伦理豁免刍议

伦理豁免,是在一定的伦理尤其是亲属关系(一定程度上包括朋友关系)中,在究竟是履行伦理的义务、还是履行法律的义务之间,人们陷入紧张冲突甚至两难的情况下,被法律赋予一定的特殊权利,得依法免除法定的义务、责任甚至罪责。中华伦理、中华法系以伦理豁免来解决伦理、法律的矛盾,有宝贵的理论和实践;其中蕴涵的基本价值是,通过维护伦理,从根本上维护社会秩序。伦理豁免对今天解决伦理、法律之两难,仍是宝贵的智慧。     

Welfare and Self-Governance

Two ideas have dominated ethical thought since the time of Bentham and Kant. One is utilitarianism, the other is an idea of moral agency as self-governance. Utilitarianism says that morality must somehow subserve welfare, self-governance says that it must be graspable directly by individual moral insight. But these ideas seem to war with one another. Can we eliminate the apparent conflict by a careful review of what is plausible in the two ideas? In seeking an answer to this question I examine (1) the implications of welfarism, (2) the nature of moral obligation (3) the nature of our moral knowledge.     

What Creates the Dilemma in Ethical Dilemmas? Examples From Psychological Practice

Twenty psychologists were interviewed about an ethical dilemma that they had found to be particularly difficult to resolve. In just under half of the cases the dilemma involved a perceived conflict of ethical principles (e.g., the welfare of the consumer vs. the right to privacy). In the other cases, the psychologists were prevented from following an ethically prescribed course of action by some nonethical consideration such as contractural obligation, legal requirement, or the demands of an employer. We discuss the implications of these two sorts of dilemmas for psychological practice and make some suggestions for proactive approaches to ethical problem solving.     

What creates the dilemma in ethical dilemmas? Examples from psychological practice

Twenty psychologists were interviewed about an ethical dilemma that they had found to be particularly difficult to resolve. In just under half of the cases the dilemma involved a perceived conflict of ethical principles (e.g., the welfare of the consumer vs. the right to privacy). In the other cases, the psychologists were prevented from following an ethically prescribed course of action by some nonethical consideration such as contractual obligation, legal requirement, or the demands of an employer. We discuss the implications of these two sorts of dilemmas for psychological practice and make some suggestions for proactive approaches to ethical problem solving.     

GOD IN THE CAVE

When Finite and Infinite Goods was published in 1999, it took its place as one of the few major statements of a broadly Augustinian ethical philosophy of the past century. By “broadly Augustinian” I refer to the disposition to combine a Platonic emphasis on a transcendent source of value with a traditionally theistic emphasis on the value‐creating capacities of absolute will. In the form that this disposition takes with Robert Merrihew Adams, it is the resemblance between divine and a finite excellence that makes the finite excellence objectively of value, and it is the correspondence of an obligation to a divine command that makes the obligation objectively obligatory. I look closely at the complexity of this ethical division of labor—between the good and the right—mainly as it appears in the context of Finite and Infinite Goods, but also with attention to the broader corpus of Adams's writings, particularly his work on Leibniz and the essays of his that have been gathered together in The Virtue of Faith. I argue that there is a creative tension in his work between his desire to secure an objective basis for ethics and his affirmation of the value of grace, a love that is not proportioned to the excellence of its object. This tension, I further argue, ought to be resolved in the direction of grace.     

The movement from ethics to social relationships for Levinas,and why decency obscures obligation

According to Emmanuel Levinas, the individual bears an infinite obligation to the other person. In the Talmudic reading “Judaism and revolution,” Levinas suggests that we move from the ethical encounter (and infinite obligation) to social relationships (with limited obligations) using contracts—both particular contracts and the social contract. So social relationships are created by limiting obligation, and as a result these relationships can only be practically acceptable, not ethical. Jewish religious practice for Levinas should also be understood as a set of negotiated limits to our infinite obligation.     

Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

SHOULD WE DE‐MORALIZE ETHICAL THEORY?

Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti‐social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.     

