None Too Simple: Examining Issues of Religious Nonbelief and Nonbelonging in the United States

Prior research on those who are “not religious” in the traditional, organizational sense has focused on a broad category of people in the United States who do not identify with an established religious tradition. We distinguish three categories of people who are religiously nonbelieving or nonbelonging: atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers. Examining issues of religious belief and identity, we compare private spiritual life, attitudes on political issues, and stance toward religion in the public sphere for these three categories of nonreligious respondents. Atheists are the most uniformly antireligious. Agnostics, by comparison, are less opposed to religion overall, while unchurched believers display higher levels of personal religiosity and spirituality than atheists or agnostics. While atheists, agnostics, and unchurched believers are similar in their political identification and attitudes related to religiously infused political topics, unchurched believers are as strongly opposed to religion in the public sphere as atheists.     

Changes in Politics and Religiosity Among Students at a Protestant University

College is a setting and time of profound change in the lives of emerging adults. This change can include shifts in identity related to politics and religion. Given widespread attention to the alignment of religious people with conservative politics and less religious people with liberal politics (i.e., the “God Gap”), we ask: do college students who become politically liberal lose their religion in the process? Using longitudinal panel data, this study examines changes in political identity and religiosity among students at a Protestant university. Findings reveal changes in students’ politics align with changes in public and private religious behaviors, certainty in belief, agreement with core tenets of the Christian faith, faith maturity, and closeness to God. Whereas students who become more politically conservative increase their religiosity, the inverse is true for those whose politics become more liberal in college.     

An apology for the “New Atheism”

In recent years, a series of bestselling atheist manifestos by Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, and Christopher Hitchens has thrust the topic of the rationality of religion into the public discourse. Christian moderates of an intellectual bent and even some agnostics and atheists have taken umbrage and lashed back. In this paper I defend the New Atheists against three common charges: that their critiques of religion commit basic logical fallacies (such as straw man, false dichotomy, or hasty generalization), that their own atheism is just as “faith-based” as the religious beliefs they criticize, and that their expressed disrespect for religious belief is immoral.     

Two Approaches to Religion and Politics: Moral Cosmology and Subcultural Identity*

We explore two competing approaches to internal religious divisions and their political consequences. The “moral cosmology” approach focuses on religious worldviews. It juxtaposes the religiously orthodox to modernists, arguing that the former are theologically communitarian in belief while the latter are individualistic. The religiously orthodox worldview (relative to modernists) is posited to lead to politically conservative stances on cultural issues of abortion, sexuality, and family but politically liberal stances on economic issues. In contrast, the “subcultural identity” approach focuses on identity rather than worldview. According to this approach, self‐identified evangelicals and fundamentalists are expected to be more politically conservative on both cultural and economic issues when compared to mainline or liberal Protestants. Through analyses of the 1998 GSS, which allows operationalization of the two approaches and their extension to Catholic identities, we find that cosmology and identity are associated, but they have independent—and sometimes opposite—effects on Americans’ political beliefs.     

Social Affiliation from Religious Disaffiliation: Evidence of Selective Mixing Among Youth with No Religious Preference During the Transition to College

The number of individuals claiming a nonreligious identity in the United States is on the rise, with one‐fourth of the overall U.S. public failing to identify with any of the major religious traditions. In this article, we examine whether religious disaffiliation structures social network formation in a social context in which religious identification (and religiosity) is a salient cultural marker. We take advantage of unique data on the personal networks of youth transitioning into a college where religion is a culturally salient facet of everyday life. We hypothesize that, if there is nonreligious homophily, it may result from an attraction of the disaffiliated to each other or from a repulsion away from the religiously affiliated. Results of exponential random graph models suggest that both mechanisms may be at play. We find that religious “Nones” and affiliated non‐Catholics are disproportionately more likely to form and maintain relationships with one another and are relatively less likely to form and maintain relationships with members of their respective religious out‐groups. We close by outlining the implications of our findings and delineating promising avenues for future research.     

