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1.
Richard Woodward 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):273-288
Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other
than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of
a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen
objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions
that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism
is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing
her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic
contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and
argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.
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Richard WoodwardEmail: |
2.
Chris Calvert-Minor 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):67-86
Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively
pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application
of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their
responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used
abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, whereas the abductive argument is “inflationary”
because it reaches beyond the limits of evidence for its realist conclusion. To illustrate the problems of the abductive argument
and motivate my Davidsonian approach, I take a brief look at the abductive argument for realism in Frederick Will’s work.
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Chris Calvert-MinorEmail: |
3.
Towfic Shomar 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(2):321-349
There is confusion among scholars of Bohr as to whether he should be categorized as an instrumentalist (see Faye 1991) or a realist (see Folse 1985). I argue that Bohr is a realist, and that the confusion is due to the fact that he holds a very special view of realism,
which did not coincide with the philosophers’ views. His approach was sometimes labelled instrumentalist and other times realist,
because he was an instrumentalist on the theoretical level, but a realist on the level of models. Such a realist position
is what I call phenomenological realism. In this paper, and by taking Bohr’s debate with Einstein as a paradigm, I try to
prove that Bohr was such a realist.
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Towfic ShomarEmail: |
4.
Jeffrey Dunn 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):367-393
Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem
of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does
not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.
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Jeffrey DunnEmail: |
5.
Yurevich A 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2007,41(1):21-27
The author presents several arguments against Toomela’s (Culture of science: Strange history of the methodological thinking
in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007a, doi:, History of methodology in psychology: Starting point, not the goal. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007b, doi:) pessimistic thesis: “The last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray.” Nevertheless he admits that
Toomela’s article despite the excessively categorical assessments contained in it and the undue pessimism crowing its conclusion,
represents a substantial contribution to the highlighting of socio-cultural impact on various models of psychological cognition,
which lurks behind the international unification of globalizing science.
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Andrey YurevichEmail: |
6.
Valeriano Iranzo 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2008,39(1):115-120
According to the “no-miracles argument” (NMA), truth is the best explanation of the predictive-instrumental success of scientific
theories. A standard objection against NMA is that it is viciously circular. In Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth Stathis Psillos has claimed that the circularity objection can be met when NMA is supplemented with a reliabilist approach
to justification. I will try to show, however, that scientific realists cannot take much comfort from this policy: if reliabilism
makes no qualifications about the domain where inference to the best explanation is reliable, scientific realists flagrantly
beg the question. A qualified version of reliabilism, on the other side, does not entitle us to infer the realist conclusion.
I conclude, then, that Psillos’s proposal does not make any significant progress for scientific realism.
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Valeriano IranzoEmail: |
7.
Patricia Sheridan 《Sophia》2007,46(3):263-275
Hutcheson’s theory of morality shares far more common ground with Clarke’s morality than is generally acknowledged. In fact,
Hutcheson’s own view of his innovations in moral theory suggest that he understood moral sense theory more as an elaboration
and partial correction to Clarkean fitness theory than as an outright rejection of it. My aim in this paper will be to illuminate
what I take to be Hutcheson’s grounds for adopting this attitude toward Clarkean fitness theory. In so doing, I hope to bring
to light an otherwise unexpected continuity between moral sense theory and the moral rationalism to which it is usually opposed,
and, in so doing, draw attention to the anti-sceptical realism that lies at the heart of both accounts.
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Patricia SheridanEmail: |
8.
The 23-item Meaningful Life Measure (Morgan and Farsides 2008) comprises five subscales, each designed to assess a distinct component of personal meaning: purposeful life; valued life;
accomplished life; principled life; and exciting life. In addition to providing a comprehensive composite meaning measure,
this instrument presents the possibility of measuring these components separately in future research applications. To demonstrate
the utility of their separate measurement, the present study therefore aimed to show differential patterns of correlation
between these five subscales and meaning correlates identified in the literature. The MLM’s factor structure and internal
reliability were replicated on the present sample. Evidence was then provided for the MLM’s convergent validity, and it was
demonstrated that its five subscales were indeed differently predicted by the meaning correlates from the literature. Findings
attest to the practical utility of a five-factor conceptualisation of meaning in life. In addition to identifying people who
score low and high on different factors of meaning in life, the MLM facilitates the further investigation of specific antecedents and consequences of different meaning components.
相似文献
Jessica MorganEmail: |
9.
Ben Saunders 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):279-290
The three most common responses to Taurek’s ‘numbers problem’ are saving the greater number, equal chance lotteries and weighted
lotteries. Weighted lotteries have perhaps received the least support, having been criticized by Scanlon What We Owe to Each
Other (1998) and Hirose ‘Fairness in Life and Death Cases’ (2007). This article considers these objections in turn, and argues that they do not succeed in refuting the fairness of a weighted
lottery, which remains a potential solution to cases of conflict. Moreover, it shows how these responses actually lead to
a new argument for weighted lotteries, appealing to fairness and Pareto-optimality.
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Ben SaundersEmail: |
10.