Assessment for the Right Reason The Ethics of Outcomes Assessment

This essay explores and challenges the two primary ethical arguments for assessment, accountability, and professional responsibility, by demonstrating their strengths and exposing their weaknesses, which are rooted in their limited notions of community, contract, and guild respectively. In contrast, I argue for assessment on the basis of an ethic of covenantal obligation which incorporates both accountability and responsibility but grounds them on a broader view of community, a view of the teaching-learning environment as a covenant community replete with mutual obligations and responsibilities, one of which is assessment. While the notion of covenant community has deep roots in American society, its theological underpinnings make the ethic of assessment as covenant obligation most relevant to church-related institutions of higher education, the context in which I teach and learn. I conclude the paper by delineating some principles for ethical assessment practice which follow from a covenantal perspective.     

On Sexual Obligation and Sexual Autonomy

In this paper, I try to make sense of the possibility of several forms of voluntarily undertaken “sexual obligation.” The claim that there can be sexual obligations is liable to generate worries with respect to concerns for gender justice, sexual freedom, and autonomy, especially if such obligations arise in a context of unjust background conditions. This paper takes such concerns seriously but holds that, despite unjust background circumstances, some practices that give rise to ethical sexual obligations can actually ameliorate some of the problems caused by such background conditions. Similarly, despite a surface appearance that sexual obligation and sexual autonomy are in tension, this need not be the case. By understanding how practices and conventions regulate the way such obligations can arise, this paper shows how supporting the possibility of sexual obligation can actually facilitate individual efforts to achieve sexual autonomy.     

Applying Virtue to Ethics

Virtue ethics is sometimes taken to be incapable of providing guidance for an individual's actions, as some other ethical theories do. I show how virtue ethics does provide guidance for action, and also meet the objection that, while it may account for what we ought to do, it cannot account for the force of duty and obligation.     

Should Faculty Members be Exempt From a Mandate to Receive Instructional Design Training Because of Their Rights Under Academic Freedom?

The quality of the educational experience for students may be at risk if they are not taught in ways that are effective and pertinent. While educational institutions (administrators, faculty senates or a combination) may try to compel faculty members to gain knowledge of and utilize up-to-date learning and instructional design strategies, these faculty members may baulk at this mandate, citing academic freedom as their right to design their courses in any way they see fit. Following is a discussion exploring the issue, suggesting that regardless of how academic freedom is interpreted, faculty members have an ethical obligation to deliver instruction in ways that do not violate students' rights to learn. Consequently, institutions have a right as well as a duty to compel their faculty members to follow through with this obligation.     

Ill-placed democracy: ethics consultations and the moral status of voting

As groups around the country begin to craft standards for clinical ethics consultations, one focus of that work is the proper procedure for conducting ethics consults. From a recent empirical look into the workings of ethics consult services (ECSs), one worrisome finding is that some ECSs rely on a committee vote when making a recommendation. This article examines the practice of voting and its moral standing as a procedural strategy for arriving at a clinical ethics recommendation. I focus here on the type of clinical ethics conflicts that are most likely to lead an ECS to vote, namely, conflicts involving ethical uncertainty--or, in the Greek, aporia. I argue that in cases of aporia, voting on an ethics conflict is not a morally justifiable procedure. Then on the same grounds that I use to show that voting is ethically problematic, I raise broader concerns about the common practice of making recommendations by other procedures. In contrast to the standard approach of adjudicating between moral claims, I argue that ECSs can best resolve aporetic conflict through the process of clinical ethics mediation.     

The Real Value of Fake Teams: An Ethical Defense of Fantasy Sports

ABSTRACT

In the only two articles on the topic of which I am aware, Chad Carlson and Scott Aikin have leveled three objections against fantasy sports—namely, that participation in fantasy sports elicits (1) a distortion of the virtue of loyalty, (2) an ethically problematic failure of understanding, either of morally valuable parts of games and/or of games as coherent wholes, and (3) a failure to respect the game in that participants desire to see play that is good for their fantasy team rather than play that makes for a good game. This paper defends fantasy sports against those objections. I argue that once the ethical values underlying objections (1) and (2) are identified and plausibly interpreted, we see that fantasy sports pose no threat to those values, but rather provide participants with an alternative, and in some cases superior, means of realizing the relevant values. Participation in fantasy sports is in unavoidable tension with the obligation at work in objection (3), but that obligation is so weak that its failure is easily compensated for by the realization of an ethical value that is central to fantasy sports, yet has been overlooked by both critics—namely, human flourishing in the form of the emotional and intellectual virtues which fantasy sports challenge participants to develop and display.     

