Backward crosstalk effects in psychological refractory period paradigms: effects of second-task response types on first-task response latencies

Three experiments using psychological refractory period (PRP) tasks documented backward crosstalk effects in which the nature of the second-task response influenced the first-task response latencies. Such effects are difficult to explain within currently popular bottleneck models, according to which second-task response selection does not begin until first-task response selection has finished. In Experiments 1 and 2, the first of the PRP tasks required a choice reaction time (RT) response, whereas the second task required a go/no-go decision. Task 1 responses were faster when the second task required a go response than when it required a no-go response. Experiment 3 showed that Task 1 RTs were also influenced by the complexity of second-task responses. These backward crosstalk effects indicate that significant second-task processing is carried out in time to influence first-task responses and thus challenge strictly serial bottleneck models.     

Resources and alternatives in coalition formation: The effects on payoff,self‐serving behaviour,and bargaining length

A consistent finding in coalition research is that the payoff of coalition members is related to (a) the resources they contribute to the coalition, and to (b) the number of alternative coalitions they can form. These two factors are, however, often intertwined. A greater number of resources tends to go hand in hand with a greater number of alternatives, leaving unanswered how both factors affect coalition behaviour. This paper attempts to clarify the interplay of resources and alternatives by disentangling the two in a newly developed coalition paradigm. Results indicated that participants base their payoff allocation on both resources and alternatives, but suggest that self‐serving behaviour is more related to alternatives. Furthermore, resources and alternatives had a distinct effect on the bargaining process. It was shown that differences in alternatives led to longer bargaining. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taking Egoism Seriously

Though utilitarianism is far from being universally accepted in the philosophical community, it is taken seriously and treated respectfully. Its critics do not dismiss it out of hand; they do not misrepresent it; they do not belittle or disparage its proponents. They allow the theory to be articulated, developed, and defended from criticism, even if they go on to reject the modified versions. Ethical egoism, a longstanding rival of utilitarianism, is treated very differently. It is said to be “refuted” by arguments of a sort that apply equally well to utilitarianism. It is said to be “unprovable,” when many of the greatest utilitarians themselves, such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), and Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900), admitted that no normative ethical theory, including their own, is provable. Critics of ethical egoism seldom discuss the various theoretical moves that utilitarians are routinely allowed to make, such as (1) fighting the facts, (2) transforming the theory from “act utilitarianism” to “rule utilitarianism,” and (3) biting the bullet. This essay argues that every defensive move made by utilitarians can be made, with equal vigor (if not also plausibility), by ethical egoists. The conclusion is that ethical egoism deserves to be taken more seriously than it is.     

Transformations of visual memory induced by implied motions of pattern elements

Four experiments measured distortions in short-term visual memory induced by displays depicting independent translations of the elements of a pattern. In each experiment, observers saw a sequence of 4 dot patterns and were instructed to remember the third pattern and to compare it with the fourth. The first three patterns depicted translations of the dots in consistent, but separate directions. Error rates and reaction times for rejecting the fourth pattern as different from the third were substantially higher when the dots in that pattern were displaced slightly forward, in the same directions as the implied motions, compared with when the dots were displaced in the opposite, backward directions. These effects showed little variation across interstimulus intervals ranging from 250 to 2,000 ms, and did not depend on whether the displays gave rise to visual apparent motion. However, they were eliminated when the dots in the fourth pattern were displaced by larger amounts in each direction, corresponding to the dot positions in the next and previous patterns in the same inducing sequence. These findings extend our initial report of the phenomenon of "representational momentum" (Freyd & Finke, 1984a), and help to rule out alternatives to the proposal that visual memories tend to undergo, at least to some extent, the transformations implied by a prior sequence of observed events.     

Libet's temporal anomalies: a reassessment of the data

Benjamin Libet compared the perceived time of direct brain stimulation to the perceived time of skin stimulation. His results are among the most controversial experiments at the interface between psychology and philosophy. The new element that I bring to this discussion is a reanalysis of Libet's raw data. Libet's original data were difficult to interpret because of the manner in which they were presented in tables. Plotting the data as psychometric functions shows that the observers have great uncertainty about the relative timing of events, as seen the shallow psychometric slopes. A second indication of uncertainty comes from Libet's use of three response categories, A first; B first; and A and B simultaneous. The large number of "perceptually simultaneous" responses provides a further measure of the difficulty of the judgment. There are thus a very broad range of stimulus delays in which the subject is unable to make an accurate ordering response. These points provide evidence that there is no compelling reason to invent exotic or ad hoc mechanisms to account for Libet's data since the uncertainty window is large enough to allow simple mechanism such as memory shifts. Libet argued that his data provide evidence for a backward referral in time. I argue that even though Libet's own data are weak, there are good arguments for a backward referral mechanism to help the subject make sense out of the tangled chaos of asynchronous information associated with experienced events.     

