The strategic nature of changing your mind

In two experiments, we studied how people’s strategy choices emerge through an initial and then a more considered evaluation of available strategies. The experiments employed a computer-based paradigm where participants solved multiplication problems using mental and calculator solutions. In addition to recording responses and solution times, we gathered data on mouse cursor movements. Participants’ motor behavior was revealing; although people rapidly initiated movement to the calculator box or the answer input box, they frequently changed their minds and went to the other box. Movement initiation direction depended on problem difficulty and calculator responsiveness. Ultimate strategy selection also depended on these factors, but was further influenced by movement initiation direction. We conclude that strategy selection is iterative, as revealed by these differences between early cursor movement and eventual strategy implementation. After rapidly initiating movement favoring one strategy, people carefully evaluate the applicability of that strategy in the current context.     

Sartre and Spinoza on the nature of mind

What surfaces first when one examines the philosophy of mind of Sartre and Spinoza are the differences between them. For Spinoza a human mind is a mode of the divine mind. That view is a far cry from Sartre’s view of human consciousness as a desire never achieved: the desire to be god, to be the foundation of one’s own existence. How could two philosophers, one a determinist and the other who grounds human freedom in the nature of consciousness itself, be seen as having any commonalities worth exploring? How could the noted user of the deductive method and one of the most important phenomenologists of the twentieth century share any philosophical ground at all? I will argue in this paper that despite the very real differences between their two philosophies, there are striking similarities between Sartre’s view of consciousness and Spinoza’s view of the mind. They become apparent when one examines each one’s analysis of the nature of mind and its relationship to itself, the body, and the world. Both are heir to a kind of Aristotelian naturalism. This commonality between them derives from their mutual rejection of Descartes’ substance dualism. I first explore the consequences of that rejection on how each one conceives of the relationship between the mind and its objects. Next I examine their view of the mind’s relation to itself and finally I look at how each one understood the mind’s relationship to the body and the world. The examination of their two views reveals how much they anticipate and support theories of mind defended by contemporary analytic philosophers of mind.     

More than a body: mind perception and the nature of objectification

According to models of objectification, viewing someone as a body induces de-mentalization, stripping away their psychological traits. Here evidence is presented for an alternative account, where a body focus does not diminish the attribution of all mental capacities but, instead, leads perceivers to infer a different kind of mind. Drawing on the distinction in mind perception between agency and experience, it is found that focusing on someone's body reduces perceptions of agency (self-control and action) but increases perceptions of experience (emotion and sensation). These effects were found when comparing targets represented by both revealing versus nonrevealing pictures (Experiments 1, 3, and 4) or by simply directing attention toward physical characteristics (Experiment 2). The effect of a body focus on mind perception also influenced moral intuitions, with those represented as a body seen to be less morally responsible (i.e., lesser moral agents) but more sensitive to harm (i.e., greater moral patients; Experiments 5 and 6). These effects suggest that a body focus does not cause objectification per se but, instead, leads to a redistribution of perceived mind.     

Theory of mind for learning and teaching: the nature and role of explanation

The relationship between “theory of mind” and teaching is deep and complex. We focus on one particularly powerful link that is based on the role of children's psychological explanations in their learning. Psychological explanations involve explaining persons’ actions and lives as the causes and consequences of their mental states. We begin by showing that psychological explanations are central to children's developing theories of mind—they are part of the mechanism for development in this domain. We then review theory and data suggesting that psychological explanations are also critically important for learning and being taught more generally.     

Hegel,modal logic,and the social nature of mind

ABSTRACT

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood.     

Multiple routes to mind wandering: Predicting mind wandering with resource theories

Three experiments examine individual (attentional capacity) and task-related characteristics leading to mind wandering, and the effect of mind wandering on task performance. Drawing on resource theories, we tested interactive nonlinear effects of these predictors, manipulating task demand using math tests of varying difficulty (Exp 1: N = 143, three levels between-subjects; Exp 2: N = 59, three levels within-subjects; Exp 3: N = 133, four levels within-subjects). Results confirmed that mind wandering was most frequent during extreme task demand levels, although the effect varied somewhat between experiments. Additionally, results from Experiment 3 and an integrated analysis demonstrated that people with relatively higher attentional capacity were less likely to mind wander as task demand increased. Moreover, mind wandering was more detrimental to performance as task demand increased across all experiments. Our findings build on past research by demonstrating the importance of accounting for interactions and nonlinear effects of task demand and attentional capacity in mind wandering research.     

Hebrew Healing: Jewish Authenticity and Religious Healing in Canada

This paper describes a Jewish healing group, referred to as ‘Yehi Ohr’, and discusses strategies for constructing religious authenticity employed by Yehi Ohr's leader and the rabbis who have assisted in leading Yehi Ohr's service. A discussion of the participants in the healing service follows, with an outline of their criteria for authenticity and a focus on the range of their healing experiences. By demonstrating the centrality of these strategies for achieving authenticity in the work of Yehi Ohr, the paper points to the importance of issues of authenticity to the success of this religious healing group and proposes that authenticity may well be central to the work of other healing groups in pluralistic, postmodern settings.     

Keeping the reader's mind in mind: Development of perspective-taking in children's dictations

This study investigated when children can take the perspective of their reader if the information-processing demands of writing are removed by means of dictation to a scribe. Participants (N = 96) aged 5, 6 and 7 years dictated letters to an addressee who possessed requisite content knowledge, and then revised the letter or dictated a new letter to an addressee who lacked this knowledge (counterbalanced). Results showed that 19% of 5-year-olds, 41% of 6-year-olds, and 72% of 7-year-olds considered their reader's missing knowledge. Children's awareness of their reader's knowledge was neither related to performance on higher-order theory of mind tasks, nor to measures of executive function. Significantly greater perspective-taking was demonstrated in children's new letters than revised letters. However, although revision is considered a late-developing skill, half of even the 5-year-olds were able to make revisions (albeit few revisions demonstrated actual perspective-taking). Findings have significant implications for the emergent-literacy curriculum.     

李贽以心论《易》及其自然人性论初探

李贽易学以心论《易》,结合前人易说,重点从"心"出发,标立童心,重视人情和性命,阐发自然人性论;通过多年的自研自得,他将易学视为简易自然之圣学。在易学诠释上,李贽属于重自然童心的义理一派;此外,李贽将易学与学术背景和时代启蒙思想相结合,代表新兴市民的时代诉求,反映了自然人情的时代特色,是对传统易学的发展。     

Google and the mind: predicting fluency with PageRank

Human memory and Internet search engines face a shared computational problem, needing to retrieve stored pieces of information in response to a query. We explored whether they employ similar solutions, testing whether we could predict human performance on a fluency task using PageRank, a component of the Google search engine. In this task, people were shown a letter of the alphabet and asked to name the first word beginning with that letter that came to mind. We show that PageRank, computed on a semantic network constructed from word-association data, outperformed word frequency and the number of words for which a word is named as an associate as a predictor of the words that people produced in this task. We identify two simple process models that could support this apparent correspondence between human memory and Internet search, and relate our results to previous rational models of memory.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.