The Neural Basis of Motor-Skill Learning

Recent work indicates that motor-skill learning is supported by four processes: a strategic process that selects new goals of what to change in the environment, a perceptual-motor integration process that adjusts to new relationships between environmental stimuli and the appropriate motor response, a sequencing process that learns sequences of motor acts, and a dynamic process that learns new patterns of muscle activations. These four processes can operate in one of two modes: an unconscious mode, in which one is aware only of the goal of the movement, or a conscious mode, in which one consciously controls detailed aspects of the movement. This article provides an overview of these four processes and two modes, and describes their neural bases.     

Conscious awareness of action potentiates sensorimotor learning

Many everyday skills are unconsciously learned through repetitions of the same behaviour by binding independent motor acts into unified sets of actions. However, our ability to be consciously aware of producing newly and highly trained motor skills raises the question of the role played by conscious awareness of action upon skill acquisition. In this study we strengthened conscious awareness of self-produced sequential finger movements by way of asking participants to judge their performance in terms of maximal fluency after each trial. Control conditions in which participants did not make any judgment or performance-unrelated judgments were also included. Findings indicate that conscious awareness of action, enhanced via subjective appraisal of motor efficiency, potentiates sensorimotor learning and skilful motor production in optimising the processing and sequencing of action units, as compared to the control groups. The current work lends support to the claim that the learning and skilful expression of sensorimotor behaviours might be grounded upon our ability to be consciously aware of our own motor capability and efficiency.     

Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection: Investigating indirect conscious control

The assumption that the contents of our conscious visual experience directly control our fine-tuned, real-time motor activity has been challenged by neurological and psychophysical evidence that suggest the two processes work semi-independently of each other. Clark [Clark, A. (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? The Philosophical Review, 110, 495–519; Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 181–202; Clark, A. (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensori-motor contingency theory. PSYCHE, 12 (1). Available from http://www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au] argues that such evidence implies a more indirect relationship between conscious visual experience and motor-control where the function of visual consciousness is not to control action but to select what actions are to be controlled. In this paper, I argue that this type of dynamic also exists at the wider level of self-regulation where conscious intent appears to indirectly control the enactment of the intended behaviour. I argue that by drawing parallels between Clark’s proposed dynamic and self-regulation, the former is not only bolstered by a previously unrecognised source of support but our understanding of the latter can help to further elucidate Clark’s proposed mechanism of indirect conscious control.     

Conscious intention and motor cognition

The subjective experience of conscious intention is a key component of our mental life. Philosophers studying 'conscious free will' have discussed whether conscious intentions could cause actions, but modern neuroscience rejects this idea of mind-body causation. Instead, recent findings suggest that the conscious experience of intending to act arises from preparation for action in frontal and parietal brain areas. Intentional actions also involve a strong sense of agency, a sense of controlling events in the external world. Both intention and agency result from the brain processes for predictive motor control, not merely from retrospective inference.     

Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition: evidence from masked priming

Recent results from “subliminal priming” experiments have shown that masked prime stimuli which can not be consciously perceived can trigger response activation processes, but that these response activations can later be subject to inhibition. Links between conscious awareness and response inhibition were investigated by manipulating the visibility of masked prime stimuli, from clearly visible primes to prime stimuli that were inaccessible to conscious perception. Response inhibition was observed with unperceived prime stimuli, but not for suprathreshold primes. Correlations between individual prime identification thresholds and the onset of response inhibition indicate that the absence or presence of conscious awareness can predict whether or not response inhibition is elicited. These results demonstrate qualitative differences in the effects of conscious and unconscious information. It is argued that response facilitation produced by consciously available perceptual information can counteract automatic effects of self-inhibitory motor control circuits.     

Intentional Action and the Post-Coma Patient

Detecting conscious awareness in a patient emerging from a coma state is problematic, because our standard attributions of conscious awareness rely on interpreting bodily movement as intentional action. Where there is an absence of intentional bodily action, as in the vegetative state, can we reliably assume that there is an absence of conscious awareness? Recent neuroimaging work suggests that we can attribute conscious awareness to some patients in a vegetative state by interpreting their brain activity as intentional mental action. I suggest that this change of focus, from the interpretation of motor behaviour as intentional bodily action to the interpretation of neural activity as intentional mental action, raises philosophical issues that affect the interpretation of the neuroimaging data.     

