Understanding advantaged groups' opposition to diversity,equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies: The role of perceived threat

To combat social inequality, organizations develop and implement initiatives that seek to improve the status of disadvantaged groups (e.g., women, racial/ethnic minority groups). Such diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) policies are controversial, because people disagree about whether they are necessary and what their (positive and negative) consequences may be. Opposition can be particularly fierce from people who belong to advantaged groups that benefit from the status quo (e.g., men, racial/ethnic majority groups). Given the power wielded by advantaged groups, their opposition can undermine the successful implementation of DEI policies, thus resulting in continued inequality, wasted resources, and potential for tension in the organization. In this paper, I draw on theory and research to consider three types of threat that can explain advantaged groups' opposition to DEI policies: (1) resource threat, or concern about losing access to outcomes and opportunities; (2) symbolic threat, or concern about the introduction of new values, culture, and expectations; and (3) ingroup morality threat, or concern about their group's role in perpetuating inequality. I review strategies identified by the literature to mitigate these threats, and discuss their potential negative consequences. The final section takes stock of the literature and considers directions for future research.     

Ethnic and Cultural Diversity:

Within the past decade, feminist therapists have successfully taken a leadership role in challenging the traditional and inherent prejudice and discrimination concerning women in psychotherapeutic counseling theory and practice. As progress is made in research, theory, and practice affecting the mental health of women in therapy, more complex issues emerge. This paper will focus on the issues of ethnic and cultural diversity, as it applies to women of color seeking therapy.     

Coming together and remaining a part: Development of a group-as-a-whole compass. Part II

Group-as-a-whole theory is an attempt to explain the collaboration and synergy that results when patients share their care. The art and science of treating individuals within psychotherapy groups is enriched by an understanding of the unique mediums ³ through which a group comes into being and the more general domains within which it comes to be known. This paper continues the development of a group-as-a-whole compass, as an integration of extant models and theories (Ettin, 1996). The focus shifts from conceptual and spatial models to an exploration of the cultural and relational processes that make up whole-group functioning. The paper comes full circle with hypotheses drawn about how a psychotherapy group, as a holistic phenomenon, is composed and maintained.Private practice, East Brunswick, New Jersey.     

ALTRUISM AND THE GOLDEN RULE

This essay addresses recent claims about the compatibility of the sociobiological theory of reciprocal altruism with standard Western formulations of the Golden Rule. Derek Parfit claims that the theory of reciprocal altruism teaches us to be “reciprocal altruists,” who benefit only those people from whom we can reasonably expect benefits in the future. The Golden Rule, on the other hand, teaches us to benefit anyone regardless of their intention or ability to return the favor, or as Parfit puts it, the Golden Rule teaches us to be “suckers.” I argue that this distinction is founded on a misconception of the nature of the theory of reciprocal altruism, which is sociobiological as opposed to moral, and that this distinction accordingly confuses is with ought. Sociobiological theories may explain underlying psychological motivations in individuals (and perhaps even in populations), but these theories do not prescribe any sort of moral behavior. Furthermore, the theory of reciprocal altruism does not imply mental states of which agents are aware. The unconscious motivations assumed by this theory are in fact compatible with certain formulations of the Golden Rule; I will accordingly argue for the view that certain words with moral content related to the Golden Rule—such as “altruism” and “selfishness”—exist only insofar as they are social tools, which can further the self‐interests of an individual in any group.     

Oppression and Victimization; Choice and Responsibility

This essay discusses a cluster of problems for feminist theory and practice which concern responsibility and choice under conditions of oppression. I characterize four major perspectives from which situations of oppression or victimization can be seen and questions about choice and responsibility answered: The Perspective of the Oppressor; The Perspective of the Victim; The Perspective of the Responsible Actor; and The Perspective of the Observer/Philosopher. 1 compare their strengths and weaknesses and discuss their compatibility.     

Working with Racial Themes in Group Psychotherapy

Racial themes frequently emerge in group psychotherapy but are often unaddressed by therapists. Confusion about the relevance of race to the psychotherapeutic process, countertransferential responses, and a lack of training in how to address racial content contribute to therapists' reluctance. Approaches to addressing racial content in groups are examined. Case examples are used to demonstrate therapist characteristics and perspectives on the group process that create a climate where racial content can be explored. An exploration of the meaning of racial content provides an opportunity for deepened understanding of interpersonal relationships for patients and therapists.     

Is Having Pets Morally Permissible?

