Accounting for occurrences: a new view of the use of contingency information in causal judgment

When people make causal judgments from contingency information, a principal aim is to account for occurrences of the outcome. When 2 causes are under consideration, the capacity of either to account for occurrences is judged from how likely the cause is to be present when the outcome occurs and from the rate at which the outcome occurs when that cause alone is present, which gives an estimate of the strength of the cause. These propositions are formalized in a weighted averaging model, which successfully predicted several judgmental phenomena not predicted by other models of causal judgment. These include a tendency for judgment of one cause (A) to be reduced as the number of occurrences of when only the other one (B) increases and a tendency for A to receive higher judgments than B if A is better able to account for occurrences than B is even if B has a higher contingency with the outcome than A does. Overshadowing, a tendency for judgments of B to be depressed if A has a higher contingency, is weak or absent when B is better able to account for occurrences than A. Results of several experiments support these and related predictions derived from the accounting for occurrences hypothesis.     

Causal judgment from contingency information: Relation between subjective reports and individual tendencies in judgment

In two experiments, participants made causal judgments from contingency information for problems with different objective contingencies. After the judgment task, the participants reported how their judgments had changed following each type of contingency information. Some reported idiosyncratic tendencies--in other words, tendencies contrary to those expected under associative-learning and normative rule induction models of contingency judgment. These idiosyncratic reports tended to be better predictors of the judgments of those who made them than did the models. The results are consistent with the view that causal judgment from contingency information is made, at least in part, by deliberative use of acquired and sometimes idiosyncratic notions of evidential value, the outcomes of which tend, in aggregate, to be highly correlated with the outcomes of normative procedures.     

Effects of wording and stimulus format on the use of contingency information in causal judgment

There are four kinds of contingency information: occurrences and nonoccurrences of an effect in the presence and in the absence of a cause. Previous studies have shown that these four kinds are not given equal weight in causal judgment. The present research was designed to test two hypotheses about this unequal weighting: that weightings are influenced by the form of the question and other features of the stimulus materials and that unequal weightings occur, in part, because individual differences in the use of contingency information are not evenly distributed across the four kinds of information. Support was found for both hypotheses. However, the effects of question wording were not always as had been predicted, indicating that more needs to be learned about how people interpret the task, instructions, and materials they are given.     

Causal judgement from contingency information: Judging interactions between two causal candidates

In two experiments participants judged the extent to which occurrences and non-occurrences of an effect could be attributed to an interaction between two causal candidates A and B. In Experiment 1 judgements were influenced by the proportion of instances normatively evaluated as confirmatory for the interaction interpretation, when the objective contingency was held constant. Information about instances in which both candidates were present and the effect occurred was more influential than information about instances in which both candidates were absent and the effect did not occur. In Experiment 2 the occurrence rate of the effect when both candidates were present, when A alone was present, when B alone was present, and when both were absent was manipulated. Interaction judgements were mainly determined by occurrence rate when both were present. There was also a significant effect of occurrence rate when both were absent, but the other two occurrence rates had no significant effect. These results are interpreted as supporting a general model in which causal judgements are made according to the proportion of instances evaluated as supporting the interpretation being judged.     

Causal judgment from contingency information: the interpretation of factors common to all instances

Participants made judgments about stimulus materials in which there were 2 possible causes of an outcome. One of these was a common factor, a factor present in all instances presented for judgment, and the other was a positive covariate of the outcome. Instead of interpreting the positive covariate as the cause, participants consistently preferred an interpretation in which the common factor was the cause and the positive covariate enabled the cause to produce its effect. Participants' judgments of both interpretations were predicted by the proportion of instances that were confirmatory for the interpretation and not by deltaP. The findings support a hypothesis that people have a multirole conceptualization of causality including, in addition to the roles of cause and effect, that of an enabler, a factor the presence of which ensures that a thing is in a state of readiness to produce a particular effect.     

Judgement of two causal candidates from contingency information: Effects of relative prevalence of the two causes

In four experiments participants made judgements about two possible causes of an effect. The prevalence of the causes was manipulated independently of their degree of contingency with the effect. Significant effects of the prevalence manipulation were obtained: In particular, ratings of the unmanipulated candidate tended to decline as the prevalence of the other candidate increased, and there was also a significant but smaller effect on judgements of the latter. These tendencies were independent of the order in which the two candidates were judged. These results were replicated under two stimulus presentation procedures, the instance list procedure (Experiments 1 and 2) and the trial-by-trial procedure (Experiment 3). It was hypothesized that people judge, to some degree, the proportionate strength of the candidates, in other words the proportion of occurrences of the effect in the presence of each, and that the cause prevalence effect is a consequence of this tendency. This hypothesis was supported by the results of Experiment 4: Those participants whose judgements of one candidate were negatively correlated with the frequency of occurrence of the effect in the presence of the other candidate showed a significantly stronger cause prevalence effect than the remainder.     