Effects of nonconscious perception on motor response

The present study reviews the literature on the empirical evidence for the dissociation between perception and action. We first review several key studies on brain-damaged patients, such as those suffering from blindsight and visual/tactile agnosia, and on experimental findings examining pointing movements in normal people in response to a nonconsciously perceived stimulus. We then describe three experiments we conducted using simple reaction time (RT) tasks with backward masking, in which the first (weak) and second (strong) electric stimuli were consecutively presented with a 40-ms interstimulus interval (ISI). First, we compared simple RTs for three stimulus conditions: weak alone, strong alone, and double, i.e., weak plus strong (Experiment 1); then, we manipulated the intensity of the first stimulus from the threshold (T) to 1.2T and 2T, with the second stimulus at 4T (Experiment 2); finally, we tested three different ISIs (20, 40, and 60 ms) with the stimulus intensities at 1.2T and 4T for the first and second stimuli (Experiment 3). These experiments showed that simple RTs were shorter for the double condition than for the strong-alone condition, indicating that motor processes under the double condition may be triggered by sensory inputs arising from the first stimulus. Our results also showed that the first stimulus was perceived without conscious awareness. These findings suggested that motor processes may be dissociated from conscious perceptual processes and that these two processes may not take place in a series but, rather, in parallel. We discussed the likely mechanisms underlying nonconscious perception and motor response to a nonconsciously perceived stimulus.     

Training of fast tapping with reduction of kinaesthetic, tactile, visual and auditory sensations

Five subjects were trained to tap on a light Morse-key during nerve compression block. The training sessions lasted for 40 sec., with a 5 sec. rest after the first 20 sec. work period. The group learning curve reached 89.5 per cent. level of normal performance by the eighth training session. In the ninth, the testing session, subjects tapped with visual and auditory sense reduction superimposed on the kinaesthetic and tactile impariment of the training condition. Performance in the testing session reached 40.9 per cent. of normal.

The sixth subject was trained in the same task as the other five subjects, but the training condition included elimination of cues from all four sensory channels. He reached 79.09 per cent. of his normal tapping performance in the seventh session.

These results show that the motor skill of tapping can be relearned in the absence of kinaesthetic cues. Furthermore when the subject has no conscious knowledge of any peripheral sensory cues connected with the ongoing motor activity, learning can nevertheless take place. These findings lead to the hypothesis, that skilled motor activity can be monitored by central processes alone.

During the training sessions subjects showed a tendency of tapping in groups of gradually increasing length. It is hypothesized that increased number of taps forming a group gives an indication to the possible mode of action of these central processes.     

A model of the hierarchy of behaviour, cognition, and consciousness

Processes comparable in important respects to those underlying human conscious and non-conscious processing can be identified in a range of species and it is argued that these reflect evolutionary precursors of the human processes. A distinction is drawn between two types of processing: (1) stimulus-based and (2) higher-order. For 'higher-order,' in humans the operations of processing are themselves associated with conscious awareness. Conscious awareness sets the context for stimulus-based processing and its end-point is accessible to conscious awareness. However, the mechanics of the translation between stimulus and response proceeds without conscious control. The paper argues that higher-order processing is an evolutionary addition to stimulus-based processing. The model's value is shown for gaining insight into a range of phenomena and their link with consciousness. These include brain damage, learning, memory, development, vision, emotion, motor control, reasoning, the voluntary versus involuntary debate, and mental disorder.     

Pragmatic Perspectives on the Psychology of Meaning

A recurrent idea in the history of psychology is that one is conscious of outputs but not of the complex processes underlying the generation of outputs, which is evident in the out-of-the-blue, “eureka-like” experiences associated with intuition. We examine how this idea may suffer from a logical fallacy and may thus have inadvertently hindered progress on the study of the intimate liaisons among high-level central processes, intuition, and overt action. It is proposed that, for various reasons, the only undisputable output in the nervous system is overt action. Once this is accepted, the overlooked relationship between conscious central processes and overt action can be examined. A review of the evidence reveals that conscious processing is in the business of, not low-level perceptual processing, motor control, or action production per se, but of constraining a peculiar form of knowledge-based, integrated action-goal selection, which can lead to integrated actions such as holding one's breath. Unconscious processing can influence behavior indirectly, by producing these conscious constraining dimensions that modulate action-goal selection, or directly, through unintegrated actions such as reflexively inhaling or responding to a subliminal stimulus. From this standpoint, eureka-like intuitions reflect not an atypical brain process but the general nature by which unconscious machinations influence action either directly or indirectly, through the limited purview of consciousness.     