Sequential search by groups with rank-dependent payoffs: An experimental study

In many sequential search situations, decisions are reached by groups. We examine behavior in such situations experimentally using an extension of the “secretary problem”. In our setup, group members (players) with non-aligned preferences inspect alternatives or “applicants” one at a time with no backward solicitation. A minimal information structure is assumed where players are only informed of the relative ranks of the alternatives as they inspect them sequentially. We present the equilibrium solution, and then use it as a benchmark for our analysis. We report the results from a controlled experiment showing that subjects over-searched relative to equilibrium. Decisions were affected by theoretically irrelevant observations including the relative rank of the previous alternative and the other player’s relative rank of the current alternative. For managers engaged in committee sequential search tasks, our findings highlight the importance of being aware to reach compromises early on, among other implications.     

Overdetermination and Elimination

Abstract

I focus on two arguments, due to Jaegwon Kim and Trenton Merricks, that move from claims about the sufficiency of one class of causes to the reduction or elimination of another class of entity, via claims about overdetermination. I argue that in order to validate their move from sufficiency to reduction or elimination, both Kim and Merricks must assume that there can be no ‘weak overdetermination’; i.e., that no single effect can have numerically distinct but dependently sufficient causes occurring at the same time. One problem for both arguments is that weak overdetermination isn't obviously objectionable. That point has been well made before. But I want here to go further than merely shifting the burden of proof onto the advocates of overdetermination arguments. I want to tease out why they are so convinced that we must resist weak overdetermination and explain why their conviction is misguided. Both Merricks and Kim, I shall argue, ultimately rest their case on the same motivating principle, which I call the principle of additional causal powers. This principle, I argue further, should be rejected. It lacks argumentative support, and it begs the question against those at whom the arguments are directed.     

Spinoza and the problem of other substances

Most of Spinoza’s arguments for God’s existence do not rely on any special feature of God, but instead on merely general features of substance. This raises the following worry: those arguments prove the existence of non-divine substances just as much as they prove God’s existence, and yet there is not enough room in Spinoza’s system for all these substances. I argue that Spinoza attempts to solve this problem by using a principle of plenitude to rule out the existence of other substances and that the principle cannot be derived from the PSR, as many claim.

Abbreviation: PSR: Principle of Sufficient Reason     

Time,tense and special relativity

In this essay I address the issue of whether Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity counts against a tensed or “A-series” understanding of time. Though this debate is an old one, it continues to be lively with many prominent authors recently arguing that a genuine A-series is compatible with a relativistic world view. My aim in what follows is to outline why Special Relativity is thought to count against a tensed understanding of time and then to address the philosophical attempts to reconcile the two theories. I conclude that while modern physics on its own does not rule out the possibility of a real A-series, the combination of Einstein's theory and the philosophical arguments against tense is decisive. The upshot is that the tenseless or “B-series” view of time is the best one.     

MORALITY AND POLITICS IN THE WORK OF MICHAEL WYSCHOGROD

Michael Wyschogrod claims that his arguments proceed from his biblical faith. But many of the (commendable) things that he has to say about politics and morality seem to derive from an autonomous ethics. I give five examples of arguments that cannot, in my reading of them, be drawn out of the relevant (but not definitive) biblical texts. Either the texts don't support the arguments at all, or they require interpretation, or some texts must be chosen above others if the arguments are to stand. Faith in the texts cannot by itself sustain the arguments that Wyschogrod wants to make.     

Is open-mindedness truth-conducive?

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives.

     

What a person thinks upon learning he has chosen differently from others: Nice evidence for the persuasive-arguments explanation of choice shifts

Small shifts in choice occur even without discussion, when individuals merely know each other's preference. This appears to support an interpersonal comparison explanation of group induced shifts in choice and to refute explanations based on persuasive argumentation. The present study demonstrates the contrary, that such effects are consistent with the persuasive-arguments formulation and are obtained under particular conditions specified only by the latter theory, to wit: Knowledge of other's choices is assumed to lead a person to think of reasons (arguments) others might have had for their choices-reasons which ordinarily would not come to mind without this knowledge. Such reasoning functions in the same way as persuasive argumentation during group discussion; it causes the person to persuade himself that an alternative course of action now has greater merit than the one he initially preferred. To test this analysis, an experiment was performed in which subjects responded to choice-dilemma items under three different conditions: Following their own choice (I) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in that same item; (II) they learned what several others had chosen and then wrote arguments in support of alternatives given in a different item; and (III) they received no information about others' choices but merely wrote arguments on that item. As predicted, shifts in choice occurred only if the person knew what others chose and had an opportunity to think about the latter (condition I); they did not occur if an opportunity to think of others' choices was denied (condition II), nor if knowledge of others' choices was withheld (condition III). Content analysis of the arguments subjects produced in conditions I and II completely supported the hypothesis, as did analyses of responses to postexperimental questionnaire which directly asked the subjects about their feelings and thoughts upon learning what others had chosen.     

Against the New Evidentialists

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don't claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it.     

