Political Conservatism and Left–Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries

The relationship between political conservatism and left–right orientation was examined in 15 Western European and 13 former communist Central and Eastern European countries using the data from European Social Survey Round 3 (N = 46,103) and Round 4 (N = 50,601). Cross‐culturally validated values were used to measure the two potential aspects of conservatism: resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. Both of these aspects were positively related to right‐wing orientation in Western countries. In the former communist countries, the relationships were positive, negative, and nonexistent; they differed between the countries and varied between 2006 and 2008. The results indicate that conservatism can be related to left‐wing or right‐wing orientation depending on the cultural, political, and economic situation of the society in question. The results also show that despite the shared communist past, former communist Central and Eastern Europe is a diverse region that should be treated as such also in research.     

A smarter brain is associated with stronger neural interaction in healthy young females: A resting EEG coherence study

General intelligence, the g factor, is a major issue in psychology and neuroscience. However, the neural mechanism of the g factor is still not clear. It is suggested that the g factor should be non-modular (a property across the brain) and show good colinearity with various cognitive tests. This study examines the hypothesis that functional connectivity may be a good candidate for the g factor. We recorded resting state eyes-closed EEG signals in 184 healthy young females. Coherence values of 38 selected channel pairs across delta, theta, alpha, beta and gamma frequencies were correlated with six intelligence quotient (IQ) subtests, including symbol search, block design, object assembly, digit span, similarity and arithmetic. A three-stage analytic flow was constructed to delineate common (g factor) and unique neural components of intelligence. It is noticed that the coherence pattern demonstrates good correlation with five of the IQ subtests (except symbol search) and non-modularity in the brain. Our commonality analyses support connectivity strength in the brain as a good indicator of the g factor. For the digit span and arithmetic tests, the uniqueness analyses provide left-lateralized topography relevant to the operation of working memory. Performance on the arithmetic test is further correlated with strengths at left temporo-parietal and bilateral temporal connections. All the significant correlations are positive, indicating that the stronger the connectivity strengths, the higher the intelligence. Our analyses conclude that a smarter brain is associated with stronger interaction in the central nervous system. The implication and why the symbol search does not show parallel results are discussed.     

Why scientists valuep values

According to almost any approach to statistical inference, attained significance levels, orp values, have little value. Despite this consensus among statistical experts,p values are usually reported extensively in research articles in a manner that invites misinterpretation. In the present article, I suggest that the reasonp values are so heavily used is because they provide information concerning the strength of the evidence provided by the experiment. In some typical hypothesis testing situations, researchers may be interested in the relative adequacy of two different theoretical accounts: one that predicts no difference across conditions, and another that predicts some difference. The appropriate statistic for this kind of comparison is the likelihood ratio,P(D|M ₀)/P(D|M ₁), whereM ₀ andM ₁ are the two theoretical accounts. Large values of the likelihood ratio provide evidence thatM ₀ is a better account, whereas small values indicate thatM1 is better. I demonstrate that, under some circumstances, thep value can be interpreted in the same manner as the likelihood ratio. In particular, forZ,t, and sign tests, the likelihood ratio is an approximately linear function of thep value, with a slope between 2 and 3. Thus, researchers may reportp values in scientific communications because they are a proxy for the likelihood ratio and provide the readers with information about the strength of the evidence that is not otherwise available.     

Are high-IQ individuals deficient in common sense? A critical examination of the ‘clever sillies’ hypothesis

A controversial hypothesis [Charlton (2009). Clever sillies: Why high-IQ people tend to be deficient in common sense. Medical Hypotheses, 73, 867–870] has recently been proposed to account for why individuals of high-IQ and high social status tend to hold counter-intuitive views on social phenomena. It is claimed that these ‘clever sillies’ use their high general intelligence and Openness to Experience to overanalyze social problems for which socially intelligent/common sense responses would seemingly be more appropriate. The first three sections of this review will consider i) the relationship between general and social intelligence; ii) the role of situational effects on the direction of the correlation between IQ and political attitudes; iii) the behavioral ecology of competitive altruism. While there is no hard evidence for Charlton's hypothesis, sophisticated although ultimately non-rational subjective analyses of social phenomena (i.e. ones that are disconfirmed by data, or reject empiricism) do seem to be favored by individuals in certain high-IQ knowledge work sectors. It is suggested that these function as costly signals of altruism, and that their popularity can best be understood in light of the theory that social attitudes are fundamentally influenced by perceptions of dominance and counter-dominance, with the latter playing an especially significant role in influencing the values systems of contemporary societies where the degree of conspicuous inequality is significantly evolutionarily novel.     