Dimensions of movement specific reinvestment in practice of a golf putting task

ObjectivesThis study aimed to investigate the role of the two dimensions of movement specific reinvestment (conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness) in performance of a complex task early and later in practice. Furthermore, the study also examined the underlying kinematic mechanisms by which conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness influence performance in practice.MethodsTrait measures of conscious motor processing and movement self-consciousness were obtained from participants using the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale. Participants (n = 30) with no prior golf putting experience practiced 300 golf putts over the course of two days. Putting proficiency (number of putts holed) and variability of movement kinematics (SD impact velocity and SD putter face angle at impact) were assessed early and later in practice.ResultsMovement self-consciousness positively influenced putting proficiency early and later in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. Conscious motor processing positively influenced putting proficiency early in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. Later in practice, conscious motor processing was not associated with putting proficiency.ConclusionThe findings suggest that higher propensity for movement self-consciousness potentially influences performance early and later in practice by reducing variability of impact velocity and putter face angle at impact. A higher propensity for conscious motor processing benefits performance in a similar manner as movement self-consciousness early in practice but it does not seem to influence performance later in practice. The findings of the current study suggest that movement self-consciousness and conscious motor processing differentially influence performance at different stages in practice of a complex motor skill, suggesting that they might depict different types of conscious processing.     

The link between brain learning, attention, and consciousness

The processes whereby our brains continue to learn about a changing world in a stable fashion throughout life are proposed to lead to conscious experiences. These processes include the learning of top-down expectations, the matching of these expectations against bottom-up data, the focusing of attention upon the expected clusters of information, and the development of resonant states between bottom-up and top-down processes as they reach an attentive consensus between what is expected and what is there in the outside world. It is suggested that all conscious states in the brain are resonant states and that these resonant states trigger learning of sensory and cognitive representations. The models which summarize these concepts are therefore called Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, models. Psychophysical and neurobiological data in support of ART are presented from early vision, visual object recognition, auditory streaming, variable-rate speech perception, somatosensory perception, and cognitive-emotional interactions, among others. It is noted that ART mechanisms seem to be operative at all levels of the visual system, and it is proposed how these mechanisms are realized by known laminar circuits of visual cortex. It is predicted that the same circuit realization of ART mechanisms will be found in the laminar circuits of all sensory and cognitive neocortex. Concepts and data are summarized concerning how some visual percepts may be visibly, or modally, perceived, whereas amodal percepts may be consciously recognized even though they are perceptually invisible. It is also suggested that sensory and cognitive processing in the What processing stream of the brain obey top-down matching and learning laws that are often complementary to those used for spatial and motor processing in the brain's Where processing stream. This enables our sensory and cognitive representations to maintain their stability as we learn more about the world, while allowing spatial and motor representations to forget learned maps and gains that are no longer appropriate as our bodies develop and grow from infanthood to adulthood. Procedural memories are proposed to be unconscious because the inhibitory matching process that supports these spatial and motor processes cannot lead to resonance.     

Deceiving oneself about being in control: conscious detection of changes in visuomotor coupling

Previous research has demonstrated that compensatory movements for changes in visuomotor coupling often are not consciously detected. But what factors affect the conscious detection of such changes? This issue was addressed in 4 experiments. Participants carried out a drawing task in which the relative velocity between the actual movement and its visual consequences was perturbed. Unconscious compensatory movements and conscious detection rates were simultaneously recorded. There was an invariant relationship between the extent of the change and its conscious detection that was proportional to the initial drawing velocity. This suggests that conscious change detection relies on a system that integrates visual and motor information-as, for instance, suggested by the internal model theory of motor control. Figural discrepancies increased the detection rates, indicating that additional cues for the what system facilitate conscious change detection.     

Priming in the attentional blink: Perception without awareness?

The attentional blink refers to a reduction in accuracy that occurs when observers are required to identify the second of two rapidly sequential targets. Even when the second target cannot be reported, however, it is still capable of priming the response to a subsequent related item. At issue in the present work was whether this priming is attributable mainly to conscious or unconscious processes. To answer this question, we used an exclusion procedure that permitted an assessment of the relative dominance of conscious and unconscious processes. The results showed that second targets that are identified incorrectly are nonetheless processed extensively outside of awareness. Moreover, this processing is sufficient to prime a subsequent response for at least 1 s after the onset of the prime.     

