The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values

While individual differences in the willingness and ability to engage analytic processing have long informed research in reasoning and decision making, the implications of such differences have not yet had a strong influence in other domains of psychological research. We claim that analytic thinking is not limited to problems that have a normative basis and, as an extension of this, predict that individual differences in analytic thinking will be influential in determining beliefs and values. Along with assessments of cognitive ability and style, religious beliefs, and moral values, participants judged the wrongness of acts considered disgusting and conventionally immoral, but that do not violate care- or fairness-based moral principles. Differences in willingness to engage analytic thinking predicted reduced judgements of wrongness, independent of demographics, political ideology, religiosity, and moral values. Further, we show that those who were higher in cognitive ability were less likely to indicate that purity, patriotism, and respect for traditions and authority are important to their moral thinking. These findings are consistent with a “Reflectionist” view that assumes a role for analytic thought in determining substantive, deeply-held human beliefs and values.     

Belief bias during reasoning among religious believers and skeptics

We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mechanisms. The present study extends the previous research by assessing both performance and response times on quintessential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those reporting more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors than did believers. This finding remained significant after controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive first impressions. Implications for using additional processing measures, such as response time, to investigate individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.     

The mediating effect of reflective-analytic cognitive style on rational thought

Abstract

We investigate whether non-miserly cognitive styles mediate the effects of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. Specifically, we review relevant literature on two dimensions that define non-miserly cognitive style: reflection-impulsivity and analytic-intuitive. We use these two dimensions to identify a continuum of cognitive styles that vary from miserly (impulsive-intuitive) to non-miserly (reflective-analytic) and are congruent with tendencies to commit specific rational thinking errors. Further, we argue that this continuum, which we label reflective-analytic cognitive style, mediates the effect of cognitive ability and thinking dispositions on rational thought. We conduct an experiment testing our predictions and find evidence, via structural equation modelling, that reflective-analytic cognitive style does mediate the effect of cognitive ability (as measured by working memory capacity) and thinking dispositions (as measured by need for cognition and actively open-minded thinking) on responses to traditional rational thinking tasks.     

Reflective minds and open hearts: Cognitive style and personality predict religiosity and spiritual thinking in a community sample

We examined associations between two psychological constructs, analytic cognitive style and the personality facet ‘Openness to Experience’, and several dimensions of religiosity: religious affiliation, strength of faith and spiritual epistemology. In a relatively large (N = 1093), older community sample (M = 55.4 years), analytic cognitive style was associated with a lower probability of affiliating with a religious denomination and a higher probability of possessing strong religious faith. Overall, openness was also associated with a lack of religious affiliation but was positively related to possessing a spiritual epistemology. A path‐analytic model revealed that openness had a positive relationship to both faith and religious denomination that was mediated by spiritual epistemology, but negative direct relationships with religiosity after the meditational effects were taken into account. Taken together, these results extend previous findings on the effect of cognitive style on religiosity and provide a new perspective on the complex relationship between cognitive and personality factors and different dimensions of religiosity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

技能和风格：理性思维的两种测量途径

本文通过总结前人关于理性思维的个体差异的研究, 介绍和区分了两种有关理性思维的测量途径, 并讨论了二者之间的内在关系。理性思维可以分成技能和风格两种形式。前者常用评价性的、情境测试方式进行评估, 后者常用描述性的、自陈量表方式进行测量。通过分析认知能力对这两种理性思维的影响, 本文提出一个认知能力与理性思维技能和思维风格关系的理论模型, 为后续在理性思维测量方法上的研究提供一种理论指导。     

Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection

Recent research has indicated a negative relation between the propensity for analytic reasoning and religious beliefs and practices. Here, we propose conflict detection as a mechanism underlying this relation, on the basis of the hypothesis that more-analytic people are less religious, in part, because they are more sensitive to conflicts between immaterial religious beliefs and beliefs about the material world. To examine cognitive conflict sensitivity, we presented problems containing stereotypes that conflicted with base-rate probabilities in a task with no religious content. In three studies, we found evidence that religiosity is negatively related to conflict detection during reasoning. Independent measures of analytic cognitive style also positively predicted conflict detection. The present findings provide evidence for a mechanism potentially contributing to the negative association between analytic thinking and religiosity, and more generally, they illustrate the insights to be gained from integrating individual-difference factors and contextual factors to investigate analytic reasoning.     

