Average intelligence predicts atheism rates across 137 nations

Evidence is reviewed pointing to a negative relationship between intelligence and religious belief in the United States and Europe. It is shown that intelligence measured as psychometric g is negatively related to religious belief. We also examine whether this negative relationship between intelligence and religious belief is present between nations. We find that in a sample of 137 countries the correlation between national IQ and disbelief in God is 0.60.     

Religious upbringing and current religiosity in Spanish nursing and medicine students

The influence of religious education in the family upon current spiritual and religious tendencies was assessed in a sample of 599 Spanish nurse and medicine students using a religiosity scale and answers to a series of belief/disbelief statements. Results showed that nursing and medicine students were equally low-religious, with no differences in religiosity total scores between participants coming from religious families; however, medical students coming from nonreligious families showed higher religiousness than the corresponding nursing trainees. This distinction appeared both across religiosity items and in a variety of responses to belief/disbelief of Christian/secular assertions. Regression analysis showed that religious family background was a consistent predictor of religious beliefs at young adulthood, and its influence was higher for medical students. In addition to establish religious upbringing as an important factor modulating enduring religiosity, these findings provide distinctions between nurse and medical trainees, and reproduce, in a Spanish mainly catholic sample, the structure of religiosity factors previously found on North American mainline protestants.     

Atheists

Atheists represent an inconspicuous minority, identifiable only by their disbelief in God(s). Despite being highly stigmatized and disliked, until recent scientific endeavors, little has been known about this group including why they don't believe, how many people are atheists, and why they trigger intense reactions. Thus, this paper aims to synthesize what is known about atheists (so far) and to help explain the widespread negative attitudes and prejudice towards atheists; the possible cognitive, motivational, and cultural origins of disbelief; and the unique challenges facing the study of religious disbelievers. To do so, we will explore current findings in psychological research on atheism by considering the complex interactions of cultural learning, motivations, and core cognitive processes. Although significant scientific progress has been made in understanding the factors underlying atheism, there remains much to be explored in the domain of religious disbelief.     

The relationship between intelligence and multiple domains of religious belief: Evidence from a large adult US sample

High levels of religiosity have been linked to lower levels of intelligence in a number of recent studies. These results have generated both controversy and theoretical interest. Here in a large sample of US adults we address several issues that restricted the generalizability of these previous results. We measured six dimensions of religiosity (rather than just one or two), along with a multi-scale instrument to assess general intelligence. We also controlled for the influence of the personality trait openness on facets of religious belief and practice. The results indicated that lower intelligence is most strongly associated with higher levels of fundamentalism, but also modestly predicts central components of religiosity such as a sense of religious identification and private religious practice. Secondly, we found that a higher level of openness - often assumed to lead to lower religiosity - is weakly associated with reduced fundamentalism but with increased religious mindfulness, private religious practice, religious support, and spirituality. These new results provide a framework for understanding the links between reasoning and faith.     

On intelligence education and religious beliefs

A number of authors have suggested that education mediates the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, there is very little direct evidence for this mediation, and the indirect evidence is contradictory. The results of the current paper suggest that, by and large, education does not mediate the effect of intelligence on religiosity. However, the results also suggest that since education has a positive effect on religiosity when religious background is strong and a negative effect when religious background is weak, and since intelligence has a positive effect on education, the negative effect of intelligence on religiosity is stronger when religious background is strong than when it is weak. We examine this mediated moderation model in two large, nationally representative, databases.     

Analytic Thinking,Religion, and Prejudice: An Experimental Test of the Dual-Process Model of Mind

Dual-process models of the mind, as well as the relation between analytic thinking and religious belief, have aroused interest in recent years. However, few studies have examined this relation experimentally. We predicted that religious belief might be one of the causes of prejudice, while analytic thinking reduces both. The first experiment replicated, in a mostly Muslim sample, past research showing that analytic thinking promotes religious disbelief. The second experiment investigated the effect of Muslim religious priming and analytic priming on prejudice and showed that, although the former significantly increased the total prejudice score, the latter had an effect only on antigay prejudice. Thus, the findings partially support our proposed pattern of relationships in that analytic thinking might be one of the cognitive factors that prevents prejudice, whereas religious belief might be the one that increases it.     

The Flynn effect,group differences,and g loadings

Flynn effect gains are predominantly driven by environmental factors. Might these factors also be responsible for group differences in intelligence? Group differences in intelligence have been clearly shown to strongly correlate with g loadings. The empirical studies on whether the pattern of Flynn effect gains is the same as the pattern of group differences yield conflicting findings. We present new evidence on the topic using a number of datasets from the US and the Netherlands. Score gains and g loadings showed a small negative average correlation. The general picture is now that there is a small, negative correlation between g loadings and Flynn effect gains. It appears that the Flynn effect and group differences have different causes.     

