共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 46 毫秒
1.
Christopher Gregory Weaver 《Synthese》2012,184(3):299-317
I give two arguments for the claim that all events which occur at the actual world and are such that they could be caused,
are also such that they must actually be caused. The first argument is an improvement of a similar argument advanced by Alexander
Pruss, which I show to be invalid. It uses Pruss’s Brouwer Analog for counterfactual logic, and, as a consequence, implies
inconsistency with Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals. While (I suggest) this consequence may not be objectionable, the
argument founders on the fact that Pruss’s Brouwer Analog has a clear counterexample. I thus turn to a second, “Lewisian”
argument, which requires only an affirmation of one element of Lewis’s analysis of causation and one other, fairly weak possibility
claim about the nature of wholly contingent events. The final section of the paper explains how both arguments escape objections
from supposed indeterminacy in quantum physics. 相似文献
2.
Steven Daskal 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(2):221-229
In “Desire as Belief” and “Desire as Belief II,” David Lewis (1988, 1996) considers the anti-Humean position that beliefs about the good require corresponding desires, which is his way of understanding
the idea that beliefs about the good are capable of motivating behavior. He translates this anti-Humean claim into decision
theoretic terms and demonstrates that it leads to absurdity and contradiction. As Ruth Weintraub (2007) has shown, Lewis’ argument goes awry at the outset. His decision theoretic formulation of anti-Humeanism is one that no
sensible anti-Humean would endorse. My aim is to demonstrate that Lewis’ infelicitous rendering of anti-Humeanism really does
undermine the force of his arguments. To accomplish this, I begin by developing a more adequate decision theoretic rendering
of the anti-Humean position. After showing that my formulation of anti-Humeanism constitutes a plausible interpretation of
the anti-Humean thesis, I go on to demonstrate that if we adopt this more accurate rendition of anti-Humeanism, the view is
no longer susceptible to arguments like the ones Lewis has devised. I thereby provide a more robust response to Lewis’ arguments
than has yet been offered, and in the process I develop a formulation of anti-Humeanism that creates the possibility for future
decision theoretic arguments that, unlike Lewis’, speak directly to the plausibility of anti-Humeanism. 相似文献
3.
Daniel Peterson 《Synthese》2011,181(3):367-374
In his 2007 paper “Quantum Sleeping Beauty”, Peter Lewis poses a problem for the supporters’ of the Everett interpretation
of quantum mechanics appeal to subjective probability. Lewis’s argument hinges on parallels between the traditional “sleeping
beauty” problem in epistemology and a quantum variant. These two cases, Lewis argues, advocate different treatments of credences
even though they share important epistemic similarities, leading to a tension between the traditional solution to the sleeping
beauty problem (typically called the “thirder” solution) and Everettian quantum mechanics. In this paper I examine the metaphysical
and epistemological differences between Lewis’s two cases, and, in particular, I show how diachronic Dutch book arguments
support both the thirder solution in the traditional case and the Everettian’s solution in the variant case. These Dutch books,
I argue, reveal an important disanalogy between Lewis’s two cases such that Lewis’s argument does not reveal an inconsistency
in either the Everettian’s or the thirder’s assignment of credences. 相似文献
4.
Patrick McGivern 《Synthese》2008,165(1):53-75
I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale
analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience
argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based”
properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts
such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be
revised. 相似文献
5.
Rachael Briggs 《Synthese》2009,167(1):81-92
David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse
ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties
(Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS
faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious
norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from the ‘big bad bug’ (henceforth ‘the Bug’)
by rejecting realism about laws, chances, and dispositions (Halpin 1994, Aust J Phil 72:317–338, 1998, Phil Sci 65:349–360;
Ward 2005, Phil Sci 71:241–261). I will argue that this strategy cannot possibly work: it is the ontology, not the realist
thesis, that lies at the root of the problem. 相似文献
6.
Jens Johansson 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):309-310
Rebecca Roache’s recent critique of David Lewis’s “cohabitation” view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about
something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption. 相似文献
7.
Alan Hájek 《Topoi》2011,30(1):3-15
The thesis that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities has putatively been refuted many times by so-called
‘triviality results’, although it has also enjoyed a number of resurrections. In this paper I assault it yet again with a
new such result. I begin by motivating the thesis and discussing some of the philosophical ramifications of its fluctuating
fortunes. I will canvas various reasons, old and new, why the thesis seems plausible, and why we should care about its fate.