What Makes Politicians “Religious”? How Identity Congruence Shapes Religious Evaluations

How do Americans evaluate politicians’ religiosity? We theorize extra-religious “identity congruence,” the perceived correspondence between others’ group identities and our own, will powerfully shape evaluations. We test this expectation using data from two large, nationally representative surveys that ask Americans to rate the religiosity of prominent politicians. Consistent with our theory, the strongest predictors of how Americans rate politicians’ religiosity are their congruence on party identification and ideological identity as well as expected alignments with racial identity and Christian nationalism. Respondents’ religious characteristics are relatively weak predictors. And these trends hold regardless of Americans’ knowledge of leaders’ professed religious identity. Patterns are consistent with our theory even when we split samples by party. When we compare ratings between politicians who are widely regarded as irreligious to those who are regarded as conventionally religious, partisan congruence and racial identity largely mitigate the religious advantage of the latter. Racial identity also moderates congruence on key factors. Finally, identity congruence on party, ideology, and Christian nationalism follows expected patterns even among secular Americans for whom “religious” less intuitively implies “my group.” In a time of growing identity-alignment along partisan, ideological, racial, and religious lines, extra-religious “identity congruence” powerfully shapes how Americans evaluate politicians’ religiosity.     

BIOLOGY TEACHERS’ CONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF LIFE IN BRAZIL,ARGENTINA, AND URUGUAY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Teachers’ conceptions about the origin of life in three Latin American countries with contrasting levels of secularism were analyzed: Argentina (Catholic constitution), Brazil (formally secular but not in practice), and Uruguay (consolidated secularism). A European survey questionnaire was used and the interpretation of the results drew on Barbour's four categories concerning the relationships of science and religion. A large majority of Argentinian and Uruguayan teachers were clearly evolutionist, even when believing in God (Independence or Dialogue category), with no difference between Argentina and Uruguay. The majority of Brazilian teachers assumed a religious position about the origin of life, being creationist (Conflict or Independence categories) or evolutionary creationist (Dialogue or Integration categories). Differences of Brazilian teachers’ conceptions may result from the higher percentage of evangelicals and lower proportion of agnostics/atheists. Brazilian Catholic teachers were more creationist than their Catholic colleagues in Argentina and Uruguay. Distinct patterns were found, but further research is needed to understand possible classroom impacts.     

Assessing Conventional Wisdom about Religion and Politics: A Preliminary View from the Pews

Given religious leaders’ frequent opportunities to communicate to a large and receptive audience, political messages delivered during religious services have the potential to make a considerable impact on American politics—with particular significance for political education and mobilization. Social scientists routinely conclude that such messages are indeed disseminated, a claim we test in this study. Is it in fact true that church– and temple–going Americans regularly receive political messages from their ministers, priests, and rabbis during worship services? If so, what forms do these pronouncements take? How intense are they? Is this communication limited to messages from the service leader or does it come from other parts of the service, either informal or ritualistic? Existing empirical assessments of this topic depend heavily on survey research, asking congregants (or, less often, members of the clergy) about the frequency and content of political messages. Although such studies are certainly valuable, we approach religious political communications in a more immediate way: by observing them directly. Our conclusions are based on two waves of attendance at weekly services during 1998–1999, varying by religious tradition and denomination, region, and other dimensions. We find that “political” messages, broadly defined, are indeed delivered quite often. However, content analysis of these messages reveals that they typically address matters of social justice and rarely other types of political activity or belief, such as specific public policies or civic involvement (including voting). Political references during services only very occasionally constituted calls to direct political action on the part of the worshiper. Ultimately, our findings suggest that political content does occur relatively frequently during U.S. religious services, supporting the accounts of other social scientists. Our analysis offers new insight as to the content and nature of the political messages Americans are exposed to during religious services.     

Asynchrony in Attitudes Toward Abortion and Gay Rights: The Challenge to Values Alignment

Political commentators tend to assume that Americans who share a particular religious affiliation think similarly about values issues and that values questions are aligned. Although religious affiliation is a strong predictor of attitudes toward abortion and gay rights, there is differentiation within denominational subgroups with respect to both; for example, while majorities of mainline Protestants and Catholics favor gay marriage, many of their respective co‐religionists do not. Further, aggregate survey data shows asynchrony in within‐group attitudes on abortion and gay rights; for example, whereas Hispanic Catholics are more likely to support gay marriage than legal abortion, black Protestants are more likely to support legal abortion than gay marriage. Abortion and gay equality are discrete issues and give rise to divergent attitudes based on the lived reality of different ethnoreligious groups. These findings challenge the utility of the construct of the “values voter,” and underscore that abortion and gay rights should be recognized as separate public policy domains.     