In this article, I consider the question of whether having pets is morally permissible. However, I do so indirectly by considering three objections to the practice of having pets — what I shall call the ‘restriction of freedom objection’, the ‘property objection’, and the ‘dependency objection’. The restriction of freedom objection is dismissed relatively easily. The property objection also fails to show that having pets is morally impermissible. However, my consideration of this second objection does lead to the conclusion that we ought to aim at changing existing legal systems and the majority of people's attitudes towards pets such that they (pets) are no longer considered to be the personal property of the humans in whose homes they are kept. But, while it is clear that we ought to aim at ending the practice of owning pets, it is not clear whether we ought to aim at ending the practice of keeping pets. Indeed, I do not to reach a definitive conclusion about the cogency of the dependency objection. However, I argue that this lack of clarity is of little concern at this time as our present moral obligations to pets are quite clear.     

Racial Profiling Versus Community

abstract A police technique known as racial profiling draws on statistical beliefs about crime rates in racial groups. Supposing that such beliefs are true, and that racial profiling is effective in fighting crime, is such profiling morally justified? Recently, Risse and Zeckhauser have explored the racial profiling of African‐Americans and argued that justification is forthcoming from a utilitarian as well as deontological point of view. Drawing on criticisms made by G. A. Cohen of the incentives argument for inequality, I argue that, assuming that crime rates between different racial groups would converge in the absence of racial discrimination and unjust inequality, racial profiling is comprehensively unjustified. I also explain that, because Risse and Zeckhauser simply compare the status quo with an outcome that differs from it only in respect of the practice of racial profiling, they fail to show that such profiling is non‐comprehensively justified. And, exploring the problem from the point of view of a deontological concern for fairness, I identify a number of situations in which it would be non‐comprehensively unjustified to implement racial profiling (as well as some in which it might be non‐comprehensively unjustified not to implement racial profiling).     

Reply to Dr. Lambert

Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not convincing, partly because he does not take the theory in its most plausible form and partly because he ignores certain important distinctions (for example, between what a statement is about and what it is true in virtue of). Then I raise two new objections to the psychologistic theory. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the psychologistic theory remains an important and serious position from which we can learn much about the status of logic.     

Large groups in treatment and training settings

A review of published work over the past decade and a half supports the effectiveness of the large group in clinical settings. Greater sophistication among practitioners has led to combining administrative, psychotherapeutic, and sociotherapeutic large groups and to the use of effective treatment teams and clearly defined contracts in inpatient hospital work. Some research findings suggest that large treatment groups are as effective as small therapy groups with some patient populations. There appears to be a movement toward convergence in the techniques employed by individual, small group, and large group therapists in practice, while not in theory. This positive trend in the mental health field may lead to more flexible practitioners.He is also on the board of the A. K. Rice Institute and a faculty member of the Cincinnati Psychoanalytic Institute. He would like to thank Walter Stone and Peter Herr for their comments and Lorna Volk for editing.     

Agape and Karuna: Some comparisons

Agape in Western Christianity and Karuna in Mahayana Buddhism are central concepts which serve as a basis for comparing the views of the “self”; and its altruistic concern for the “other”; in the two traditions. The Bodhisattva Vow is compared with the emphasis on disinterested love in some teachings of Christianity, and attitudes towards enemies are examined. The foundations in religious practice and world views are examined by comparing such terms as grace and prajna.     

Contrasting Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Relations

The current forum is designed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of social identity, social dominance, and system justification as theoretical approaches to the study of intergroup relations. Each of these approaches tries to account for variation in the development of ingroup cohesion and outgroup antipathy among individual group members, across groups, and in different societies—three levels at which theorists have commonly sought explanations for variability in intergroup attitudes and behavior. Social dominance theory is the most ambitious of the theories but does not succeed in explaining intergroup relations equally well at all three levels. However, it has excelled in highlighting individual differences in the need and desire to dominate members of lower-status groups and in exploring the interaction between individuals and institutions. Social identity theory is primarily concerned with the attributes of groups that foster the development of ingroup bias and examines the conditions under which this occurs. It is more fully developed in this respect than the other approaches but ignores variation at the individual level and, to a lesser degree, the societal level. System justification theory considers a mix of individual- and societal-level factors, focusing on the role of support for the status quo in producing acceptance of status inequalities among members of low-status groups, even when it is against their own interest to do so. The theory highlights an important problem—the quiescence of low-status groups—but more work is needed to flesh out the theory and its central concepts.     