Causal judgements about two causal candidates: Accounting for occurrences,estimating strength,and the importance of interaction judgements

When two possible causes of an outcome are under consideration, contingency information concerns each possible combination of presence and absence of the two causes with occurrences and nonoccurrences of the outcome. White (2008) proposed that such judgements could be predicted by a weighted averaging model integrating these kinds of contingency information. The weights in the model are derived from the hypothesis that causal judgements seek to meet two main aims, accounting for occurrences of the outcome and estimating the strengths of the causes. Here it is shown that the model can explain many but not all relevant published findings. The remainder can be explained by reasoning about interactions between the two causes, by scenario-specific effects, and by variations in cell weight depending on quantity of available information. An experiment is reported that supports this argument. The review and experimental results support the case for a cognitive model of causal judgement in which different kinds of contingency information are utilised to satisfy particular aims of the judgement process.     

Judgement of two causal candidates from contingency information: II. Effects of information about one cause on judgements of the other cause

When judgements are being made about two causes there are eight possible kinds of contingency information: occurrences and nonoccurrences of the outcome when both causes are present, when Cause 1 alone is present, when Cause 2 alone is present, and when neither cause is present. It is proposed that contingency information is used to some extent to judge proportionate strength, which is the proportion of occurrences of the outcome that each cause can account for. This leads to a prediction that judgements of one cause will be influenced by information about occurrences, but not nonoccurrences, of the outcome when only the other cause is present. In six experiments consistent support was found for this prediction when the cause being judged had a positive relation with the outcome, but no consistent tendency was found when the cause being judged had a negative relation with the outcome. The effects found for causes with positive contingency cannot be explained by the Rescorla-Wagner model of causal judgement nor by the hypothesis that causal judgements are based on conditional contingencies.     

The case for regularity in mechanistic causal explanation

How regular do mechanisms need to be, in order to count as mechanisms? This paper addresses two arguments for dropping the requirement of regularity from the definition of a mechanism, one motivated by examples from the sciences and the other motivated by metaphysical considerations regarding causation. I defend a broadened regularity requirement on mechanisms that takes the form of a taxonomy of kinds of regularity that mechanisms may exhibit. This taxonomy allows precise explication of the degree and location of regular operation within a mechanism, and highlights the role that various kinds of regularity play in scientific explanation. I defend this regularity requirement in terms of regularity??s role in individuating mechanisms against a background of other causal processes, and by prioritizing mechanisms?? ability to serve as a model of scientific explanation, rather than as a metaphysical account of causation. It is because mechanisms are regular, in the expanded sense described here, that they are capable of supporting the kinds of generalizations that figure prominently in scientific explanations.     

Weighting of contingency information in causal judgement: Evidence of hypothesis dependence and use of a positive-test strategy

Contingency is an important cue to causation. Research shows that people unequally weight the cells of a 2 × 2 contingency table as follows: cause-present/effect-present (A) > cause-present/effect-absent (B) > cause-absent/effect-present (C) > cause-absent/effect-absent (D). Although some models of causal judgement can accommodate that fact, most of them assume that the weighting of information is invariant as a function of whether one is assessing a hypothesized generative versus preventive relationship. An experiment was conducted that tested the hypothesis-independence assumption against the predictions of a novel weighted-positive-test-strategy account, which predicts hypothesis dependence in cell weighting. Supporting that account, judgements of hypothesized generative causes showed the standard A > B > C > D inequality, but judgements of hypothesized preventive causes showed the predicted B > A > D > C inequality. The findings reveal that cell weighting in causal judgement is both unequal and hypothesis dependent.     

Judgmental overshadowing: Further evidence of cue interaction in contingency judgment

We investigated a phenomenon calledjudgmental overshadowing. Subjects predicted whether each of several patients had a disease on the basis of whether or not the patient had each of two symptoms. For all the subjects, the presence of the disease was moderately contingent on the presence of one ofthe symptoms (S1). In Condition 1 of our first experiment, the presence of the disease was highly contingent on the presence of the other symptom (S2). In Condition 2, the presence of the disease was independent of S2. Judgmental overshadowing occurred in that the S1-disease contingency was judged to be stronger in Condition 2 than in Condition 1. Subsequent experiments showed that judgmental overshadowing depends little on the form of the judgment, is not due to a response bias or contrast effect, and does not depend on subjects’ actively diagnosing each patient. These results are consistent with, and are generally predicted by, an associative-learning model of contingency judgment.     

Information mispurchase in judgment tasks: A task-driven causal mechanism

Numerous studies of predecisional information purchase indicate that humans are often seriously suboptimal in balancing the costs and benefits of the information they purchase. Underpurchase is reported in some tasks, over-purchase in others, but no convincing account has been offered of the mechanisms producing these patterns of error. The present paper attempts such an account. We first show by computer simulation that simple hill-climbing algorithms reliably reproduce patterns of over-and underpurchase found in earlier studies, and identify the task characteristics that drive this result. We then specify a novel task that should, by this account, yield a new pattern of purchase error and demonstrate that both simulated and real subjects do, in fact, show such error patterns. Implications are drawn both for research strategy in the area and for practical application.     