Religious Identity-Inconsistent Attending: Its Correlates and Political Implications

The foundation of religious measurement in surveys presumes that individual religious affiliation (“What is your present religion, if any?”) accurately describes the religious community in which respondents are involved. But what if it doesn't? In a recent survey of 4,000 Americans, we asked whether their current congregation matches their religious identity and about a fifth of Americans indicated that it does not. We document the degree of this inconsistency, its correlates, and its implications, focusing primarily on the politics that congregants are exposed to from clergy and the attitudes they hold about salient political matters. The identity-inconsistent attenders often vary significantly from identity-consistent attenders, which serves to introduce considerable measurement error in the use of a religious tradition measure to depict American religion. The results suggest that salient disagreement induces a sizable population to migrate to a congregation outside their religious identity.     

FAITH,BELIEF, AND THE COMPATIBILITY OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE

Recent attacks on the compatibility of science and religion by the “militant modern atheists” (Jerry Coyne, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens) have posed serious challenges for anyone who supports the human importance of religious faith (particularly their identification of “faith” with “believing without evidence”). This article offers a critical analysis of their claims compared with those who do not equate faith with belief. I conclude that (i) the militant modern atheist interpretation of faith undervalues transformative religious experiences, (ii) that more people of faith hold it for this reason than their opponents acknowledge, and (iii) that meaningful dialogue between religion and science is both possible and desirable.     

Mental disorder among nonreligious adolescents

This study is the first of its kind to investigate mental disorder among nonreligious adolescents. In this paper, we report three main findings based on data from the National Comorbidity Survey of Adolescents. First, nonreligious adolescents on average have higher rates of mental disorder than adolescents who identify as religious. Second, there is variability in rates of mental disorder among the three types of nonreligious adolescents, with atheists/agnostics experiencing the highest rates, followed by those with no religion, and those with no religious preference. Indeed, after controlling for a host of sociodemographic characteristics, adolescents with no preference have levels of mental disorder that do not differ from the religiously affiliated. Third, the mental health disadvantage of nonreligiosity is strongest among nonreligious adolescents with two highly religious parents. Their rates of mental illness are almost twice that of religious adolescents raised in religious households. Moreover, neither nonreligious nor religious adolescents are negatively affected by being raised in nonreligious households.     

The Association of Religiosity and Political Conservatism: The Role of Political Engagement

Some argue that there is an organic connection between being religious and being politically conservative. We evaluate an alternative thesis that the relation between religiosity and political conservatism largely results from engagement with political discourse that indicates that these characteristics go together. In a combined sample of national survey respondents from 1996 to 2008, religiosity was associated with conservative positions on a wide range of attitudes and values among the highly politically engaged, but this association was generally weaker or nonexistent among those less engaged with politics. The specific political characteristics for which this pattern existed varied across ethno‐religious groups. These results suggest that whether religiosity translates into political conservatism depends to an important degree on level of engagement with political discourse.     

A house divided? The psychology of red and blue America

Recently it has become commonplace in America for commentators and the public to use the terms "red" and "blue" to refer to perceived cultural differences in America and American politics. Although a political divide may exist in America today, these particular terms are inaccurate and reductive. This article presents research from social psychology demonstrating that the increased use of these terms is likely to increase the conflict between political groups in America by making political conflict salient in nonpolitical contexts, reducing the ability of Americans to form multifaceted complex identities, pushing Americans to misperceive political in-groups and out-groups, and contributing to a "spiral of silence." An alternative model for discussing cultural differences is proposed.     

Race,Religion, and Anti‐Poverty Policy Attitudes

Using the 2008 National Politics Study, the present study indicates that while African Americans are more likely than whites to hear sermons about poverty and other political issues, hearing such sermons more consistently associates with support for anti‐poverty government programs among non‐Hispanic whites than among both African Americans and Hispanics. The racially/ethnically marginalized status of blacks and Hispanics may contribute to these groups being more receptive than whites to religious messages emphasizing social inequality. The contrasting racial experiences of dominance and marginalization may also help explain why hearing politicized sermons is more meaningful to the progressive social welfare attitudes of whites than to African Americans and Hispanics. This expectation is rooted in the heightened variability of perspectives among whites and their religious organizations regarding the government's role in aiding the economically disadvantaged. Conversely, the vast majority of blacks and Hispanics support the government helping individuals who fallen upon hard times. The greater variability in opinion among whites may also allow for greater differences in opinion to emerge between whites who attend relative to those outside of religious congregations led by clergy emphasizing spiritual and political solidarity with the poor than is the case for African Americans and Hispanics.     