Analytic cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief

An analytic cognitive style denotes a propensity to set aside highly salient intuitions when engaging in problem solving. We assess the hypothesis that an analytic cognitive style is associated with a history of questioning, altering, and rejecting (i.e., unbelieving) supernatural claims, both religious and paranormal. In two studies, we examined associations of God beliefs, religious engagement (attendance at religious services, praying, etc.), conventional religious beliefs (heaven, miracles, etc.) and paranormal beliefs (extrasensory perception, levitation, etc.) with performance measures of cognitive ability and analytic cognitive style. An analytic cognitive style negatively predicted both religious and paranormal beliefs when controlling for cognitive ability as well as religious engagement, sex, age, political ideology, and education. Participants more willing to engage in analytic reasoning were less likely to endorse supernatural beliefs. Further, an association between analytic cognitive style and religious engagement was mediated by religious beliefs, suggesting that an analytic cognitive style negatively affects religious engagement via lower acceptance of conventional religious beliefs. Results for types of God belief indicate that the association between an analytic cognitive style and God beliefs is more nuanced than mere acceptance and rejection, but also includes adopting less conventional God beliefs, such as Pantheism or Deism. Our data are consistent with the idea that two people who share the same cognitive ability, education, political ideology, sex, age and level of religious engagement can acquire very different sets of beliefs about the world if they differ in their propensity to think analytically.     

Divine intuition: cognitive style influences belief in God

Some have argued that belief in God is intuitive, a natural (by-)product of the human mind given its cognitive structure and social context. If this is true, the extent to which one believes in God may be influenced by one's more general tendency to rely on intuition versus reflection. Three studies support this hypothesis, linking intuitive cognitive style to belief in God. Study 1 showed that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in God. Participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), which employs math problems that, although easily solvable, have intuitively compelling incorrect answers. Participants who gave more intuitive answers on the CRT reported stronger belief in God. This effect was not mediated by education level, income, political orientation, or other demographic variables. Study 2 showed that the correlation between CRT scores and belief in God also holds when cognitive ability (IQ) and aspects of personality were controlled. Moreover, both studies demonstrated that intuitive CRT responses predicted the degree to which individuals reported having strengthened their belief in God since childhood, but not their familial religiosity during childhood, suggesting a causal relationship between cognitive style and change in belief over time. Study 3 revealed such a causal relationship over the short term: Experimentally inducing a mindset that favors intuition over reflection increases self-reported belief in God.     

Religion and the morality of mentality

Christian doctrine considers mental states important in judging a person's moral status, whereas Jewish doctrine considers them less important. The authors provide evidence from 4 studies that American Jews and Protestants differ in the moral import they attribute to mental states (honoring one's parents, thinking about having a sexual affair, and thinking about harming an animal). Although Protestants and Jews rated the moral status of the actions equally. Protestants rated a target person with inappropriate mental states more negatively than did Jews. These differences in moral judgment were partially mediated by Protestants' beliefs that mental states are controllable and likely to lead to action and were strongly related to agreement with general statements claiming that thoughts are morally relevant. These religious differences were not related to differences in collectivistic (interdependent) and individualistic (independent) tendencies.     

Shifting foundations: religious belief change and adjustment in college students

In a sample of 154 college students, prevalence of religious belief change and its relationship to religiosity and coping variables were examined twice over the course of one month. Students who reported belief change (62%) scored higher than those who did not on measures of religiosity and fared worse on adjustment measures. Significant differences in coping strategies were noted, with the change group using more religious coping and alcohol and drugs to cope. Within the change group, a higher degree of change was related to higher levels of religiousness and religious coping, and poorer adjustment at baseline and follow-up.     

