Learning artificial phonotactic constraints: time course, durability, and relationship to natural constraints

G. S. Dell, K. D. Reed, D. R. Adams, and A. S. Meyer (2000) proposed a "breadth-of-constraint" continuum on phoneme errors, using artificial experiment-wide constraints to investigate a putative middle ground between local and language-wide constraints. The authors report 5 experiments that test the idea of the continuum and the location of the experiment-wide constraints within it. Experiments 1 and 2 replicated the findings of Dell et al. on the experiment-wide constraints but showed only chance adherence to the local positional constraints. Experiment 3 showed that the latter constraints are uniquely affected by the form of practice used. Experiments 4 and 5 investigated the time course and robustness of the experimental constraints by reversing them during testing. This caused no difficulty when occurring between blocks (Experiment 4) but caused short-lived disruption when occurring within block (Experiment 5). The authors propose that the results do not support the idea of a continuum, but that the experiment-wide constraints reflect a local biasing of language-wide constraints, probably related to the need for rapid learning.     

‘Why should we talk to you? You'll only tell the Court!’ On being an informer and a family therapist

The family therapy literature recognizes the constraints imposed on a therapist's freedom and impartiality in a statutory agency. This paper shows that clinical settings that are apparently independent are not free of such constraints. The wider professional welfare system has confused expectations of a clinical agency that it should provide simultaneously both therapy and a measure of social control. An account is given of one hospital-based family therapy team's struggles to find manoeuvrability in child-focused statutory cases, so as to be helpful both to families and referrers. One method of working is illustrated with a case example.     

Reframing the question of forbidden knowledge for modern science

In this paper I use the concept of forbidden knowledge to explore questions about putting limits on science. Science has generally been understood to seek and produce objective truth, and this understanding of science has grounded its claim to freedom of inquiry. What happens to decision making about science when this claim to objective, disinterested truth is rejected? There are two changes that must be made to update the idea of forbidden knowledge for modern science. The first is to shift from presuming that decisions to constrain or even forbid knowledge can be made from a position of omniscience (perfect knowledge) to recognizing that such decisions made by human beings are made from a position of limited or partial knowledge. The second is to reject the idea that knowledge is objective and disinterested and accept that knowledge (even scientific knowledge) is interested. In particular, choices about what knowledge gets created are normative, value choices. When these two changes are made to the idea of forbidden knowledge, questions about limiting or forbidding lines of inquiry are shown to distract attention from the more important matters of who makes and how decisions are made about what knowledge is produced. Much more attention should be focused on choosing directions in science, and as this is done, the matter of whether constraints should be placed on science will fall into place.