Causal judgment from contingency information: A systematic test of the<Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>CI rule

Contingency information is information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an effect when a possible cause is present or absent. Under the evidential evaluation model, instances of contingency information are transformed into evidence and causal judgment is based on the proportion of relevant instances evaluated as confirmatory for the candidate cause. In this article, two experiments are reported that were designed to test systematic manipulations of the proportion of confirming instances in relation to other variables: the proportion of instances on which the candidate cause is present, the proportion of instances in which the effect occurs when the cause is present, and the objective contingency. Results showed that both unweighted and weighted versions of the proportion-of-confirmatory-instances rule successfully predicted the main features of the results, with the weighted version proving more successful. Other models, including the power PC theory, failed to predict the results.     

Perceiving a strong causal relation in a weak contingency: Further investigation of the evidential evaluation model of causal judgement

Contingency information is information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of a certain effect in the presence or absence of a candidate cause. An objective measure of contingency is the δP rule, which involves subtracting the probability of occurrence of an effect when a causal candidate is absent from the probability of occurrence of the effect when the candidate is present. Causal judgements conform closely to δP but deviate from it under certain circumstances. Three experiments show that such deviations can be predicted by a model of causal judgement that has two components: a rule of evidence, that causal judgement is a function of the proportion of relevant instances that are judged to be confirmatory for the causal candidate, and a tendency for information about instances in which the candidate is present to have greater effect on judgement than instances in which the candidate is absent. Two experiments demonstrate how this model accounts for some recently published findings. A third experiment shows that it is possible to use the model to predict the occurrence of high causal judgements when the objective contingency is close to zero.     

Interpersonal coordination tendencies and perception of visual information for decision-making in futsal

This study investigated how futsal players visually perceived information on angular interpersonal coordination relations, between available sources such as nearest defender, goalkeeper position and ball, when deciding to shoot at goal. Experienced players (n = 180) participated in eighteen, video-recorded futsal matches, during which 32 participants wore an eye tracking device. Forty-five sequences of play were selected and edited from the moment a teammate passed the ball to the shooter, until the moment a shot was undertaken. Independent variables included the angle connecting the shooter to their closest defender and goalkeeper, and it’s rate of change (velocity and variability) during performance. Then eye tracking system (TOBII PRO) was used to examine gaze patterns of shooters during task performance. Findings revealed that: (i) futsal players adapted their gaze patterns differently between key information sources when shooting confirmed as: their closest defender, goalkeeper, ball, and court floor; and (ii), the ball was the information source which was most fixated on, regardless of the characteristics of interpersonal coordination tendencies that emerged when shooting. These findings can be interpreted as evidence of functional perceptual behaviours used to regulate actions needed to ensure precise contact with the ball when shooting at goal. Further, adaptations of fixation patterns, varied between marking defender, goalkeeper, and ball, may provide functional postural orientation to facilitate a successful shot at goal.     

An information processing view of framing effects: The role of causal schemas in decision making

People prefer a sure gain to a probable larger gain when the two choices are presented from a gain perspective, but a probable larger loss to a sure loss when the objectively identical choices are presented from a loss perspective. Such reversals of preference due to the context of the problem are known asframing effects. In the present study, schema activation and subjects’ interpretations of the problems were examined as sources of the framing effects. Results showed that such effects could be eliminated by introducing into a problem a causal schema that provided a rationale for the reciprocal relationship between the gains and the losses. Moreover, when subjects were freed from framing they were consistently risk seeking in decisions about human life, but risk averse in decisions about property. Irrationality in choice behaviors and the ecological implication of framing effects are discussed.     

Crime and punishment: distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment

Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection of an agent to a harmful consequence. Also, selectively for judgments of punishment and blame, people who attempt but fail to cause harm more are judged more leniently if the harm occurs by independent means than if the harm does not occur at all. An account of these phenomena is proposed that distinguishes two processes of moral judgment: one which begins with harmful consequences and seeks a causally responsible agent, and the other which begins with an action and analyzes the mental states responsible for that action.     

Clutching at straws: Is it time to abandon the moral judgment deficit explanation for delinquency?

We respond to the commentary by Brusten, Stams, and Gibbs (2007) on the research by Tarry and Emler (2007) , arguing for the appropriateness of key design decisions – studying delinquency as assessed by self‐report in a sample of 12‐ to 15‐year‐old males. We argue that ‘known‐group’ methods for assessing involvement in delinquency, the major alternatives to self‐report, produce divergent results with respect to moral judgment level because these methods are confounded with other influences on moral judgment level, in particular education.     

Feature cues in probability learning: Data base information and judgment

Judgments of probabilistic events are often based partly on some information about past similar events. This study investigates the impact of summarized historical data termed a feature cue on performance in a cue probability learning task. Judges (n = 64) made 150 predictions of a criterion variable (Y_e) from a single cue variable (X). The feature cue variable (Z) provided judges with the “average past criterion” for the cue value on trial i, i.e., the conditional mean . Availability of the feature cue was varied with an AB-BA transfer design. Results demonstrate that the presence of the feature cue greatly imporved prediction achievement and accuracy. Under certain conditions, consistency and cue weighting were also improved by the feature cue aid. Although the feature cue value itself was not used as a prediction, it served as an anchor, around which judgments were dispersed. Implications for decision making with data base information are discussed.