Relationship Between Religiosity and Conduct Problems Among African American and Caucasian Adolescents

This study investigated the relationship between religiosity and conduct problems in a racially diverse sample of high school aged adolescents (ages 13–19) who attended public schools in a large metropolitan area. The results of the study found racial and gender differences in religiosity: African American adolescents were more likely to attend church, describe themselves as very religious and use Collaborative and Deferring religious coping styles; they were less likely to use Self-Directing religious coping styles when compared to Caucasian adolescents. Females were more likely to be involved in church activities, use a Collaborative religious coping style and tended to be less likely to use a Self-Directing religious coping style when compared to males. The results of multiple regression analyses, after controlling for race, gender, and self-reported religiousness found that Self-Directing and Deferring religious coping styles were risk factors for conduct problems; there was no relationship between Collaborative religious coping and conduct problems. The findings from the study provide additional support for the importance of considering religiosity, race and gender when examining mental health outcomes in adolescents and have implications for the development of mental health interventions for adolescents.     

On the failure of cognitive ability to predict myside and one-sided thinking biases

Two critical thinking skills—the tendency to avoid myside bias and to avoid one-sided thinking—were examined in three different experiments involving over 1200 participants and across two different paradigms. Robust indications of myside bias were observed in all three experiments. Participants gave higher evaluations to arguments that supported their opinions than those that refuted their prior positions. Likewise, substantial one-side bias was observed—participants were more likely to prefer a one-sided to a balanced argument. There was substantial variation in both types of bias, but we failed to find that participants of higher cognitive ability displayed less myside bias or less one-side bias. Although cognitive ability failed to associate with the magnitude of the myside bias, the strength and content of the prior opinion did predict the degree of myside bias shown. Our results indicate that cognitive ability—as defined by traditional psychometric indicators—turns out to be surprisingly independent of two of the most important critical thinking tendencies discussed in the literature.     

Religiosity and the formulation of causal attributions

Researchers have suggested that religious individuals engage primarily in intuitive over analytic processing. We investigated a connection between specific aspects of religiosity and the attribution of causation to social and physical events. College undergraduates completed measures of religiosity online and were asked to determine the causes of events that varied in type, outcome, and likelihood, as well as the personality characteristics of the protagonist. Individuals with greater intrinsic religious orientation, fundamentalism, who viewed God as loving, who were more dogmatic, and had an external locus of control were more likely to attribute supernatural phenomena to events compared to those lower in those traits. Supernatural causation was invoked more often when the character of the protagonist and the outcome of social event matched in valence (both positive or both negative) than when they did not match (e.g., character positive, outcome negative). Individuals low and high in religiosity showed similar reasoning, but individuals higher in religiosity were more likely to attribute supernatural causes for positive outcomes and characters in physical scenarios, consistent with their view of God as benevolent.     

Effects of impulsivity, reinforcement sensitivity, and cognitive style on Pathological Gambling symptoms among frequent slot machine players

Pathological Gambling (PG) is the inability to resist recurrent urges to gamble excessively despite harmful consequences to the gambler or others. A cognitive-behavioral Pathways Model of PG (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002) suggests individual differences in rash impulsivity and reward sensitivity, together with a cognitive style that promotes poor decision making, as risk factors. These individual differences were examined in a community sample of experienced slot machine players (N = 100), who were classified into Low, Moderate, and Problem gambling groups according to the Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001). There were significant group differences on rash impulsivity as measured by the Eysenck Impulsivity scale, and on reward sensitivity as measured by the BIS/BAS Drive scale. For cognitive style, there were differences on Actively Openminded Thinking (AOT), but not the Rational Experiential Inventory. Hierarchical regression analyses found that impulsivity and AOT predicted severity of PG, but that AOT mediated the effect of BAS Drive. A thinking style that promotes erroneous cognition may correlate with PG, but individual differences in rash impulsivity and reward-seeking play a more critical role in the etiology of PG. The individual characteristics of Pathological Gamblers are similar to those of people with Substance Use Disorders.     

Heuristic and analytic processing: age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles

Developmental and individual differences in the tendency to favor analytic responses over heuristic responses were examined in children of two different ages (10- and 11-year-olds versus 13-year-olds), and of widely varying cognitive ability. Three tasks were examined that all required analytic processing to override heuristic processing: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning under conditions of belief bias, and probabilistic reasoning. Significant increases in analytic responding with development were observed on the first two tasks. Cognitive ability was associated with analytic responding on all three tasks. Cognitive style measures such as actively open-minded thinking and need for cognition explained variance in analytic responding on the tasks after variance shared with cognitive ability had been controlled. The implications for dual-process theories of cognition and cognitive development are discussed.     

