The indexicality of ‘knowledge’

Epistemic contextualism—the view that the content of the predicate ‘know’ can change with the context of utterance—has fallen into considerable disrepute recently. Many theorists have raised doubts as to whether ‘know’ is context-sensitive, typically basing their arguments on data suggesting that ‘know’ behaves semantically and syntactically in a way quite different from recognised indexicals such as ‘I’ and ‘here’ or ‘flat’ and ‘empty’. This paper takes a closer look at three pertinent objections of this kind, viz. at what I call the Error-Theory Objection, the Gradability Objection and the Clarification-Technique Objection. The paper concludes that none of these objections can provide decisive evidence against contextualism.     

The Ingredients of Aristotle’s Theory of Fallacy

In chapter 8 of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle claims that his theory of fallacy is complete in the sense that there cannot be more fallacies than the ones he lists. In this article I try to explain how Aristotle could have justified this completeness claim by analysing how he conceptualizes fallacies (dialectical mistakes which do not appear so) and what conceptual ingredients play a role in his discussion of fallacies. If we take the format of dialectical discussions into account, we will see that there are only so many mistakes one can make which still do not appear to be mistakes. Aristotle’s actual list is almost identical to these apparent mistakes.     

The ‘Compositional Rigidity’ of Recognitionality

Abstract

Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ‘recognitional’ concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ‘inherited’ by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics on this issue has focused on his construal of compositionality, the critics in effect advocating a weaker conception than that assumed by Fodor. I argue that the critics' contention is under-motivated, and in the current context ad hoc. But there is something else wrong with Fodor's argument. He misidentifies the notion of recognitionality in which the empiricist should trade. A proper understanding of recognitionality allows us to disarm Fodor's argument without resolving the question about compositionality that divides Fodor and his critics. I end with two very general remarks. First a contention about the motivation for empiricist semantics, and second, a suggestion that my proposal about recognitionality may be extended to disarm a more familiar and influential type of concern about their viability.     

The Music of Dan’s Life

ABSTRACT

In a persistent quest for understanding of what animates life and produces human experience, Daniel Stern was able to put the unspeakable into words. Impregnated with the world of childhood, he described the Forms of Vitality, rendering as never before the ubiquity of the music of life that animates and underlies the unfolding of movement and action. This concept opens new horizons for many disciplines.

Examples will describe advances in neuroscience or for the diagnosis of autism, as well as the essential function of human relationships in early development.     

The ‘Constitutive Thought’ of Regret

In this paper I defend and develop Bernard Williams’ claim that the ‘constitutive thought’ of regret is ‘something like “how much better if it had been otherwise”’. An introductory section on cognitivist theories of emotion is followed by a detailed investigation of the concept of ‘agent-regret’ and of the ways in which the ‘constitutive thought’ might be articulated in different situations in which agents acknowledge casual responsibility for bringing about undesirable outcomes. Among problematic cases discussed are those in which agents have caused harm through no fault of their own, or have been constrained to choose the lesser of two evils or to act against their moral values. R. Jay Wallace’s ‘bourgeois predicament’ and related cases, in which we recognize that our present advantages have flowed from regrettable antecedents, further show that regret is often not a simple emotion, and it is argued that conflicted regrets are sometimes unavoidable. Finally, the paper looks at Descartes’ account of regret as a form of sadness engendered by the recollection of irrecoverable happy experiences, to which the ‘constitutive thought’ does not readily apply. It is suggested that what Descartes is discussing is a different genre of emotion for which ‘nostalgia’ might be a better name.     

The Italian school of ‘history of religions’

This study sets out to cast light on the most significant theoretical and methodological aspects of the Italian School of History of Religions, a school that owes its particular character to the cultural commitment of Raffaele Pettazzoni, Ernesto de Martino and Angelo Brelich. Since these scholars are not well known internationally, this article aims at providing some keys to their interpretation for the purpose of a wider circulation. The thought of Pettazzoni, de Martino and Brelich has not exhausted its potential and can make a far from negligible contribution to today's discussions on subjects such as the role of the history of religions in contemporary culture, the meaning of the secular approach to the religious phenomenon, and the search for new conceptions of the comparative method. The most pregnant image of the history of religions provided by an analysis of the works of these Italian scholars is that of a discipline committed to tackling the problems of our time.     

