DO CONDITIONAL REINFORCERS COUNT?

Six pigeons were trained on a procedure in which seven components arranged different food-delivery ratios on concurrent variable-interval schedules each session. The components were unsignaled, lasted for 10 food deliveries, and occurred in random order with a 60-s blackout between components. The schedules were arranged using a switching-key procedure in which two responses on a center key changed the schedules and associated stimuli on two side keys. In Experiment 1, over five conditions, an increasing proportion of food deliveries accompanied by a magazine light was replaced with the presentation of the magazine light only. Local analyses of preference showed preference pulses toward the alternative that had just produced either a food-plus-magazine-light or magazine-light-only presentation, but pulses after food deliveries were always greater than those after magazine lights. Increasing proportions of magazine lights did not change the size of preference pulses after food or magazine-light presentations. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of correlations between food ratios and magazine-light ratios: In Condition 6, magazine-light ratios in components were inversely correlated (-1.0) with food ratios, and in Condition 7, magazine-light ratios were uncorrelated with food ratios. In Conditions 8 and 9, pecks also produced occasional 2.5-s flashes of a green keylight. In Condition 8, food and magazine-light ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and green-key ratios were correlated -1.0. In Condition 9, food and green-key ratios were correlated 1.0 whereas food and magazine-light ratios were correlated -1.0. Preference pulses toward alternatives after magazine lights and green keys depended on the correlation between these event ratios and the food ratios: If the ratios were correlated +1.0, positive preference pulses resulted; if the correlation was -1.0, preference pulses were negative. These results suggest that the Law of Effect has more to do with events signaling consequences than with strengthening responses.     

DO WE SENSE MODALITIES WITH OUR SENSE MODALITIES?1

It has been widely assumed that we do not perceive dispositional properties. I argue that there are two ways of interpreting this assumption. On the first, extensional, interpretation whether we perceive dispositions depends on a complex set of metaphysical commitments. But if we interpret the claim in the second, intensional, way, then we have no reason to suppose that we do not perceive dispositional properties. The two most important and influential arguments to the contrary fail.     

HOW WELL DO JURORS REASON?

Significant individual variation IS observed m how people reason as jurors At the saUsficing end of a continuum we identify, the juror draws on evi-dence selectively to construct a single story of what happened, with no acknowledgment of discrepant evidence or alternative possibilities A contrasting theory-evidence coordination mode of processing entails construction of multiple theories (story-verdict constellations)that are evaluated against the evidence and against alternatives Individual differences Influence task outcome, the satisficing mode being associated with more extreme verdict choices and very high certainty     

DO PEOPLE REALLY ADAPT TO MARRIAGE?

Although cross-sectional studies have shown a reliable association between marital status and subjective well-being, a recent longitudinal study [Lucas et al. 2003, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 84(3), pp.␣527–539] found no support for the idea that happiness increases after marriage. Instead, participants who got married reported short-term increases followed by complete adaptation back to baseline levels of well-being. However, researchers have criticized this study on two grounds. First, these results contradict cohort-based analyses from a nationally representative sample. Second, these analyses do not control for pre-marriage cohabitation, which could potentially inflate baseline levels of well-being. The original data (plus four additional waves) are reanalyzed to address these concerns. Results confirm that individuals do not get a lasting boost in life satisfaction following marriage.The data used in this paper were made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). This research was supported by a grant from the Anthony Marchionne Foundation.     

WHY DO PEOPLE USE FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE?

Abstract— In this article, we examine the discourse goals that are accomplished by the use of eight forms of figurative language: hyperbole, idiom, indirect request, irony, understatement, metaphor, rhetorical question, and simile. Subjects were asked to provide reasons why they would use a particular figure of speech. Based on their responses, a discourse goal taxonomy that includes each of the eight figures was developed. The goal taxonomy indicates that each figure of speech is used to accomplish a unique constellation of communicative goals. The degree of goal overlap between the eight forms was also calculated, and the results provide support for theoretical claims about the relatedness of certain figures. Taken together, the goal taxonomy and overlap scores broaden our understanding of functional and theoretical differences between the various kinds of figurative language.     