Mother,Melancholia, and Art in Erik H. Erikson’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Toys and Reasons</Emphasis> 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2007,46(3):369-383
In three earlier articles (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), I focused on the theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, and suggested that the melancholic self may
experience humor, play, and dreams as restorative resources. In this article, I want to make a similar case, based on Erik
H. Erikson’s Toys and Reasons (1977), for art (in this particular case, a painting of the Annunciation). I have made a similar case for the restorative role of art in articles on Leonard da Vinci’s Mona Lisa (Capps, Pastoral Psychology, 53, 107–137, 2004) and James McNeill Whistler’s painting of his mother (Capps, Pastoral Psychology, 2007d). In the present article, however, I focus on the special biographical circumstances in Erikson’s own development of a melancholy
self and the painting he discusses in Toys and Reasons, thereby suggesting that individuals may find a particular work of art especially relevant to their own experience of melancholy.
I conclude with Erikson’s testimonial at the memorial service of a colleague and friend who translated her own melancholy
into her service to others.
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Donald CappsEmail: |
11.
Donald Capps 《Journal of religion and health》2007,46(4):591-606
In an earlier article on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (Capps, 2007), I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict with maternal authority, and drew attention
to the restorative role of humor. In this article, I discuss two of the three chapters in part three, “The Growth of the Ego,”
of Erikson’s first major book, Childhood and Society [Erikson, Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1950, Childhood and society (rev. edition). New York: W. W. Norton, 1963]. I explore the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of play.
I interpret the differences between the two cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” [Freud, Mourning
and melancholia. In S. Freud, General psychological theory (pp. 164–179). P. Rieff (ed.). New York: Collier Books. 1963].
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Donald CappsEmail: |
12.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(2):229-246
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional
fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on
a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be
abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed
in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof
invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
13.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |
14.
K. Brad Wray 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):81-89
I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation.
Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world,
the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue
that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.
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K. Brad WrayEmail: |
15.
Ira Kiourti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):343-352
In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers
are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to
do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin.
I argue that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis
fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b)
(together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities.
I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on
autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori.
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Ira KiourtiEmail: |
16.
Graham Harman 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(3):367-383
Manuel DeLanda is one of the few admitted realists in present-day continental philosophy, a position he claims to draw from Deleuze. DeLanda conceives of the world as made
up of countless layers of assemblages, irreducible to their parts and never dissolved into larger organic wholes. This article supports DeLanda’s position as a
refreshing new model for continental thought. It also criticizes his movement away from singular individuals toward disembodied
attractors and topological structures lying outside all specific beings. While endorsing DeLanda’s realism, I reject his shift
from the actual to the virtual.
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Graham HarmanEmail: |
17.
Mark Allen Peterson 《Contemporary Islam》2007,1(3):247-264
The American press began to take notice of the Danish cartoons after they began to circulate outside of Europe. The press
primarily framed the events as a single problem of global interaction: an issue of ‘freedom of speech’ opposed to ‘religious
sensitivity.’ Much of the coverage permitted, within limits, a plurality of voices. Drawing on a case study of stories about
the ‘cartoon controversy’ in the Boston Globe, I argue that U.S. journalism is organized by a logic of objectivity that seeks to produce a ‘perspectiveless perspective
on all perspectives’ (Bourdieu, On television. New York: The New Press, 1998), showing voices on ‘both sides,’ simultaneously masked and contributed to the press’s reifying a series of events into a
single global ‘event,’ one that reflected a clash of Western and Islamic values.
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Mark Allen PetersonEmail: |
18.
Rebecca Roman Hanrahan 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):281-306
David Chalmers supports his contention that there is a possible world populated by our zombie twins by arguing for the assumption
that conceivability entails possibility. But, I argue, the modal epistemology he sets forth, ‘modal rationalism,’ ignores
the problem of incompleteness and relies on an idealized notion of conceivability. As a consequence, this epistemology can’t
justify our quotidian judgments of possibility, let alone those judgments that concern the mind/body connection. Working from
the analogy that the imagination is to the possible as perception is to the actual, I set forth a competing epistemology,
‘modal empiricism.’ This epistemology survives the incompleteness objection and allows some of our everyday modal judgments
to be justified. But this epistemology can’t justify the claim that Zombie World is possible, which leaves Chalmers’s property
dualism without the support it needs.
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Rebecca Roman HanrahanEmail: |
19.
Three experiments re-investigated selective attention in the ‘ring-cueing’ paradigm of Egly and Homa (J Exp Psychol: Human
Percept Perform 10:778–793, 1984). Observers were cued to attend to one of three concentric rings of radius 1°, 2°, or 3°, and their signal detection accuracy
for cued and uncued rings was measured. Experiment 1, which used a central color cue to indicate a like-colored ring, replicated
ring-cueing effects along the lines of Egly and Homa. Experiments 2 and 3 examined whether these effects were produced by
observers exploiting secondary-depth cues possibly inherent in the display layout. With color cues, the availability of secondary-depth
information had no influence on the ring-cueing effects. However, making the rings monochrome and using central size cues
significantly reduced the ring-cueing effects when the depth information was disrupted. The results suggest that selection
was object-based, operating on a spatial ‘grouped-array’ representation of the cued ring made salient by color- or depth-based
segmentation mechanisms.
相似文献
Hermann J. MüllerEmail: |
20.
Christopher Hitchcock 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):391-401
Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own.
In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are
then diagnosed.
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Christopher HitchcockEmail: |