The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox

In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for what you should choose. Here we show that the conflicting recommendations assume different probabilistic structures relating your choice and the algorithm’s prediction. This resolves the paradox: the reason there appears to be two conflicting recommendations is that the probabilistic structure relating the problem’s random variables is open to two, conflicting interpretations. We then show that the accuracy of the prediction algorithm in Newcomb’s paradox, the focus of much previous work, is irrelevant. We end by showing that Newcomb’s paradox is time-reversal invariant; both the paradox and its resolution are unchanged if the algorithm makes its ‘prediction’ after you make your choice rather than before.     

The relativity of ‘absolute’ judgements

Suppose that, with rather few exceptions, the assignment of a number to a stimulus on one trial of a magnitude estimation or category judgement experiment serves as the point of reference for choosing an appropriate assignment on the next trial. This principle of relative judgement—relative to the immediate context—is developed to generate models for both magnitude estimation and category judgement experiments. It is applied, in particular, to the explanation of three, hitherto unrelated, phenomena: these are (a) the limited transmission of information in category judgements; (b) sequential constraints on the resolving power of category judgements; and (c) the autocorrelation of successive numerical magnitude estimates. Finally, some comparison is made between the principle of relative judgement introduced here and other contemporary ideas which have been addressed to one or more of these three critical phenomena.     

The logic of Simpson’s paradox

There are three distinct questions associated with Simpson’s paradox. (i) Why or in what sense is Simpson’s paradox a paradox? (ii) What is the proper analysis of the paradox? (iii) How one should proceed when confronted with a typical case of the paradox? We propose a “formal” answer to the first two questions which, among other things, includes deductive proofs for important theorems regarding Simpson’s paradox. Our account contrasts sharply with Pearl’s causal (and questionable) account of the first two questions. We argue that the “how to proceed question?” does not have a unique response, and that it depends on the context of the problem. We evaluate an objection to our account by comparing ours with Blyth’s account of the paradox. Our research on the paradox suggests that the “how to proceed question” needs to be divorced from what makes Simpson’s paradox “paradoxical.”     

The temporality of Merleau-Ponty’s intertwining

In his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explored the fact that we believe that perception occurs in our heads (“in the recesses of a body”) and, hence, assert that the perceptual world is “in” us, while also believing that we are “in” the world we perceive.  In this article, I examine how this intertwining of self and world justifies the faith we have in perception. I shall do so by considering a number of examples.  In each case, the object “in itself” will turn out to be neither within us nor outside of us, but rather at the intersection set by the intertwining. I will then turn to what this disclosure of this object reveals about human temporality and, indeed, about human being as a place (or “clearing”) that permits disclosure.     

The assessment of incarcerated sexual delinquents’ risk of recidivism

IntroductionThe present study examined the possibility of assessing the risk of sexual recidivism on the basis of static and dynamic factors.ObjectiveA comparison was carried out of detainees on the basis of their scores on a predictive scale of risk of recidivism, on their empathy towards the victim, on their attributive style, and on their self-esteem.MethodThree samples of detainees were compared: two samples of individuals guilty of sexual crime (one sample having committed the aggression towards adults, the second towards children under fifteen years of age) and a control group composed of non-sexual delinquents.ResultsResults showed that sexual offenders targeting children had a lower risk of recidivism than sexual offenders of adults. However, when considering only the recidivists, no difference was found in risk between the two populations.ConclusionIn conclusion, some of the dynamic factors that were analyzed could be retained to complete the static factors in predictive scales of risk of recidivism.     