The Role of Face Familiarity in Judgments of Personality and Intelligence

Personality judgments based on facial features are a common occurrence. The face familiarity overgeneralization hypothesis states that people make judgments of unknown faces based on their similarity to known faces. However, there is a dearth of research regarding how face familiarity relates to perceptions of personality and intelligence in strangers. The current article used two studies to provide evidence for the relationship between face familiarity and judgments of personality and intelligence. Study 1 showed that photographs perceived as familiar by one set of participants were rated more positively regarding personality and intelligence by a second group of participants. Study 2 found that high perceived familiarity resulted in positive judgments of personality and intelligence, whereas familiarity based on exposure did not. These findings indicate both that perceived familiarity significantly impacts positive judgments of personality and intelligence and that the face familiarity overgeneralization hypothesis is a useful framework for this area of research.     

The Motivation for “Toward an African Moral Theory”

Abstract

Here I introduce the symposium issue of the South African Journal of Philosophy that is devoted to critically analysing my article “Toward an African Moral Theory.” In that article, I use the techniques of analytic moral philosophy to articulate and defend a moral theory that both is grounded on the values of peoples living in sub-Saharan Africa and differs from what is influential in contemporary Western ethics. Here, I not only present a précis of the article, but also provide a sketch of why I have undertaken the sort of project begun there, what I hope it will help to achieve, and how the contributors to the symposium principally question it.     

The MBR metric

P. H. Schönemann's (1982, Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 19, 317–319; 1983, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 27, 311–324) MBR metric is designed to account for distortion effects in distance estimates caused by upper bounds in the response scales. To test the MBR hypothesis, given data have to be transformed first into the half-open interval [0, 1). This is achieved by defining the greatest distance estimate as the upper bound, and then dividing all values by this bound plus some “small constant” e, which ensures that the interval is open. How e should be picked is left open. It is shown here that very small differences in the value chosen for e have massive effects on the fit of the MBR model. Moreover, if e → 0, then the fit will eventually get bad for all realistic data.     

Is collective intelligence (mostly) the General Factor of Personality? A comment on Woolley,Chabris, Pentland,Hashmi and Malone (2010)

A recent paper [Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone. (2010). Evidence for a collective intelligence factor in the performance of human groups. Science, 330, 686–688] presents evidence for the existence of a general collective intelligence factor, ‘c,’ which may undergird performance on a variety of group tasks. This factor appears to be only modestly correlated with the average and maximum intelligence of group members whilst being more strongly correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, a tendency for several members to contribute to group conversations rather than a small number dominating the discussions, and the proportion of females in the group. An alternative hypothesis, not considered by the authors, is that the General Factor of Personality (GFP) is able to account for the correlates of c observed, and that c may therefore be primarily a group level manifestation of the GFP, with a subordinate contribution from general intelligence. We maintain that a consideration of the GFP and its correlates as potential confounding variables would be of considerable benefit to future research into collective intelligence.     

Finding the Loch Ness Monster: Left‐Wing Authoritarianism in the United States

Although past research suggests authoritarianism may be a uniquely right‐wing phenomenon, the present two studies tested the hypothesis that authoritarianism exists in both right‐wing and left‐wing contexts in essentially equal degrees. Across two studies, university (n = 475) and Mechanical Turk (n = 298) participants completed either the RWA (right‐wing authoritarianism) scale or a newly developed (and parallel) LWA (left‐wing authoritarianism) scale. Participants further completed measurements of ideology and three domain‐specific scales: prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. Findings from both studies lend support to an authoritarianism symmetry hypothesis: Significant positive correlations emerged between LWA and measurements of liberalism, prejudice, dogmatism, and attitude strength. These results largely paralleled those correlating RWA with identical conservative‐focused measurements, and an overall effect‐size measurement showed LWA was similarly related to those constructs (compared to RWA) in both Study 1 and Study 2. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that LWA may be a viable construct in ordinary U.S. samples.     