I will look at some objections to Lewis’s famous triviality results, and thus some reasons for the pursuit of further triviality
results. I will generalize Lewis’s results in ways that meet the objections. I will conclude with some reflections on the
demise of the thesis—or otherwise. 相似文献
8.
Hilary Kornblith 《Philosophical Studies》2006,130(2):337-349
Helen Beebee has recently argued that David Lewis’s account of compatibilism, so-called local miracle compatibilism (LMC),
allows for the possibility that agents in deterministic worlds have the ability to break or cause the breaking of a law of
nature. Because Lewis’s LMC allows for this consequence, Beebee claims that LMC is untenable and subsequently that Lewis’s
criticism of van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument for incompatibilism is substantially weakened. I review Beebee’s argument
against Lewis’s thesis and argue that Beebee has not refuted LMC and concomitantly has not demonstrated that Lewis’s criticism
of the Consequence Argument fails. 相似文献
9.
Jonathan Ichikawa 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):383-398
I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge
attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among
the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections
to Lewis’s account. 相似文献
10.
Ross P. Cameron 《Synthese》2007,156(1):143-159
In this paper I argue that warrant for Lewis’ Modal Realism is unobtainable. I consider two familiar objections to Lewisian
realism – the modal irrelevance objection and the epistemological objection – and argue that Lewis’ response to each is unsatisfactory
because they presuppose claims that only the Lewisian realist will accept. Since, I argue, warrant for Lewisian realism can
only be obtained if we have a response to each objection that does not presuppose the truth of Lewisian realism, this circularity
is vicious. I end by contrasting Lewis’ methodology with Forrest’s in order to illustrate a rival method that does not fall
victim to the objection I lay against Lewis. 相似文献
11.
Sungho Choi 《Philosophia》2010,38(3):579-588
This paper discusses Lee’s argument that Lewis’s reformed conditional analysis of dispositions is preferable to the simple
conditional analysis of dispositions. Lee’s argument is basically that there are some examples that can be adequately handled
by Lewis’s analysis but cannot by the simple conditional analysis of dispositions. But I will reveal that, when carefully
understood, they spell no trouble for the simple conditional analysis of dispositions, failing to serve a motivating role
for Lewis’s analysis. 相似文献
12.
Chris John Daly 《Synthese》2008,162(1):37-52
David Lewis’s genuine modal realism is a controversial thesis in modal metaphysics. Charles Chihara and Ross Cameron have
each argued that Lewis’s defence of his thesis involves his committing serious methodological errors; in particular, that
his replies to two well-known and important objections are question-begging. Scott Shalkowski has further argued that Lewis’s
attempt to analyse modal talk in non-modal terms is viciously circular. This paper considers the methodology which Lewis uses
to argue for his thesis, and the paper tries to show that it is guilty of no methodological errors. 相似文献
13.
It is often argued that the great quantity of evil in our world makes God’s existence less likely than a lesser quantity would,
and this, presumably, because the probability that some evils are gratuitous increases as the overall quantity of evil increases.
Often, an additive approach to quantifying evil is employed in such arguments. In this paper, we examine C. S. Lewis’ objection
to the additive approach, arguing that although he is correct to reject this approach, there is a sense in which he underestimates
the quantity of pain. However, the quantity of pain in that sense does not significantly increase the probability that some
pain is gratuitous. Therefore, the quantitative argument likely fails. 相似文献
14.
Sungho Choi 《Synthese》2006,148(2):369-379
Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional
analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis
can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates
of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples including Martin’s cases
by invoking the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. This means that Lewis’s own necessary defense
of the reformed analysis invalidates his motivation of it. Finally, I will argue that we have a good reason to favor the simple
analysis over Lewis’s analysis. 相似文献
15.
Mark Moyer 《Synthese》2006,148(2):401-423
Puzzles about persistence and change through time, i.e., about identity across time, have foundered on confusion about what it is for ‘two things’ to be have ‘the same thing’ at a time. This is most directly seen in the dispute over whether material objects can occupy exactly the same place at the
same time. This paper defends the possibility of such coincidence against several arguments to the contrary. Distinguishing
a temporally relative from an absolute sense of ‘the same’, we see that the intuition, ‘this is only one thing’, and the dictum,
‘two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time’, are individuating things at a time rather than absolutely and are therefore compatible with coincidence. Several other objections philosophers have raised ride
on this same ambiguity. Burke, originating what has become the most popular objection to coincidence, argues that if coincidence
is possible there would be no explanation of how objects that are qualitatively the same at a time could belong to different
sorts. But we can explain an object’s sort by appealing to its properties at other times. Burke’s argument to the contrary
equivocates on different notions of ‘cross-time identity’ and ‘the statue’. From a largely negative series of arguments emerges
a positive picture of what it means to say multiple things coincide and of why an object’s historical properties explain its
sort rather than vice versa – in short, of how coincidence is possible. 相似文献
16.