Influence of neighborhood size and exposure duration on visual-word recognition: evidence with the yes/no and the go/no-go lexical decision tasks

We present two experiments in which we measured lexical decision latencies and errors to words with few or many orthographic neighbors (ie., Coltheart's N). The main goal of the study was to examine whether or not the neighborhood size effect in a lexical decision task could be affected by the exposure duration of the stimulus item (unlimited vs. limited time exposure, 150 msec plus a backward mask) and the type of decision involved in the task (yes/no vs. go/no-go lexical decision tasks). In the yes/no task, the results showed a facilitative neighborhood size effect for low frequency that did not interact with exposure duration (Experiment 1). In contrast, in the go/no-go task (in this task, participants are instructed to respond as quickly as they can when a word is presented and not to respond if a nonword is presented), the neighborhood size effect for low-frequency words (and for nonwords) was greater under limited viewing time (Experiment 2). In addition, the word frequency effect was greater in the go/no-go task than in the yes/no task, replicating Hino and Lupker (1998, 2000). The results were interpreted in terms of the interaction of decision and lexical factors in visual-word recognition.     

Decisions among time saving options: when intuition is strong and wrong

When people judge the time that can be saved by increasing the speed of an activity, they are often victims of a time saving bias. That is, they overestimate the time that can be saved by increasing the speed. Judgments of time savings following speed increase when driving follow the Proportion heuristic [Svenson, O. (1970). A functional measurement approach to intuitive estimation as exemplified by estimated time savings. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 204-210]. In a choice between time saving options, this heuristic simplifies to the Ratio rule. The first study tested this rule and found that the Ratio rule predicted incorrect decisions when planning to save traveling time in road traffic. The second study showed that the time saving bias was also present in planning of health care; to specify, in decisions about which one of two clinics to reorganize to save more of the doctors' time for personal contacts with patients. To further test the Ratio rule, Study 3 used a matching procedure in which two decision alternatives were made equal by the participants. The results supported the Ratio rule. Practical implications of the results are discussed including the Planning fallacy. In conclusion, the present set of studies have illustrated a time saving bias and provided evidence explaining why people make systematic errors when judging and deciding about time saved following a speed increase.     

Ideology,Doping and the Spirit of Sport

The current World Anti-doping Code can be characterised as a tough approach to doping. In this paper we investigate how the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) justifies this tough approach. To this end, WADA advances two justificatory arguments. It maintains, first, that protection of the spirit of sport warrants tough measures and, second, that athletes have voluntarily consented to the Code. We argue that in the way they are presented by WADA, neither of these arguments can withstand scrutiny. In the second part of the paper, we go on to show that these arguments are in fact ideological in nature. The specific aim of these arguments is not to be correct, but rather to distort social reality, because in this way they can be used to ward off any critical discussion of the Code. We conclude that WADA’s interest is to create a façade of justice, not in serving justice itself.     

Control of stimulus-response translation in dual-task performance

In contradiction to stimulus-response- (S-R-) translation bottleneck models of dual-task control, stimulus processing in a primary task is affected by its compatibility with the response in a secondary, later performed task (Hommel, 1998a)- an indication of parallel S-R translation. Here we show that this backward-compatibility effect is independent of working-memory load, whether this is induced by an extra memory task (Experiment 1) or by increasing the number of S-R alternatives in the primary task (Experiment 2). However, backward effects occur even when the secondary task is no longer carried out (Experiment 3) and they are strongly affected by the inconsistency of previously used S-R mappings (Experiment 4). These findings suggest that S-R translation is (or can be) capacity-independent and automatic even under multiple-task conditions, and that it is mediated by direct S-R associations that emerge after only little practice.     

Qualia Compression

Color qualia inversion scenarios have played a key role in various philosophical debates. Most notably perhaps, they have figured in skeptical arguments for the fundamental unknowability of other persons’ color experiences. For these arguments to succeed, it must be assumed that a person's having inverted color qualia may go forever unnoticed. This assumption is now generally deemed to be implausible. The present paper defines a variant of color qualia inversion—termed ‘‘color qualia compression’’—and argues that the possibility of undetectable color qualia compression is immune to the objections that have been levelled against color qualia inversion arguments, and that color qualia compression scenarios support full‐blown skepticism regarding other people's color experiences.     

Humility and constraints on <Emphasis Type="Italic">O</Emphasis>-language

In “Ramseyan Humility,” David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since they rely on a highly implausible assumption about the expressive power of our language.     

Realism and the underdetermination of theory

The main theme is that theorizing serves empirical prediction. This is used as the core of a counter to contemporary anti-realist arguments. Different versions of the thesis that data underdetermines theory are identified and it is shown that none which are acceptable differentiates between theory selection and prediction. Criteria sufficient for the former are included amongst those necessary for the latter; and obviously go beyond mere compatibility with data.Special attention is given to causal process theories. It is argued that the only empirically equivalent alternatives which can be constructed to any theory of this kind must be parasitic on that theory; so a choice for the original theory can not be avoided. Once this is established, a positive case for taking a realist position can be developed.