Is behaviorism false because there is no such thing as conditioning? Popper and skinner on learning

Sir Karl Popper has claimed that behaviorism is misguided because it holds that conditioning occurs through repetition. According to Popper, there is no such thing as learning through repetition. To the limited extent that philosophers of science have concerned themselves with behaviorism, this attack is one of the most direct and unique in that the battleground is not over the value of mentalism/cognitivism but a bold claim that conditioning—the heart and soul of behaviorism—is fictitious. This paper examines the soundness of Popper's argument against behaviorism by examining whether operant and classical conditioning rely on learning through repetition and suffer from other problems Popper attributes to the notion of conditioning. Although Popper correctly attributes certain properties to classical conditioning, he fails to undermine the empirical evidence that such conditioning occurs. Second, we claim that although B. F. Skinner is never entirely clear, operant conditioning does not rely on repetition nor does it suffer from the other problems Popper attributes to conditioning. Thus, Popper's argument also fails because of his assumption that all conditioning is classical conditioning and therefore his misattributing properties of classical conditioning to operant conditioning. We conjecture that the earlier polemics of John Watson and Watson's sole reliance on classical conditioning probably contributed to Popper's confusion on this point.     

Commentary on “six domains of research ethics”

This commentary on K.D. Pimple’s “Six Domains of Research Ethics”, focuses on the area of institutional integrity and looks at “relationships between researchers, their sponsoring institutions, funding agencies, and the government,” considering the implications of institutional demands and support for research, and, in turn, demands and support on research priorities and public education.     

A Functional Analysis of “Aesthetic”: A Commentary on Mechner

The Psychological Record - In his target article, Mechner provides a bio-behavioral analysis of effects called “aesthetic.” He then examines hundreds of such effects across a wide range...     

Commentary on “Life as a Pregnant Genetic Counselor”

The genetic counseling role is complex. There are frequently challenges raised for the genetic counselor both personally with the client and through factors external to the genetic counselor such as the clinical setting. The pregnant genetic counselor working in a prenantal diagnosis center may be confronted by her own countertransference towards the client or by the client’s tranference. The processes of transference and countrtransference need to be clearly understood, identified and dealt with in a sensitive self aware manner to facilitate the role of communicating empathically and giving genetic information to facilitate informed client decision making. Regular professional supervision and debriefing for the genetic counselor are essential to develop professional boundaries and to develop self awareness.     

Being “Done For” in Analysis: Commentary on Paper by Stuart A. Pizer

Stuart A. Pizer's fascinating article explores through a relational lens analytic impasse, and its manifestation through transference and countertransference love. How this love is demonstrated (or not) and the ways in which we provide for our patients will have profound effect on the process (and progress) of any treatment. But, too often, reluctance to “do for” our patients compromises our ability to provide what may be needed in any given moment. Perhaps an expansion of the “doer—done to” dyadic paradigm into a “doer—done for” model might allow more analytic leeway and more possibility of growth within our patients.     

“Plausible insofar as it is intelligible”: Quine on underdetermination

Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis within Quine’s philosophy, and (v) it does not carry with it the anti-realistic consequences often associated with the thesis in recent debates. The paper analyzes Quine’s views on the matter and the changes they underwent over the years. A conjecture is put forth about why Quine’s thesis has been so widely misrepresented: Quine’s writings up to 1975 tackled primarily the formulation and justification of the thesis, but afterwards were concerned mostly with the question whether empirically equivalent rivals to the theory we hold are to be considered true also. When this latter discussion is read without bearing in mind Quine’s earlier formulation and justification of the thesis, his thesis seems to have stronger epistemic consequences than it actually does. A careful reading of his later writings shows, however, that the formulation of the thesis remained unchanged after 1975, and that his mature and considered views supported only a very mitigated version of the thesis.     

Beyond the “Delivery Problem”: Why There is “No Such Thing as a Language”

In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “delivery problem”.