Tomasz Bigaj 《Erkenntnis》2012,76(1):1-22
David Lewis’s latest theory of causation defines the causal link in terms of the relation of influence between events. It
turns out, however, that one event’s influencing another is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for its being a cause
of that event. In the article one particular case of causality without influence is presented and developed. This case not
only serves as a counterexample to Lewis’s influence theory, but also threatens earlier counterfactual analyses of causation
by admitting a particularly troublesome type of preemption. The conclusion of the article is that Lewis’s influence method
of solving the preemption problem fails, and that we need a new and fresh approach to the cases of redundant causation if
we want to hold on to the counterfactual analysis of causation. 相似文献
17.
Peter A. Graham 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):65-82
David Lewis has offered a reply to the standard argument for the claim that the truth of determinism is incompatible with
anyone’s being able to do otherwise than she in fact does. Helen Beebee has argued that Lewis’s compatibilist strategy is
untenable. In this paper I show that one recent attempt to defend Lewis’s view against this argument fails and then go on
to offer my own defense of Lewis’s view.
相似文献
Peter A. GrahamEmail: |
18.
Alasdair Urquhart 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(4):453-472
Quine has argued that modal logic began with the sin of confusing use and mention. Anderson and Belnap, on the other hand,
have offered us a way out through a strategy of nominalization. This paper reviews the history of Lewis’s early work in modal
logic, and then proves some results about the system in which “A is necessary” is intepreted as “A is a classical tautology.” 相似文献
19.
Justin Broackes 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):27-71
This paper proposes a fundamentally opposite conception of the possibility of metaphysics to that of Barry Stroud in The Quest for Reality and other writings. I discuss Stroud’s views on everyday ‚truth’ and metaphysics (Section 1), on interpretation (Section
2 – replying with a theory of ‚quasi-understanding’), and his ‚no threat’ claim (Section 3). But the main argument (Section
4) is a response to Stroud’s claim that we have no right either to affirm or to deny the metaphysical reality of colours.
Stroud’s view resembles Carnap’s (1950, Revue Internationale de Philosophie
4, 20–40), that experience can in some sense never settle the metaphysical issue between e.g. materialism, idealism and phenomenalism;
though we can allow everyday ‚knowledge’ e.g. that there is a fallen tree in the garden outside, as something available on
all three views. (Carnap takes the undecidability as a sign that the metaphysical issue is a pseudo-question; Stroud insists
it is factual, but places it beyond our ken, ‚external’.) I argue, instead, that metaphysical argument is possible from within our conceptual scheme and epistemic situation (as in Gareth Evans’s arguments for realism over phenomenalism); that ‚external’
and ‚internal’ questions cannot be separated as Stroud wishes; and that if we really were denied knowledge on ‚metaphysical’
matters, that would infect our right to claim knowledge of ‚observational’ matters too. And I sketch a theory of colour that
would allow us to conclude (at once ‚metaphysically’ and ‚internally’) that things are indeed ‚really’ coloured. For all his
expressions of sympathy for Wittgenstein, Stroud’s metaphysics is remarkably Cartesian. 相似文献
20.
Anthony Wrigley 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):175-190
Non-Identity arguments have a pervasive but sometimes counter-intuitive grip on certain key areas in ethics. As a result,
there has been limited success in supporting the alternative view that our choices concerning future generations can be considered
harmful on any sort of person-affecting principle. However, as the Non-Identity Problem relies overtly on certain metaphysical
assumptions, plausible alternatives to these foundations can substantially undermine the Non-Identity argument itself. In
this paper, I show how the pervasive force and nature of Non-Identity arguments rely upon a specific adoption of a theory
of modality and identity and how adopting an alternative account of modality can be used to reject many conclusions formed
through Non-Identity type arguments. By using Lewis’s counterpart-theoretic account to understand ways we might have been,
I outline the basis of a modal account of harm that incorporates a person-affecting aspect. This, in turn, has significant
implications for ethical decision-making in areas such as reproductive choice and the welfare of future generations. 相似文献