Putting the Mystical Mind Together

This article reviews and responds to various issues that have been raised in critical analysis of our work studying the relationship between religion and the brain. An adequate response necessitates a discussion about the origins of this research, the potential pitfalls of doing empirical research in this field, and the complex requirements of interpreting the implications of such an approach. Through inquiry such as this, the study of the brain and its relation to religion and religious experience will continue to advance and uncover the many fascinating questions that await.     

The "Humpty Dumpty Problem" in the Study of Early Cognitive Development: Putting the Infant Back Together Again

ABSTRACT— In this article, I propose that the big question for the field of infant cognitive development is best characterized as the "Humpty Dumpty problem": Now that we have studied cognitive abilities in isolation, how do we put the developing cognitive system (and the infant) back together again? This problem is significant because cognitive abilities do not occur in isolation. Infants remember the items they have attended to and perceived, and their emotional state will influence their perception and representation of the events they encounter. Moreover, by examining the development of the whole cognitive system, or the whole child, we gain a deeper understanding of mechanisms developmental change. Thus, the big question for the study of infant cognition is like the question confronting all the king's horses and all the king's men: How do we put the infant's cognitive system back together again?     

Discussion: Putting our Heads Together; Mentalizing Systems

This discussion reviews the psychoanalytic and developmental psychological theories that utilize nonlinear dynamic systems theory to situate Sperry's paper in its theoretical and historical context. The power of such nonlinear models for clinical work and theories of mind is argued. The essay then argues that the shift in theory entails a shift in ways of clinical writing and that the clinical discussion in the paper does not always feel consonant with the theory. Moving to a model of nonlinearity, intersubjectivity, and uncertainty is likely to entail shifts in conceptualizing and conveying clinical material.     

From Universe to Multiverses—and Back Again

A number of concepts and ideas from constructivist and second-order cybernetic family therapy literature are presented and their implications for therapy are examined. I was inspired by and, in this article, refer to videotapes of consultations and therapy sessions shown at an international conference on constructivism and family therapy in Sulitjelma, Norway, June 1988, and to written material from the Tromsø group Andersen and Anna M. Flå), the Milan team (Luigi Boscolo and Gianfranco Cecchin), and the Galveston team (Harlene Anderson and Harold Goolishian). The article also represents an attempt to use constructivist concepts and ideas in a reflection on the author's own professional development as a psychologist and family therapist.     

From Contracts to Capabilities and Back Again

It has been common for researchers and commentators within the discipline of Social and Public Policy to evoke Rawlsian theories of justice. Yet some now argue that the contractualist tradition cannot adequately incorporate, or account for, relations of care, respect and interdependency. Though contractualism has its flaws this article proposes that we should not reject it. Through a critique of one of its most esteemed critics, Martha Nussbaum, it proposes that contractualism can be defended against the capabilities approach she prefers. The article concludes by suggesting how and why the moral philosophy of Thomas Scanlon offers a basis for reconciling the strengths of a contractualist, egalitarian liberalism with those of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.

Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together

Though physicalism remains the most popular position in the metaphysics of mind today, there is still considerable debate over how to retain a plausible account of mental concepts consistently with a physicalistic world view. Philip Goff (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2), 191–209, 2011) has recently argued that physicalism cannot give a plausible account of our phenomenal concepts, and that as such, physicalism should be rejected. In this paper I hope to do three things, firstly I shall use some considerations from ontology to rebut Goff’s argument and consider some objections and replies. Secondly, I shall outline a version of a posteriori physicalism about phenomenal consciousness which draws on this particular ontology. Thirdly, I shall give support to this version of physicalism by arguing that it marries well with prominent theories in cognitive science, and has important advantages over other versions of a posteriori physicalism.     

Externalism and Token‐Identity

This study has two goals. The first is to identify three desiderata required for a successful defense of a version of nonreductive physicalism: semantic externalism, token‐identity between mental and physical events, and nonrelational type‐individuation of physical states. In this context, the paper also presents a refutation of recent challenges to content‐externalism by those who attempt to resuscitate internalism by focusing on narrow content associated with the fundamental phenomenology, rather than the intentionality, of mental states. The second goal is to defend the token‐identity thesis from Tyler Burge's argument to the effect that token‐identity is incompatible with semantic externalism. An account is also offered as to why Burge's argument, albeit fallacious, might seem persuasive under a certain interpretation of possible worlds.