Is collective intelligence (mostly) the General Factor of Personality? A comment on Woolley,Chabris, Pentland,Hashmi and Malone (2010)

A recent paper [Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone. (2010). Evidence for a collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330, 686–688] presents evidence for the existence of a general collective intelligence factor, ‘c,’ which may undergird performance on a variety of group tasks. This factor appears to be only modestly correlated with the average and maximum intelligence of group members whilst being more strongly correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, a tendency for several members to contribute to group conversations rather than a small number dominating the discussions, and the proportion of females in the group. An alternative hypothesis, not considered by the authors, is that the General Factor of Personality (GFP) is able to account for the correlates of c observed, and that c may therefore be primarily a group level manifestation of the GFP, with a subordinate contribution from general intelligence. We maintain that a consideration of the GFP and its correlates as potential confounding variables would be of considerable benefit to future research into collective intelligence.     

Religious Tradition,Religiosity, or Everyday Theologies? Unpacking Religion’s Relationship to Support for Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage Among a College Student Sample

This study explores the differential impact of religious tradition, religiosity, and everyday theologies on support for legalizing same-sex marriage among a sample of undergraduate college students. The findings suggest that among college students in the United States the group of everyday theologies—personal religious beliefs that emerge through individuals’ lived experiences and social interactions—that we examine has a larger influence on attitudes about legalizing same-sex marriage than do either religious tradition or religiosity (measured as attendance, prayer, and guidance). We operationalize the concept of everyday theologies as levels of endorsement for six different religious themes. Implications for social movements promoting same-sex marriage and future research are discussed.     

Updating Allport's and Batson's Framework of Religious Orientations: A Reevaluation from the Perspective of Self‐Determination Theory and Wulff's Social Cognitive Model

We theoretically and empirically evaluate Allport's intrinsic‐extrinsic and Batson's quest religious orientations through the lens of self‐determination theory (SDT) and Wulff's social‐cognitive model. Confirming our theoretical analysis, we find that Allport's intrinsic‐extrinsic dichotomy fails to correspond empirically to the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation within SDT. Whereas Allport's intrinsic religious orientation was positively related to internalized extrinsic motivation, his two extrinsic (i.e., personal and social) religious orientations were not systematically related to any of the discerned motives within SDT. Furthermore, Batson's quest orientation was unrelated to any of the SDT concepts but was positively related to symbolic disbelief. The present findings suggest that Allport's motivational orientations model needs both refinement and relabeling to better fit with recent theoretical evolutions in the field of motivational psychology.     

Cognitive ability, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation: A five-year longitudinal study amongst adolescents

We report longitudinal data in which we assessed the relationships between intelligence and support for two constructs that shape ideological frameworks, namely, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Participants (N = 375) were assessed in Grade 7 and again in Grade 12. Verbal and numerical ability were assessed when students entered high school in Grade 7. RWA and SDO were assessed before school graduation in Grade 12. After controlling for the possible confounding effects of personality and religious values in Grade 12, RWA was predicted by low g (β = − .16) and low verbal intelligence (β = − .18). SDO was predicted by low verbal intelligence only (β = − .13). These results are discussed with reference to the role of verbal intelligence in predicting support for such ideological frameworks and some comments are offered regarding the cognitive distinctions between RWA and SDO.     

Disbelief in belief: On the cognitive status of supernatural beliefs

Religious people seem to believe things that range from the somewhat peculiar to the utterly bizarre. Or do they? According to a new paper by Neil Van Leeuwen, religious “credence” is nothing like mundane factual belief. It has, he claims, more in common with fictional imaginings. Religious folk do not really “believe”—in the ordinary sense of the word—what they profess to believe. Like fictional imaginings, but unlike factual beliefs, religious credences are activated only within specific settings. We argue that Van Leeuwen’s thesis contradicts a wealth of data on religiously motivated behavior. By and large, the faithful genuinely believe what they profess to believe. Although many religions openly embrace a sense of mystery, in general this does not prevent the attribution of beliefs to religious people. Many of the features of religious belief that Van Leeuwen alludes to, like invulnerability to refutation and incoherence, are characteristic of irrational beliefs in general and actually betray their being held as factual. We conclude with some remarks about the common failure of secular people to face the fact that some religious people really do believe wildly implausible things. Such incredulity, as evinced by Van Leeuwen and others, could be termed “disbelief in belief.”     

Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic Monopoly Failed

Under communism, the Russian religious landscape consisted mainly of two competitors—a severely repressed Russian Orthodox Church and a heavily promoted atheist alternative to religion called "scientific atheism." Under these circumstances, one might expect the rapid spread of religious disbelief, but the intensity of the atheist campaign originated from official mandate and not popular appeal. In turn, scientific atheism never inspired the Russian population and grew increasingly uninspired as Soviet officials created a monopoly "church" of scientific atheism in hopes of replacing persistent religious beliefs and practices. This article is dedicated to explaining why Communists could not successfully convert the masses to atheism. The findings provide evidence that systems of belief require more than simply the power of promotion and coercion to become accepted.     