The corroboration paradox

Evidentiary propositions E ₁ and E ₂, each p-positively relevant to some hypothesis H, are mutually corroborating if p(H|E ₁ ∩ E ₂) > p(H|E _i ), i = 1, 2. Failures of such mutual corroboration are instances of what may be called the corroboration paradox. This paper assesses two rather different analyses of the corroboration paradox due, respectively, to John Pollock and Jonathan Cohen. Pollock invokes a particular embodiment of the principle of insufficient reason to argue that instances of the corroboration paradox are of negligible probability, and that it is therefore defeasibly reasonable to assume that items of evidence positively relevant to some hypothesis are mutually corroborating. Taking a different approach, Cohen seeks to identify supplementary conditions that are sufficient to ensure that such items of evidence will be mutually corroborating, and claims to have identified conditions which account for most cases of mutual corroboration. Combining a proposed common framework for the general study of paradoxes of positive relevance with a simulation experiment, we conclude that neither Pollock’s nor Cohen’s claims stand up to detailed scrutiny. I am quite prepared to be told…”oh, that is an extreme case: it could never really happen!” Now I have observed that this answer is always given instantly, with perfect confidence, and without any examination of the proposed case. It must therefore rest on some general principle: the mental process being something like this—“I have formed a theory. This case contradicts my theory. Therefore, this is an extreme case, and would never occur in practice.” Rev. Charles L. Dodgson      

The Savanna-IQ interaction hypothesis: A critical examination of the comprehensive case presented in Kanazawa's The Intelligence Paradox

Kanazawa (2012b) has recently presented the most comprehensive case yet for his Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, intelligence is a domain-specific adaptation which has been selected for as humans have moved away from the (evolutionarily familiar) Savanna. As such, ability in ‘evolutionarily novel’ tasks and ‘evolutionarily novel’ preferences are positively correlated with high IQ. This article will present a critical examination of the hypothesis, arguing that there is a strong case against anchoring human nature on the Savanna, the hypothesis predicts contradictory findings, there is empirical evidence against it, it is not falsifiable, and it is not necessary to explain that data which Kanazawa presents.     

Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time

The Victorian era was marked by an explosion of innovation and genius, per capita rates of which appear to have declined subsequently. The presence of dysgenic fertility for IQ amongst Western nations, starting in the 19th century, suggests that these trends might be related to declining IQ. This is because high-IQ people are more productive and more creative. We tested the hypothesis that the Victorians were cleverer than modern populations, using high-quality instruments, namely measures of simple visual reaction time in a meta-analytic study. Simple reaction time measures correlate substantially with measures of general intelligence (g) and are considered elementary measures of cognition. In this study we used the data on the secular slowing of simple reaction time described in a meta-analysis of 14 age-matched studies from Western countries conducted between 1889 and 2004 to estimate the decline in g that may have resulted from the presence of dysgenic fertility. Using psychometric meta-analysis we computed the true correlation between simple reaction time and g, yielding a decline of − 1.16 IQ points per decade or − 13.35 IQ points since Victorian times. These findings strongly indicate that with respect to g the Victorians were substantially cleverer than modern Western populations.     

The effects of feedback about self and others on the recall and judgments of feedback-relevant information

After people have received feedback about the outcome of their behavior, their responses to information bearing on the validity of this feedback may be influenced by their desire to maintain a favorable self-image. This experiment investigated the cognitive mediators of these responses. Subjects who received negative feedback about their performance on an intelligence test disparaged intelligence tests in general and judged a report they had read to be unfavorable to intelligence tests. Nevertheless, they recalled more arguments in the report that were favorable to intelligence tests than did positive feedback recipients. These results contradicted the hypothesis that subjects selectively attend to information that helps them to maintain a positive self-concept in light of negative information about themselves. Rather, they may attempt to refute arguments that support the validity of the negative feedback they receive, and this relatively greater processing may facilitate the recall of these arguments later on. In contrast, there was no evidence that subjects try to refute information that calls the validity of positive feedback into question. Results had implications for two additional issues: first, whether the effect of performance feedback depends on whether it is received before or after information bearing on its validity; second, whether feedback has similar effects on recall and judgments by persons to whom it does not directly pertain.     

Relationship of vocational maturity to work values

This study examined the relationship of vocational maturity to work values. Two hypotheses were tested: (1) Vocational maturity is positively related to differentiation of work values within subjects. (2) Vocational maturity is positively associated with intrinsic work values and negatively associated with extrinsic work values. Sixty-two subjects enrolled in remedial reading at a community college were administered the Vocational Development Inventory-Attitude Scale and the Work Values Inventory. Data analyses supported hypothesis 1 for females, but not for males, and partially supported hypothesis 2.     

Confucian Social Media: An Oxymoron?