Is Belief in God Related to Differences in Adolescents’ Psychological Functioning?

Many studies have documented links between positive psychological functioning and religiousness during the adolescent years, but very few have contrasted religious and nonreligious youth. The purpose of the present study was to examine differences in psychological functioning among adolescent atheists, agnostics, and believers using a profile analysis approach. The authors conducted a survey of Grade 8 students (N = 1,925) enrolled in Catholic schools in two Australian states. The survey included 10 measures of psychological functioning, broadly divided into three categories (positive adjustment, social well‐being, and negative outcomes). Results indicated that belief in God was related to distinct profiles of psychological adjustment. The implications of these findings for understanding how differing value systems are related to particular developmental stages are discussed.     

Believe it or not: Exploring the relationship between dogmatism and openness within non-religious samples

Personality and dogmatic thinking within religious individuals have been examined by previous research, but neglected for non-religious individuals. In this experiment, we distinguish between two types of non-religious groups; those who ascribe themselves to an identity (atheists) and those who do not (no beliefs in particular). A total of 103 non-religious individuals (36% atheists and 64% with no particular beliefs) completed an online questionnaire measuring dogmatism and openness traits, with an additional Christian group (n = 91) serving as a control. After confirming a relationship between identity salience and dogmatism, and validating a measure of dogmatism (DOG) in both non-religious groups, we note key personality differences between the two. Those with no beliefs in particular demonstrated a traditional negative correlation between openness and dogmatism (along with Christians) while these variables correlated positively for atheists (in particular, on ‘unconventionality’). This study is the first to establish differences between the relationship of dogmatism and openness within non-religious populations and explain these differences through group identity. Thus, identity strength and group belief systems are suggested to be key contributors to observed group differences between non-religious individuals.     

Bounded by Disbelief: How Atheists in the United States Differentiate themselves from Religious Believers

Recent empirical studies have revealed that religious believers tend to hold atheists and other religious doubters in low regard. This article examines how atheists in turn negotiate and construct the social and symbolic boundaries between atheists and religious believers. I draw on ethnographic and interview data to explore the lenses through which atheists view religion, religious believers, and the boundary between religious believers and non-believers. I find that atheists participate in boundary work to construct difference between religious believers and non-believers. However, atheists see greater social distance between themselves and some groups of religious believers than they do in relation to other groups, constructing religious leaders and devout adherents of particular religions as especially different. Atheists’ constructions of religious believers also vary in response to their individual experiences with religious people. The analysis illuminates the complexity of boundary work among members of a minority group.     

Psychological Distress Among Religious Nonbelievers: A Systematic Review

Studies of religious belief and psychological health are on the rise, but most overlook atheists and agnostics. We review 14 articles that examine differences between nonbelievers and believers in levels of psychological distress, and potential sources of distress among nonbelievers. Various forms of psychological distress are experienced by nonbelievers, and greater certainty in one’s belief system is associated with greater psychological health. We found one well-documented source of distress for nonbelievers: negative perceptions by others. We provide recommendations for improving research on nonbelievers and suggest a model analogous to Pargament’s tripartite spiritual struggle to understand the stresses of nonbelief.     

Presidential Appointments and Religious Stratification in the United States, 1789–2003

In America's colonial period, the “Protestant Establishment” (Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians) had more access to political power than “Other Colonial Elites” (Quakers and Unitarians), “Other Protestants” (e.g., Baptists and Methodists), and “Others” (e.g., Catholics, Jews, and people with no religious affiliation). To what extent has this pattern of religious stratification persisted and/or changed over the course of U.S. history? New data on the religious affiliations of U.S. presidents, cabinet members, and justices on the Supreme Court indicate that the Protestant Establishment and Other Colonial Elites are not as dominant as they once were but continue to be overrepresented in the White House, in the cabinet, and on the Supreme Court. Other Protestants and Others have made noteworthy gains but continue to be underrepresented in most spheres of national political life. Presidents from all religious strata are more likely to appoint people who belong to the Protestant Establishment than any other religious stratum. Other Protestants and Others are most likely to appoint religious outsiders. Thus, political appointments are a means by which religious stratification both persists and changes.