Constructivism and Technology Critique: Replies to Critics

1. Thomson's critique: Despite the efforts of his followers to show that Heidegger had a progressive theory of technology, his work is clouded by nostalgia. His positive contribution is a fragmentary opening toward a phenomenology of daily technical practice, which I use to develop de Certeau's distinction between the strategic control of technical systems and their tactical usage by subordinates. Heidegger himself made no such application of his own phenomenological approach. 2. Stump's critique: Can an ontological essentialism and a historically oriented constructivism be combined as Questioning Technologyattempts to do? Stump claims they cannot, but assumes that I accept far more ontological and epistemological baggage from each position than I do. In fact, what I retain from essentialism is primarily the analysis of the basic technical relation to reality, and from constructivism, historical and hermeneutic methods of analysis of the realization of that relation in actual systems and devices. These elements of the two theories are compatible.     

Explanation is a Genus: An Essay on the Varieties of Scientific Explanation

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explainswithout drawing attention to causes–that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinctfrom that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes theexplanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation ofthe standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physicaltheories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals oraspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insightfor a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstoneof a new theory of scientific method.     

L'état c'est moi — Except When I Am Not: Commentary on Paper by Orna Guranlik and Daphne Simeon

In this discussion, I situate Guralnik and Simeon's argument about depersonalization and interpellation among ways that different psychoanalytic theorists have understood the interaction of the psychic and social domains. I elaborate on what Guralnik and Simeon mean when they refer to the role of “the State” in dissociation, interpellation, and depersonalization. Upon showing how self-states simultaneously incorporate and resist the State, Guralnik and Simeon provide a clinical rationale to confront interpellation's “discursive instructions.” This leads me to explore the curious status of the term state in psychoanalytic theory and practice.     

Trauma, Regression, and the Intensive Group Experience

Ferenczi contributed a theory of trauma and regression that has application in the contemporary practice of group therapy. This article seeks to present an extension of these seminal ideas in the form of interventions based on therapist induced regression. The Intensive Group Experience (I.G.E.), a time extended group format found to be necessary for extensive emotional reliving and working through of trauma is described. A clinical case example is then discussed in detail and concludes this report.     

On that peculiar practice of promising

T. M. Scanlon has alleged that the social practice of promising fails to capture the sense in which when I break my promise I have wronged the promisee in particular. I suggest the practice of promising requires the promisee to have a normatively significant status, a status with interpersonal authority with respect to the promisor, and so be at risk of a particular harm made possible by the social practice of promising. This formulation of the social practice account avoids Scanlon’s concern without collapsing into what Elinor Mason has recently referred to as deflationism about promising.

Group status is related to group prototypicality in the absence of social identity concerns

Based on self-categorization theory, group status should be positively related to group prototypicality when the relevant superordinate category is positively valued. In this case, high-status groups should be perceived to be more prototypical than low-status groups even in the absence of concerns about maintaining a positive social identity. To test this hypothesis, a minimal group study was conducted in which participants (N = 139) did not belong to any of the groups involved. Consistent with predictions, participants perceived high-status groups to be significantly more prototypical than low-status groups. Consistent with self-categorization theory's cognitive analysis, these results demonstrate that the relation between group status and group prototypicality is a relatively basic and pervasive effect that does not depend on social identity motives.     

Internalism about reasons: sad but true?

Internalists about reasons following Bernard Williams claim that an agent’s normative reasons for action are constrained in some interesting way by her desires or motivations. In this paper, I offer a new argument for such a position—although one that resonates, I believe, with certain key elements of Williams’ original view. I initially draw on P.F. Strawson’s famous distinction between the interpersonal and the objective stances that we can take to other people, from the second-person point of view. I suggest that we should accept Strawson’s contention that the activity of reasoning with someone about what she ought to do naturally belongs to the interpersonal mode of interaction. I also suggest that reasons for an agent to perform some action are considerations which would be apt to be cited in favor of that action, within an idealized version of this advisory social practice. I then go on to argue that one would take leave of the interpersonal stance towards someone—thus crossing the line, so to speak—in suggesting that she do something one knows she wouldn’t want to do, even following an exhaustive attempt to hash it out with her. An internalist necessity constraint on reasons is defended on this basis.     

Children with ADHD in Residential Care

Little is known about the characteristics or functioning of children with ADHD in residential care as compared to their non-ADHD peers. This study evaluated data on 538 children with (n = 125) and without (n = 413) ADHD in residential care to determine demographic, mental health, behavioral, and treatment (i.e., medication use) characteristics. Results revealed that both groups presented elevated risks, however, scores for children with ADHD indicated even greater levels of need. Specifically, differences were found between the two groups on demographics (e.g., family reunification status, restrictiveness of prior out-of-home placements), behavior (e.g., attention problems, rule-breaking and aggressive behaviors) and medication status. Findings suggest there is a need for aftercare services to help support families as children transition from care, interventions to address behavior, and medication management through assessment and monitoring.