Freudian modalities of disbelief

This article can be characterized as a ‘rediscovery’ of a notion of psychoanalysis that had disappeared or had been confused by later operations. The authors explore a Freudian notion that has been unjustly misunderstood, especially because of the multiple ways in which ‘Unglaube’ – disbelief – has been translated. We shall establish the archaeology of this term in Freud by extracting its three significant modes. Firstly, paranoiac disbelief designates an unconscious process of the rejection of belief in the subject's first encounter with a sexual reality that is always traumatic. Secondly, the obsessional neurotic's disbelief, which we shall call ‘incredulity’, is a secondary, less radical refusal of belief, one that is different from its paranoiac counterpart. Finally, we shall envision a third – dialectical – type of disbelief, which Freud called ‘act of disbelief’ and which will enable us to approach the fundamental epistemic and ethical stakes for psychoanalysis.     

The influence of the hijab (Islamic head-cover) on perceptions of women's attractiveness and intelligence

This study examined the effects of wearing the hijab, or Islamic headwear, on men's perceptions of women's attractiveness and intelligence. A total of 57 non-Muslim men and 41 Muslim men rated a series of images of women, half of whom were unveiled and half of whom wore the hijab. For attractiveness and intelligence ratings, a mixed analysis of variance showed a significant effect of hijab status, with women wearing the hijab being rated more negatively than unveiled women. For attractiveness ratings, there was no significant effect of participant religion, although non-Muslim men rated unveiled women significantly higher than veiled women. For intelligence ratings, non-Muslim men provided significantly higher ratings than Muslim men for both conditions. In addition, Muslim men's ratings of the attractiveness and intelligence of women wearing the hijab was positively correlated with self-reported religiosity. These results are discussed in relation to religious stereotyping within increasingly multi-cultural societies.     

Lost in the crowd: Conformity as escape following disbelief in free will

Belief in free will is founded on the idea that people are responsible for their behavior. People who believe in free will derive meaning in life from these beliefs. Conformity refers to succumbing to external pressures and imitating others’ behaviors. Sometimes, conformity involves a loss of self-awareness, which reduces perceived meaninglessness. We tested if disbelief in free will increases perceived meaninglessness and if people subsequently become more conformist to address this negative existential perception. We conducted three studies to test this hypothesis. In Study 1, experimentally induced disbelief in free will resulted in perceived meaninglessness. In Study 2, perceived meaninglessness correlated with conformity. Finally, in Study 3, perceived meaninglessness mediated the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity, especially under high self-awareness. We conclude that perceptions about meaning play a central role in the relationship between disbelief in free will and conformity.     

Divine Emotions: On the Link Between Emotional Intelligence and Religious Belief

There have been only few attempts to explore the relationship between emotional intelligence (EI) and religiosity. However, none of them included measures of ability EI. In two studies, we investigated the potential associations between various aspects of religious belief and ability and trait EI. In Study 1 (N = 240), we found that ability EI was positively associated with general level of religious belief. Study 2, conducted among Polish Christians (N = 159), replicated the previous result on the connection between ability EI and religion. Moreover, both trait and ability EI were negatively correlated with extrinsic religious orientation and negative religious coping. Additional analysis showed that extrinsic orientation mediated the relationship between ability EI and religiosity.     

The comparability of intelligence test results: Group- and individual-level comparisons of seven intelligence tests

A significant body of research has demonstrated that IQs obtained from different intelligence tests substantially correlate at the group level. Yet, there is minimal research investigating whether different intelligence tests yield comparable results for individuals. Examining this issue is paramount given that high-stakes decisions are based on individual test results. Consequently, we investigated whether seven current and widely used intelligence tests yielded comparable results for individuals between the ages of 4–20 years. Results mostly indicated substantial correlations between tests, although several significant mean differences at the group level were identified. Results associated with individual-level comparability indicated that the interpretation of exact IQ scores cannot be empirically supported, as the 95% confidence intervals could not be reliably replicated with different intelligence tests. Similar patterns also appeared for the individual-level comparability of nonverbal and verbal intelligence factor scores. Furthermore, the nominal level of intelligence systematically predicted IQ differences between tests, with above- and below-average IQ scores associated with larger differences as compared to average IQ scores. Analyses based on continuous data confirmed that differences appeared to increase toward the above-average IQ score range. These findings are critical as these are the ranges in which diagnostic questions most often arise in practice. Implications for test interpretation and test construction are discussed.     

The accessibility of religious beliefs

We used reaction time techniques to study individual differences in accessibility of beliefs about the reality of religious targets. Moderately religious people were slower than religious or irreligious people. Religious people were faster than non-religious people. Reaction times to classify religious stimuli are stable over 8 days. We also found that religious people with accessible beliefs have the highest well-being, and that religious beliefs correspond to greater levels of religious behavior when the reality of religious stimuli is accessible. These results further our understanding on natural individual differences in attitude accessibility and add to our understanding of religious beliefs, including their impact.