International observers and critics often attack China's Internet policy on the basis of liberal values. If China's Internet is designed and built on Confucian values that are distinct from, and sometimes incompatible to, liberal values, then the liberalist critique ought to be reconsidered. In this respect, Mary Bockover's “Confucian Values and the Internet: A Potential Conflict” appears to be the most direct attempt to address this issue. Yet, in light of developments since its publication in 2003, it is time to re-examine this issue. In this paper, I revisit Bockover’s argument and show why it fails. Using social media as an example, I offer an alternative argument to show why the Internet remains largely incompatible with Confucian values. I end this paper by suggesting how to recontextualise the Confucian way of life and to redesign social media in accordance to Confucian values in the information society.     

The hierarchy of consistency: A review and model of longitudinal findings on adult individual differences in intelligence,personality and self-opinion

When viewed in the aggregate, studies of the longitudinal consistency of intelligence, personality traits and self-opinion (self-esteem, life satisfaction etc.) show a hierarchy of consistency. Uncorrected retest coefficients over periods of 6 months to 50 yr are analyzed as the product of period-free reliability (R) and the true stability of the construct (sⁿ, where s is the coefficient of annual stability and n the number of years of the retest interval). The annual stabilities of intelligence, personality traits and self-opinions are estimated as 0.99, 0.98 and 0.94, respectively. While intelligence and personality may be regarded as relatively stable characteristics over the length of the adult lifespan, self-opinion has little stability over periods of more than 10 yr. The hierarchy of consistency should be taken into account in causal models of human development. Although self-opinion is not a longitudinally-stable characteristics, it may still be predicted over long periods of time by higher-order constructs such as personality traits and intelligence.     

Bayesian hypothesis testing for psychologists: A tutorial on the Savage–Dickey method

In the field of cognitive psychology, the p-value hypothesis test has established a stranglehold on statistical reporting. This is unfortunate, as the p-value provides at best a rough estimate of the evidence that the data provide for the presence of an experimental effect. An alternative and arguably more appropriate measure of evidence is conveyed by a Bayesian hypothesis test, which prefers the model with the highest average likelihood. One of the main problems with this Bayesian hypothesis test, however, is that it often requires relatively sophisticated numerical methods for its computation. Here we draw attention to the Savage–Dickey density ratio method, a method that can be used to compute the result of a Bayesian hypothesis test for nested models and under certain plausible restrictions on the parameter priors. Practical examples demonstrate the method’s validity, generality, and flexibility.     

Re-evaluating the extractive foraging hypothesis

In his seminal 1992 paper, Dunbar examined three hypotheses advanced to explain primate intelligence, arguing that whereas his social group size hypothesis was supported, neither of two ecological hypotheses, the extractive foraging and frugivory hypotheses, were supported. Following this, and Dunbar's subsequently elaborated argument, many investigators concluded that primate intelligence arose as social rather than ecological adaptations. This paper questions Dunbar's characterization of extractive foraging and social intelligence as alternative hypotheses, raises sampling issues about Dunbar's brain data, species choice, and measurement of extractive foraging. It summarizes the extractive foraging hypothesis, and counters its critics. It reexamines the hypothesis in light of recent behavioral and brain data, new methodology for quantifying extractive foraging, and a new phylogeny of primate intelligence. It concludes that the extractive foraging hypothesis is now supported by several converging lines of evidence.     

Propositional epistemic luck,epistemic risk,and epistemic justification

If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good evidence in both cases. And yet it clearly does matter. The aim of this paper is to explain why, and in the process delineate a species of epistemic luck that has hitherto gone unnoticed—what we call propositional epistemic luck—but which we claim is crucial to accounting for the importance of proper basing. As we will see, in order to understand why this type of epistemic luck is malignant, we also need to reflect on the relationship between epistemic luck and epistemic risk.     

Contrasting patterns in the acquisition of spatial/temporal terms

Competing hypotheses about the acquisition of terms that refer to relationships in both time and space are tested. One hypothesis is that the language of time is acquired as a spatial metaphor; consequently, such terms will be acquired in their spatial sense first. The competing hypothesis is that differential experience with the dual senses of each term will result in different patterns of acquisition, depending upon which sense is dominant in actual usage. Comprehension of before-after, first-last, and ahead-behind by 4- to 6-year-olds was assessed in spatial, temporal, and spatial-temporal meaning tasks. Results support the second view: there is no consistent order of acquisition; the sense acquired first is the dominant sense, as determined by both linguistic evidence and empirical survey.