of different positive states?

Several theorists have proposed that distinctions are needed between different positive emotional states, and that these discriminations may be particularly useful in the domain of vocal signals (Ekman, 1992b, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200; Scherer, 1986, Psychological Bulletin, 99, 143–165). We report an investigation into the hypothesis that positive basic emotions have distinct vocal expressions (Ekman, 1992b, Cognition and Emotion, 6, 169–200). Non-verbal vocalisations are used that map onto five putative positive emotions: Achievement/Triumph, Amusement, Contentment, Sensual Pleasure, and Relief. Data from categorisation and rating tasks indicate that each vocal expression is accurately categorised and consistently rated as expressing the intended emotion. This pattern is replicated across two language groups. These data, we conclude, provide evidence for the existence of robustly recognisable expressions of distinct positive emotions.     

RT patterns and chunks in SRT tasks: a reply to Jiménez (2008)

Previous research has shown that the formation of units or chunks contributes to sequence learning in serial reaction time (SRT) tasks (Koch & Hoffmann, Psychological Research 63:22–35, 2000). However, some of these results were assumed to be unrelated to sequence learning and to reflect preexistent response tendencies (Jiménez, Psychological Research 72:387–396, 2008). In the Experiment of this study, we aimed to evaluate this issue. One group of participants responded to a strongly structured sequence of digits by pressing one out of six response keys depending on digit identity. In a second experimental group, a weakly structured sequence was presented, which contained comparable transitions among the single items, but did not have series of ascending and descending triplets of successive digits. The results indicated that serial learning in general as well as response tendencies to certain fragments of the sequence were modulated by the manipulation of the strength of relational patterns. The data are consistent with the notion that relational patterns contribute to the formation of chunks as suggested in the original study.     

“We All Have Feelings for Our Girlfriends:” Progressive (?) Representations of Lesbian Lives on the <Emphasis Type="Italic">The L Word</Emphasis>

The Showtime series The L Word (2004–2009) marked one of the first dramatized representations of prominent lesbian characters. While many popular culture scholars are focusing attention on the recent “gaying” of television narrative (e.g., Battles and Hilton-Morrow in Critical Studies in Media Communication 19: 87–105, 2002; Shugart in Text and Performance Quarterly 23: 30–54, 2003; Critical Studies in Media Communication 20: 67–91, 2003), far less attention is given to non-romantic interpersonal relationships surrounding main characters in these narratives. Sexuality scholarship notes that lesbian individuals must negotiate their self-disclosure to heterosexuals (Dindia in Dialectical approaches to studying personal relationships, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Inc., Mahwah, NJ, 1998), and that this can be challenging for forming relationships and maintaining identity (Meyer in Communication Quarterly 51: 262–276, 2004). Ultimately, this essay argues that despite the gains in visibility and even in intimacy, The L Word articulates an ideology of avoidance whereby the underlying problems of heterosexism and homophobia are left unchallenged.     

The Problem of De Se Assertion

It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977; No?s 13: 3–21, 1979, Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself, call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan (1989), has it that if Alma says “I am hungry,” the asserted content, or what is said, is the proposition that Alma is hungry (at a given time). I argue that the received view has difficulties handling de se assertion, i.e., contents that one expresses using the first person pronoun, to assert something about oneself. I start from the observation that when two speakers say “I am hungry,” one may truly report them as having said the same thing. It has often been held that the possibility of such reports comes from the fact that the two speakers are, after all, uttering the same words, and are in this sense “saying the same thing”. I argue that this approach fails, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient to use the same words, or words endowed with the same meaning, in order to be truly reported as same-saying. I also argue that reports of same-saying in the case of de se assertion differ significantly from such reports in the case of two speakers merely implicating the same thing.     

Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions

Rabern and Rabern (Analysis 68:105–112 2) and Uzquiano (Analysis 70:39–44 4) have each presented increasingly harder versions of ‘the hardest logic puzzle ever’ (Boolos The Harvard Review of Philosophy 6:62–65 1), and each has provided a two-question solution to his predecessor’s puzzle. But Uzquiano’s puzzle is different from the original and different from Rabern and Rabern’s in at least one important respect: it cannot be solved in less than three questions. In this paper we solve Uzquiano’s puzzle in three questions and show why there is no solution in two. Finally, to cement a tradition, we introduce a puzzle of our own.     

The Role of Verbal Threat Information in the Development of Childhood Fear. “Beware the Jabberwock!”

Rachman’s (Behaviour Research and Therapy 15:372–387, 1977; Clinical Psychology Review 11:155–173, 1991) three pathways theory proposed that childhood fears not only arise as a consequence of direct learning experiences, but can also be elicited by means of threat information transmission. This review looks at the scientific evidence for this idea, which has accumulated during the past three decades. We review research on the influences of media exposure on children’s fears, retrospective parent and child reports on the role of threat information in fear acquisition, and experimental studies that explored the causal effects of threat information on childhood fears. We also discuss possible mechanisms by which threat information exerts its influence and the processes relevant to understand the role of this type of learning experience in the origins of fear. Finally, implications for the prevention and intervention of childhood fears are briefly explored, and potential leads for future research will be highlighted.     

A diffusion model analysis of task interference effects in prospective memory

Holding an intention often interferes with other ongoing activities, indicating that resource-demanding processes are involved in maintaining the intention and noticing the appropriate event to fulfill it. Little is known, however, about the nature of the processes underlying this task interference effect. The goal of the present research was to decompose the processes contributing to the task interference effect by applying the diffusion model (Ratcliff, Psychological Review 85:59–108, 1978) to an event-based prospective memory task. In the first experiment, we validated the interpretation of the response criterion parameter (a) of the diffusion model as reflecting strategies to cope with the anticipated demands of a prospective memory task in the context of the ongoing task. The second experiment served to investigate which underlying processes contribute to the task interference often found with prospective memory tasks. Diffusion model analyses revealed that the task interference effect was due to (1) less efficient processing in the more demanding than in the less demanding prospective memory task and (2) a more conservative response criterion. We suggest that the anticipated demands and the additional processing demands of the prospective memory task jointly contribute to the task interference effect.