Conscious awareness of motor fluidity improves performance and decreases cognitive effort in sequence learning

Motor skill learning is improved when participants are instructed to judge after each trial whether their performed movements have reached maximal fluidity. Consequently, the conscious awareness of this maximal fluidity can be classified as a genuine learning factor for motor sequences. However, it is unknown whether this effect of conscious awareness on motor learning could be mediated by the increased cognitive effort that may accompany such judgment making. The main aim of this study was to test this hypothesis in comparing two groups with, and without, the conscious awareness of the maximal fluidity. To assess the possible involvement of cognitive effort, we have recorded the pupillary dilation to the task, which is well-known to increase in proportion to cognitive effort. Results confirmed that conscious awareness indeed improved motor sequence learning of the trained sequence specifically. Pupil dilation was smaller during trained than during novel sequence performance, indicating that sequence learning decreased the cognitive cost of sequence execution. However, we found that in the group that had to judge on their maximal fluidity, pupil dilation during sequence production was smaller than in the control group, indicating that the motor improvement induced by the fluidity judgment does not involve additional cognitive effort. We discuss these results in the context of motor learning and cognitive effort theories.     

Conscious Control Is Associated With Freezing of Mechanical Degrees of Freedom During Motor Learning

This study investigated whether conscious control is associated with freezing of mechanical degrees of freedom during motor learning. Participants practiced a throwing task using either error-strewn or error-reduced practice protocols, which encourage high or low levels of conscious control, respectively. After 24 hr, participants engaged in a series of delayed retention and transfer tests. Furthermore, propensity for conscious control was assessed using participants' ratings and freezing was gauged through movement variability of the throwing arm. Performance was defined by mean radial error. In the error-strewn group, propensity for conscious control was positively associated with both freezing and performance. In the error-reduced group, propensity for conscious control was negatively associated with performance, but not with freezing. These results suggest that conscious control is associated with freezing of mechanical degrees of freedom during motor learning.     

Conscious and unconscious processes: the effects of motivation

The process-dissociation procedure has been used in a variety of experimental contexts to assess the contributions of conscious and unconscious processes to task performance. To evaluate whether motivation affects estimates of conscious and unconscious processes, participants were given incentives to follow inclusion and exclusion instructions in a perception task and a memory task. Relative to a control condition in which no performance incentives were given, the results for the perception task indicated that incentives increased the participants' ability to exclude previously presented information, which in turn both increased the estimate of conscious processes and decreased the estimate of unconscious processes. However, the results also indicated that incentives did not influence estimates of conscious or unconscious processes in the memory task. The findings suggest that the process-dissociation procedure is relatively immune to influences of motivation when used with a memory task, but that caution should be exercised when the process-dissociation is used with a perception task.     

Mind and movement

Voluntary movements embrace both intentional, conscious and post-intentional, largely automatic processes. Here, we examine these types of processes and the relations between them during preparation and execution of voluntary movements. First, a general overview is given about how intentional and post-intentional components are interleaved to enable successful control of purposeful movements. Second, we briefly describe some post-intentional processes that are triggered by preceding intentions. Third, we discuss findings according to which such post-intentional processes or their results can become accessible to conscious awareness. Under such conditions, automatic and conscious processes can co-occur. We show that intentional interventions into post-intentional processes can be overridden by automatic processes, can interfere with automatic processes and can be independent so that their outcomes add to those of automatic processes.     

Performances of Faith: A Relation Between Conscious and Unconscious Organizations of Faith

Performances of faith are found in ordinary and extraordinary stories, behavior, and rituals, and they are inextricably yoked to unconscious and conscious processes and organizations of faith experience. This article explores the relation between unconscious and conscious processes and organizations of faith. The claim is that the unconscious system represents unformulated experiences of faith that are affectively and relationally organized. In human development these unconscious organizations of faith experience are partially transformed by a person's conscious and self-reflective use of symbols and language. At the same time, conscious and self-reflective organizations of faith, manifested in narratives, rituals, and use of other symbolic media, continue to be shaped by unconscious processes and unconscious configurations of faith. An appreciation of the dynamic interaction between unconscious and conscious processes and organizations of faith focuses one's attention to the complexity of human performances of faith in ministry.     

Process-dissociation procedure: a testable model for considering assumptions about the stochastic relation between consciously controlled and automatic processes

This paper presents an extension of the process-dissociation procedure with wordstem completion, which makes possible the measurement of the stochastic relationship between consciously controlled and automatic processes. By means of an indirect wordstem completion test, the conditional probabilities of conscious remembering with and without automatic processes can be successfully determined. A multinomial model for the evaluation of this extended process-dissociation procedure is presented. This model makes the distinction between voluntary and involuntary conscious memory processes possible and has been applied to two experiments discussed in this paper. The results show that the assumption of stochastic independence is often violated, albeit not as strongly as predicted by the redundancy or exclusivity model variants. Two conscious processes were found, voluntary and involuntary conscious memory processes, each with a different probability of occurrence.