The Two-Sense Reading of Spinoza’s definition of attribute

Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ (E1d4) has been described as ‘one of the most puzzling passages in the Ethics’ and ‘a longstanding worry’ for Spinoza interpreters. Its puzzling status stems from (a) its apparent ‘subjectivist’ character and (b) the dominant understanding of Spinoza’s notion of attribute as an ‘objectivist’ notion. The paper aspires to remove this puzzlement by proposing and defending a reading of E1d4 in which it is understood to have two senses. First, I defend the objectivist character of Spinoza’s notion of attribute, and explain why E1d4 is problematic within the framework of an objectivist interpretation of the Spinozistic attribute. Second, I propose a reading of E1d4 as having two senses and explain the cause of an apparent contradiction in E1d4. Finally, I devote the largest part of the paper to a defence of the Two-Sense Reading of E1d4. More specifically, I draw on four sources for this defence: (a) the structure of E1d1 and E1d3, (b) the content and form of E1p4 and its demonstration, (c) Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism and (d) Descartes’ treatment of attribute and its influence on Spinoza.     

The psychological side of Hempel’s paradox of confirmation

People often test hypotheses about two variables (X andY), each with two levels (e.g.,X1 andX2). When testing “IfX1, thenY1,” observing the conjunction ofX1 andY1 is overwhelmingly perceived as more supportive than observing the conjunction ofX2 andY2, although both observations support the hypothesis. Normatively, theX2&Y2 observation provides stronger support than theX1&Y1 observation if the former is rarer. Because participants in laboratory settings typically test hypotheses they are unfamiliar with, previous research has not examined whether participants are sensitive to the rarity of observations. The experiment reported here showed that participants were sensitive to rarity, even judging a rareX2&Y2 observation more supportive than a commonX1&Y1 observation under certain conditions. Furthermore, participants’ default strategy of judgingX1&Y1 observations more informative might be generally adaptive because hypotheses usually regard rare events.     

The Determinants of Happiness of China’s Elderly Population

“Three generations under one roof” is an old Chinese saying used to describe a desired living arrangement. The traditional concept of happiness for a Chinese elderly person is being able to “play with grandchildren with candy in mouth, enjoy life with no cares.” In a fast-changing economy like China, how does society, especially the elderly themselves, view these traditional values? Using the 2005 Chinese General Social Survey, we study the determinants of happiness of the Chinese elderly. We are particularly interested in whether living with their child and whether living with their grandchild affect the happiness of the elderly. An important empirical concern is that unobserved permanent income may affect both the living arrangements of the elderly and their level of happiness. We include property ownership variables as proxies and also adopt an instrument variable approach to identify the causal relationship between the elderly’s happiness and their living arrangements. We find that, conditional on living with a grandchild, living with one’s child has a negative effect on the elderly’s happiness. Furthermore, elderly Chinese who live with grandchildren are associated with a much higher degree of happiness than their counterparts.     

The Politics of Language: A Discussion of Andrew Samuels’s “The ‘Activist Client’”

This commentary offers three suggestions or potential additions to Samuels’s fine and important article “The ‘Activist Client’” (this issue). First, it is suggested that hermeneutic theory would set a solid philosophical foundation for his political project, a foundation that could add to the article’s persuasiveness and assist the ability of others to apply his perspective to their own therapeutic practices. Two, certain linguistic terms Samuels uses are discussed as counterproductive to his goals, and alternative terms are suggested. Finally, Gadamer’s argument against the concept of empathy is offered as a supplement to Samuels’s intriguing use of Brecht’s approach.     

The Environment of Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary

The author evokes the tragic death of Ferenczi’s colleague and analysand Dr. Elisabeth Radó-Révész in 1923. She died of pernicious anemia, the same illness that ended the life of Ferenczi 10 years later, at age 59. Can this be a tragic coincidence? Following notes in Ferenczi’s Clinical Diary, the author considers the deep disappointments both Ferenczi and Radó-Révész had experienced and explores some of the Tragic Man qualities of Ferenczi.