WHY “DO NO HARM”?

Edmund Pellegrino has argued that the dramatic changes in American health care call for critical reflection on the traditional norms governing the therapeutic relationship. This paper offers such reflection on the obligation to “do no harm.” Drawing on work by Beauchamp and Childress and Pellegrino and Thomasma, I argue that the libertarian model of medical ethics offered by Engelhardt cannot adequately sustain an obligation to “do no harm.” Because the obligation to “do no harm” is not based simply on a negative duty of nonmaleficence but also on a positive duty of beneficence, I argue that it is best understood to derive from the fiduciary nature of the healing relationship.     

WHAT DO PROACTIVE PEOPLE DO? A LONGITUDINAL MODEL LINKING PROACTIVE PERSONALITY AND CAREER SUCCESS

We developed and tested a model linking proactive personality and career success through a set of four behavioral and cognitive mediators. A 2-year longitudinal design with data from a sample of 180 full-time employees and their supervisors was used. Results from structural equation modeling showed that proactive personality measured at Time 1 was positively related to innovation, political knowledge, and career initiative, but not voice; all measured at Time 2. Innovation, political knowledge, and career initiative in turn had positive relationships with career progression (salary growth and the number of promotions during the previous 2 years) and career satisfaction. Interestingly, voice had a negative relationship with career progression. We discuss practical implications and future research directions for proactive personality, extra-role behavior, and careers.     

DO I HAVE TO BE HERE NOW?

Kaplan claims that (1) ‘I am here now’, though analytic, is not a necessary truth. But this sentence is not a proposition, in a sense of proposition in which some, but not all, sentences are propositions. Since it is not a proposition, it is not true, and consequently not analytic. It is in fact a fragment of a proposition, the same fragment as ‘he was there then’ in (2) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1991 that he was there then’. Sentences containing indexicals in general owe their sense to the corresponding fragments of sentences containing ‘quasi-indexicals’(‘then’, for example, is the quasi-indexical to ‘now’ as indexical). Someone uttering (1) assertively will thereby make a proposition like (2) true. (2) entails (3) ‘CJFW said in Oxford on 23 September 1993 that CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. So by uttering (1) in the appropriate circumstances I made it true that I had asserted the proposition (4) ‘CJFW was in Oxford on 23 September 1991′. What is analytic and necessarily true is the proposition ‘If (3) then (4)’.     

DO INFANTS SHOW GENERALIZED IMITATION OF GESTURES?

Two experiments were conducted to investigate generalized imitation of manual gestures in 1- to 2-year-old infants. In Experiment 1, 6 infants were first trained four baseline matching relations (e.g., when instructed "Do this", to raise their arms after they saw the experimenter do so). Next, four novel gestures that the infants did not match in probe trials were selected as target behaviors during generalized imitation Test 1; models of these gestures were presented on unreinforced matching trials interspersed with intermittently reinforced baseline matching trials. None of the infants matched the target behaviors. To ensure that these behaviors were in the infants' motor skills repertoires, the infants were next trained to produce them, at least once, under stimulus control that did not include an antecedent model of the target behavior. In repeat generalized imitation trials (Test 2), the infants again failed to match the target behaviors. Five infants (3 from Experiment 1) participated in Experiment 2, which was identical to Experiment 1 except that, following generalized imitation Test 1, the motor-skills training was implemented to a higher criterion (21 responses per target behavior), and in a multiple-baseline, across-target-behaviors procedure. In the final generalized imitation test, 1 infant matched one, and another infant matched two target behaviors; the remaining 17 target behaviors still were not matched. The results did not provide convincing evidence of generalized imitation, even though baseline matching was well maintained and the target behaviors were in the infants' motor skills repertoires, raising the question of what are the conditions that reliably give rise to generalized imitation.     

DO EXPLANATORY DESIRE ATTRIBUTIONS GENERATE OPAQUE CONTEXTS?

Many philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co-referring expression salva veritate as the objects of non-psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be read de re.