THE MYSTIQUE OF MORAL DILEMMAS

The paper is concerned with the question of the existence of moral dilemmas, conceived of as situations involving a subject in a conflict of non‐overridden moral obligations. I reject some of the presuppositions underlying discussions of this question and argue that certain morally relevant choices cannot be evaluated in relation to an all‐things‐considered moral obligation as permissible or impermissible, right or wrong. In arguing for the inadequacy of our ordinary moral predicates for fully capturing the nature of such choices, I argue that they are, in certain respects, inexpressible.     

道德哲学建基在错误之上吗？

责任或义务是伦理学中最基本的概念。它是客观的、绝对自明的,因而是不可定义的、无需推理的。人们既不能从别的非伦理的事实或非伦理的属性中推出义务,也不能把它归约为任何其它伦理属性。以往的各种伦理理论的错误在于用一些其它伦理属性来规定责任,从而使其丧失了绝对客观的和自明的意义,其结果是使伦理学长期陷入困境之中。     

Data Sharing and Dual-Use Issues

The concept of dual-use encapsulates the potential for well-intentioned, beneficial scientific research to also be misused by a third party for malicious ends. The concept of dual-use challenges scientists to look beyond the immediate outcomes of their research and to develop an awareness of possible future (mis)uses of scientific research. Since 2001 much attention has been paid to the possible need to regulate the dual-use potential of the life sciences. Regulation initiatives fall under two broad categories—those that develop the ethical education of scientists and foster an awareness and responsibility of dual-use issues, and those which assess the regulation of information being generated by current research. Both types of initiatives are premised on a cautious, risk-adverse philosophy which advocates careful examination of all future endpoints of research endeavors. This caution advocated within initiatives such as pre-publication review of journal articles contrasts to the obligation to share underpinning data sharing discussions. As the dual-use debate has yet to make a significant impact on data sharing discussions (and vice versa) it is possible that these two areas of knowledge control may present areas of ethical conflict for scientists, and thus need to be more closely examined. This paper examines the tension between the obligation to share exemplified by data sharing principles and the concerns raised by the risk-cautious culture of the dual-use debates. The paper concludes by reflecting on the issues of responsibility as raised by dual-use as relating to data sharing, such as the chain of custody for shared data.     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

Disquiet in the consulting room: everything/nothing that is said here is confidential

Writing from experiences in the consulting room in private practice in Australia, the author refers to the layered complexity of a conflict of ethical duty which has legal and social implications. The paper explores how the ethics that are congruent with creating a safe vas bene claustrum can be diametrically opposed to the social and legal structures and processes on which we all rely. It is suggested that within the vas, analysts and analysands engage in a shared process of emotionally connected, layered, symbolic thinking. Subpoenas directed at analysts are seeking concrete evidence that will stand up in court. The paper argues that this is a category error based on ignorance and misconceptions of what analytic work entails. The intrusion of a subpoena into the vas has the potential to cause havoc in the mental health and the lives of already vulnerable, possibly traumatized and isolated individuals. It can undermine a fundamental human right and undermine the profession of psychotherapy as a whole. The paper proposes that analysts have an ethical obligation to protect the work contained within the vas from these category errors and to educate other professionals as to why we cannot provide the kind of evidence that the courts require.     

Ethical Challenges of Personal Disclosure in Gaining Entry with Religious Congregations

This is a story about learning how to navigate my social identities as a non‐religious gay man attempting to conduct data‐based consultation with a religious congregation. Beyond my own growth in knowing myself better, this story speaks to the larger ethical challenge of how we build trust in community relationships, and in particular how much of our personal selves we need to disclose in the process of an individual or group deciding to work with us. Individuals and groups make decisions to work with us based on who they perceive us to be; thus, what is our ethical obligation to disclose aspects of who we are to promote full informed consent? To illustrate this ethical challenge of personal disclosure, I tell the story of discussions I had with three different religious leaders and a congregational committee about potentially working together. Throughout these stories, I reflect on my own messy process of growth as a window into the more general question of how we navigate our identities and values as community psychologists in the work we do with communities.