The relationship between religion and thought-action fusion: Use of an in vivo paradigm

Research has demonstrated that higher levels of religiosity are positively correlated with thought-action fusion (TAF), a set of cognitive biases found to be associated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, previous studies have exclusively relied on a nomothetic approach to measuring TAF using a single self-report instrument, the thought-action fusion scale. The current study examined the relationship between religiosity and TAF using an in vivo behaviorally-based assessment in which participants thought about and wrote down thoughts of negative events involving loved ones. Forty-three highly religious Protestant Christians were compared to 30 Atheists/Agnostics on their in vivo ratings of anxiety, estimates of likelihood, and moral wrongness related to the negative thoughts. Results indicated that compared to the non-religious participants, those who were highly religious believed that writing and thinking about the negative events was more morally wrong and increased the likelihood of the event. Results are discussed in terms of the potential relationship between certain religious teachings and TAF-related beliefs about the importance, significance, and influence of thoughts.     

Sexual Prejudice among Christian College Students, Denominational Teachings, and Personal Religious Beliefs

Although numerous studies have examined the role of religious tradition and religiosity on attitudes toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, the role of endorsement of denominational teachings has largely been overlooked, even though such teachings are often cited to explain study findings. To better understand the complex relationship between religion and sexual prejudice, this study explores the unique contributions of religious tradition, religiosity, and individual endorsement of denominational doctrine about same-sex sexuality in shaping these attitudes. Findings indicate that endorsement of denominational doctrine concerning same-sex sexuality is more influential than religiosity, and that endorsement of denominational doctrine is not simply a proxy for believing that same-sex sexuality is a sin. Implications for future research are discussed.     

On the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability

In 7 different studies, the authors observed that a large number of thinking biases are uncorrelated with cognitive ability. These thinking biases include some of the most classic and well-studied biases in the heuristics and biases literature, including the conjunction effect, framing effects, anchoring effects, outcome bias, base-rate neglect, "less is more" effects, affect biases, omission bias, myside bias, sunk-cost effect, and certainty effects that violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In a further experiment, the authors nonetheless showed that cognitive ability does correlate with the tendency to avoid some rational thinking biases, specifically the tendency to display denominator neglect, probability matching rather than maximizing, belief bias, and matching bias on the 4-card selection task. The authors present a framework for predicting when cognitive ability will and will not correlate with a rational thinking tendency.     

Attentional bias for threat: Evidence for delayed disengagement from emotional faces

This study examined cognitive aspects of coping with stress, how these related to religiosity, and how they related to outcomes (positive mood and distress). Participants (n=126) were of Protestant or Jewish background, and had all experienced recent major stress. They were assessed on measures of religiosity, religious coping, perception of the consequences of the stressful event, attributions for its occurrence, and distress, intrusive unpleasant thoughts, and positive affect. Religiosity affected ways of thinking about the stressful situation, namely: Belief that G-d is enabling the individual to bear their troubles (religious/spiritual support), belief that it was all for the best, and (more weakly) belief that all is ultimately controlled by G-d. Religiosity affected neither the proportion of positive consequences perceived as outcomes of the event, nor the causal attributions examined. Religious background (Protestant vs. Jewish) had negligible effects on the cognitions measures. Causal pathway analysis suggested that religion-related cognitions might directly affect positive affect, but not distress. Problems of design and interpretation are discussed. The study suggests some cognitively mediated means by which religion may have comforting effects.     

Religion,religiosity, and South Korean consumer switching behaviors

• This study investigated the relationship between religious affiliation and level of religiosity and consumer product‐ and store‐switching behavior among South Korean consumers. Comparisons in switching behavior are reported for three different denominational groups prevalent in South Korea (Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism), non‐religious affiliated respondents, and among persons exhibiting different levels of religiosity. Religious affiliation, including non‐affiliation, was not found to be significantly related to switching behavior. However, consumers reporting high levels of religiosity were found to be significantly less likely to engage in product purchase‐ and store‐switching behaviors than those reporting lower levels of religiosity. Consumers reporting high levels of religiosity are also less likely to engage in product purchase switching behavior than non‐religious affiliated consumers (i.e., no religiosity consumers). This pattern held across denominations. Statistically significant differences in switching behavior were not obtained between consumers reporting low levels of religiosity and those respondents who expressed no religious affiliation.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.